1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 6, 1968, 8:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R. Top Secret; Cherokee; Eyes Only. Mr. President: I have now acquired copies of Sec. Rusk's communications with Thompson in the Cherokee channel. They are attached./2/ /2/None printed but summarized below. You may wish to go through them to see precisely where we stand. They include: Tab A--Sec. Rusk's message on time and place./3/ /3/Rusk said that Dobrynin should be informed that the administration wanted the summit meeting to take place in Geneva on or about December 16-17. (Telegram 279345 to Moscow, November 28) Tab B--Thompson's evaluation of what could and could not be achieved at the meeting. (His conclusion: mainly announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks.)/4/ /4/The first of this seven-paragraph message from Ambassador Thompson to Secretary Rusk reads as follows: "While appreciate President's desire to advance cause of peace before leaving office, I confess I am skeptical that much can be achieved at proposed meeting except announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks which I gather is already well prepared." (Telegram 6643 from Moscow, November 29) Tab C--Dobrynin's positive view with respect to Nixon's presence./5/ /5/Regarding Dobrynin's personal attitude toward a summit meeting with Nixon, Thompson reported in part: "He said he was much in favor whether before or after inauguration. I put this information in letter to Bob Murphy dated Nov. 19." (Telegram 6642 from Moscow, November 29) This letter has not been found. Tab D--Thompson's talk with Gromyko of 29 November--mainly positive, but with Gromyko "not in a position to comment" on December 16-17 in Geneva. (para. 4)/6/ /6/Telegram 6635 from Moscow, November 29. For a memorandum of Thompson's telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk, November 29, on this subject, see Document 294. Tab E--Sec. Rusk's instructions for Tommy to get with Dobrynin./7/ /7/Secretary Rusk wondered whether Gromyko's talk with Thompson (see footnote 6 above) was "supposed to be their answer to my conversation with Dobrynin" of November 25 (see Document 294, especially footnote 2), and he thus wanted Thompson to see Dobrynin "as soon as you can" to "try to get some feel from him as to Soviet thinking about a possible meeting now that he has been in town for a few days and may be able or willing to say somewhat more than did Gromyko." (Rusk to Thompson, December 4, typewritten draft of telegram) Tab F--Thompson's response of December 5 indicating that he has not yet been able to set up an appointment with Dobrynin./8/ /8/Thompson reported in part that Dobrynin had been "delayed in arriving here by weather and Foreign Office now states he has been ill." (Telegram 6728 from Moscow, December 5) Thompson apparently met with Dobrynin sometime between December 5-11. In a memorandum to President Johnson, December 11, 1968, Walt Rostow noted that Secretary Rusk had reported an additional cable from Thompson as follows: "I failed to report an additional observation of Dobrynin. He said that if the President decided not to go ahead with the meeting, that would be understood in Moscow and there would be no hard feelings." The President wrote at the bottom of this memorandum, "I'm ready. Are they?" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11) W.W. Rostow/9/ /9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
298. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)/1/ Washington, December 7, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. Dear Glenn: Thank you for your views regarding the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons./2/ We will be most interested in seeing the terms of reference and the results of the study which the AEC is undertaking of the ability of the U.S. to meet foreseeable requirements for fissionable material and tritium under conditions of a cutoff. /2/Document 290. The DOD is looking at this problem and has also requested that a review of the present U.S. position on cutoff and transfer proposals be made by the Committee of Principals. To this end, I have requested my staff to prepare an updated paper that sets forth the present U.S. position and our proposed modification of the verification aspects. In this connection, the intelligence community is preparing an evaluation of our ability to detect, by unilateral means, clandestine plants in the USSR which could produce significant additions to the existing Soviet stockpiles of fissionable material. I have delayed answering your letter of October 9, 1968, because I had hoped to have data from this evaluation which I could send on for your use. I will forward it to you, along with other material which we are assembling, at a later date. We will consider the range of alternative actions which you outlined in the last paragraph of your letter in reformulating our alternative proposal of a plant-by-plant "shutdown." Our draft will emphasize the efforts already taken by the AEC in cutting back on production. My staff representatives will coordinate with yours on this subject. Sincerely Bill
299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 11, 1968, 1:35 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was received at 1:40 p.m. Mr. President: I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool. The reasons are ample: --time is short; Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course. But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead./2/ /2/The President has circled the words "we shall regret more" and drawn an arrow to the margin where he wrote, "I agree." Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons. Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally./3/ /3/The President has also circled much of this sentence and drawn a line down to the same "I agree" referenced above. Walt
300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 24, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17. Top Secret. An attached December 24 memorandum from Adrian Fisher to Clifford notes that Secretary Rusk still believed "that the phrase 'equally' should be inserted in the second principle and will doubtless so indicate to the President when the matter is discussed today." SUBJECT I am enclosing a proposed Joint Statement of Agreed Objectives and Principles affecting the Limitation and Subsequent Reduction in Strategic Armaments./2/ It is based on the Soviet draft which we recently received but has been cast in the form of a Joint Statement and has been altered to the minimum extent necessary to meet the five points made in Secretary Clifford's memorandum concerning it./3/ The draft and this memorandum have been discussed with Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler. /2/Not attached; for text, see Document 301. /3/Document 288. Four of these five points have been met completely; one has been met in substance. This latter point is that the first and second principles in the Soviet draft phrase the scope of projected arrangements somewhat differently, the first indicating that they should deal with "offensive and defensive weapons systems" and the second indicating they should deal with "offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems." The point is made that the second principle would cover manned bombers but not bomber defenses and the suggestion is made that the second principle be dropped. This point is well taken but, consistent with the principle of minimum changes, it has been met by melding the two principles together and using the phrase "offensive and defensive weapons systems" throughout. You should be aware, however, that the phrase being eliminated, "offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems" was used in your July 1 statement as well as the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations on this subject. One point made in Secretary Clifford's memorandum and incorporated in the attached draft has implications of which you should be aware. This is the point that focuses on the fact that the third principle in the Soviet draft contains the statement that ". . . equal security should be assured for both sides." The point is made (which closely relates to the first point in the DOD memorandum) that the intent may be to provide for substantial adjustments in the strategic arms balance. The DOD memorandum takes the position that, in view of the fact that our forces are not symmetrical and that our security needs differ, we should eliminate the word "equal" on the grounds that it is tautological because the notion of security being "equal" is involved in the very concept of security itself. Perhaps a related reason for the DOD objection is a general objection to the word "equal" because of overtones of "equality" or "parity." Based on a conversation he has had with Ambassador Dobrynin, General Wheeler is concerned that the Soviets are attempting to use this principle in order to obtain agreement, in principle, on a non-obtainable symmetry (bomber for bomber, sub for sub, missile for missile, warhead for warhead)./4/ The "equal" has been eliminated in order to smoke them out to see if that is what they are up to. /4/Perhaps a reference to Wheeler's conversation with Dobrynin on August 5; see Document 265. In putting the language back up to the Soviets with the "equal" eliminated, we might be running a risk that the Soviets would reply by pointing out that paragraph 5 of the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, September 20, 1961, states that "all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage in the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." This might weaken somewhat the argument based on tautology or redundancy. But read in its entirety, the phrase "so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantage" is sufficiently comprehensive so that the Soviets might be trying to get something else with the concept of "equal security", and I am not at all sure that we should regard a 1961 formulation as controlling. The last paragraph on page three of the draft Joint Statement that containing agreement that special delegations should meet promptly to work out an agreement, has been put in brackets. This is to bring to your attention the concern that some have felt that it might be difficult to live up to such an agreement in light of the limited time available between now and January 20th, 1969. This is a matter on which I would, of course, defer to your judgment. Dean Rusk/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
301. Draft Paper/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen 13 Jan 1969." JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED OBJECTIVES AND The President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have exchanged views during the last few years on the question of restraining the strategic arms race. In the last few months of this exchange they took note of the action of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and of the XXIIId General Assembly of the United Nations urging the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic armaments at an early date. As a result of the exchange of views on this subject, the two sides have arrived at a conclusion on the desirability and feasibility of achieving a mutually acceptable understanding on this question. They have also arrived at a conclusion that the implementation of measures to restrain the strategic arms race would serve the interests of both countries as well as the interests of strengthening international security, and that this would also generate more favorable conditions for solving other major issues in the field of disarmament. It was agreed that there should be established basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in strategic armaments and that the general objectives of our two countries in this field should be formulated. Specifically, it was agreed that the two sides would be guided by the following general objectives: --To maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic armaments. --To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating Soviet and U.S. willingness to limit their strategic armaments. --To provide mutual assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. --To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. At the same time it was agreed that the task of limiting and subsequently reducing strategic armaments should be resolved in compliance with the following basic principles: (1) Giving due regard for the integral inter-connection of the two principal components of strategic armaments, i.e., offensive and defensive weapons systems, the limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out as a complex including both offensive and defensive weapons systems. (2) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantage and that security should be assured equally for both sides. It was agreed that [special delegations of]/2/ the two governments, guided by the above-mentioned objectives and principles, would promptly address themselves to [devising an agreement on] the concrete aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. /2/Regarding the brackets in this paragraph, which appear in the source text, see the last paragraph of Document 300./2/ It was also agreed that the two governments, along with the development of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, would study the question of taking steps to minimize the possible accidental appearance of conflict-fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments.
302. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ A-2804 New York, December 24, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack on December 21, and cleared by Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Officer. SUBJECT SUMMARY The adoption by the XXIII General Assembly (GA) of a moderate resolution (2456A) regarding the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNC)/2/ represents in our judgment a significant accomplishment for those who support the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This resolution incorporates the essential points of the U.S. position on NNC follow-up. It will not cause complications for the NPT, and in effect, constitutes an endorsement for the idea that the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states must work together rather than in opposition on nuclear problems. This GA session was also outstanding in demonstrating the virtually unanimous desire that the U.S. and USSR get on with strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), an absence of any serious or active pressure for further security assurances, and broad ignorance and distrust of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as evidenced particularly by the Mexican resolution (2456C) calling for a study by the UN Secretary General (SYG) on peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) serv-ices (see USUN 8583)./3/ End Summary. /2/Reference is to a four-part resolution (A-D) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1968. Parts B and D were approved unanimously with some abstentions; Part A was adopted by a vote of 103-7, with 5 abstentions; Part D was adopted 75-9, with 30 abstentions. Text of the resolution is in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 797-801. /3/Dated December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) PART I--NNC 1. Resume of Negotiations on the NNC Resolution. Early in the session, the Italian Delegation, strongly supported by Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan, took the initiative in organizing a prestigious group of UN delegations in order to formulate a GA resolution on the NNC which would establish a UN ad hoc committee to pursue NNC recommendations in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and security assurances. Other invitees were Mexico, Chile, Argentina, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Japan. Initial reactions suggested that the Italian effort would be difficult to stop, particularly since many delegations (including the Netherlands) were reluctant to oppose the Italian plan and thereby risk exclusion from whatever committee might be established. The Japanese had initially intended to suggest a resolution establishing a new committee to focus on assurance, but they were dissuaded by the US from pursuing this within the Italian group. The idea of a counter-resolution effort and the first draft of the counter resolution were developed by the US Delegation, which encouraged the Japanese and Netherlands Delegations to establish a counter-resolution group which ultimately also included Finland, Canada, Austria and Australia. At the same time, the US and USSR took an extremely stiff position in the First Committee against the creation of any new body. The efforts of the Italian Mission group then shifted to seeking an early meeting next year of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) (an existing body) to consider peaceful uses and security assurances. The counter-resolution group, which held most of its meetings at the Finnish Mission, advocated positions acceptable to the US, i.e., that no decision to convene a UNDC session should be taken before the XXIV GA and that there should be no revision of the UNDC's terms of reference explicitly to include peaceful uses. The group accepted virtually all of the recommendations of the US regarding the counter resolution and disagreed on only one point. Despite US opposition, the Finnish group maintained that it was essential in order to increase the chances of success for the counter resolution that it "endorse" rather than "note" the declaration adopted by the NNC in Geneva. During a series of lengthy meetings between the Italian and Finnish groups, the latter several times appeared on the verge of collapse but was propped up by frequent reminders that the Italian group would have clear sailing if no counter resolution survived. The crucial turning point came on December 3 when negotiations broke down between the two groups and the Finnish group tabled its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.450),/4/ thus gaining the tactical advantage of priority in the First Committee voting. Shortly thereafter the Italian group tabled its resolution (A/C.1/L.451). Further negotiations between the two groups resulted in a "compromise" resolution essentially the same as that of the Finnish group and, in general, in accordance with US desires./5/ /4/Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 761-762. /5/A/C.1/L.458, December 13, which became part A of Resolution 2456 (XXIII). The compromise resolution (2456A), inter alia, endorses the NNC declaration; takes note of the NNC resolutions; requests the Secretary General (SYG) to transmit the NNC results to the appropriate bodies; invites these bodies to report on action taken; requests the SYG to place on the agenda of the XXIV GA the question of implementation of the NNC results, including (a) the question of convening the UNDC in early 1970 to consider disarmament and the related question of security, and (b) international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The resolution also requests the SYG to appoint an experts group to prepare a report on the contribution of nuclear technology to the developing countries. 2. Relationship to the NPT. Throughout the session, the U.S. and USSR stressed that the establishment of a new body or a 1969 meeting of the UNDC would, as a practical matter, complicate and delay the acceptance and entry into force of the NPT. Although this argument was not welcomed by some of the prominent NPT abstainers, those who strongly support the Treaty, e.g., the Netherlands, Finland and Canada, shared our concern that the NPT could be prejudiced by procedural steps being pushed by the Italian group. (The Italians professed throughout that only their proposals could "save" the NPT by restoring the confidence of the non-nuclear- weapon states that the nuclear powers would in fact live up to their obligations under the NPT.) The conflict between the groups regarding the NPT was symbolized by the fact that the Italian Mission resolution was co-sponsored by five non-signers of the NPT (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Pakistan) and only one signer (Yugoslavia), a fact alluded to publicly in particularly heavy-handed fashion by the Byelorussian representative. In contrast, the Finnish Mission's resolution was co-sponsored by four NPT signatories (Austria, Canada, Finland, and the Netherlands), and only two non-signers (Australia and Japan). The effectiveness of the argument of the need to protect the NPT was finally demonstrated when Ambassador Shahi (Pakistan), an original member of the Italian groups, stated in his speech introducing the final compromise resolution: "Let me give the assurance, if any assurance is required, that there is no desire that the UN Disarmament Commission, if it is convened, should weaken the positive results which have been achieved in the field of disarmament by way of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other." 3. Failure of Efforts to Provoke Confrontation Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. When the session began, there was considerable talk, particularly among non-NPT signatories, about forcing a confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. Several non-nuclears insisted in the corridors that the nuclears would have no choice but to join a new ad hoc committee if one was formed. However, members of the Finnish Mission group, particularly the Japanese, insisted that the cooperation of the nuclear powers was essential to achieve any worthwhile results in the nuclear field. Throughout the lengthy negotiations between the two groups, the Finnish group often rejected proposals solely on the grounds they would be unacceptable to the nuclear powers, i.e., the U.S., since the USSR had by then taken a completely negative stance. The acceptance of the final compromise resolution, which most members knew the U.S. had helped develop, thus represents a recognition that the cooperation of the nuclear powers is essential to progress in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament. One of the most significant results of this session would appear to be a setback for, and possibly even the burial of, the idea that the non-nuclears can or should organize themselves as a political force, as some attempted at the NNC, for the purpose of confrontation with the nuclear powers. It is also significant that the stress on the need to protect the NPT, in the end, contributed to unifying, rather than dividing, the members of the UN who overwhelmingly supported the final compromise resolution. 4. Role of the United States. The United States effort was fundamentally assisted by our ability early in Committee deliberations to propose an attractive compromise position which we could then stand by. (The U.S. Delegation appreciates the efforts in Washington which resulted in timely and helpful instructions.) The U.S. Delegation's corridor activities were, unavoidably, conspicuously visible. Nevertheless, the members of the Finnish group appeared to welcome the frequency and frankness of their contacts with the U.S. Delegation. Although initially disagreements between the U.S. and a few other delegations, particularly the Italian, appeared fairly sharp, when the final compromise resolution was adopted, there were no appearances of resentment against the U.S. by the Italian group. Members of the Brazilian and Italian Delegations said they were satisfied with the final result. 5. Role of the Non-Nuclears. (a) Italy. The Italians invested considerable effort in promoting a new ad hoc body, as evidenced in part by the heavy reinforcement of their Delegation with senior officials from Rome and Geneva. Because the Italians pursued their aims in company with a number of other prestigious delegations, failure to achieve their main objective, the establishment of a new committee, did not stand out as a purely Italian failure (in contrast to the picture perceived by all in the Italian attempt to amend the Outer Space Treaty). (b) Pakistan. The Pakistanis made a strong effort to preserve their image as the promoters of the NNC. They volunteered to be the rapporteurs for the Italian Mission group and introduced the final NNC compromise resolution even though this resolution was largely the product of the Finnish group. (c) Brazil. Castro, though widely understood to be strongly sympathetic to the Italian group's efforts, did not permit himself to be identified as a leader of the group. His behavior contrasts sharply with what we understand was a heavy-handed performance by da Silveira at the NNC in Geneva. (d) Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs expressed discomfort at participating in the Italian Mission group with so many prominent non-signatories of the NPT. They hung on, however, in an effort to make some mark on the question of security assurances. (e) India. The Indian Delegation worked actively on both sides of the street. It remained in the Italian group, but allowed the impression to develop that it would welcome the success of the Finnish group's efforts, providing there was no mention of the NPT in the preamble of the Finnish resolution. (Members of the Finnish group felt considerable annoyance when, after deleting all references to the NPT, they did not wind up with Indian co-sponsorship for the final compromise resolution.) The initial Indian concern focused on Pakistan's role. India had considerable misgivings about the creation of any ad hoc committee since this would clearly give Pakistan a major role; but India was even more strongly determined to be on any committee that might be set up and therefore stayed with the Italian group until its failure was assured. A Pakistani delegate delivered himself of several pronouncements to others that India had again played its traditional game of deceit. (f) Mexico. Garcia Robles kept his eyes riveted throughout on objectives of primary concern to Mexico, i.e., the endorsement by the GA of the NNC resolution on the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and authorization for a SYG study on PNE services. Both of these ideas were initially embedded in the Italian Mission draft resolution. When it became apparent that the Italian resolution might not be the one finally adopted, Garcia Robles lost no time in launching separate initiatives to achieve his aims. Although he was successful, we heard a number of expressions of irritation at his performance. Garcia Robles' position appeared particularly strong because of his traditional hold on Latin American votes. Mexico's participation in the Italian group, along with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, gave the impression that the Latin Americans would vote as a bloc for any product of the Italian group. (g) The Netherlands. Eschauzier played an active and constructive role in the Finnish group, despite the fact that he clearly felt vulnerable to pressures from the Italians because of his Government's desire to maintain the cooperation of the Italian Government in various European projects. (h) Finland. Jakobson was a strong member of his group's negotiating team; he was unquestionably inhibited, however, by the fact that the USSR might not support (and in the event did not support) his group's compromise resolution. (i) Australia. The Australians (Shaw and Evans) played a vigorous and effective role in stiffening the spine of the Finnish group. We have the impression from several conversations that the Australian UN Delegation wished to turn in a helpful performance in order to compensate somewhat for Australia's failure so far to sign the NPT. (j) Japan. Ogiso played a key role, in very close contact with the U.S. Delegation, in developing the counter-resolution effort. This was a particularly ticklish task because the Japanese UN Mission, before Ogiso's arrival in New York, had accepted an invitation to participate in the effort of the Italian Mission group. (USUN believes it would be warranted, assuming Embassy Tokyo thinks it appropriate, for the Embassy to express to Ogiso, and perhaps also to his superiors, the U.S. Delegation's appreciation for the most constructive and skillful role played by the Japanese Delegation and particularly Ogiso.) 6. Role of the Developing Countries (LDC's). A curious feature of the struggle over the NNC resolution was that the LDC's, and particularly the Africans, remained almost totally on the sidelines while two groups of relatively advanced countries argued privately about formulation of their resolutions. Although a number of influential and responsible LDC's were courted, especially by the Finnish group, they refrained from active participation. An interesting insight was provided when Pinera (Chile), an activist within the Italian Mission group, was overheard to tell Kolo (Nigeria) that the Italian group was attempting to promote the interests of the LDC's. Kolo responded tartly that in fact the Italian group was telling the LDC's what ought to be good for them rather than actually obtaining their participation. Kolo's remark is less than fair, however, since both the Nigerian and Kenyan Delegations were initially invited to participate in the Italian Mission deliberations. The Kenyan Delegation never showed up and the Nigerian Delegation only appeared for the first few meetings. The Ethiopians were completely inactive. The great mass of LDC's were, in fact, content to accept in toto the results ironed out by the Italian and Finnish groups. We are virtually certain that the LDC's would have accepted any result achieved by the two groups. The LDC's disinterest probably was equally a mixture of their desire to avoid making a difficult choice and their feeling that the details of nuclear issues are much more remote from them than are many other matters with which they are preoccupied at the UN. 7. Role of the USSR. Although initially members of the Soviet Delegation appeared anxious to support the counter-resolution effort promoted by the U.S., Moscow apparently took an extremely negative and tough stance against any NNC resolution that gave stature to NNC results. Moreover, it eventually became clear that the Soviets, who had resorted to the transparent maneuver of directing Bulgaria and Hungary to introduce a negative resolution on the NNC results, had a strong interest in pursuing a resolution containing a formula that would exclude the FRG from participation in NNC implementation activities. (The Bulgarian resolution (A/C.1/L.452) requested the SYG to transmit NNC results "to the Governments of States Members of the UN, to the IAEA, to the specialized agencies concerned and to other international organizations concerned." The compromise resolution uses the formula "to the Governments of States Members of the UN and members of its specialized agencies and of the IAEA, and to the international bodies concerned.") This probably explains why the Hungarians, joined by the Soviets, felt compelled to insist on voting, which they lost, on the question of priority between their resolution and the final compromise resolution. When the session was concluded, the Soviets and their allies, who voted against the compromise resolution, were completely isolated. (The other nuclear powers, including specifically France, voted in favor of the compromise resolution.) The introduction of the Soviet-inspired resolution was tactically useful, however, in that it permitted the U.S. and others to argue that the Finnish Mission resolution was a genuine compromise between the extreme positions staked out by the Italian and the Bulgarian-Hungarian resolutions. PART II--SECURITY ASSURANCES 1. Absence of Pressure for Further Assurances. Despite the attention it received at the NNC, the issue of security assurances did not come to life at the XXIII GA. There was, of course, considerable grumbling that the security situation is far from satisfactory. However, we were not confronted by proposals of new formulas for positive assurances or for non-use of nuclear weapons, and virtually no interest at all was shown in introducing or adopting the FRG NNC resolution on the non-use of force. The desire to have the proposed ad hoc committee or the UNDC take up this question was pressed only by Yugoslavia and Brazil. Although at the outset of the session the Brazilian Foreign Minister had proposed a special conference on security, the Brazilian Delegation displayed no initiative whatever in pursuing this idea which thereafter was quietly buried. The security issue was reduced to a passing reference in the final compromise NNC resolution. 2. Effect of US Views. The US views on security assurances appear to have gained some ground. Although Pakistan has been a major supporter of further security assurances, Ambassador Shahi, in introducing the compromise NNC resolution, quoted favorably and at length from the assurances section of Foster's November 19 statement to the First Committee./6/ Lebanon did the same in urging Cyprus to withdraw its resolution (A/C.1/L.449). /6/Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 718-727. 3. Reasons for Less Interest in Assurances. There are several probable reasons for this lessened interest in assurances: (a) The Czech invasion demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not the only or necessarily the most relevant element of military power that can affect the security and independence of smaller states. (b) Many countries appreciate our point that the time is not propitious for further efforts with the Soviets towards additional assurances. (c) The Soviets did not pursue vigorously their non-use proposal, partly to avoid trouble for the NPT, partly to keep the Czech situation from being dragged into the disarmament debate, and partly to avoid the possibility of ending up with a GA resolution that would be some variant of the FRG NNC resolution on non-use of force. (d) The states traditionally concerned with assurances, such as Yugoslavia, appeared to be more interested in keeping this issue in front of the public than in coming up with new formulas or arrangements--thus the emphasis was on procedural initiatives such as handing the problem to an ad hoc committee or the UNDC. (e) There appears to be wider understanding of the fact that the assurances question is difficult and complex (and properly a matter for Security Council consideration) and that the principal nuclear powers have gone as far as they can in SC resolution 255/7/ and their parallel declarations. /7/Submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to the Eight-een-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 7, 1968 (ENDC/222), it was approved by the U.N. Security Council on June 19 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan). Text ibid., p. 444. (f) Many UN members appear to appreciate that greater security lies in a gradual strengthening of the UN and the achievement of further measures of disarmament and arms control. (A member of the Yugoslav Delegation readily conceded that a pledge not to use nuclear weapons would have had no relevance in deterring the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.) 4. Conclusion. It seems clear that SC resolution 255 has not put us on a "slippery slope" leading to greater demands for assurances. It is equally clear that we face no urgent pressure to alter our position on the assurances issue. PART III--SALT, USSR MEMORANDUM, GCD, CTB, 1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A matter on which there was virtual unanimity was the desirability of prompt initiation of US-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks. Speakers in the First Committee frequently referred to the urgency of holding such talks and pointed particularly to the obligations in Article VI of the NPT of the nuclear powers to proceed with disarmament negotiations. It was never in doubt that Pakistan's resolution (2456D), which urged bilateral talks at an early date, would be adopted without opposition (Cuba and France abstained). 2. Soviet Activities--USSR Memorandum and Foreign Bases Item. A noteworthy aspect of the disarmament debate was the decision by the Soviets not to push to a vote their resolution (A/C.1/L.443) on the USSR July 1 disarmament memorandum./8/ This memorandum, which lists Soviet disarmament proposals, was included as a separate GA agenda item at the request of Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Gromyko placed great emphasis on the Soviet memorandum in his speech to the General Assembly.)/9/ Although the memorandum was already before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the Soviet resolution requested that it be transmitted to the ENDC by the SYG. The Soviets withdrew this resolution after the US persuaded them and the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC to insert a preambular reference to the USSR memorandum in the omnibus resolution on GCD (2454B)./10/ /8/Regarding the Soviet Union's July 1 memorandum, see footnote 6, Document 252. /9/Gromyko's speech has not been further identified. /10/Parts A and B of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2454 (XXIII) on general and complete disarmament were adopted unanimously on December 20, with a few abstentions in each case. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 793-796. Similarly, the Soviets did not promote their old propaganda item on the elimination of foreign bases. Although listed as a separate agenda item, this subject received virtually no attention. It was disposed of by including a reference to the 1966 GA resolution on bases/11/ with other previous UN disarmament resolutions listed in the preamble of the GCD resolution. /11/Presumably a reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI), December 5, 1966, which called for an end to foreign bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Text ibid., 1966, p. 804. We made clear to the Soviets early that we would strongly oppose separate resolutions on either of these items. The lack of a greater Soviet effort to press them can be ascribed to their desire (a) to appear moderate and cooperative in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (b) to preserve for the benefit of NPT an atmosphere of US-USSR cooperation in disarmament, and (c) to avoid questions about the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Republic which might well have been stimulated by a debate on foreign bases. 3. General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). Led by Sweden, the non-aligned delegations demonstrated a renewed interest in a serious examination of major disarmament steps of the type included in plans for GCD. In fact, collateral measures were not mentioned in the non-aligned draft of the omnibus GCD resolution until we suggested that a reference to them be included. We anticipate that this interest in further work on major disarmament proposals will be registered at the ENDC. 4. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). The Swedes made an effort to sneak into the test ban resolution (2455)/12/ their concept that a comprehensive test ban should prohibit all nuclear explosions, including PNE tests. At the insistence of the US, however, the Swedes returned to the language of previous resolutions which refer solely to the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. The US Seismic Investigation Proposal received little comment although the British expressed their interest and support privately to the Soviet and several other delegations. /12/Text ibid., 1968, pp. 796-797. 5. Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW). The Soviet agreement to use the formula "chemical and bacteriological (biological)" throughout the terms of reference (TR) for the SYG's CBW effects study represents an advance in obtaining acceptance of the US position on this issue. This is particularly true in light of the precedent, to which we earlier expected the Soviets to cling, of the term "chemical and bacteriological" in the ENDC report that recommended the SYG study. The US Delegation encountered some difficulty in arriving at an acceptable resolution (2454A) on the CBW study due to the assertiveness of the Polish Delegation and a tendency on the part of the Canadians and British not to fight with the Poles about points that were of more interest to the US than to Canada and the UK. Moreover, a strong UK objection to the TR worked out by the US and Soviet Delegations, and accepted by the Canadian Delegation, almost wrecked US effort to provide the TR to the SYG. The UK Delegation continued to press its objection to the "bacteriological (biological)" formula with the Secretariat and the US Delegation even after the TR had been read to the First Committee and handed over to the Secretariat. The UK Delegation hopes this difference will not affect the CBW study, but the UK and Soviet experts may not be able to avoid a resumption of the dispute when drafting the CBW study report. 6. Arms Transfer Registration. The Danish arms transfer resolution (A/C.1/L.446)/13/ ran into trouble from the outset when the Soviets let it be known they opposed it. The Arabs and Indians were successful in convincing most LDC's that arms registration is an unworkable idea and could hurt their interests. Notwithstanding our expressed intention to support the resolution, our NATO allies, including Italy, Belgium and Turkey, were unenthusiastic about the Danish proposal and the resolution was eventually withdrawn. /13/Dated November 21; ibid. p. 728. PART IV--FUTURE PROSPECTS Although the post-NNC antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states gave way to an improved atmosphere at the conclusion of the XXIII GA, what happens in the future will depend on developments in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament. In both fields appearances are important, and so long as work on each appears to be progressing satisfactorily, the present climate can probably be maintained. (Our views on the need to improve the image of the IAEA were expressed in USUN 8583.) The atmosphere in the future will also depend on what is accomplished during the coming year in implementing the constructive proposals of the NNC and in demonstrating that the proposals the U.S. does not like have been carefully evaluated and proved impractical. Even if concrete results are not extensive, evidence of efforts by the U.S. to respond to the issues highlighted at the NNC and active participation by the U.S. in existing bodies will prevent charges that the U.S. is disinterested in problems of great importance to others. Buffum [end of document]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |