1. Decontrol upon receipt--sensitive but unclassified--protect accordingly.
2. Summary: The Embassy recently acquired an internal state Duma study of the START-2 treaty that recommends ratification certain important amendments (copy being faxed to EUR/RUS). The amendments are designed to correct what the authors see as imbalan ces in the treaty in favor of the United States. The report recommends that the Duma ratify the treaty while stressing the link between strategic weapons reduction and observance of the ABM treaty. It also recommends amending the treaty to:
Permit each side to keep Mirved ICBM's with four warheads or less, rather than banning Mirved ICBM's altogether;
Provide for the controlled liquidation of warheads removed from Mirved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of the process of meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry;
Require liquidation of old launch platforms and their replacement with platforms designed specifically to bear fewer warheads;
In order to reduce the cost of reconfiguring the land-based leg of Russia's deterrent, permit utilization of 154 launch silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead missiles;
Delete the requirement to fill with concrete such ICBM launch silos;
Permit redefinition of all 170 RS-18 missiles as single-warhead missiles;
Push back the implementation deadline for START-2 by 2-3 years.
3. The Duma study, written by the parliament's analytical center before the July START-2 hearings, strongly attacks U.S. plans to develop limited anti-missile defense systems. It states that, `In Reality, deployment of such a limited ABM system, coupled with radical cuts in strategic nuclear forces, is no less destabilizing a factor than constructing a full-scale ABM system. Since a limited ABM system requires establishing a full infrastructure (Information Systems, Communications, and Military Command), it can grow very quickly to a size at which a retaliatory strike by our strategic nuclear forces could be neutralized.' Thus, the report concludes, it is essential for the duma to lay down an unbreakable link between strategic force reductions a nd observance of the 1972 ABM treaty.
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4. Thus, the study recommends that, `When ratifying the START-2 treaty, the state duma of the Russian Federation should declare that the `exceptional circumstances' mentioned in paragraph 4, article VI of the treaty include as well circumstances arisin g in connection with one of the parties ceasing to observe the 1972 ABM treaty, or its substantial violation.' The report goes yet further, and also recommends that, `Attainment of a coordination and officially confirmed agreement on demarcation of strate gic and `nonstrategic' ABM systems should precede ratification of START-2.' The report states that such an agreement on the demarcation issue must include `precise quantitative limitations on deployment of `nonstrategic'ABM systems.
5. The report notes that the current text of the START-2 treaty calls for total elimination of MIRVed ICBM's. It calls this provision unacceptable, because it is contrary to Russia's National Security interests and favorable to the interests of the U.S . The study's authors note that 50 percent of Russia's strategic forces consist of land-based MIRVed ICBM's They recommend that the treaty be amended to ban only MIRVed ICM's with more than 4 warheads
6. The authors admit that the effective life of Russia's SS-18 and SS-24 missiles will run out in 10-15 years, and that production of more such missiles will be next to impossible, since the facilities for doing so are in Ukraine. Russia cannot today afford to build a comparable defense industrial infrastructure for producing new SS-18's and SS-24's on its own soil, they note. However, they call for developing a new, Mirved sea-based missile that could also be deployed on land. In the future, they believe, Russia will need to maintain a proper balance between Mirved and single-warhead ICBM's in both its strategic rocket forces and fleet.
7. The Dama study states that START-2 would permit the U.S. to maintain essentially intact a large number of launch platforms for nuclear weapons that, while formally speaking no longer used for nuclear purposes, could in a `Crisis Situation' be rapidl y refitted with nuclear warheads. The report charges that, under the treaty, `the U.S. would assure itself of a favorable regime for reducing nuclear weapons that would not require liquidation of the carriers of nuclear weaponry, except for 50 MX ICBMs an d part of its older B-52 heavy bombers.' Russia, on the other hand, would have to undertake an expensive reconfiguration of much of its strategic forces. It adds: `The START-2 Treaty allows the possibility of rapidly deploying the nuclear potential of the U.S. in all components of the Strategic Nuclear triad.'
8. The study asserts that the U.S. would quickly be able to redeploy previously removed nuclear warheads on still extant Minuteman-3 and Trident-2 missiles in a crisis. Similarly, nuclear weapons could be quickly reloaded onto B-LB bombers, since `START-2 does not require them to be refitted in order to be re-oriented toward non-nuclear tasks.' `After realization of START-2 the U.S. will have the possibility in a crisis situation of operationally increasing its nuclear potential by more than 4000 nuclear warheads. Russia cannot compensate such an increase.' Hence, the report's authors recommend amending the START-2 Treaty to require liquidation of warheads removed from M irved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of the process of meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry. They also call for altering START-2 to require liquidation of old launch platforms and their replacement with platforms designed specifically to bear fewer warhe ads.
9. The Study charges that START-2 essentially favors the U.S., permitting it to reduce its nuclear forces in the most economical way, while imposing an unacceptably high burden on Russia. It calls treaty provisions permitting Russia to re-fit 90 launch silos for heavy ICBM's and re-utilize them for single-warhead missiles insufficient. Its answer is to call for amending the treaty to permit Russia to re-use 154 launch silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead missiles, to delet e the requirement to fill with concrete such ICBM launch silos, and to permit redefinition of all 170 RS-18 missiles as single-warhead missiles.
10. Finally, the study's authors also call for delaying implementation of the START-2 treaty by 2-3 years. The report argues that, since the seven-year implementation period for START-1 will end in 2001, only one year will remain for completing impleme ntation of START-2. This is not enough time, and so, when ratifying START-2. This is not enough time, and so, when ratifying START-2, the Duma should `extend' the implementation period by 2-3 years, in order to avoid `significant financial and production difficulty.'
11. This study was prepared as a guide for Duma deputies by the Duma's Analytical Center, and thus reflects the views of the Duma's in-house defense and security analysts. While pro-ratification in principle, they are clearly eager to see changes in th e treaty that would substantially alter its character in ways that appear to be unacceptable from the standpoint of U.S. policy. In the first round of START hearings in July, deputies did not raise the kind of fundamental amendments addressed in this pape r, though they did stress the link between START-2 and the ABM Treaty. The upcoming second round of hearings will show whether many deputies agree with the views outlined in the START study, and, indeed, whether the Duma is willing to ratify START-2 in an y form before the December parliamentary elections.
12. The START study also indicates that Russian Government analysts are thinking carefully about how to restructure the country's nuclear deterrent to adapt to the Government's current straitened economic circumstances while maintaining the force's eff ectiveness. If this study is any indication, at least some analysts are envisaging a Russian deterrent that would still contain significant numbers of Mirved ICBM, both land-based and at sea--in contradiction of what START-2 calls for.
[from the Congressional Record, December 22, 1995]