The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, December 15, 1995.
Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
Democratic Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: I would like to convey my assessment of the conference on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (H.R. 1530). The bill in its current form continues to contain objectionable provisions that raise s erious constitutional issues and unduly restricts our ability to execute our national security and foreign policy responsibilities.
The bill would require deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system to defend the U.S. from a long-range missile threat which the Intelligence Community does not believe will ever materialize in the coming decade. By forcing an unwarranted and unnecessary NMD deployment decision now, the bill would needlessly incur tens of billions of dollars in missile defense costs and force the Department of Defense prematurely to lock into a specific technological option. In additio n, by directing that the NMD be `operationally effective' in defending all 50 states (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now writte n. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued Russian implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security.
The bill also imposes restrictions on the President's ability to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the national interest. The restrictions on funding to commence a contingency operation and the requirement to submit a supplemental re quest within a certain time period to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on the authority of the President. Moreover, by requiring a Presidential certification to assign U.S. Armed Forces under United Nations (UN) operational or tactical c ontrol, the bill infringes on the President's constitutional authority.
In addition, the Administration has serious concerns about the following: onerous certification requirements for the use of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as well as subcaps on specified activities and elimination of funding for the Def ense Enterprise Fund; restrictions on the Technology Reinvestment Program; restrictions on retirement of U.S. strategic delivery systems; restrictions on the Department of Defense's ability to execute disaster relief, demining, and military-to-military contact programs; directed procurement of specific ships at specific shipyards without a valid industrial base r ationale; restrictions on my ability to manage the Department of Defense effectively, including the abolition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
We will weigh heavily the actions of the Congress on these matters in advising the President whether to veto the Defense authorization bill that is ultimately presented to him. This letter outlines many, but not all of the concerns with the legislation . I continue to be willing to work with the Congress to develop an acceptable bill. In its current form, however, I would have no recourse but to recommend a veto.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
[from the Congressional Record, December 19, 1995]