I wish to thank the IIE and Fred Bergsten
for inviting me back again to address the 21st Century Council,
which brings together some of the best minds in Korea and the
U.S. As a forum of officials, executives and journalists, the
21st Century Council plays a unique and valuable role in
fostering informal communications between Korea and the
U.S.
The success of our policies on the North Korean
nuclear challenge has removed this topic from the daily media
headlines. But Korean issues are among my most important
responsibilities and continue to receive regular attention at the
highest levels in the U.S. Government. We are very conscious of
the importance of consistency and constancy for achieving our
policy objectives.
Long Term Goals
What are those
long term objectives on the Korean Peninsula? U.S. policy seeks
to achieve a durable peace and to facilitate progress by the
Korean people toward achieving national reunification. We look
forward to the day when all Koreans will enjoy peace, prosperity
and freedom as well as constructive relations with their
neighbors.
Our approach is founded on our rock solid
relationship with the Republic of Korea. Our ties were forged
in the crucible of war. They have been cemented by an alliance
that has endured for forty years. They have been nurtured by
long established patterns of close consultation and cooperation.
As Koreans have built an economic miracle, our bilateral trade
has expanded rapidly, reaching about $50 billion last year and
making Korea our fifth largest market. And as Koreans have
developed their own democratic institutions, a commitment to
shared values has strengthened the bonds between our two
peoples.
On these foundations, the United States stands
ready to support the Republic of Korea in meeting the challenges
of peace, reconciliation and reunification on the Korean
peninsula. It is our fundamental long standing principle that
the issues of peace and reunification must be resolved by the
Korean people themselves. North Korean proposals to pursue these
issues unilaterally with the United States have not and will not
be acceptable. The ROK has the lead; the U.S. will remain in a
supportive role. We consult closely and continuously on our
respective policies toward the North.
The humanitarian aid
issue which has received so much media attention recently is,
contrary to what some have written, a good example of allied
collaboration. Before deciding to extend $2 million of
humanitarian assistance, my colleagues and I conducted very close
consultations bilaterally with the ROK and trilaterally in
Honolulu with the ROK and Japan.
We explained that this
aid would respond to a real humanitarian need, keep the World
Food Program engaged in North Korea and demonstrate to North
Korea the benefits of permitting international organizations to
operate there. Seoul understood that we were considering only
modest humanitarian aid to flood victims, not massive aid to deal
with North Korea's overall food deficit. In the course of the
consultations, we adjusted our plans to make this point clear to
the Korean people. Consequently, the ROK announced that it had
no objection to our provision of emergency disaster relief
assistance through the World Food Program. Japan also expressed
support.
Internationally, the ROK is playing an
increasingly active and constructive role in the world community,
reflecting its stature as the world's twelfth largest economy.
This year, the ROK begins its first two year term as a member of
the UN Security Council. And this year, it hopes to conclude its
negotiations to become a member of the OECD. Seoul is also
exploring participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).
These developments mean that we and the ROK
increasingly work together on major international issues in
multilateral forums as well as bilaterally. It is gratifying to
note the extent to which our approaches are consistent and
mutually supportive.
The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward
the DPRK
In order to understand where we are today, it is
helpful to recall briefly the evolution of U.S. policy through
three administrations over the last eight years. Our approach
toward the DPRK began to evolve in 1988, when the Reagan
Administration undertook the so-called "Modest Initiative" to
open the window for limited contact.
The next step came
in January 1992, during a period of hopeful dialogue between
North and South Korea, roughly at the same time as the conclusion
of the North-South Basic Agreement, the North-South Joint
Denuclearization Declaration, and the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards
Agreement. The Bush Administration agreed to host the first ever
high-level meeting between U.S. and DPRK officials. While
useful, this did not lead to further high level official
contacts. The U.S.-DPRK dialogue quickly slipped back, with
contact limited to working-level exchanges between our embassies
in Beijing.
In early 1992, the North Korean nuclear issue
was becoming a focus of world attention as the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was denied access to nuclear waste
sites in North Korea. Suspicions grew that North Korea had
reprocessed enough plutonium for one or perhaps two nuclear
weapons. Then, the DPRK's March 1993 announcement that it would
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) spurred
determined American diplomatic efforts.
Following up the
UNSC's call for member states to do whatever they could to help
resolve the crisis, this Administration decided to engage the
DPRK once again at the political level, in talks led by
Ambassador Bob Gallucci and my Deputy, Tom Hubbard. After
protracted and difficult negotiations and the closest
consultations between the U.S., South Korea and Japan, we
fashioned the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21,
1994.
Working forward from this historical experience, the
U.S. will pursue relations with North Korea in a manner that
contributes to our longer term goals -- a durable peace on the
peninsula and eventual reunification. These goals would make a
major contribution to regional security in Northeast
Asia.
In dealing with North Korea, the U.S. will follow
three broad approaches:
-- The implementation of the
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework;
-- The reduction of tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, most importantly through substantive
North-South dialogue; and
-- The opening of increased
contacts with North Korea.
The Agreed Framework
A
year and a half ago, the world faced a dangerous situation in
which the North Korea nuclear program was on the verge of
producing enough plutonium for 5-6 nuclear bombs annually, the
UN was threatening sanctions against North Korea, and the specter
of conflict loomed over the Korean Peninsula. Today, all that
has changed. The Framework is a true success story.
For
over a year, the North Korean nuclear program has been frozen
under international surveillance, and the DPRK has not produced
any additional plutonium. When fully implemented, the Framework
will lead to the dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear program and
the threats it poses. These dramatic changes make the Agreed
Framework one of the most significant recent accomplishments in
American foreign policy.
We have made more progress than
many would have expected in implementing other aspects of the
Framework. The DPRK has accepted that the reactors, which the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will
supply, will be based on the South Korean model. KEDO was
established in March 1995 by the U.S., Korea and Japan. Last
December, KEDO and The DPRK signed an agreement on the supply of
these proliferation-resistant light water reactors. This supply
agreement has activated a DPRK obligation to allow the
International Atomic Energy Agency to resume ad hoc and routine
inspections of nuclear facilities not subject to the
freeze.
Preparations for the safe, interim storage of the
DPRK's spent nuclear fuel are well advanced. The process of
loading that fuel into safe storage canisters should begin soon,
with full DPRK cooperation.
KEDO is supplying North Korea
with heavy fuel oil as called for in the Framework. To ensure
that this oil is used for the intended purposes, the DPRK has
agreed to monitoring procedures proposed by the U.S.
KEDO
is gaining increasing international support. A dozen countries
have joined KEDO or indicated their intention to do so. Some
twenty countries have contributed financially or plan to do so.
Given the major contribution which KEDO is making to regional
stability and the global non-proliferation regime, broad support
by countries around the world, including in Europe and Asia, is
warranted and important. We have been intensively engaged, along
with our South Korean and Japanese partners, in lining up
additional international support.
KEDO is preparing for
its negotiations with the Korean Electric Power company (KEPCO),
the firm with which it plans to conclude the prime contract for
the LWR project. In addition, KEDO is opening new channels with
the North. Preparatory work on the LWR project has begun, and
four KEDO teams have visited North Korea to survey the proposed
reactor site. These teams have included participants from all
the three core members of KEDO, including many experts from the
ROK. This preparatory work is proceeding in a thoroughly
professional and cooperative manner.
One key aspect of the
Agreed Framework, however, is seriously lagging -- the North's
obligation to engage in dialogue with the ROK, a subject to which
I will return later.
The Reduction of Tensions
The
Agreed Framework has been so successful that some may overlook
that North Korea still poses a serious military threat and
foreign policy challenge. The world still faces the continued
confrontation between North and South, a closed DPRK society
isolated from the outside world, the massive, forward-deployed
DPRK military forces, and the DPRK missile, chemical and
biological weapons programs. The Korean peninsula remains the
most heavily armed real estate in the world
today.
Consequently, a key objective of U.S. policy toward
the peninsula must continue to be preserving security and peace.
The cornerstone of our efforts is our alliance with the Republic
of Korea. The 37,000 U.S. forces in Korea supporting this
alliance are part of the overall 100,000 troops the U.S.
maintains in the Asia-Pacific area. Our alliance is committed
both to continued vigilance and to exploring ways to reduce
tensions on the peninsula.
With the North Korean nuclear
program in check, we must continue to address the conventional
military threat. The Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 has
helped to maintain the peace for more than 40 years now; the U.S.
believes that all sides should abide by its terms until it can
be replaced by a new peace system.
Over the last few
years, the DPRK has engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine
the armistice. This threatens peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula. We urge the DPRK to restore military communications
in Panmunjom so that we can ensure that the armistice is
maintained. This is in Pyongyang's interest as well as that of
other interested parties.
The DPRK has repeatedly sought
to open direct bilateral talks with us to discuss a permanent
peace treaty. In solidarity with our ally, the ROK, we have
repeatedly rebuffed this approach. As the North-South Basic
Agreement of December 1991 stipulates, it is up to Koreans --
both North and South -- to create a stable peace on the Korean
peninsula.
The United States will support fully any joint
efforts by the North and South to create a new peace mechanism,
and is willing to play whatever role agreed upon by both the
North and the South. But the U.S. will not engage the DPRK
bilaterally, over the head of our South Korean allies. The ROK
must fully participate in any military-to-military
contacts.
These realities point up the fundamental
importance of improved North-South relations. In the Agreed
Framework the DPRK made a commitment to engage in North-South
dialogue. This commitment was so central that the U.S. would not
have concluded the Framework without it. North-South dialogue
is an essential aspect of the Agreed Framework and a prerequisite
for its full implementation.
We have repeatedly urged
Pyongyang to meet its commitment and begin direct governmental
dialogue with the ROK. Recently, Kim Yong Sun, the Secretary of
the Korean Workers Party Central Committee, made a major speech
in Pyongyang calling for 1996 to be a year of peace and national
unity. We hope this speech, despite some familiar rhetoric, is
a harbinger of a willingness by North Korea to have constructive
dialogue with the South, much as it did in the productive efforts
that produced the 1992 North-South Declarations.
Expanding
Contacts with the DPRK
Expanding contacts with North Korea
is an important means of reducing tensions and building a broader
basis for peace and security on the peninsula. In close concert
with our South Korean allies, we seek to engage the DPRK
bilaterally on a number of issues. One of the goals of the
Agreed Framework is to build a North Korean stake in responsible
behavior.
We encourage the DPRK to continue down the road
of greater openness to the outside world. We seek to demonstrate
to Pyongyang the benefits of acting in accordance with
international norms in areas such as missile proliferation and
terrorism. And we remain ready to cooperate with the DPRK on
humanitarian issues such as the return of the remains of US
soldiers.
To achieve these goals, it is important to open
up channels of communication with the DPRK, both governmental and
private. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, we are
prepared to exchange liaison offices when remaining technical
issues are resolved. In the non-governmental sphere, we
encourage cultural, academic and other people-to-people
exchanges. We have facilitated North Korean groups that have
visited the U.S. and welcome the visits of American groups to
North Korea.
We also believe it will be beneficial to all
parties for the DPRK to expand its economic ties so that its
people can share in the East Asian economic miracle. We took
initial steps a year ago to ease U.S. economic sanctions on the
DPRK. These steps, while modest, have led to a small, but still
significant increase in commercial contacts between the U.S. and
the DPRK.
For example, direct telecommunications services
have been established, U.S. companies have signed contracts to
import magnesite from the DPRK, and an unprecedented number of
licenses have been issued for American firms to provide
humanitarian goods to the DPRK. We welcome indications from
American firms of their interest in exploring discussions with
North Korea, within the context of U.S. law.
We are
committed gradually to normalize economic as well as political
relations with the DPRK as progress is made on the Agreed
Framework and other issues of concern to the U.S. There have
been recent steps forward -- particularly the signing of the LWR
supply agreement and progress on spent fuel canning. The timing
and extent of further sanctions reduction measures will in large
part depend on DPRK willingness to engage constructively on the
issues we care about, including missile proliferation, the return
of war remains, the reduction of tensions and, most importantly,
North-South dialogue.
Summation
On all of these
issues concerning the Korean peninsula, the U.S. will continue
to coordinate closely with the ROK as well as Japan. It is
essential that U.S.-DPRK and North-South relations proceed in
parallel. The U.S. will not get out in front of the
ROK.
Our pattern of consultations is intense and constant.
President Clinton has visited Seoul. President Kim has made two
visits to Washington. National Security Adviser Lake was in
Seoul this week. Deputy Secretary Talbott met with his
counterpart in December. Secretary Christopher, ROK Foreign
Minister Gong and former Japanese Foreign Minister Kono decided
last November to institute a series of high-level trilateral
consultations to coordinate policy toward North
Korea.
Together, we encourage greater North Korean
openness to the outside world, and engagement with the South.
I recently hosted the first such consultation in Honolulu. This
process reflects the determination of two close allies who enjoy
a deep and productive friendship. We will continue to work
closely with our allies as well as China, Russia and
others.
The Agreed Framework has been a great success in
dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. It serves regional
stability and global non-proliferation efforts. We will continue
to do everything necessary to ensure the Framework's smoothest
possible implementation.
At the same time, it encompasses
more than just the nuclear issue -- we plan to use it to promote
a broader approach toward our long term goals: a durable peace
and the eventual reunification that the Korean people seek.
These are issues on which Koreans will play the leading role.
As a friend and ally, the United States stands ready to
help.
Thank you.