35TH GENERAL CONFERRENCE OF THE IAEA, 09/16/1991, Speeches
- Basis Date:
- 19921013
- Committee:
- International Atomic Energy Vienna, Austria
- Docfile Number:
- S92AN216
- Hearing Date:
- 19910916
- DOE Lead Office:
- OS
- Hearing Subject:
- 35TH GENERAL CONFERRENCE OF THE IAEA
- Witness Name:
- J. Watkins
-
Hearing Text:
-
REMARKS
James De Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Secretary of Energy
to
The 35th General Conference of
the International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria
September 16, 1991
On behalf of President George Bush, I extend warmest greetings
and good wishes to His Excellency Dr. Santana, our Conference president,
to the distinguished representatives at the member nations here today, and to
General Hans Blix and the Secretariat.
Dr. Santana, let me begin by congratulating you on your election
as President of the Thirty-Fifth General Conference of the member
states of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My delegation will
work constructively with the officers of this Conference and the other
delegations.
Now I have the honor of delivering a special message to
this General Conference from President Bush.
For more than three decades, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has been in the forefront of international efforts to stem the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Since the end of the Gulf War, the IAEA has responded
resourcefully to unprecedented challenges in fulfilling its
responsibilities under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687
to inspect, sequester and destroy Iraqi nuclear weapon-related
capabilities, materials, and equipment. Agency efforts to date have
shown that international concerns about Saddam Hussein's nuclear
ambitions were well-founded. Indeed, for the first time ever the UN
Security Council found that a party had violated the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, based on the Agency's conclusion that Iraq
had breached its safeguards obligations. Continued
vigilance will be required for a long time to come if we are to prevent
resurrection of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
The case of Iraq has highlighted the need to strengthen the Agency's
safeguards system, and we hope the General Conference will advance this
objective. That strengthening must begin with efforts to ensure that
Agency safeguards are fully and promptly implemented. Success in these
efforts is particularly important in North Korea today.
At the same time that Saddam Hussein has challenged the global norm
against nuclear weapons proliferation, other nations have reinforced it.
The United States welcomes the accession of Tanzania, Zambia, and South
Africa to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the commitments
of France, the People's Republic of China, and Zimbabwe to accede to the
Treaty. We also look forward to the early conclusion of comprehensive
safeguards agreements with Argentina and Brazil, as well as the full entry
into force of the treaty of Tlatelolco in all of Latin America.
The dramatic events of the past year entail both challenges and
opportunities for our nonproliferation efforts. The challenges are
clear to all of us; the opportunities stem from the growing appreciation
the world over for the need to address these challenges with renewed vigor.
This will require building upon well-established foundations as well as
considering new and imaginative ways to confront the problem. The Agency
will continue to have a vital role to play in these efforts. On behalf of
the people of the United States, I wish the Agency success in doing so in
the years ahead.
(End Presidential Message)
President Santana, I would also like to give special recognition to
Dr. Blix and the entire staff of the Agency. They have done an extraordinary
job over the past months, including, as President Bush stated in his message,
implementing those parts of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687
that deal with the Iraqi nuclear program. We also applaud their determination
under the Council's Resolution 707.
***MISSING PAGE 2***
Agency inspectors have been called upon to function under.
conditions very different from normal safeguards inspections.
These conditions have been frustrating and sometimes even hazardous.
The inspectors have nevertheless shown courage and commitment in
refusing to be deflected from their purposes. On behalf of my
government, I thank each member of the Agency staff and each volunteer
from the various countries who participated directly and indirectly in
this effort for a job well done. I am proud that the United States
Department of Energy has been able to support this effort with
manpower, equipment, and technology.
Introduction: A Watershed Period
Mr. President, my fellow delegates: History records a few
pivotal events in every century. Certainly in our 20th century it
will mark the Bolshevik Revolution as one such event and World War II
as another. And I believe the past two years, since I last addressed
the IAEA General Conference in September 1989, will constitute a third
such watershed in our century.
Surely, no other similarly brief period in history's long march has
brought such rapid and breathtaking change. From the fall of the Berlin
Wall; the collapse of the Iron Curtain across Eastern and Central Europe;
and the failure of the August coup attempt in the Soviet Union itself; to
the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, to the concerted, rapid
response of the world community to block Iraqi aggression and assert the
rule of law; events since 1989 have opened opportunities, as never before,
to define the future in terms of personal freedom, political pluralism, market
economies, and international cooperation.
This Agency, too, stands at a watershed. Several governments
have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or announced their
decision to. do so, even as the Iraq situation has illustrated the need
for new safeguards approaches. At the same time, the post-communist
governments of Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Soviet Union
are grappling with problems of nuclear safety and putting new demands
on this Agency and its member states for technical assistance
and information. And in my own country, with the issuance of
our National Energy Strategy, we are laying the groundwork for a
revitalization of our civilian nuclear power industry.
I would like to consider with you briefly these major trends,
and the opportunities that they offer for this Agency and for the
international community to build a more stable and mutually supportive
world order.
Strengthening the Global Non-proliferation System
Let us begin with the progress being made in expanding and
strengthening the global non-proliferation system, in no small part
because of the steady efforts of this Agency. As President Bush's
message indicates, within the past year, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia
and Mozambique have all acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China
has taken this decision in principle. I believe these actions clearly
reflect an international determination that proliferation must be
halted. These new adherents confirm the continued vitality of the
Treaty. All this bodes well for further progress as we approach the
1995 NPT Extension Conference, at which time we hope the
Non-Proliferation Treaty's parties will agree to the indefinite
extension of the Treaty.
Another important milestone is the recent bilateral agreement to
control nuclear material between Argentina and Brazil, together with their
decisions to negotiate a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA,
mentioned by President Bush in his statement. These agreements will draw
the two largest nations in South America, both having major nuclear
programs, into the global non-proliferation system and assure the
Agency's deeper involvement in this rapidly developing and vital region.
South Asia is another of the world's regions where dangers of
nuclear proliferation need to be urgently addressed. An important first
step has already been taken in the agreement by India and Pakistan
not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. We would encourage the
concerned parties to expand upon this good beginning by developing
broader regional non-proliferation arrangements.
Another important effort to contain nuclear weapons-related
technology was begun in March of this year, when the members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to seek common export
control guidelines on dual-use commodities. International discussions
are now underway to develop a list of commodities to which these guidelines
would apply. The United States considers this to be an urgent and
important priority.
Looking ahead, the new arms control initiative for the Middle
East, announced by President Bush in May, could dramatically strengthen
the non-proliferation system. This initiative, supported by all of the
major suppliers of conventional arms to the region, builds on the IAEA
and other existing institutions to impede proliferation of nuclear
weapons in this critical region of the world. The President's
proposals:
- Call on regional states to implement, a verifiable ban on
the production or acquisition of weapons-useable materials;
- Reiterate our call on all states in the region to accede
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- Reiterate our call to place all nuclear facilities in the
region under Agency safeguards; and
- Continue to support the eventual creation of a nuclear
weapons free zone in the region.
Enhancing the Safeguards Regime
Whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, nuclear weapons
proliferation is a problem which potentially threatens the security of
all nations. Because of strong international consensus against such
proliferation, countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons have
unfortunately chosen to do so in secret and through all manner of
subterfuge.
We saw this problem in Iraq's clandestine approach to nuclear
weapons development and recognize its serious challenge to the Agency's
system of safeguards. We welcome proposals to enhance safeguards
against covert proliferation and will work with the IAEA in this vital
effort.
In seeking to strengthen safeguards, we must first acknowledge
that they can work only after a safeguards agreement has been
concluded with the country concerned. Therefore, we must insist that
these agreements be negotiated and implemented in a timely manner. In
particular, parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty share a common
responsibility to ensure that safeguards required by Article III of the
Treaty are put into place within time limits set by that Article.
Many parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have pressed North
Korea to honor its obligations under the Treaty. We welcome the fact
that a safeguards agreement with North Korea has now been approved by
the Board of Governors. This is but a step in a process which must move
forward. The agreement should be ratified and brought into force
without further delay. In addition, we urge all NPT parties who have
not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements as quickly as
possible. South Africa's prompt negotiation of its safeguards
agreement, following its accession to the non-proliferation treaty in
July, provides an example which should be widely emulated.
Second, we must apply the lessons form Iraq: in the future,
the IAEA must be permitted by states to make full use of its powers.
The standard safeguards agreement signed by parties to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty has long provided for special inspections of
undeclared facilities. States must now agree to allow the IAEA to
exercise its full authority. For the vast majority of states,
submitting to special inspection would reinforce confidence in
compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and strengthen
international peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Finally, this seems an especially appropriate time to
strengthen the IAEA safeguards inspection system to reinforce the
worldwide nuclear non-proliferation regime. President Bush's message
to you today declares his support for this action. Director General Blix
has stated his commitment to developing enhanced safeguards capabilities.
The system must be strengthened in ways that would help enable
the early detection of undeclared nuclear activities. I urge all
countries to endorse this action and to commit to work with Director
General Blix and the Board of Governors to implement it. I strongly
advocate that procedures for the conduct of special inspections be
adopted as soon as possible.
Promoting Arms Control
Turning to a related matter, I want to acknowledge the special
responsibilities of the nuclear weapons states for reducing
potential risks of nuclear war. A pivotal turning point came in Moscow
this July, when Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START). START is indeed a significant achievement,
the first-ever arms control agreement to actually reduce the number of
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each side. Once this Treaty is
ratified, its extensive verification provisions implemented, and
consideration of a further reduction in stockpiles is begun, the risk
of nuclear war between our countries will be significantly diminished.
START will, quite simply, make the world a safer place.
Further arms control measures in the European arena may also
be expected soon, particularly in the area of short range nuclear
systems. Contrary to some opinion, arms control does not lead to
changes in defense posture; rather, it follows changing security
perceptions, capturing them in formal agreements. As international
security relationships evolve in a global climate of increasing
openness and cooperation, further arms control measures may well be
possible.
In such a global climate, we anticipate that the
responsibilities of the United States Department of Energy for nuclear
weaponry would continue to shift toward closing nuclear production
facilities and dismantling weapons. The Department is now
beginning to address serious toxic and hazardous waste disposal
problems and environmental remediation needs at contaminated nuclear
sites. Resolving these problems will require time, money, and the
development of advanced technologies.
Last month we officially rededicated the first of our weapons
production facilities solely to an environmental restoration mission.
Mission changes will also come at other facilities. As we make progress
in developing realistic and environmentally sound solutions to nuclear
waste disposal and clear up problems, we will share our experiences and
technologies with the international community. Some may be useful in
implementing future arms reduction agreements. Others could be
broadly applicable in the next years as a substantial number of power
reactors throughout the world are decommissioned or refurbished.
Improving Nuclear Reactor Safety
Although safeguards and proliferation issues have dominated
the press and public consciousness over the past year,
nuclear reactor safety remains at the top of the international
agenda for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Safety must be of paramount
concern throughout the entire life cycle of a reactor, from design and
site selection through construction, operation, and decommissioning.
Identification of generic safety problems and information relating to
solutions should be widely shared. Here, the IAEA has played and must
continue to play a major role in facilitating the exchange of vital
information around the world community.
The emergence of personal freedom and political pluralism in
Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union are bringing increased
public awareness of nuclear reactor safety issues. The United States
welcomes this development and is working with others, both through the
IAEA and directly, to improve safety and operating practices at nuclear
reactors in these areas.
In this context, I would like to report that substantial
progress is now being made in the bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Initiative On Operational Safety. This joint initiative, which I first
proposed to the Soviets while here at the General Conference of the
IAEA two years ago, was established under the auspices of the
U.S./U.S.S.R. Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the
Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Its purpose is to share
information to improve operational safety practices and procedures
in nuclear facilities in both countries. Work to date has resulted in
recommendations from these three Expert Working Groups and specific
operational improvements already being put into place at a lead Soviet
plant.
The United States believes strongly that safety lessons learned
from such cooperation must be applied, where possible, to reactors now
operating or under construction in other countries. The safety of
individual power reactors anywhere in the world is an important concern
for all nations. But, because of their proximity, the reactors nearing
completion in Cuba are of special concern to my government. Cuba has
access to technical assistance from the IAEA, and we would urge the
Agency to use its best efforts to assure that these reactors are built,
and in future years operated, in a manner that meets internationally-
accepted nuclear safety standards.
Supporting the U.S.the U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Industry
Now, I would like to comment briefly on my country's
National Energy Strategy, issued by President Bush in February, and
its potential impact on the U.S. civilian nuclear power industry.
The National Energy Strategy is a comprehensive blueprint for
future U.S. energy security. The Strategy seeks to diversify U.S.
energy sources, encourage efficiency and conservation, remove
regulatory barriers and spur competition across energy sectors, and
promote greater investment and collaborative research in advanced
technologies. In its comprehensive, balanced approach to energy
supply and demand, the Strategy lays a foundation for reviving the
nuclear energy option in the United States.
Electricity is expected to increase its share of U.S. primary
energy consumption significantly over the next 40 years, from 36
percent of consumption today, to 40 percent by 2010 and 46 percent by
2030. Based on expectations for growth in the U.S. Gross National
product and other economic indicators, the Strategy projects that the
United States will need about 200,000 megawats of additional generating
capacity by the year 2010.
Consistent with this analysis and with present and future
environmental requirements, the Strategy envisions that new reactor
designs will be certified and available to meet the needs of U.S. power
producers by 1995, with the objective of having a new plant come on
line by the year 2000. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation
to authorize a one-step licensing process for such plants. Under this
streamlined process, a utility would apply for a Joint construction and
operating license, and would address and resolve all legitimate safety
issues prior to a major investment of project capital.
The National Energy Strategy also addresses the issue of plant license
renewal, essential to the continued vitality of nuclear generation in
the United States. Licenses at roughly one-third of existing nuclear
plants are due to expire between the years 2000 and 2010. Because we
believe the operating lives of most of these plants can be extended safely
and economically, the Department of Energy is now co-funding with industry
a demonstration of the license renewal process for two operating
plants. We expect the first completed renewal application to be
submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by early next year,
and to receive their ruling by 1994.
A third issue essential in maintaining the U.S. civilian nuclear power
industry is achievement of some measurable level of progress by 1995 in
nuclear waste management. This applies to progress both in characterizing
Yucca Mountain, in the state of Nevada, as a candidate waste repository
site and in selecting a site for a monitored retrievable storage facility
which could be opened by 1998. The National Energy Strategy proposes
legislation to aid progress in these areas.
Conclusion
In concluding, let me return to my opening theme of an
international community facing pivotal change and enormous opportunity.
We stand at a moment in history when the confluence of events gives us
unparalleled opportunity to chart a new course for a new century.
That course must be grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of
law. That course must be sustained by a truly united international community
working effectively through bilateral arrangements and international
agencies like the United Nations and the IAEA.
None of us knows precisely what the future holds, but we do know our
committed efforts today will shape tomorrow's world. Let us keep this
clearly in mind - and let us all understand that this Agency's two
primary missions - - to prevent nuclear proliferation and to provide
technical assistance in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy -- can only become more important in future years.
The IAEA faces a myriad of challenges, but captured in
each is the far larger and more important opportunity to help chart the
course of the 21st century as a time of international stability and
cooperation -- and perhaps ultimately, as a time when nuclear
technology will be used solely and exclusively for the health and
betterment of all people in a safe, secure world. I am fully confident
that the IAEA, under the able leadership of Director General Blix, and
with its talented and dedicated staff, will seize this opportunity.
Thank you Mr. President.