The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
_________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release September 27, 1993
Fact Sheet
Nonproliferation And Export Control Policy
The President today established a framework for U.S. efforts
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and the missiles that deliver them. He outlined three major
principles to guide our nonproliferation and export control
policy:
-- Our national security requires us to accord higher
priority to nonproliferation, and to make it an
integral element of our relations with other countries.
-- To strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization
abroad and international stability, we actively seek
expanded trade and technology exchange with nations,
including former adversaries, that abide by global
nonproliferation norms.
-- We need to build a new consensus -- embracing the
Executive and Legislative branches, industry and
public, and friends abroad -- to promote effective
nonproliferation efforts and integrate our
nonproliferation and economic goals.
The President reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong, effective
nonproliferation regime that enjoys broad multilateral support
and employs all of the means at our disposal to advance our
objectives.
Key elements of the policy follow.
Fissile Material
The U.S. will undertake a comprehensive approach to the
growing accumulation of fissile material from dismantled
nuclear weapons and within civil nuclear programs. Under this
approach, the U.S. will:
-- Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation
of stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium or
plutonium, and to ensure that where these materials
already exist they are subject to the highest
standards of safety, security, and international
accountability.
-- Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the
production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium
for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of
international safeguards.
-- Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to
constrain fissile material production in regions of
instability and high proliferation risk.
-- Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for
our deterrent to inspection by the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
-- Pursue the purchase of highly-enriched uranium from the
former Soviet Union and other countries and its
conversion to peaceful use as reactor fuel.
-- Explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium
from civil nuclear programs, and seek to minimize the
civil use of highly-enriched uranium.
-- Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options
for plutonium disposition, taking into account
technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary
and economic considerations. Russia and other nations
with relevant interests and experience will be invited
to participate in this study.
The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium
and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive
purposes. The United States, however, will maintain its existing
commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear
programs in Western Europe and Japan.
Export Controls
To be truly effective, export controls should be applied
uniformly by all suppliers. The United States will harmonize
domestic and multilateral controls to the greatest extent
possible. At the same time, the need to lead the International
policy interests may justify unilateral export controls in
specific cases. We will review our unilateral dual-use export
controls and policies, and eliminate them unless such controls
are essential to national security and foreign policy interests.
We will streamline the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation
export controls. Our system must be more responsive and
efficient, and not inhibit legitimate exports that play a key
role in American economic strength while preventing exports that
would make a material contribution to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.
Nuclear Proliferation
The U.S. will make every effort to secure the indefinite
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. We will seek
to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the
resources needed to implement its vital safeguards
responsibilities, and will work to strengthen the Iaea's ability
to detect clandestine nuclear activities.
Missile Proliferation
We will maintain our strong support for the Missile Technology
Control Regime. We will promote the principles of the Mtcr
Guidelines as a global missile nonproliferation norm and seek to
use the Mtcr as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat
missile proliferation. We will support prudent expansion of the
Mtcr's membership to include additional countries that subscribe
to international nonproliferation standards, enforce effective
export controls and abandon offensive ballistic missile programs.
The United States will also promote regional efforts to reduce
the demand for missile capabilities.
The United States will continue to oppose missile programs of
proliferation concern, and will exercise particular restraint in
missile-related cooperation. We will continue to retain a strong
presumption of denial against exports to any country of complete
space launch vehicles or major components.
The United States will not support the development or acquisition
of space-launch vehicles in countries outside the Mtcr.
For Mtcr member countries, we will not encourage new space launch
vehicle programs, which raise questions on both nonproliferation
and economic viability grounds. The United States will, however,
consider exports of Mtcr-controlled items to Mtcr member
countries for peaceful space launch programs on a case-by-case
basis. We will review whether additional constraints or
safeguards could reduce the risk of misuse of space launch
technology. We will seek adoption by all Mtcr partners of
policies as vigilant as our own.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
To help deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, we
will promote new measures to provide increased transparency of
activities and facilities that could have biological weapons
applications. We call on all nations -- including our own -- to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention quickly so that it may
enter into force by January 13, 1995. We will work with others
to support the international Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons created by the Convention.
Regional Nonproliferation Initiatives
Nonproliferation will receive greater priority in our diplomacy,
and will be taken into account in our relations with countries
around the world. We will make special efforts to address the
proliferation threat in regions of tension such as the Korean
peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia, including efforts to
address the underlying motivations for weapons acquisition and to
promote regional confidence-building steps.
In Korea, our goal remains a non-nuclear peninsula. We will make
every effort to secure North Korea's full compliance with its
nonproliferation commitments and effective implementation of the
North -South denuclearization agreement.
In parallel with our efforts to obtain a secure, just, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, we will promote dialogue and
confidence-building steps to create the basis for a Middle East
free of weapons of mass destruction. In the Persian Gulf, we
will work with other suppliers to contain Iran's nuclear,
missile, and Cbw ambitions, while preventing reconstruction of
Iraq's activities in these areas. In South Asia, we will
encourage India and Pakistan to proceed with multilateral
discussions of nonproliferation and security issues, with the
goal of capping and eventually rolling back their nuclear and
missile capabilities.
In developing our overall approach to Latin America and South
Africa, we will take account of the significant nonproliferation
progress made in these regions in recent years. We will
intensify efforts to ensure that the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and China do not contribute to the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles.
Military Planning and Doctrine
We will give proliferation a higher profile in our intelligence
collection and analysis and defense planning, and ensure that our
own force structure and military planning address the potential
threat from weapons of mass destruction and missiles around the
world.
Conventional Arms Transfers
We will actively seek greater transparency in the area of
conventional arms transfers and promote regional confidence-
building measures to encourage restraint on such transfers to
regions of instability. The U.S. will undertake a comprehensive
review of conventional arms transfer policy, taking into account
national security, arms control, trade, budgetary and economic
competitiveness considerations.
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