7.1 The Integrated Response to Countering Proliferation

Progress in Addressing the Counterproliferation ACEs. Table 7.1 summarizes the integrated programmatic response of DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence in addressing the counterproliferation ACEs. Key programs strongly related to countering proliferation are matched to the ACE priorities they address. As illustrated in Table 7.1, considerable RDT&E and procurement activities are underway in each ACE priority area by multiple DoD Agencies (including through the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and Counterproliferation Support Program (CPSP)), the Services, and DOE.

7.2 Findings and Recommendations

The CPRC finds, as evidenced by the numerous accomplishments cited in this report, that the seriousness of the WMD proliferation threat and the need to enhance capabilities to counter it are recognized throughout the DoD, the Joint Staff (including the Services and the CINCs), the DOE, and U.S. Intelligence. Indeed, "countering proliferation" has now become an established and institutionalized priority within each of the CPRC-represented Departments. These efforts reflect the President's firm commitment to stemming the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Much has been done, but much remains to do. And as the decision makers, policy makers, and warfighters continue to reprioritize their nonproliferation and counterproliferation needs, the CPRC will continue to review counterproliferation-related DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence acquisition programs to ensure that these programs continue to meet their evolving needs. The CPRC's recommendations for 1996 are summarized in Figure 7.1 and discussed below.

Just as last year, the FY 1997 President's budget submitted to Congress in March 1996 addresses priority programs for countering proliferation. Therefore, the CPRC recommends that the FY 1997 President's budget for each of the CPRC-represented Departments be authorized and appropriated by the Congress.

Countering proliferation is a challenge that will have to be addressed for the foreseeable future. Although the programs proposed in the FY 1997 budget will continue to produce substantial progress in U.S. capabilities to address WMD proliferation threats, areas of capability shortfall will remain after FY 1997. Therefore, it is the intention of the CPRC to continue the CPRC program review process beyond its congressionally mandated 1996 term. The CPRC will continue to review FY 1998 and out-year programs and programmatic options associated with countering proliferation and recommend modifications, deletions, or additions to DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence activities and programs as appropriate.

In light of the CPRC's finding that the need to enhance our national capabilities to counter proliferation has become established and institutionalized within the DoD, DOE, U.S. Intelligence, and the Joint Staff, the CPRC has not identified specific programmatic options this year for FY 1998. The CPRC expects the normal budget development processes of each CPRC-represented Department to be adequate to ensure a robust, integrated program for countering proliferation. Therefore, the CPRC directs each represented Department to continue to address nonproliferation and counterproliferation needs and requirements as a high priority item in their FY 1998 budget development processes.

The CPRC recommends a continuation of the close coordination of counterproliferation-related RDT&E and procurement programs and activities among the DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence. To this end, the CPRC directs the ATSD(NCB), through his Deputy for Counterproliferation and his Deputy for Chemical/Biological Matters and consistent with their management oversight role for DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative, to continue their active participation in the review of DoD budget submissions to ensure the DoD budget fulfills the recommendations of the CPRC. Furthermore, the CPRC recommends that DoD's ATSD(NCB) continues to work closely with DOE's Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and with U.S. Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center to maintain the interdepartmental coordination in RDT&E, acquisition, and management oversight activities that has characterized their integrated response to meeting ACE priorities to date.

In order to better access and utilize DOE's extensive core competencies and more efficiently leverage the existing technical expertise of the DOE laboratories in the chemical and biological sciences, the CPRC recommends that DOE, DoD, and U.S. Intelligence establish a joint R&D initiative in CW/BW Defense. This joint R&D activity will serve to expedite the development and rapid fielding of advanced capabilities for CW/BW defense. Under the auspices of the CPRC, a joint DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence management oversight committee will be established to coordinate and identify DoD and U.S. Intelligence technology requirements that might be addressed by the DOE laboratories. Through this oversight committee, DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security will be able to make available the full range of DOE R&D capabilities to the CW/BW defense user community, in particular, DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, DoD's Counterproliferation Support Program, and appropriate organizations within U.S. Intelligence (see Section 5.3). A joint long term R&D plan for CW/BW nonproliferation and defense will be developed for interdepartmental review through the CPRC to implement this recommendation.

Recognizing the global nature of WMD proliferation threats, the CPRC recommends expanding international cooperative efforts to counter these threats by expanding existing joint activities in R&D, proliferation prevention, and counterterrorism being conducted by DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence. To expedite and more efficiently and effectively meet the challenges posed by this global problem, the CPRC further encourages and endorses cooperation with our international partners through conferences and joint programs.

In light of the ongoing reviews of CINC requirements and national counterterrorism capabilities, the CPRC will review the counterproliferation ACEs in October 1996 and reprioritize them as required based on the outcome of these reviews. The CPRC will be particularly cognizant of the results of the ongoing counterproliferation mission analyses and operational planning exercise workshops being conducted with each of the geographic CINCs (See Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4.). Lastly, in view of the growing recognition of WMD terrorism as a significant national security threat, the CPRC believes that the current ACE priority 13, "Defend Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats", should be elevated in priority in the revised ACE priority list. This reprioritization will ensure that the counterproliferation ACEs continue to reflect the integration of CINC warfighting priorities and the overarching national security objectives they support. This ACE reprioritization will serve to improve the focus of future programmatic and managerial efforts to counter the threat of WMD proliferation.

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