5. DoD Counterproliferation Programs

To achieve these counterproliferation policy objectives, U. S. forces must possess a broad spectrum of capabilities. R& D and acquisition programs and other DoD activities designed to bring these capabilities to fruition are described in Sections 5.2 through 5.8 below and in Section 8.

5.1.1 DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative.

Activities of the CP Council. To ensure that DoD's broad counterproliferation policy objectives are met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, DoD's Counterproliferation Council (i. e., the "CP Council") was established by the Secretary of Defense in April 1996. The CP Council is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and composed of the USD( A& T), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chiefs of the Military Services, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD( ISP)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD( C3I)), the ATSD( NCB), and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff. Through the complementary themes of "institutionalizing" and "internationalizing," the CP Council monitors departmental progress in developing the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to execute counterproliferation objectives effectively. It also monitors DoD- wide efforts at training, exercising, and equipping U. S. forces for the counterproliferation mission, as well as overseeing DoD counterproliferation activities in interagency and international fora.

The CP Council meets on a regular basis, focusing on the potential impact of NBC/ M proliferation on the Department's ability to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies, as well as on Joint and individual Service doctrine, training, and exercising for integrated operations in an NBC environment. In this connection, the CP Council identified the importance of understanding the likely NBC employment concepts of proliferants, and took steps to ensure that focused intelligence assessments would be used to develop U. S. regional military plans (as well as doctrine and exercise policies) to counter them. The CP Council will continue to address specific issues within the broad areas of adversary use concepts, counterproliferation doctrine, training and exercising, and related issues.

5.1.2 CINC Counterproliferation Priorities and Planning Activities.

Because the challenges of counterproliferation involve new policy considerations, the Missions and Functions Study was a special effort chartered by the Secretary of Defense and aimed at facilitating future DoD counterproliferation planning. The study was a combined effort by the Joint Staff, Services, CINC representatives, and OSD. Its key findings were: i) each geographic CINC would be responsible for executing U. S. counterproliferation policy within his area of responsibility (AOR); and ii) implementation of counterproliferation policy within each AOR would be executed via each CINC's standard deliberate planning process. This planning process included the development of the overarching CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN, prior to each CINC developing an AOR- specific counterproliferation CONPLAN.

The findings of the Missions and Functions Study were approved by the Secretary of Defense in May 1995, and he further directed that a Counterproliferation Charter be written prior to the development of the CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN. The Counterproliferation Charter was developed as a supplement to the top- level guidance documents delineated above, providing more of a military focus with respect to the counterproliferation mission. The Counterproliferation Charter has been approved by the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN further defines national level counterproliferation policy and guidance in terms of three national counterproliferation operational objectives and six counterproliferation operational tasks. These national counterproliferation operational objectives and tasks evolved from an in- depth analysis of the intentions of multiple top-level U. S. policy documents relevant to the counterproliferation mission. The ensuing objectives and tasks have been fully coordinated throughout the Commands and within OSD. These counterproliferation operational objectives and tasks will guide the CINCs through the development of their AOR- specific CONPLANs. The CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN was coordinated in the Joint Staff and was then given to the CINCs so that they could initiate their own AOR- specific counterproliferation planning. The reader is referred to the Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN for additional details.

The CINCs' Counterproliferation Required Capabilities. The current CINCs' listing of 16 counterproliferation required capabilities, considered necessary to conduct the counterproliferation mission from a military warfighting perspective, was developed by the Joint Staff's Deterrence/ Counterproliferation JWCA team, approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and endorsed by the CINCs in 1996. The prioritized list evolved from a series of Operational Planning Workshops (OPWs) with each of the CINCs. The workshops reviewed national objectives which support the U. S. national goal of countering proliferation. Deterrence/ Counterproliferation operational tasks and required military capabilities were identified, validated, and prioritized from the CINC perspective of supporting the CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN. The CINCs generally put the highest priority on those areas where the most leverage could be exercised for getting enhanced capabilities out to the field quickly. Table 5.1 lists the CINCs' required counterproliferation capabilities. It also illustrates the evolution of the current required capabilities from the CINCs' original counterproliferation priorities established by the Deterrence/ Counterproliferation JWCA and approved by the JROC in 1994 (and reaffirmed annually). This evolution reflects the CINCs' need for improved capabilities and technologies to support timely counterproliferation- related intelligence, conventional counterforce response with minimal collateral effects, and the activities of SOF in countering paramilitary and terrorist threats. The CINCs' counterproliferation required capabilities were reviewed by the CPRC and served as a basis for the review and revision of the counterproliferation ACEs. In general, the top priority ACEs track the top priority CINC- required counterproliferation capabilities. There are, however, some differences owing to the broader perspective of the interdepartmental CPRC and because the CPRC ACEs focus on capability shortfalls whereas the CINCs focus on capability requirements. This comparison is also summarized in Table 5.1.

5.1.3 Key Counterproliferation Studies and Analyses.

The 1996 DoD Counterproliferation Study. Last year, during the FY 1997 - 2001 DoD budget review, a detailed assessment of all counterproliferation- related programs was conducted. The assessment addressed programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts, CINC requirements, and management alternatives. The goal of the Counterproliferation Study was to provide senior DoD leadership with quantitative estimates of returns on counterproliferation investments over the FY 1998 - 2003 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) in support of this assessment. The study was conducted under the auspices of OSD's Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA& E), with participation by ATSD( NCB) 's Deputy for Counterproliferation (DATSD( NCB)( CP)), ASD( SO/ LIC), ASD( ISP), ASD( Strategy and Requirements), the Services, Joint Staff, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was completed in the summer of 1996.

The study reviewed R& D and acquisition programs strongly related to counterproliferation to identify applicable U. S. capabilities and technologies and employed validated NBC/ M threats and conflict scenarios. These building blocks, together with the CINCs' updated counterproliferation required capabilities, led to the formulation of programmatic alternatives. To meet study time lines, the study did not employ full- scale military campaign models, but, instead, employed simpler models, results from previous authoritative studies, reasonable interpolations and extrapolations of their results, and expert judgment to perform first order cost- benefit analyses of NBC passive defense programs. Synergies between NBC passive defense, ballistic missile active defense, and NBC/ M counterforce operations were also identified. Three scenarios involving NBC/ M were addressed: i) a Major Regional Contingency in North- East Asia; ii) conventional counterforce operations against a rogue nation's NBC/ M infrastructure; and iii) terrorist attacks using CW/ BW, with and without prior warning.

Major Regional Contingency. This scenario, an extrapolation of BMDO's "Capstone" Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment (COEA), involves an intense conflict initiated by the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK) against the Republic of (South) Korea (ROK) and its U. S. allies. Four tractable NBC/ M- related "vignettes" were defined to capture the essential features of the conflict and illuminate counterproliferation- related programmatic options. One vignette deals with the capability of U. S. ground forces to prevail against CW- armed rocket and standoff BW attacks. Two other vignettes focus on U. S. capabilities to sustain air base and seaport operations in the face of CW- armed theater ballistic missile attacks and BW attacks by covert DPRK infiltrators. The fourth vignette addresses collateral effects on civilians arising from DPRK NBC attacks on nearby ROK military targets.

The interplay among active defense, counterforce operations, and passive defense strongly influences achievable air base sortie rates and the operational status of port facilities. Early in the conflict, an effective active defense helps establish air superiority by reducing the ballistic missile delivered CW threat to air bases, thereby enabling high sustained sortie rates. Air superiority is a key prerequisite for successful counterforce operations against mobile rocket and missile launchers, and attrition of these launchers further reduces CW threats to both air bases and port facilities. This attrition also places less stress on stocks of passive defense materiel for individual and collective protection, decontamination, and medical treatment. The synergistic roles of active defense, counterforce operations, and passive defense in "thinning the threat" is depicted in Figure 5.1. Timely detection and early warning of CW/ BW agents greatly reduces U. S. casualties by allowing military personnel to quickly don individual protective gear. Modern NBC protective equipment greatly improves the effectiveness of U. S. forces and their ability to sustain high aircraft sortie rates. To maintain nominal port operations, passive defense measures must also be available to those essential civilian workers primarily responsible for unloading and transporting cargo. Moreover, it must be noted that NBC attacks, particularly BW attacks, could have devastating collateral effects on nearby population centers, and that, consequently, the host nation (possibly assisted by the U. S.), should plan for timely detection, early warning, and protection measures for its civilian population.

U. S. Strike Against a Rogue Nation's NBC/ M Infrastructure. The capability to destroy or disrupt an adversary's NBC/ M infrastructure - and to do so with minimal collateral effects - is a top priority of the CINCs. NBC/ M infrastructure targets in five rogue nations, organized by function (nuclear, biological, or chemical production or storage facilities) and hardness (aboveground soft or hard, shallow underground, deeply buried, and tunneled), were reviewed by a DSWA- convened panel of weapon and weapons effects experts to evaluate current and projected counterforce capabilities against these targets. They concluded that current capabilities to hold NBC/ M infrastructure targets at risk significantly limit CINC counterforce options. In particular, the more hardened targets could not be defeated reliably, and collateral effects could not be predicted or controlled with confidence. The ongoing and follow- on Counterproliferation ACTDs are addressing these shortfalls and will significantly expand CINC counterforce options. However, shortfalls will remain in placing deeply buried and tunneled targets at risk.

Terrorist CW/ BW Attack. Two scenarios were evaluated: i) a surprise CW/ BW attack on a U. S. asset amidst a population indigenous to the terrorists, and ii) a BW attack announced in advance during a civil event within a population foreign to the terrorists. In the surprise attack, terrorists targeted an air base supporting U. S. military activities in a foreign country with a sufficient quantity of CW or BW agents to provide a lethal dose to base personnel while minimizing the risk of exposure to the surrounding population. CW/ BW agent detectors could be used to direct appropriate and timely medical treatment, and improved collective protection, such as better building filtration, would reduce casualties for personnel remaining indoors. In the scenario with prior warning, the terrorists, equipped with BW dispensers each containing a few kilograms of anthrax, take up multiple positions around a major European city in order to threaten as many people as possible. Their dispersed posture makes counterterrorism actions difficult. It was estimated that U. S. SOF troops at current readiness levels could simultaneously neutralize several of the BW dispensers and/ or bands of terrorists with high confidence, provided their locations were known or could be found quickly.

General Conclusions of the Study. DoD's investments in passive defense have direct and positive impacts on the effectiveness of ground forces in CW and BW contaminated environments. Additionally, if both active defense and counterforce operations are highly effective, air base and port facility operations are sustainable; however, civilian port workers must be supplied with some measure of CW/ BW attack warning and individual protection. The Counterproliferation ACTDs will provide the CINCs with more options for defeating fixed NBC/ M infrastructure targets while minimizing collateral effects. A remaining, long- term shortfall is still projected in U. S. capabilities to defeat deeply buried and tunneled targets. CW/ BW detection and agent neutralization technologies can be used or adapted to counter terrorist use of these weapons. In concert with local law enforcement and intelligence authorities, better NBC- related consequence management planning, integration, and exercise support would fill some gaps in counterterrorism capabilities. Finally, the net impact of the study was an increase of $225 million in the FY 1998 -2003 FYDP for: i) BW detection and warning equipment (in particular, the NBC Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN), the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), and JBREWS); ii) equipment to enhance the NBC target defeat and counterterrorism capabilities of the U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); and iii) equipment to improve DoD's consequence management capabilities.

The Effects of Chemical and Biological Warfare on Air Base Combat Operations. This comprehensive study completed by the Air Force assessed the impact of CW and BW attacks on forward air base operations by surveying the Service's institutional knowledge, reviewing previous technical assessments and studies, conducting a field exercise, and examining training programs. The study pointed out the need for improvements in individual and collective protection, new training standards, automated detectors, base- level contamination assessment models, and education for senior leadership on operations in contaminated environments. It also indicated a need for greater research and analysis, realistic field exercises, and the development of new policies and procedures for sustaining operations in a CW/ BW contaminated environment. This study led to the creation of the "Air Force NBC Ability- to- Survive- and- Operate" Integrated Process Team (IPT) to oversee passive defense activities in coordination with the Air Force's overarching Counterproliferation IPT (see section 5.1.5 below).

5.1.4 The Counterproliferation Support Program.

Mission of the Deputy for Counterproliferation. ATSD( NCB) and his Deputy for Counterproliferation serve as the central point of contact for DoD counterproliferation R& D and acquisition programs and are responsible for managing the Counterproliferation Support Program. DATSD( NCB)( CP) 's mission is to: i) provide management oversight for DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative to ensure it fully supports the President's policy to limit the spread of and contain the threat from NBC/ M; ii) manage the Counterproliferation Support Program; and iii) ensure coordination of DoD counterproliferation R& D and acquisition efforts with DOE, U. S. Intelligence, and other federal agencies. Oversight of the Counterproliferation Initiative is accomplished by: i) participating in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Programming, Planning and Budgeting System reviews, Departmental planning and policy development, and acquisition oversight activities; ii) serving as facilitator across individual program boundaries; and iii) interacting with the Joint Staff, JROC, the Deterrence/ Counterproliferation JWCA, and the CINCs to ensure that their counterproliferation priorities are adequately addressed. In its role as interagency integrator and coordinator of programs related to counterproliferation, the Deputy for Counterproliferation seeks to maximize the payoff from the national investment in counterproliferation- related activities, facilitate interactions between the DoD R& D and acquisition communities and other U. S. Government agencies, and identify non- DoD programs to meet CINC and other DoD user needs.

Counterproliferation Mission Statement The mission of the Counterproliferation Office is to advocate, focus, and accelerate acquisition capabilities to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevail decisively when confronted with their use.

The Counterproliferation Support Program budget request for FY 1998 is $104.7 million, up from the $93.7 million received for FY 1997. This year, the Counterproliferation Support Program is focusing its investments in 8 of the 15 counterproliferation ACEs, as shown in Table 5.2. Nearly 80% of its FY 1998 budget is allocated in the areas of remote detection, characterization, and early warning of BW agents (DoD ACE priority 1) and detection and defeat of NBC/ M and underground facilities with minimal collateral effects (DoD ACE priorities 2 and 3). For FY 1998, the Counterproliferation Support Program budget represents approximately 2% of DoD's total investment in counterproliferation. Table 5.2 also compares Counterproliferation Support Program funding with the overall DoD investment in counterproliferation. By focusing its budget on high payoff areas and leveraging existing programs by adding funding to accelerate project schedules and deliverables, enhancements in counterproliferation capabilities are being achieved in the near term, and, by the end of the decade, significant advancements in operational capabilities in most of the counterproliferation ACEs will be achieved.

New Project Starts and Management/ Oversight Accomplishments. New project starts in FY 1997 implemented since last year's CPRC report include: i) the follow- on Counterproliferation Counterforce (" CP2") ACTD; ii) the JBREWS ACTD for early warning of BW attack; iii) the Consequence Management "911- BIO" ACTD; and iv) the Cooperative Army/ Navy Hard Target Tactical Missile System for hard and underground target defeat. These projects are described in more detail in the subsections that follow. Key management/ oversight accomplishments of the Counterproliferation Support Program include: i) providing technical direction for the 1996 Counterproliferation Study; ii) working with the Joint Staff (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, J- 8) Warfighting Analysis Division to improve their NBC weapons technical analysis capabilities; iii) working closely with ASD( SO/ LIC) and USSOCOM to adapt technologies for specialized SOF use; iv) signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ATSD( NCB) and the DIA/ CMO for improving interagency cooperation in unattended ground sensor R& D; v) coordinating efforts to establish a cooperative DoD/ U. S. Customs Service program to improve efforts to stem NBC proliferation from FSU states, Eastern Europe, and the Baltics; and vi) establishing a counterproliferation website as part of DoD's ACQWeb website.

5.1.5 Other Key Activities Associated with DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative.

In the Pacific and Middle East regions, U. S. friends and allies have also recognized the growing security risks posed by proliferation. DoD has collective defense arrangements with many nations in the Pacific region and conducts combined operations with their militaries. For example, DoD has established a regular dialogue with Australia to forge common approaches to improving military capabilities in the face of NBC risks. DoD is also planning to initiate a dialogue with South Korea on these issues, and a counterproliferation seminar will be conducted with Japan this summer. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions, DoD has held discussions with longtime friends and allies on NBC defense preparedness. A counterproliferation working group with Israel has been established to discuss common approaches to NBC/ M threats. Discussions have also been held with Kuwait, and in the near future these bilateral discussions will be expanded to include other U. S. friends and potential coalition partners in the region. These international activities demonstrate that the U. S. is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of NBC/ M proliferation. DoD remains committed to building international partnerships with allies and friends whose security and national interests are threatened by NBC/ M proliferation.

Science and Technology Strategic Planning for Counterproliferation. The 1997 Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP) provides a Joint science and technology (S& T) perspective across the Services and Defense Agencies for the purpose of assuring that the DoD S& T program adequately supports high- priority Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs). While these JWCOs are not all inclusive, they are validated by the JROC as being important to CINC mission needs. The JWSTP emphasizes Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and ACTDs that transition innovative concepts and mature technologies to the warfighter faster and more cost effectively than traditional acquisition mechanisms. "Chemical/ Biological Warfare Defense" and "Countering WMD" are two of the ten JWCOs addressed in the 1997 JWSTP. The JWSTP also highlights technology development efforts in the areas of NBC contamination avoidance, point detection, early warning, individual and collective protection, and decontamination. Counterproliferation- related ATDs and ACTDs in the areas of NBC passive defense and counterforce are also described in the JWSTP. The 1997 JWSTP and JWCO-supportive elements of the DoD S& T program continue to receive funding priority in the President's Budget and the FYDP.

5.2 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Proliferation Prevention Programs

5.2.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Perspectives for Proliferation Prevention.

5.2.2 New DoD Initiatives in Proliferation Prevention.

DoD/ U. S. Customs Cooperative Program. In the FY 1997 NDAA (Section 1424), Congress authorized DoD, in cooperation with the U. S. Customs Service, to develop and implement a training and technical assistance program to assist border enforcement authorities in the states of the FSU, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states in preventing the proliferation of NBC/ M and related materials. The principal objectives of this program are to: i) assist in the establishment of a professional cadre of border enforcement personnel trained to detect, identify, interdict, and investigate all aspects of smuggling and trafficking related to NBC weapons, components, dual- use items, and delivery systems; and ii) deliver technical assistance to enhance and improve the ability of these countries to interdict materials of concern. Initial country assessments are followed up with in- country training programs. The first countries to receive training (starting in late FY 1997) will be Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. These countries already have undergone customs related assessments as part of other programs. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is the executive agent for the program and will be responsible for its day- to- day operations and for leading the country assessment and training teams. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 9).

5.2.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Proliferation Prevention.

The Counterproliferation Support Program, in partnership with the Navy, has been successful in deploying the SEI prototype system to improve capabilities to identify and facilitate the tracking of ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC/ M and related materials. Deployment of the SEI system began in April 1995, six months ahead of schedule, and currently 32 units are deployed. The project transitions to the Navy in FY 1998, and no additional Counterproliferation Support Program funds are budgeted for this project after FY 1997. The Navy intends to continue SEI system procurement by upgrading existing deployed systems to the SEI configuration (see subsection 5.2.4).

The Counterproliferation Support Program is continuing to support the joint DoD/ FBI effort to deter, interdict, and prevent proliferation and acquisition of NBC/ M by organized crime groups and individuals in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and states of the FSU. The DoD and FBI, in collaboration with the DOE, U. S. Intelligence, the Department of State, and the U. S. Customs Service, are developing counterproliferation training courses for foreign law enforcement agencies to prevent NBC/ M and related materials from leaving their countries. A key focus is to adapt DoD technologies, operational capabilities, and training expertise to this endeavor. Key accomplishments since last year's report include site surveys in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to assess training and assistance needs, preparation and approval of a course curriculum, and completion of final preparations for the first offering of the course scheduled for Kazak law enforcement officers in June 1997 at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest. Training courses will continue at the rate of four basic counterproliferation courses per year for the next three years, along with specialty courses as the need arises. OSIA serves as the executive agent for the program and is responsible for its day- to- day operations. The specific level of funding for this project in FY 1998 has not been determined, but funding is expected to be reprogrammed from other budgeted Counterproliferation Support Program projects consistent with other funding priorities.

The Counterproliferation Support Program, through its Integrated Proliferation Prevention and Open Source Monitoring project, is working to provide open source data collection, dissemination, research, and analysis of worldwide NBC/ M proliferation activities. Through international conferences and training activities it is also working to develop international norms to stem NBC/ M proliferation in critical countries. The Counterproliferation Support Program also supports ATSD( NCB) 's Deputy for Nuclear Matters in his continuing efforts to support DoD's oversight of DOE's nuclear stockpile stewardship responsibilities, the Nuclear Weapons Council and other senior advisory groups, policy formulation for operational nuclear weapons safety and control, and management activities associated with DoD nuclear stockpile responsibilities. ATSD( NCB) 's responsibilities in these areas extend well beyond counterproliferation issues and would have to be borne even in the absence of the Counterproliferation Support Program.

5.2.4 DoD Proliferation Prevention Programs Strongly Related to Counter-proliferation.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Several ongoing projects under the CTR Program, managed by ATSD( NCB) 's Deputy for Cooperative Threat Reduction (DATSD( NCB)( CTR)), play a major role in proliferation prevention. Under the CTR Program, DoD assists states of the FSU to destroy, transport, store, disable, and safeguard NBC weapons and related materials and components; establish verifiable safeguards against their proliferation; facilitate the demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military technologies and capabilities to civilian purposes; expand military- to- military contacts between the U. S. and FSU states; and support International Science and Technology Centers to aid in transitioning former FSU weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. DATSD( NCB)( CTR) works closely with DOE in these matters. (See Section 6.3.4.)

Key accomplishments include: i) helping Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to become non-nuclear weapons states; ii) delivering 117 rail car conversion kits to enhance the physical security of nuclear weapons and warheads in transit; iii) completing the foundation for Phase I of the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak, Russia; iv) eliminating 64 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and dismantling 81 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 20 heavy bombers; v) closing and sealing 59 of 194 nuclear weapons test tunnels and bore holes at Russia's Degelen Mountain test tunnel complex; vi) delivering three mobile chemical analytical laboratories in support of CW destruction activities; vii) establishing 17 joint venture partnerships between U. S. companies and FSU defense enterprises formerly associated with NBC/ M production; viii) re-employing nearly 15,000 former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers on peaceful, civilian projects; ix) conducting 28 facility audits and examinations of CTR assistance activities through the end of 1996; and x) funding 177 exchanges between U. S. and FSU defense establishments.

OSD Critical Technology Support Program. This program develops and publishes the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), a detailed and structured compendium of technologies DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior U. S. military capabilities. It applies to all mission areas including counterproliferation. Part I of the MCTL, Weapons Systems Technologies, includes technologies whose technical performance parameters are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U. S. military systems. Part II, Weapons of Mass Destruction, addresses technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of NBC/ M. Part III, Critical Developing Technologies, covers technologies which will enable increasingly superior military performance or an ability to maintain a superior capability more affordably. The MCTL is used as a technical foundation for U. S. export control proposals, licensing and export control processes, and intelligence collection. Technologies that a proliferant might use and that might need to be countered are addressed in Part II. Parts I and III cover those technologies that U. S. forces could use to thwart an NBC/ M program or fight in an NBC environment. Technology Working Groups made up of experts from the U. S. Government, academia, and industry review and update the MCTL regularly to ensure key technologies are included and that new technologies applicable to counterproliferation are identified. The MCTL is reviewed on an ongoing basis and updated as required. The program is managed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International and Commercial Programs (DUSD( ICP)) through the Director for Multinational Technology Programs. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 9).

Defense Technology Security Administration. DTSA's mission is to develop and implement DoD policies regarding international transfers of dual- use and munitions items to ensure such transfers are consistent with U. S. national security interests. DTSA coordinates DoD's review of export licenses, referred by the Departments of State and Commerce, for their potential to contribute to the proliferation of NBC weapons, missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. DTSA develops policies regarding the transfer of defense- related systems and technologies, participates in international export control negotiations, and provides technical support to diplomatic, intelligence, and enforcement efforts. Key accomplishments include: i) enhancement of the new multinational export control framework (the "Wassenaar Arrangement"); ii) review of over 18,000 export license applications for military and dual- use technologies; and iii) U. S. export control cooperation programs with other nations. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C. 12).

On- Site Inspection Agency Programs. OSIA is responsible for several activities associated with countering proliferation. OSIA is a Joint Service DoD organization responsible for implementing inspection, escort, and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of several U. S. international arms control treaties and confidence- building agreements involving NBC weapons. Key accomplishments in NBC weapons arms control treaties and agreements include: i) providing technical advisory support to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Interagency Backstopping Group and the U. S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament; ii) providing expertise on on- site inspection to the CTBT Verification Monitoring Task Force On- Site Inspection Subgroup; iii) supporting the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, now in its ninth year; iv) supporting the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), now entering its third year; v) planning and preparing for verification operations in support of START II ratification; vi) maintaining a capability to monitor Russian nuclear tests under the auspices of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty; and vii) completion of mock inspections and exercises as part of planning and preparation for the entry- into- force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on April 29, 1997.

OSIA's support of Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) initiatives focus on inspection and escort support for anticipated international agreements involving Mutual Reciprocal Inspection measurements of plutonium and highly enriched uranium components of disassembled nuclear weapons, and monitoring of Russian plutonium production reactors in accordance with the Plutonium Reactor Shutdown Agreement. OSIA is supporting DoD and DOE in STI talks with Russia and over the last year has escorted Russian teams to Rocky Flats, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).

OSIA also serves as the executive agent in support of several DoD counterproliferation programs. It is the executive agent for DoD in support of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and for operations to identify and destroy Iraq's NBC/ M infrastructure under UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715. OSIA also serves as executive agent for the DoD/ FBI and DoD/ U. S. Customs Service counterproliferation programs to deter the proliferation, acquisition, transfer, and transportation of NBC/ M and related materials in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, and states of the FSU (as discussed in subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 above). Additional OSIA project details are provided in Table 5.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C. 11).

The Nuclear Treaty Program Office and CTBT Implementation. The CTBT was signed at the United Nations in New York on September 24, 1996, after nearly three years of negotiations. In anticipation of this event DoD established (in March 1996) a Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs (DATSD( NCB)( NTP)) serving under the ATSD( NCB) as CTBT Treaty Manager. The Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs oversees an integrated, DoD- wide CTBT implementation and compliance program, which includes: i) implementation of International Monitoring System (IMS) stations on U. S. territory or for which the U. S. has responsibility under the treaty; ii) development of the International Data Center (IDC) and a National Data Center to collate CTBT- related data; iii) transition of the prototype International Data Center (IDC) to its permanent location at the Headquarters of the CTBT Organization in Vienna; iv) R& D activities in nuclear test monitoring techniques (e. g., involving seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide signatures) satisfying congressional requirements and presidential safeguards; and v) treaty implementation and technical support. Key accomplishments since last year's report include: i) streamlined management of CTBT verification R& D programs under DSWA to improve CTBT implementation; ii) continued development of the global continuous threshold monitoring network and CTBT data fusion knowledge base; and iii) continued data collection, storage, fusion, and distribution technology development for the IDC and commencement of IDC transition to the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. The Nuclear Treaty Program Office is also responsible for providing DoD technical support in the areas of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, fissile materials cut- off negotiations, and enhancement of nuclear safeguards through its enhanced nuclear safeguards program. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

DSWA Chemical Biological Arms Control Technology (CB ACT) Program. DSWA's CB ACT office has the lead within DoD for developing the technologies required to implement chemical and biological arms control treaties and agreements. The CB ACT office conducts RDT& E activities to meet DoD- identified treaty implementation, verification, monitoring, and inspection needs. The CB ACT program is working to protect U. S. national security interests, improve the effectiveness of verification efforts, assist in meeting U. S. legal obligations imposed by treaty provisions, support U. S. policy development, minimize inspection and implementation costs, and enhance the safety of treaty inspections. DSWA's designation as a combat support agency adds an important additional focus of considering the impact of CW/ BW arms control agreements on warfighting commanders and their missions.

The current CB ACT program concentrates on the following six activities: i) Technical Support to Negotiations, including CWC compliance and implementation, bilateral arms control negotiations with Russia, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conferences, and exchange visits to military biological facilities under the auspices of the U. S./ United Kingdom/ Russia Trilateral Statement; ii) Compliance Support/ Data Management, by supporting the development of DoD data and notification management systems consistent with treaty and international agreement reporting provisions, such as the CWC Information Management System, the Chemical Agent Management Information Network, and a proposed BWC data management system; iii) Inspector Safety Monitoring, by developing a real- time portable CW agent monitor for the detection of trace levels of volatile CWC- scheduled chemicals to assure that inspectors are not exposed to chemical hazards; iv) Off- Site Monitoring, by evaluating technologies for use in monitoring the perimeter of facilities undergoing CWC challenge inspections; v) Non- Destructive Evaluation, by developing techniques for the non- invasive interrogation of munitions and containers; and vi) On- Site Analysis, by providing state- of- the- art sample collection, screening, preparation, and determinative analysis methods and equipment integrated into a modular, field portable, "fly- away", On- Site Lab which was used to support UN activities in Iraq and has been adapted for use in the CWC compliance program. Additional information on this program may be found in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

DSWA START Verification Technology Programs. DSWA is responsible for the START Verification Technology program, which develops technologies to enable verification of the START I, START II, and follow- on nuclear weapons treaties. Technologies being developed include non- intrusive detection of nuclear weapon systems and reentry bodies. Key accomplishments include achieving full operational capability of the START Central Data System, development of a fieldable prototype gravity gradiometer for use in treaty verification, and development of technologies and procedures that enable the monitoring of nuclear weapons throughout their life cycle. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

Navy SEI Support Program. The Navy has been working with the Counterproliferation Support Program to expedite the deployment of the SEI system by providing O& M and procurement support; accelerating system development; and providing testing and fleet integration support. In FY 1998, the program transitions to the Navy which will continue implementation of the SEI system into the fleet by upgrading existing (and fleet- integrated) signal processors. Fleet integration is scheduled for FY 1999. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.3 and in Appendix C (Table C. 4).

5.2.5 Near-, Mid-, and Long- Term Milestones for DoD Proliferation Prevention Programs.

5.3 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Programs

5.3.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Objectives in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence.

5.3.2 New DoD Initiatives in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence.

5.3.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence.

In addition to these projects, the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Project (HAARP) is exploring the use of low frequency electromagnetic waves for detecting and imaging underground structures and tunnels. This program had not been considered a high priority by the Administration and was not included in its FY 1997 budget request. However, Congress provided funding for the Counterproliferation Support Program to work with the Air Force Phillips Laboratory to expedite the determination of the viability and military utility of the HAARP concept. A workshop, entitled "Longwave Radio Frequency Imaging of Underground Structures", is scheduled for May 1997 to provide government organizations with an overview of this research area and define a plan for future research. The HAARP transmitter is being upgraded, and a demonstration of the concept's underground facility detection capabilities is currently scheduled for 1997. No FY 1998 DoD funding is currently planned for this Congressional Special Interest Program. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.4 and in Appendix C (Tables C. 1 and C. 5).

5.3.4 Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation.

5.4 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Battlefield Surveillance Programs

5.4.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Objectives for Battlefield Surveillance.

5.4.2 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Battlefield Surveillance.

Key accomplishments since last year's report include: i) developed tactical FLIR design options, initiated proof- of- principle demonstrations of system modifications, and collected imagery to improve and support weapon delivery testing; ii) constructed and field tested a brassboard TUGS system; iii) continued data collection from representative NBC/ M facilities during weapon detonations to evaluate TUGS performance and demonstrate utility; and iv) continued flight testing and capability demonstration of the ATR system on JSTARS test assets. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.5 and in Appendix C (Table C. 1).

5.4.3 Battlefield Surveillance Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation.

5.4.4 Near-, Mid-, and Long- Term Milestones in DoD Battlefield Surveillance Programs.

5.5 Status and Accomplishments of DoD NBC/ M Counterforce Programs

5.5.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Perspectives.

5.5.2 New DoD Initiatives in NBC/ M Counterforce.

The CP2 Counterforce ACTD. The ongoing Counterproliferation ACTD for NBC/ M target defeat (denoted CP1 ACTD) establishes a new baseline for military counterforce capabilities against NBC/ M facilities. The second, follow- on Counterproliferation Counterforce ACTD (denoted CP2 ACTD) will continue to address CINC- prioritized shortfalls in counterforce capabilities against hard and underground NBC/ M facilities. The CP2 ACTD has been approved for an FY 1997 start. FY 1997 efforts focus on final definition of CINC requirements, selection of appropriately mature technologies for inclusion in the ACTD, and development and approval of a CP2 ACTD Implementation Directive and a Management Plan. These items are scheduled to be in place by June 1997. CP2 ACTD technology development efforts are scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 1998 and be completed by the fourth quarter of FY 2002. Based on CP1 ACTD successes to date, CINC U. S. European Command (USEUCOM) has agreed to sponsor the CP2 ACTD. In addition, CINC U. S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and CINC U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) have expressed interest in sponsoring the development of target planning and decision support tools for the CP2 ACTD. The selection of maturing technologies to be evaluated and demonstrated during the CP2 ACTD will be based on their potential military utility in meeting the high priority counterproliferation required capabilities of the CINCs. The following capabilities are being considered for inclusion in the CP2 ACTD: i) improved counterforce planning and decision support tools; ii) alternative payloads to enhance physical and functional target kills while mitigating collateral effects; iii) standoff precision delivery and improved penetration capabilities by modifying existing or developing weapon systems; iv) improved combat assessment capabilities through improved detection and prediction of collateral effects and improved collection of BDA information; and v) enhanced intelligence support by improving information dissemination, target characterization, and target functional/ nodal analysis.

The Cooperative Army/ Navy Hard Target Tactical Missile System. In direct response to the counterproliferation ACEs and the CINC counterproliferation required capabilities, the Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting a new initiative in FY 1997 to develop an earth penetrating variant of the Army's Tactical Missile System (TACMS) deliverable by the existing Army M270 tactical missile launcher and eventually by Navy surface ships and submarines. This variant, proposed by the Army TACMS program manager in conjunction with Navy Strategic Systems Programs, makes use of the demonstrated capabilities of the Army TACMS missile system and reentry and penetrator components developed by the Navy to hold the full spectrum of NBC/ M- related targets at risk. This project leverages developments in strategic reentry systems technology (including aeroshells, attitude control systems, and guidance systems), advanced penetrator technology, and the Hard Target Smart Fuse (HTSF) under development by DSWA and the Air Force (see subsection 5.5.3). Current efforts are focusing on defining a near- term ATD to support an ACTD involving live fire testing in FY 1999. Funding for FY 1998 is under review.

5.5.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in NBC/ M Counterforce.

Projects supporting the CP1 ACTD include: i) developing sensor systems for target characterization and BDA (including the TUGS and tactical FLIR sensors and the tactical multi-sensor fusion project described in subsection 5.4.2); ii) improving the understanding of and developing hazard prediction models for collateral effects release and transport phenomenology; iii) improving the state of knowledge in weapons effects and NBC/ M target vulnerability and response; iv) developing an advanced penetrating weapon, the Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), for hardened or underground target defeat; v) developing a weapon borne sensor (WBS) and the HTSF to enhance the lethality of penetrating weapons against hard and underground targets; vi) developing advanced warheads and payloads for enhanced lethality and functional kill against NBC/ M targets; vii) developing the inertial terrain- aided guidance (ITAG) all- weather weapon guidance package designed to be compatible with existing munitions; viii) developing the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) and the Integrated MEA (IMEA) targeting tools to assist in targeting, weaponeering, and strike planning against NBC/ M facilities; and ix) integrated operational testing, as part of the Counterproliferation ACTD demonstrations, to support rapid user assessment and fielding of these new capabilities. The DOE National Laboratories are also providing technical support to the TUGS, FLIR, and ITAG projects. Counterproliferation Support Program projects in NBC/ M counterforce are further summarized in Table 5.6 below and in Appendix C (Table C. 1).

Key accomplishments in counterforce projects since last year's report include: i) completion of Phase I integrated demonstrations of the CP1 ACTD, including static and live weapon drops on a simulated BW storage facility to demonstrate the integrated capabilities of sensors, weapons, target planning tools, and collateral effects prediction; ii) demonstration of controlled weapon penetration and detonation depth using the HTSF and successful integration of the GBU- 24/ HTSF with F- 15E and F/ A- 18 aircraft; iii) scale testing of the line payout system for the WBS; iv) model validation for conventional weapons effects against hard and buried targets; v) accurate prediction of atmospheric transport of hazard plumes during CP1 ACTD demonstrations; vi) continued IMEA tool hazard assessment modeling support to USEUCOM in support of contingency operations; vii) assessment by warfighters of IMEA software as a valuable aid for target planning and weaponeering; viii) completion of software simulation and initiation of ITAG hardware fabrication; and ix) completion of preliminary design definitions and initial trade studies for the Cooperative Army/ Navy Hard Target Tactical Missile system.

5.5.4 NBC/ M Counterforce Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation.

DSWA Hard Target Defeat Program. DSWA initiated its Hard Target Defeat Program in FY 1996 to: i) evaluate the hard target defeat problem end- to- end, from detection through counterforce to BDA; and ii) develop improved tactics and technologies to defeat hard targets, especially tunnels. This program supports the HDBTDC IPT with weapon- target interaction analyses for defeating targets that are difficult to counter because of their physical hardness. An IPT has been established to employ existing analysis tools and data bases to determine the physical and functional vulnerability of high value/ high risk targets and provide quantitative results to support analysis of alternative target defeat approaches. This program also supports the development of advanced capabilities in tunnel facility characterization, target planning, weapon effects, and functional defeat mechanisms. These efforts complement the NBC/ M counterforce activities supported by the Counterproliferation Support Program, including the Counterproliferation ACTDs. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.6 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

Air Force Agent Defeat Weapon Program. This program was initiated in response to a Combat Air Force Mission Need Statement. The objective of the current Concept Exploration and Definition acquisition activity is to develop an agent defeat weapon to neutralize, destroy, or deny access or immobilize CW/ BW agents and their associated weapon and delivery systems. All agent defeat weapon concepts will minimize collateral damage and effects and be deliverable by current Air Force platforms. Key program accomplishments include forming an IPT structure, building a preliminary assessment framework, collecting weapon system concepts from industry and the DoD and DOE laboratories, construction of an empirical lethality model to determine the effectiveness of inventory and conceptual weapons systems against CW/ BW agents, and forming an ACTD working group. Additional information is provided in Table 5.6 and in Appendix C (Table C. 5).

DSWA Weapons Systems Lethality Program. This program focuses on the development and validation of methodologies and research tools for applied analysis performed under the Counterproliferation Support Program as well as the Force Protection Initiative and other emerging counterterrorism programs (see Section 8.3). It supplies the CINCs with targeting tools for NBC/ M and conventional targets and tools for collateral effects and hazard prediction through the USEUCOM- sponsored Counterproliferation ACTDs. Targeting tools are available to other users through the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness. The program conducts precision and subscale testing and advanced numerical calculations to develop and validate methodologies associated with weapon- target interactions and the transport and dispersal of hazardous NBC materials, including NBC collateral effects releases. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.6 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

DARPA Information Integration Systems Program. This program supports efforts to enhance real- time situation assessments by developing an integrated, all- source, geographically referenced battlefield knowledge base and information distribution system. It supports improved capabilities to detect, identify, and track high value, time critical fixed and mobile targets, including NBC- armed missile launchers and NBC/ M support facilities. Key accomplishments include: i) completed integration of a single intelligence source correlator; ii) demonstration of the functionality of a global broadcast service and information servers for rapid dissemination of imagery products; iii) demonstration of the operational utility of disseminating intelligence products (imagery and UAV video) and one way video teleconferencing of commanders' intent; and iv) completion of nine independent correlation systems using open systems architectures. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.6 and in Appendix C (Table C. 7).

5.5.5 Near-, Mid-, and Long- Term Milestones for DoD NBC/ M Counterforce Programs.

5.6 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Active Defense Programs

5.6.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Perspectives.

DoD's theater missile defense (TMD) approach is to build on present air and missile defense systems to provide a near- term defense, and then develop capabilities to intercept enemy air and missile systems at higher altitudes and longer ranges to keep NBC weapons even farther away from U. S. and allied forces. Since threat missile systems differ in their characteristics and capabilities, no single defensive system can counter them with sufficient effectiveness or with the high confidence required for defense against NBC weapons. This is why DoD is developing a "family of systems". DoD's policy is first to upgrade and develop systems that will provide defense for theater forces. The first systems receiving attention are systems that are already fielded, specifically the Marine Corps Hawk system and the Army's PATRIOT system, both of which are undergoing upgrades that will increase their TMD capabilities. BMDO is managing the development of a set of "core" active defense programs that will provide additional capabilities. In addition to follow- on upgrades of the PATRIOT system, BMDO is leveraging the technologies of the Navy's AEGIS and Standard Missile (SM) systems to give them endoatmospheric missile intercept capabilities in the near term and exoatmospheric capabilities in the far term. BMDO and the Army are also developing an exo-/ endo- atmospheric interceptor and kill vehicle. Joining these core programs is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) system which will push the kill zone and the potential of associated NBC collateral effects even further away from friendly forces by intercepting theater ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Effective boost phase defense, where intercept occurs early in flight over the launching country, serves as a powerful deterrent to NBC/ M use.

Underlying all of these efforts are programs to develop the corresponding battle management/ command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (BMC4I) capabilities necessary to achieve an effective defense with Joint Service interoperability. BMDO also participates in several international programs to help allies develop TMD capabilities and to learn from what they accomplish, with the aim that these systems, when fielded, will be interoperable with U. S. systems. BMDO and DARPA programs are continuing to develop advanced technologies to enhance future active defense systems. BMDO also manages the National Missile Defense (NMD) program for U. S. homeland defense.

5.6.2 New DoD Initiatives in Active Defense.

The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). Perhaps the most significant new initiative has been the formation of the JTAMDO, established in November 1996 by the Vice Chairman of the JCS and USD( A& T) to develop and coordinate Joint theater air and missile defense requirements and efforts, including those for ballistic and cruise missile defenses. The JTAMDO is the single organization within DoD responsible for Joint integrated theater air and missile defense requirements, operational concepts, and architectures. The JTAMDO will coordinate TMD activities with the CINCs and Services, and in the words of Rear Admiral Richard West, BMDO Deputy Director, JTAMDO will "do the operator's side of the house, to create the operational requirements and the operational architecture . . . necessary to meet the requirement." BMDO serves as the integration systems architect, with the responsibility of translating JTAMDO-developed requirements into systems architectures, and as the lead R& D and acquisition agency. Additional details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 13).

5.6.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Active Defense.

5.6.4 Active Defense Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation.

BMDO Programs. BMDO is currently managing several TMD programs, including: i) continuing the development of upgrades to the Army's PATRIOT PAC- 3 system and the Navy's Area TBMD system; ii) developing and testing the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD); iv) developing the NTW TBMD system; v) conducting Joint Service theater missile defense Demonstration and Validation (Dem/ Val) and Program Definition and Risk Reduction acquisition activities; vi) cooperating in international missile defense development programs like the joint U. S.- European Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and Israel's Arrow program; vii) developing advanced technologies and supporting innovative science and technology development for missile defense applications; and viii) conducting studies and analyses exploring the offense/ defense synergies of counterforce operations against mobile missile systems. BMDO is also managing the development of a National Missile Defense and its supporting technologies.

The first of BMDO's core programs for near- term deployment is the Army PAC- 3 system which is being developed in several configurations. Configuration 2 features major software upgrades to the radar, giving it greater tracking capability, and improvements to communications links. Two of nine PATRIOT batteries have already been equipped with this upgraded system. PAC- 3 (Configuration 3) will build on the previous configurations with a more capable hit- to- kill missile and substantial upgrades to its ground radar. The PAC- 3 missile will begin low- rate initial production (LRIP) in FY 1998 and be fielded in late FY 1999. The second of the lower- tier systems is the Navy Area TBMD system. This program builds on the national investment in AEGIS ships and weapon systems and the Navy SM- 2 Block IV missiles now being used for air defense. With software upgrades to the SPY- 1 radar, coupled with improved kinematics and fuzing for the SM- 2 missile and a blast- fragmentation warhead, this system will be capable of ballistic missile intercepts. With this system, the Navy can bring a TMD capability into a theater without having to deploy forces on land. It will be particularly useful in providing NBC/ M protection to debarkation ports, coastal airfields, amphibious objective areas, allied forces ashore, and other high value sites. BMDO plans to field a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) in FY 1999 with first unit equipped (FUE) in 2001.

The higher altitude or upper- tier portion of the family of systems for active defense features Army and Navy programs that are still in the Dem/ Val or Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of the acquisition cycle and are not due for deployment until after the year 2000. The Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense System will provide an exo-/ endo- atmospheric intercept capability that will make it possible to protect broad areas, dispersed assets, and population centers against theater ballistic missiles. Of the many components of this system, the THAAD radar (formerly known as the Ground Based Radar) is a key factor. It is based on state- of- the- art, solid-state, X- band radar technology, and will be interoperable with both existing and future air and missile defense systems. The THAAD interceptor is a single stage booster and kinetic kill vehicle that destroys its targets by colliding with them in a "hit- to- kill" mode. THAAD's BMC4I system will manage and integrate all THAAD components. Seven THAAD flight tests have been conducted since 1995, and, while a successful intercept has not yet been achieved, these tests have been important in integrating the THAAD radar as the system's primary sensor and in developing the overall system for operational deployment. A THAAD UOES prototype (excluding missiles) is currently available for early operational assessment, enabling soldiers to influence the final system design. The current plan calls for making the THAAD UOES prototype available in 1999 for limited use as a contingency capability during a national emergency. FUE (i. e., one battery with an upload of missiles) could occur as early as FY 2005. However, the acquisition status of the THAAD program is being reviewed by USD( A& T).

The Navy Theater Wide TBMD system is an upper- tier exoatmospheric active defense system which leverages the Navy Area TBMD program, the AEGIS Weapons System, Standard Missile, and Vertical Launch System. However, the capabilities of all these systems will be upgraded, especially the range and lethality of the Standard Missile, to achieve a depth of fire and defense that can span an entire theater wide region without the need for land bases. It will be capable of intercepting threat missiles in their ascent phase, at apogee, or during descent. Coupled with the lower tier systems, like PAC- 3 and the Navy Area TBMD system, the upper tier systems will make possible a layered defense which will significantly improve capabilities to protect friendly forces and allied populations against NBC/ M threats. The main objectives of the Navy Theater Wide TBMD program are to increase the range of the system by adding a third stage to the SM- 2, Block IVA missiles and to test and integrate a hit- to- kill interceptor. Several potential interceptors, now involved in concept exploration and technology demonstrations, are under consideration, including the Lightweight Exo- Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP). The first LEAP flight test is scheduled for 1999 and the first intercept test is slated for 2000. The program would then transition to EMD followed by UOES, although no firm dates have been set for these milestones.

The U. S. government has entered into an international cooperative program with Germany and Italy to develop the Medium Extended Air Defense System. This system will fill a critical void in the current force structure by providing organic air defenses to land maneuver forces against short and medium range theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Additionally, the MEADS netted distributed BMC4I system ensures interoperability in support of Joint and combined operations. Through its Joint TMD program, BMDO is cooperating with the Israeli government in the development of their Arrow National Defense System. Much useful data have already been gleaned from a recent series of successful Arrow flight tests. BMDO is also funding the Boost Phase Intercept program in cooperation with Israel to explore the use of armed UAVs to intercept theater ballistic missiles during their ascent phase.

All of the systems discussed above are designed to intercept NBC- armed air and missile systems after they have been launched, but it may be more effective and cheaper to conduct counterforce operations (also referred to as "attack operations" in a TMD context; see Joint Publication 3- 01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, February 1996) against enemy tactical systems supporting launch operations, including mobile launch systems, before the aircraft or missiles can be launched. Counterforce operations offer synergies with defensive operations, further enhancing capabilities to protect U. S. and allied forces. In coordination with the Services, BMDO continues to monitor and sponsor studies and experiments that examine the effectiveness and cost trade- offs between active defense against theater ballistic missiles in flight and counterforce operations against NBC/ M delivery systems, like mobile missile launchers (including those deployed in hide sites or in deep underground or hardened shelters).

While these core systems are aimed at countering NBC/ M threats in a theater, DoD is also concerned about defending the U. S. homeland from these weapons and their associated delivery systems, and has directed BMDO to manage the National Missile Defense program. While NMD was once a technology development effort, it has now been elevated to a deployment readiness program and designated as a major defense acquisition program. Over the next few years, components of an NMD system will be flight tested at the national test range in the Pacific, to include an intercept test of the kill vehicle in FY 1998. The program is designed to enable development of the system in three years and, should the threat warrant it, deploy elements of the system in an additional three years. If deployed, the system will be composed of ground- based interceptors and a ground- based radar along with forward- based early warning radars.

Key BMDO accomplishments since last year's report include several successful live fire tests in which interceptor missiles successfully engaged their targets. These tests include: i) a PATRIOT PAC- 3 (Configuration 2) system with Guidance Enhanced Missiles successfully shooting down a SCUD missile, an event that also included a successful integration test of the THAAD and AEGIS radars, the Airborne Surveillance Testbed, and the Cobra Judy radar; ii) demonstration of Navy Area TBMD SM- 2 Block IV missile IR seeker and blast- fragmentation warhead functionality by intercepting a Lance ballistic missile target; and iii) three successful intercepts for the Israeli Arrow program. Other successful tests which did not involve intercepts include: i) the environmental test firing of a SM- 2, Block IVA missile which integrated the missile's IR detector dome and radar detectors and tested the dome's operation at various flight temperatures; ii) a TMD Critical Measurements Program test with a Castor IVB booster that carried and then released a crude maneuvering reentry vehicle and penetration aids along with a fly-away sensor that collected signature data on these objects; and iii) releasing a Request for Proposals for a lead NMD systems integrator and drafting an Integrated Deployment Plan for NMD. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 below and in Appendix C (Table C. 6).

Army PATRIOT PAC- 3 RDT& E and Procurement. Procurement of PATRIOT PAC- 3 upgrades transitions to the Army in FY 1998. The PAC- 3 system is being modified with the Guidance Enhanced Missile upgrade, and software and hardware improvements will give the system enhanced capabilities against both ballistic and cruise missiles. In FY 1998, 52 PAC- 3 missiles, 11 PAC- 3 launch stations, and 6 radar station modification kits will be procured. In a recent flight test, a PAC- 3 system with Guidance Enhanced Missiles shot down a SCUD target missile. RDT& E activities are under way to support development of the Remote Launch Communications Enhancement System, threat simulations, and P3I system testing. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 3).

Army Missile Defense Systems Integration and TMD BMC4I Procurement Programs. This program funds systems analysis, studies, and experimentation designed to validate and integrate the four key functions of TMD: active defense, passive defense, counterforce operations, and BMC4I. This Dem/ Val and systems integration program develops hardware and software components, doctrinal and procedural solutions, subsystem interface controls, and systems architectures. This program supports the joint U. S./ Israeli Nautilus/ Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) ACTD evaluating the effectiveness of high energy lasers to defeat threats posed by Katyusha and similar short range artillery rockets. Completion of the THEL integration and testing demonstration is scheduled for FY 1998. This program also supports the U. S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command's Missile Defense Battle Integration Center (MDBIC) which is building a flexible linked architecture of pre- existing live, virtual, and constructive simulations in a distributed interactive simulation (DIS)- based architecture to support training, exercises, advanced concepts and requirements development, and military operations associated with TMD, NMD, and space operations. The Army is also providing critical BMC4I systems for TMD, including Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals to ensure multiple platform interoperability. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 3).

Navy Active Defense Programs. In February 1997 procurement responsibilities for the Marine Corps Hawk and the Navy Area TBMD programs were transferred from BMDO to the Navy. In January 1997, the Navy Area TBMD system achieved its first intercept of a theater ballistic missile with its modified SM- 2 Block IV interceptor. The Navy Area TBMD program was subsequently approved to proceed to EMD by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The NTW Flight Demonstration/ AEGIS Leap Intercept Program is scheduled to be reviewed by OSD in April 1997 to determine its appropriate acquisition cycle status. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 4).

The Air Force Airborne Laser Program. The Air Force is developing a Boeing 747 aircraft based high power laser to intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase. The ABL combines demonstrated state- of- the- art laser, adaptive optics, beam control, and BMC4I technologies into a forward deployed long range TMD boost phase defense platform with "speed of light response" that complements other active defense systems. The program is a legacy of the Airborne Laser Laboratory of the early 1980s and builds on the advancements in laser and optical system technology achieved over the past 15 years. The program has entered the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of the acquisition process, and a $1.1 billion contract was recently awarded to a contractor team to initiate ABL system Dem/ Val. A prototype system is under development to demonstrate boost phase defense against theater ballistic missiles in FY 2002. Potential adjunct missions, such as cruise missile defense and air defense of high value airborne assets, are also being analyzed. The goal is to begin fielding the first of seven planned ABL systems in FY 2005 with full operational capability achieved in FY 2008. Key program accomplishments include: i) completion of active missile tracking demonstrations at White Sands Missile Range; ii) demonstration of required laser power levels and chemical efficiency in full scale tests; iii) demonstration of beam control functionality and a multi- beam illuminator concept; and iv) completion of in- flight 747 aircraft vibration tests and wind tunnel tests of the beam director turret. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 5).

Air Force Theater Missile Defense (R& D) Program. This program is working to improve the ability to detect, locate, identify, and destroy (or otherwise neutralize) an enemy's theater missile capability and its supporting infrastructure elements in all phases of theater conflict. It defines improvements to existing BMC4I and counterforce capabilities, develops and evaluates prototype systems, demonstrates modifications during operational concept demonstrations, and coordinates transfer of improvements to operational systems. Key accomplishments include: i) demonstration of data Link- 16 range extension and integration of the Link- 16 TMD message set on the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft; ii) development of a methodology for conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), including automated application of the methodology; iii) completion of country studies as part of the IPB process; iv) development of planning tools to assist in deployment of air and missile defense systems and a targeting decision aid for time critical targets; and v) completion of an expert missile tracker prototype. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 5).

Air Force Space Sensor and Satellite Communication Technology Program. This program is developing surveillance sensor and threat warning technologies required to support TMD and NMD. Key accomplishments include: i) fabrication and characterization of the first large format (256 x 256 element arsenic- doped silicon) array for IR space sensor applications; ii) demonstration of a two color focal plane array; and iii) fabrication of an IR camera testbed capable of testing large staring arrays. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.7 and in Appendix C (Table C. 5).

5.6.5 Near-, Mid-, and Long- Term Milestones for DoD Active Defense Programs.

5.7 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Passive Defense Programs

5.7.1 Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs and DoD Policy Perspectives.

5.7.2 New DoD Initiatives in Passive Defense.

The Air Base/ Port Bio Detection ACTD. The purpose of this ACTD is to expedite the fielding of an interim capability to provide rapid automated BW attack detection and warning to high value fixed sites such as ports and airfields. The ACTD is managed by the JPO- BD in conjunction with the CBD Program and sponsored by the CINCs of the U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and USPACOM. The BW agent detection system will be based on the Navy's deployed Interim Biological Agent Detection (IBAD) system supplemented with modules for detecting generic biological material, location reporting, and measuring meteorological conditions. In addition to the IBAD- based BW detection system, the following residuals or "leave behinds" will be provided to the CINCs: i) an integrated command and control system (involving prototype JWARN components) to assist base personnel in the rapid assessment, warning, and dissemination of BW attack data; ii) oral- nasal respirators providing protection from re- aerosolized BW agents without the stresses associated with full face protective masks; iii) decision aids and procedures for site decontamination; and iv) procedures for determining when it is safe to remove protective gear. With this system, warning of a possible BW attack can be transmitted to a central command post in about 10 minutes after the initial detection. Testing of a small scale detector network prototype is under way and full scale testing of a complete network and other residual equipment will be completed this Summer. Full scale deployment of ACTD products to CENTCOM and PACOM will begin in FY 1998.

The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). JBPDS is the developmental system that will replace existing and deployed BW detection systems, like the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS), IBAD, and the Air Base/ Port ACTD interim detector systems. It will provide BW agent detection capabilities for all the Services and throughout the battlespace. The BW detection suite will consist of four functional elements: i) the trigger for real- time detection of significant changes in ambient aerosol levels; ii) the collector for BW sample collection to enable more detailed analysis; iii) the detector for broad characterization of sampled biological material (e. g., bacteria, spore, protein, etc.); and iv) the identifier for identification of suspected BW agents. JBPDS integrates these functionalities into an automated system providing Joint Service interoperability. This Joint Service acquisition program is managed by the JPO- BD in conjunction with the CBD Program. An EMD contract will be awarded in FY 1997, and production is scheduled to start in FY 2000, with FUE scheduled for FY 2001.

5.7.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Passive Defense.

5.7.4 DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

All R& D and acquisition programs within the CBD Program are structured within six Program Elements (PE) for Basic Research, Applied Research, Advanced Technology Development, Demonstration/ Validation (Dem/ Val), Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), and management support. Procurement funds have also been consolidated. Highlights of key programs strongly related to counterproliferation within each of these program elements are described below. Additional program details, including FY 1998 budget profiles, are provided in Table 5.8 below and in Appendix C (Table C. 2).

CW/ BW defenses are conducted within the framework of three principles: i) contamination avoidance, ii) protection, and iii) decontamination. These principles provide the basis for an integrated and balanced CW/ BW defense program. Contamination avoidance is the highest priority area and consists of capabilities and procedures to: detect, identify, and warn forces of CW/ BW threats; enable commanders to determine the appropriate protective posture to assume; and distribute the necessary information so that U. S. forces can avoid contamination. When contamination cannot be avoided, protection makes it possible to survive, fight, and win in a contaminated environment. Protection consists of three elements: individual protection, collective protection, and medical programs. Finally, decontamination provides critical capabilities to allow the sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. This framework is detailed in Joint Publication 3- 11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense. Key accomplishments in each commodity area are described in what follows.

Contamination Avoidance.

Science and Technology Base - Basic Research, Applied Research, and Advanced Technology Development. Basic Research efforts include coordination and consolidation of a mass spectrometric study of biomarkers having potential utility in future BW detectors and investigation of techniques for generic detection of microbial toxins. Applied Research efforts include: i) evaluation of BW agent local warning detection technologies such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) probes, electrospray mass spectrometry, planar wave guides, flow cytometry, and other advanced technologies to support early warning of BW agents; ii) field testing of a tunable UV laser standoff breadboard prototype detector; and iii) development of technologies and databases for multispectral UV fluorescence detection and discrimination of BW agents in realistic battlespaces containing natural and man- made interferents. Key Advanced Technology Development projects include demonstrated technologies in the areas of wide area detection using chemical imaging sensors, low level atmospheric monitoring using a mini Chemical/ Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS), and small lightweight detectors using ion mobility spectrometry.

Demonstration/ Validation. Key programs include: i) the Lightweight Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance System (LNBCRS), which provides unit field commanders with real- time data that can be used to assess the battlefield for NBC hazards while on the move; ii) the Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD), which provides chemical agent detection and mapping for CW agent clouds; and iii) technology evaluation of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) addressing Joint Service CW/ BW defense requirements.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. There are several key programs in EMD that promise to offer greatly improved capabilities in the near term for contamination avoidance. They include: i) JWARN, which automates NBC warning and reporting throughout the battlefield and links digital data into existing C3 systems; ii) the CBMS, which identifies collected CW/ BW agents and is a potential component for the BIDS Pre- Planned Product Improvement (P3I) system, and the FOX NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS); iii) JCAD, which is developing a combined portable CW monitor and small point CW detector for aircraft, shipboard, and individual soldier applications; iv) the Shipboard Automated Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD) for CW detection; v) the Shipboard Chemical Agent Monitor - Portable (SCAMP); and vi) the Joint Service LNBCRS.

Procurement. The BIDS Phase II P3I system will provide technology insertion from concurrent development efforts to upgrade the Phase I Non- Development Item (NDI) BIDS and make possible the ability to detect eight BW agents, provide increased automation for detecting BW agents, and enable computerized integration of detector outputs. Procurements in FY 1998 also include the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM), the Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (ACADA), FOX NBCRS modifications, the AN/ UDR- 13 Pocket Radiac (Radiation Detection, Indication, and Computation) nuclear radiation detector, and the Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) for shipboard use.

Protection.

Science and Technology Base - Exploratory Development. Key tech base efforts to improve protection include: i) investigating enhanced protection technologies for masks; ii) continued integration of advanced mask concepts into 21st century soldier systems; and iii) investigating technologies for a lightweight, extended wear half- face mask for improved BW protection.

Demonstration/ Validation. The key Dem/ Val project for improving collective protection is the Advanced Integrated Collective Protective System (AICPS) which integrates new NBC filtration technologies with environmental controls and power generation components for tactical and combat systems. AICPS is designed to be integrated into multiple configurations to provide collective protection for a variety of tactical systems.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Key EMD projects for improving protection include development of the M45 Aircrew Protective Mask (ACPM) which provides rotary wing air crews with a less burdensome respiratory protection system, the AICPS, the M40 P3I Mask, and the M20 P3I Collective Protection System. One of the major programs to be fielded in the near-term is the Joint Service Lightweight Suit Technology (JSLIST) individual protective garment. JSLIST is a Joint Service effort to field a common chemical protective ensemble (i. e., suit, boots, and gloves) that provides adequate chemical protection, reduced heat stress, full compatibility with all interfacing equipment, longer wear, launderability, a single technical data package and manual, a split issue feature to improve fit and reduce inventory, and flame retardantcy. JSLIST promotes commonality and standardization to maximize the effectiveness of resources and eliminate redundancy among the Services.

Procurement. The key protection procurement program for FY 1997 is the fielding of the M40/ M42 standard issue NBC protective masks.

Medical Programs.

An FDA licensed anthrax vaccine is available commercially from the Michigan Biologic Products Institute. Government studies indicate that it confers excellent protective immunity against aerosolized anthrax spores. Production of this vaccine has been ongoing since Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, and the DoD- prescribed stockpile level will be completed in FY 1997. Additional efforts are being sponsored by the DoD to obtain the requisite scientific data to support a license amendment request to the FDA for a reduced immunization schedule. Another BW vaccine administered to U. S. forces during Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm was for botulinum toxoid (pentavalent). This vaccine is not FDA licensed, although it has been used for several decades to protect laboratory workers and has an excellent safety record. Efforts are ongoing to collect data on this vaccine and develop a package demonstrating product safety and efficacy for FDA licensure. After reviewing initial data, an FDA advisory council issued recommendations providing clear direction to DoD and the manufacturer for licensing this vaccine.

Decontamination.

Science and Technology Base - Exploratory Development and Advanced Technology Development. Research continues in using enzymatic technology to accomplish CW decontamination. Efforts also focus on developing decontamination approaches for sensitive (e. g., electronic) equipment.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The key EMD projects are the Modular Decontamination Systems (MDS) and development of a sorbent decontaminant, which may provide a non- aqueous replacement to the current decontaminant (denoted as DS2) and, by reducing the need for water, considerably reduce the logistics burden associated with current decontamination methods.

Chemical and Biological Defense - - Management and Support.

The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. The JPO- BD was established to provide centralized management of specified BW defense acquisition programs. JPO- BD- managed projects include: i) procurement of the BIDS NDI and P3I systems, the LR- BSDS NDI and P3I systems, and the IBAD system; ii) development of the JBPDS and the Air Base/ Port Bio Detection ACTD; and iii) the JVAP. The JPO- BD is working with the Counterproliferation Support Program in developing improved capabilities for early warning of BW attack, including development of the eye safe LR- BSDS P3I upgrade, adapting and developing point BW agent detectors for remote/ early warning detection applications, and planning and developing the JBREWS ACTD to expedite the fielding of these systems. It is also working with DATSD( NCB)( CP) to develop the 911- BIO ACTD which involves adapting passive defense technologies to BW consequence management applications (see Section 8.3).

CBD Program FY 1998 Procurement Plans. The FY 1998 procurement plan calls for the continued fielding of NBC passive defense equipment along with initial procurement of several improved passive defense systems and components.

Within the contamination avoidance mission area a number of procurement activities are planned. Procurement for ICAM, a radically improved version of the already fielded Chemical Agent Monitor, continues under a multi- year contract. Procurement for the ACADA will continue. The ACADA provides, for the first time, a point detection capability to detect blister agents. It also provides improved sensitivity and response time, interference rejection, and a programmable capability for all known CW threat agents. FY 1998 funding continues modifications to the FOX NBCRS, which include added capabilities for standoff CW agent detection and communications links to the digital battlefield. Procurement of the AN/ UDR- 13 Pocket Radiac, which provides the first ever capability to both detect and indicate prompt and residual radiation doses received by troops, continues in FY 1998. Initial procurement for two new and improved CW detection systems for naval surface ships will continue in FY 1998. The IPDS replaces the older Chemical Agent Point Detection System and provides expanded point detection of CW vapor agents, including blister agents. SALAD provides shipboard detection of liquid CW agents. Funding is also provided to produce 28 BIDS P3I systems in FY 1998 to provide an improved detection and identification capability of BW agents within a theater of operations.

Within the collective protection mission area, FY 1998 funding supports continued procurement of the Chemical Biological Protective Shelter (CBPS), a highly mobile, self- contained collective protection system which can provide a contamination- free working area for medical and other selected units.

5.7.5 Other DoD Passive Defense Programs Strongly Related to Counter-proliferation.

Under an MoU with ATSD( NCB), DARPA works closely with the Counterproliferation Support Program and the CBD Program in its BW defense efforts. Consistent with the FY 1997 NDAA (Section 228), DARPA's BW Defense Program is not consolidated into the CBD Program but exists instead under separate program elements, and, beginning in FY 1998, it will no longer be incorporated into the CBD Program management and oversight structure.

DSWA Nuclear Survivability Programs. DSWA has two programs to ensure the survivability of weapons systems in a nuclear environment: i) the Test and Simulation Technology Program which provides simulators and simulator technology to validate weapons systems operability in nuclear environments; and ii) the Weapons System Operability Program which provides force survivability assessments against nuclear weapons effects and develops nuclear hardened electronic components for military use. Key accomplishments over the past year for the Test and Simulation Technology Program include: i) demonstration of the technologies and completion of facilities for a new x- ray simulator (known as DECADE) to be located at the Arnold Engineering Development Center; and ii) consolidation of radiation test facilities for more efficient operation. Key accomplishments in the Weapon System Operability Program since last year's report are: i) completion of an operability assessment for U. S. Space Command's (USSPACECOM) tactical warning and attack assessment (TW/ AA) system; ii) completion of a quantitative assessment of non- ideal airblast weapons effects for the Army Chemical and Nuclear Agency; iii) development of nuclear hardened high integration density memory chips; and iv) demonstrated hardening of optical imaging electronics at low temperature. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.8 and in Appendix C (Table C. 8).

Navy Radiac Program. This program provides RDT& E and procurement for radiation detection and monitoring equipment for Navy and Marine Corps use, including nuclear power, medical safety, weapons safety, radiography, and EOD applications. Key accomplishments include production of the Multifunction Radiac and an EOD dosimeter, initiation of low rate initial production for a laser dosimeter, and transition to EMD for the Underwater Radiac. Additional project details are provided in Table 5.8 and in Appendix C (Table C. 4).

5.7.6 Near-, Mid-, and Long- Term Milestones for DoD Passive Defense Programs.

5.8 Summary of DoD's Counterproliferation Response

Table 5.9: DoD's Response to the Counterproliferation ACEs