To reduce the international proliferation threat, DOE focuses its resources and expertise on
the following near term priorities:
Maintaining and continuously improving a program for nuclear emergency and nuclear terrorism response.
Key Accomplishments. Over the past year, DOE has achieved major successes in a number
of areas. The Department played a pivotal role in achieving an indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in bringing about the signature of the CTBT. It provided
leadership for National Laboratory activities aimed at assisting Russia and states of the FSU in
critical areas such as export controls, nuclear materials control and accounting, and physical
protection. To date, tens of tons of nuclear materials have been secured at over 40 facilities in
Russia and seven other FSU states. During FY 1997 and FY 1998, the intense activity experienced
during the past 24 months will continue as nuclear material security upgrades continue at the 17
facilities added during the past six months and as additional facilities are added under cooperation
with the Russian Navy and icebreaker fleets, the transportation sector, and other locations and
activities in the FSU. These successes reflect expanded cooperation at all locations in Russia, the
FSU, and the Baltics where weapons- usable nuclear material is located. Further, DOE is
committed to cooperating with these countries to ensure that proper export controls on nuclear-related
materials, equipment, and technologies are enforced. The Department also anticipates
completing the canning of spent nuclear reactor fuel canisters in North Korea and continuing to
provide support for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in both North Korea
and Iraq, which reflect the Administration's commitment to reduce the global danger of nuclear
weapons proliferation.
DOE also undertakes various activities, as a member of the intelligence community, related
to nuclear proliferation intelligence data analysis and treaty monitoring. DOE nonproliferation and
proliferation prevention activities are discussed in this section. Joint DOE/ U. S. Intelligence
activities are discussed in the Intelligence Annex to this report.
6.2 New DOE Initiative: The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
In FY 1997, directly in response to a CPRC recommendation to establish a joint DOE,
DoD, and U. S. Intelligence R& D initiative in chemical and biological defense, DOE began its
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). Funding to initiate the program was
provided in the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici amendment to the FY 1997 NDAA. The CBNP is focused
on leveraging technology developed in the nuclear nonproliferation program and in numerous
"work for others" projects to support CW/ BW defense and counterproliferation efforts. Both DoD
and U. S. Intelligence have long drawn upon DOE National Laboratory capabilities in a broad range
of areas through the "work for others" process (through which other organizations can tap DOE
National Laboratory capabilities). Such activities are focused on critical near- term defense
requirements. Furthermore, DOE has maintained long standing and preeminent R& D programs in
the basic chemical sciences, life sciences, and biotechnology in support of both traditional DOE
missions (such as nuclear weapons production, production cleanup and environmental remediation,
and occupational health and safety) and its Human Genome Project.
The CBNP is coordinating the application of technology developments arising from these
efforts to meet various CW/ BW defense and counterproliferation needs identified by users from
across the interagency community. The CBNP is focusing its activities in four thrust areas:
fundamental biology, prediction, detection, and mitigation. The fundamental biology area includes
the genomic sequencing of priority pathogens, understanding structure/ function relationships for
biotoxins, and the development of tools for epidemiological monitoring. In the area of prediction,
the CBNP is focusing on the development of atmospheric transport models for use in complex
urban terrain (including the interior of structures). CW/ BW detection activities center on the
development of DNA- based technologies for bacterial agent detection and microseparation
technologies for biotoxins and CW agents. The mitigation effort is concentrating on developing
rapidly deployable, environmentally benign CW/ BW decontamination technologies. DOE has
budgeted $17 million in FY 1997 and is requesting $19 million in FY 1998 for the CBNP.
DoD and, to a lesser extent, other government agencies are sponsoring approximately $30
million in CW/ BW detection technology development at the National Laboratories. This work is
primarily focused on expanding sensor capabilities, finding near- term solutions to the
demilitarization of CW munitions stockpiles, and enhancing strategic and tactical intelligence
collection and battlefield surveillance. Nonproliferation technology development undertaken by
DOE for its nuclear mission, but which at the scientific level is also directly applicable to CW/ BW
counterproliferation, amounts to approximately $70 million out of the $200 million nuclear
verification and control technology R& D program. The National Laboratories annually conduct
over $320 million in biotechnology research under the auspices and coordination of the DOE
Biotechnology Interlaboratory Council. Chemical sciences research activities exceed this amount,
involving such activities as studies of toxicological effects, development of new and miniaturized
chemical and biological sensors, remote measurement and sensing of chemical and biological
species, development of chemical and biological remediation techniques, and development of
advanced chemical and biological laboratory analytical methods. The CBNP program is, therefore,
well positioned to leverage this extensive technology base.
6.3 Status and Accomplishments of DOE Proliferation Prevention Programs
6.3.1 Detecting and Characterizing Worldwide Production of Nuclear Materials and
Weapons.
DOE, in support of DOE ACE priority 1, continued development of both remote and
on- site complementary tools to detect and characterize foreign nuclear materials production
activities. Acquisition of special nuclear materials is the most important step for a potential nuclear
weapons proliferator to accomplish. The ability to detect production is, therefore, a critical
proliferation prevention capability, and the ability to detect such production remotely is a powerful
deterrent to proliferation. The CALIOPE (Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation Of
Proliferation Effluents) program is a major remote sensing effort focused on providing such a
capability. The CALIOPE program is composed of a multi- laboratory team with the goal of
perfecting laser based remote sensing techniques for trace chemical effluent detection. The
CALIOPE system will eventually consist of an airborne sensor system for the detection of chemical
species in environments indicative of nuclear materials production. A key accomplishment during
the past year was the fielding of a ground- based second generation carbon dioxide Differential
Absorption Lidar (CO2 DIAL) system at the Nevada Test Site. In blind tests, this system
demonstrated a significantly improved ability to detect and identify effluents which were released
both individually and in mixtures. A second highlight was the execution of a DoD/ DOE
collaborative airborne CO2 DIAL experiment called the Nonproliferation - Airborne Lidar
Experiment (N- ABLE). N- ABLE demonstrated the ability to detect and identify sub- lethal
concentrations of CW agents at extended standoff distances.
Other nuclear weapons clandestine production detection efforts are focused on the
development of a small satellite demonstration system employing multispectral infrared imaging
techniques. These imaging techniques are useful to detect and monitor such production indicators
as reactor cooling pond temperatures, which can be used to estimate plutonium production rates.
The system is scheduled for launch in FY 1999. Multispectral change detection also can be useful
in detecting undeclared production related facilities and activities. Over the past year, substantial
progress was made on an end- to- end modeling system that will aid in extracting facility power
estimates from thermal signatures and on the assembly of a high precision thermal imager
calibration facility. These efforts exploit a unique combination of DOE National Laboratory
expertise in the nuclear weapons production cycle, production signatures, laser systems, rapid
prototyping, and satellite systems engineering. Planned funding for production detection activities
in FY 1998 is $66.8 million compared to $69.7 million in FY 1997.
6.3.2 Monitoring Worldwide Nuclear Testing.
DOE, in support of DOE ACE priority 5,
continued to develop and deploy elements of U. S. capabilities for monitoring the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT) and the CTBT. DOE has a long standing partnership with DoD in this area, with
DOE designing and producing nuclear detonation detection sensor systems for deployment on DoD
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites (see subsection
5.2.4). These systems include optical, x- ray, gamma- ray, neutron, and electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) sensors. During the past year DOE delivered four GPS payloads, upgraded GPS x- ray and
optical instruments to extend their operating ranges to partially overlap with the CTBT regime
requirements, and supported the launch of one DSP payload. Additional satellite- based, CTBT
related activities included preparations for launch of a prototype satellite (denoted "FORTÉ") in the
summer of 1997 to demonstrate an autonomously triggered, non- deniable, all- weather EMP sensor
system, and the mapping of EMP backgrounds recorded by the ALEXIS satellite.
Ground- based technical methods associated with the CTBT, and specifically intended for
the International Monitoring System (IMS), involve hydroacoustics, seismology, radionuclide
detection and characterization, and infrasound techniques. DOE is actively pursuing specification
of the IMS, and has supported U. S. Government efforts to obtain international agreement on a 60
station infrasound network and a 118 station seismic network. One focus of the seismic studies is
to characterize regional areas of interest to improve the detection of smaller and potentially evasive
tests. During the past year, a database of germane signals in China was assembled, including those
from earthquakes, nuclear events, and high explosive events. Data analysis as well as algorithm and
automated data processing development continue and draw upon National Laboratory experience
in nuclear testing, mining and seismic geology, field measurements, and data fusion.
DOE completed design of a prototype infrasound station for eventual commercial
production and possible inclusion in the IMS and expects to complete a prototype later this year.
DOE National Laboratory experience in atmospheric science is especially relevant to this activity.
Hydroacoustic monitoring provides yet another complementary tool to detect low yield, potentially
evasive testing. DOE is also developing the specifications for an ocean monitoring system.
Intermediate accomplishments include signature assessments of evasive explosions and the
development of detection system specifications. Radionuclide techniques offer another important
tool by providing critical forensic data to support CTBT verification. DOE is developing
radionuclide particulate as well as prototype xenon gas samplers for commercialization and use by
the IMS. DOE works closely with DoD to support CTBT verification activities. Planned funding
for nuclear test monitoring activities in FY 1998 is $81.2 million, unchanged from FY 1997.
6.3.3 Preventing and Detecting the Diversion and Smuggling of Nuclear Materials.
DOE's efforts to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling (DOE ACE priorities 1 and 7) are focused
on securing nuclear material at its source, detecting stolen material in transit, responding to
threatened and actual events, and determining the origin of intercepted material. Extensive DOE
efforts are focused on protecting domestic nuclear materials and combating smuggling by securing
potential sources of material in the U. S. Similar efforts in protecting nuclear materials worldwide
are described in the next several sections. To deal with materials in transit, DOE works closely
with DoD, U. S. Intelligence, and others in the interagency community providing technology
support for detection and interdiction of stolen nuclear materials. In addition, DOE and National
Laboratory personnel lead an international technical working group to help determine the sources
of smuggled nuclear material by applying the full scope of laboratory forensic methods on
intercepted materials. This program exploits multiple DOE expertise in environmental and nuclear
material production signatures, radiochemical analysis, and law enforcement support. Planned
funding for these activities in FY 1998 is $43.5 million, up from $31.0 million in FY 1997.
6.3.4 Securing Nuclear Materials, Technology, and Expertise in Russia and the FSU.
Two DOE programs comprise this activity: the Material Protection, Control and Accounting
(MPC& A) program and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). The MPC& A program is
primarily related to nuclear materials security and nonproliferation, and the goal of the IPP is to
engage scientists and engineers from the weapons institutes of the FSU in peaceful technology
applications in order to help stabilize personnel and resources that represent a potential risk of
"expertise proliferation". Total funding requested for FY 1998 is $167.0 million compared with
$142.6 million received for FY 1997 (which reflects a congressional plus- up of $33.2 million).
The MPC& A Program. Material protection, control, and accounting cooperative upgrade
programs are now under way at over 40 locations in Russia and seven other FSU states,
representing more than 75% of the known locations possessing weapons- useable nuclear materials.
To date, DOE has improved the security of tens of tons of weapons- useable nuclear materials, and
negotiations are currently under way (scheduled to be completed this year) to expand MPC& A
cooperation to include all weapons- useable nuclear material at all known facilities in the FSU. Sites
not yet covered by the MPC& A program include four Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
(Minatom) nuclear weapons production and dismantlement facilities, a handful of sites that possess
highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for naval nuclear propulsion, and a few small research
facilities. The MPC& A program does not address nuclear materials in assembled weapons; these
will be covered in other cooperative programs between DoD and the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Expanded cooperation in 1997 includes accelerated work with the Russian Navy, continued
cooperative efforts at Minatom facilities, and the addition of security enhancements for nuclear
material transport. FY 1998 efforts will include: i) increased equipment procurement; ii) funding
additional work in Russia and Kazakstan and accelerating ongoing work throughout the Minatom
defense complex; iii) extending naval fuel work to cover the icebreaker fleet, naval support ships,
and naval nuclear fuel transportation; iv) fully implementing efforts to improve the MPC& A for
nuclear materials during transportation; and v) continued expanded cooperation with the Russian
Federal Nuclear Radiation and Safety Authority (denoted by its Russian acronym "GAN"),
including start- up of a pilot Russian federal MPC& A information system. Additional efforts to help
improve the safeguards culture will be supported through development of nuclear regulations and
training of GAN inspectors. Because of the size and complexity of some of the sites, full
implementation of MPC& A safeguards is expected to take several years to complete, extending
through the year 2002.
DOE is also working with governments and institutions of the FSU countries to strengthen
their export control systems and, thereby, stem the illicit flow of nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology. Much of this effort is accomplished at the grass- roots level through laboratory- to-laboratory
cooperative programs in export control. The objective is to engage their scientific
community in their own national export control systems, just as the expertise of the DOE National
Laboratories serves the U. S. Government. DOE is also identifying and training technical experts in
the FSU in how government agencies can administer export controls. DOE laboratories explain
how to provide expert technical advice to the agencies, how to review export license applications,
and what to be alert for in the export control arena.
The Initiative for Proliferation Prevention. As previously noted, the primary objective of
the IPP is to stabilize personnel associated with NBC weapon programs within the FSU to
minimize the risk of the proliferation of NBC weapons expertise. The IPP program draws
scientists, engineers, and technicians from FSU NBC weapons programs into commercial ventures,
avoiding potential "brain drain" to would- be proliferants and providing long term employment in
non- weapons work. Under the IPP, DOE National Laboratories work with Russian and FSU
institutes to identify and evaluate the commercial potential of various products related to R& D
activities conducted at those institutes. Cooperative projects between a coalition of 75 U. S.
laboratories, corporations, universities, and the nuclear inheritor states of the FSU have engaged
more than 2,700 former weapons personnel in the FSU in projects ranging from MPC& A and
nuclear safety to materials science, biotechnology, and instrumentation.
6.3.5 Limiting Weapons- Usable Fissile Materials Worldwide.
Activities in this area
focus on eliminating or reducing stockpiles of plutonium, promoting alternatives to the civilian use
of plutonium, and reducing stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, as well as eliminating the civilian use
of HEU. Further, DOE will be supporting U. S. Government efforts to negotiate an international
convention to end the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Following judicial
review of objections to the return of foreign research reactor spent fuel, the U. S. has begun
accepting shipments of U. S.- origin enriched nuclear materials from overseas. New funding in FY
1998 will support the development of advanced high density low enriched uranium fuels for
Russian and Chinese reactors and for the remaining unconverted reactors in Western Europe and
the U. S. DOE expects to begin work to convert the plutonium production reactor in Russia to
energy- only production. Funding requested for this activity in FY 1998 is $16.4 million, compared
to $16.6 million in FY 1997.
6.3.6 Ensuring Transparent and Irreversible Nuclear Reductions Worldwide.
Activities focus on: i) the exchange and confirmation of data on nuclear weapons materials
inventories; ii) monitoring nuclear warhead production and expediting dismantlement of excess
weapons under bilateral agreements; iii) conducting reciprocal bilateral inspections of nuclear
components and materials; and iv) implementing the purchase agreement of 500 metric tons of
HEU from dismantled FSU warheads while working to reduce weapons inventories. FY 1998 will
see continued: i) technical expert support and conclusion of negotiations for Russian HEU
Purchase Agreement transparency measures; ii) technical analysis relevant to plutonium Mutual
Reciprocal Inspections (MRI); iii) negotiations with the Russians on plutonium MRI; and iv)
technical and analytical support from the DOE laboratories to establish transparent and irreversible
nuclear reductions. Funding requested for this activity in FY 1998 is $3.5 million, compared to
$4.0 million in FY 1997.
6.3.7 Controlling Nuclear Exports.
Activities in this area assist the international
community in: i) effectively controlling exports and establishing responsible supplier policies; ii)
implementing U. S. statutory licensing requirements for nuclear or nuclear- related export controls;
iii) encouraging adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines; and iv) strengthening multilateral
supplier initiatives, including enhancing export controls in the FSU states. FY 1998 efforts will
assist FSU states in controlling exports, reforming statutory licensing requirements, strengthening
multilateral supplier initiatives, and promoting expanded information sharing and analysis. Funding
requested for this activity in FY 1998 is $16.5 million, down slightly from $16.9 million in FY
1997.
6.3.8 Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.
FY 1996 and FY 1997
efforts promoted adherence to the NPT and increased the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA.
DOE also provides technical expertise to enhance IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear
activities. Successes included the negotiation and signing of the CTBT and facilitation of IAEA
inspections of excess fissile materials. Other activities actively promoted regional nonproliferation
measures. FY 1998 will see the negotiation and implementation of agreements for safeguards
cooperation for improved material protection, control, accounting, and transparency with other
countries and international organizations including China, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, the
IAEA, European Atomic Energy Community, Argentina, Brazil, the Argentine- Brazil Accounting
and Control Commission, and Australia. Funding requested for this activity in FY 1998 is $34.4
million, down from $39.3 million in FY 1997.
6.3.9 Nuclear Emergency and Terrorism Response.
DOE maintains several emergency
response assets postured to respond to events that may occur should proliferation prevention
efforts fail. DOE conducts analyses and provides operational and technical support in response to
nuclear emergency and terrorism events worldwide. This includes the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team (NEST) which has primary responsibility for responding to acts of nuclear terrorism or other
incidents involving nuclear weapons or devices. It can be deployed under the authority of the FBI
for domestic incidents and the Department of State for foreign incidents. Requested funding for
DOE emergency management and response programs in FY 1998 is $41.1 million up from $35.3
million in FY 1997. Additional details are provided in Section 8.4.
6.4 DOE Technologies Developed to IOC
Except for the specific portions of the satellite nuclear detonation detection activities for
nuclear test monitoring, DOE- developed technologies are not normally taken to initial operating
capability (IOC). Under DOE technology development activities, the end product is a capability
demonstration of a system or method, most commonly in the form of a field capable prototype,
developed in direct response to requirements identified by a user agency (e. g., DoD or U. S.
Intelligence). It is at this stage in the hardware development cycle that DOE program managers
encourage and participate in the transfer of the technology product to the user community for field
hardening, engineering refinements, and production.
DOE currently produces satellite- borne sensors for the national capability to monitor and
verify compliance with the LTBT and the CTBT. These sensors are secondary payloads on the
GPS and DSP satellites (as described above in subsection 6.3.2). DOE is developing the next
generation of improved optical, x- ray, and space environmental sensors to provide a better
capability to monitor the continuation of the LTBT and to enable the U. S. to monitor and verify the
CTBT after entry- into- force. The sensor systems under development are planned to go from
development, through IOC, to production to meet required delivery dates for the next generation of
GPS satellites. In addition to these satellite systems, DOE is also developing ground based
components for airborne radionuclide sampling systems and will be heavily involved in supporting
DoD and other agencies of the U. S. Government in identifying reliable commercial suppliers.