DOT&E Director, Operational Test & Evaluation  
FY98 Annual Report
FY98 Annual Report

JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (JTMD) ATTACK OPERATIONS


Joint Test and Evaluation Program: Lead Service
Authorized Manning:14Air Force
Total JT&E Budget (TY$):$38.3M 
Charter Date:4QFY94 
Completion Date:3QFY99 

JT&E DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) Attack Operations Joint Test Force was chartered to investigate and evaluate the U.S. capability to conduct joint theater missile defense attack operations using existing and near-term (FY98) systems and CINC-approved/proposed theater missile defense architectures. The JTMD Attack Operations Joint Test Force contributes to three of the four Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts. It will help Joint Forces in the theater by contributing to full-dimensional protection of the dominant maneuver forces through precision engagement of threat ballistic missiles. The JTMD Attack Operations Joint Test Force incorporates state-of-the-art technologies in its sensors; weapons; and battle management, computer, command, control and communications systems (BMC4I).

JTMD is the integration of joint force capabilities to find targets, task resources, attack, and kill the enemy's theater missile capabilities before they can be brought to bear on friendly forces, critical assets, and areas of vital interest. This requires the capability to attack theater missiles with an appropriate mix of theater missile defense weapons. Theater missile defense activities are currently broken into three distinct areas: (1) attack operations; (2) active defense; and (3) passive defense. An integrated BMC4I architecture knits these elements together to form the total theater missile defense operational capability.


BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The JTMD charter states: "JTMD is chartered to employ multi-Service equipment and personnel to conduct a JT&E to investigate and evaluate the capability of U.S. Forces to conduct theater missile defense attack operations employing existing and near-term (FY98) systems. JTMD will utilize CINC-approved/proposed architectures and an appropriate mix of simulation experiments and field testing to conduct an evaluation."

An integrated test concept was developed that used existing data and leveraged field-testing and simulation. Operational and developmental test data is being acquired for sensors, BMC4I, and attack systems to establish the operational and technical capabilities for these systems. Field tests are used to fill gaps in the data available for these systems. The collected data is instrumental in ensuring that the capabilities of these systems are accurately reflected in the simulation models. A combination of field testing and simulation (distributed and constructive) provide the primary tools to investigate JTMD Attack Operations.


TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The Phase I Attack Operations Simulation Network (AOSN), a computer exercise conducted in July 1996, was designed to provide the necessary data to evaluate theater missile defense architecture, tactics, techniques, and procedures for a Southwest Asia scenario. The Phase I AOSN included a carrier battle group, amphibious-ready group, limited Air Force assets, and Navy Special Operations Forces.

The Phase II and III AOSN conducted in July 1997 used the same Southwest Asia scenario as Phase I. In the scenario, a U.S. Joint Task Force responded to the threat country's positioning of its land, sea, and air forces and the deployment of its theater missiles (ballistic and cruise). For Phase II, the centers of the Joint Task Force were an Air Force Air Expeditionary Force and a Naval Task Force, comprised of a Carrier Battle Force and an Amphibious Ready Group. The Air Force had an Air Operations Center commanding a composite force of fighters, transport, tanker, command and control, and sensor support aircraft. Naval aviation in the theater included carrier, Amphibious Ready Group, and land-based fighters and support assets. In addition, the Joint Task Force had access to national assets allocated for direct support of the theater commander's objectives. Phase III added additional sensors, command elements, and attack systems associated with land-based Army and Marine units.

Phase IV is designed as an in-depth study of the up-front actions in the attack operations process; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Phases I, II, and III testing concentrated on the BMC4I and attack system components of attack operations. Phase IV was designed to explore alternative sensor management techniques and the effects of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace enhancements to characterize and identify potential alternatives that might enhance U.S. forces' capabilities in these areas.

Three of the Phase IV activities assess attack operations as they relate to the Northeast Asia theater. First, the Joint Test Force capitalized on results and lessons learned from the three previously conducted AOSN tests, as well as conducting studies in other supporting areas. Secondly, a detailed investigation of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance process and potential alternative solutions was assessed through constructive simulation. Thirdly, small-scale field testing observations were used in amplifying simulation Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance results. The simulation activity was conducted as a sequence of man-in-the-loop test events over a six-month period. The final event (December 1998) was conducted in-theater with participation by 7th Air Force personnel.

For leveraged testing opportunities, the Joint Test Force operationally deploys a SCUD battalion consisting of six launchers and associated missiles, decoys, and support vehicles. Primary use of these assets is to gather sensor and attack system data for the JTMD attack operations data base. An important by-product is a unique training opportunity for the operational forces participating in the test events.


TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

The JTMD Joint Test Force mission statement identifies four critical operational issues. They were developed specifically to assist in the subsequent evaluation of achievable program objectives. The critical operational issues are:

The first three critical operational issues focus attention on the three main divisions of systems that must be integrated to conduct successful JTMD Attack Operations. The fourth critical operational issue addresses the impact on individual system capability to support other requirements when the assets are assigned to support JTMD Attack Operations. More concisely, the critical operational issues can be stated as: (1) can we find theater missile elements; (2) can we kill theater missile elements; (3) can we pass time critical information to an attack asset; and (4) what is the cost of investing critical theater attack resources into JTMD Attack Operations vice other mission areas?

Attack operations against theater ballistic missiles has a potential for success in the near-term. Combatant and operational commands should: (1) continue training in missile target sets; (2) add empirical sensor data to current data bases; (3) support joint intelligence planning; and (4) improve utilization of theater sensors.

The final JTMD program report and briefing is scheduled for June 1999.


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