1363 - Anti-missile defence for Europe (Techn & A Comm) - Mr. Lenzer
Document 1363 17th May 1993
Anti-missile defence for Europe -
guidelines drawn from the symposium
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (2)
by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
on anti-missile defence for Europe - guidelines drawn from the symposium
submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur
II. The importance of new international developments for an appropriate evaluation of the lessons learned from the symposium
III. Risk assessment, a task never completed
IV. Strategies for protecting Europe from existing and future security dangers
I. Programme of the symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe held in Cecchignola on 20th and 21st April 1993
II. Extracts from the press conference given by Mr. Aspin, United States Secretary of Defence, 13th May 1993
on anti-missile defence for Europe- guidelines drawn from the symposium
(i) Welcoming the recent progress achieved in international efforts to strengthen disarmament measures and to promote non-proliferation by concluding the START II Treaty and the chemical weapons convention (CWC) and by extending the scope and membership of the missile technology control regime (MTCR);
(ii) Concerned, however, about certain Far Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries which do not yet intend to join the chemical weapon convention and the MTCR regime;
(iii) Disturbed by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
(iv) Observing that the proliferation of theatre and strategic missile technology into sensitive regions which might affect the security of Europe is still continuing;
(v) Concerned that certain countries in unstable regions are continuing their attempts to try to obtain ABC and missile capabilities;
(vi) Gratified that the symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe held in Rome provided a useful opportunity to draw the attention of decision-makers to the risks stemming from missile proliferation;
(vii) Convinced therefore that the European governments, and in particular those of WEU member countries, must shoulder their responsibilities by taking appropriate decisions to guarantee the security of their populations and military forces before risk becomes threat;
(viii) Taking note of the recent decision by the United States to abandon further research and development of an orbital-based anti- missile global protection system (SDI) in favour of a land-based system;
(ix) Convinced that all the discussions and negotiations so far initiated on a bilateral or multinational basis on possible means of creating a system of protection of any kind whatsoever should lead to openness and enhanced international confidence and not a new arms race between a privileged group of states and others outside the system;
(x) Reiterating that Western European Union has made great progress in taking a leading role in space observation and that - as demonstrated at the symposium - European industry has excellent experience and expertise of anti-missile technology;
(xi) Convinced that the appropriate approach in the present situation should first be to create a universal early warning and surveillance system, concrete defence and protection requirements remaining initially under regional or national control,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
1. Take a leading role in promoting, in relevant international conferences and institutions, further initiatives for developing and strengthening disarmament, confidence-building measures, non- proliferation regimes and political dialogue;
2. Take an initiative in the United Nations with the aim of establishing an international early warning and surveillance centre open to all countries interested in sharing data and information on missile activities and linked to an obligation to notify all missile firings and space launches;
3. Adopt without delay its position on a global protection system discussed between the United States and Russia and ask for there to be prior consultations between the United States and its allies before resuming these talks;
4. Decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost- effective anti-missile protection system for Europe.
(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur)
When the Technological and Aerospace Committee presented its first report on anti-ballistic missile defence to the Assembly in December 19921 it came to the conclusion that the problem of risk assessment regarding the development of advanced missile technologies, their worldwide proliferation and the appropriate response to these new challenges left open so many questions that the organisation of a public debate in the form of an expert symposium seemed to be an appropriate means of starting a more in-depth debate on the subject, the aim being to circumscribe the problem and provide the basic data for defining concepts and answers. Such a symposium was held in Rome on 20th and 21st April 19932.
At the same time, the Assembly drew the attention of the WEU Council to the subject in submitting a number of proposals contained in Recommendation 533 and asking the Council to submit its conclusions to the Assembly. It appears from the Council's answer to
Recommendation 5333 that :
"1. The Council is fully aware of the need to assess the risks to Europe stemming from 'the development of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear proliferation of ballistic technology in countries close to Europe's southern and southeastern flanks'.
2. Questions pertaining to a global protection system (GPS) are on the agenda of the Council's Special Working Group.
3. An in-depth study of questions pertaining to a global system would necessarily have to precede any 'adoption of a joint European position towards the American programme for global protection against limited strikes (GPALS)'.
4. The Council will bear in mind the Assembly's request to 'promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent international and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system'.
5. Additional information will become available to the Assembly in due course."
While it is understandable that at the present stage the Council is unable to provide any concrete guidelines for the complex problem of anti-missile defence, it is to be welcomed that these questions are now being discussed in its special working group, which is an indication that the matter is considered first and foremost as a fundamental political problem.
As Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the committee, pointed out in Rome, the anti-missile symposium, like previous symposia organised by the committee, should hopefully give considerable impetus to the shaping of ideas and in such a way as to help the governments concerned decide what position to adopt and to take appropriate joint decisions; it is to be hoped that the guidelines to be drawn from this symposium will help the Council to keep its promise that "additional information will become available to the Assembly in due course."
II. The importance of new international developments for an appropriate evaluation of the lessons learned from the symposium
In the period between the Assembly's December 1992 session and the holding of the Rome symposium at the end of April 1993, a number of significant events of a very different nature have occurred on the international scene which cannot be without consequences for the conclusions to be drawn from the abundance of information, ideas and proposals presented by the various experts in Rome.
On 3rd January 1993, the United States and Russia signed the START II Treaty, aimed at the further elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multiple warheads (MIRVs), the entry into force of which depends on the fate of START I, for which the attitude of certain successor states of the Soviet Union, namely, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, will play a crucial role.
On 13th January 1993, more than 120 member countries of the United Nations signed the chemical weapons convention (CWC), which is to constitute a worldwide ban on the production, acquisition, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. By 29th March 1993, the number of signatories had increased to 143.
A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since August 1968. The importance of the successful outcome of twenty-three years of negotiations resides in the fact that the treaty is historic in the scope of its provisions and in particular regarding verification.
The conclusion of this treaty is the more important as it became evident that the threat of chemical and biological weapons has become global. According to the United States Congress Armed Services Committee, thirty-one nations either possess or could develop an offensive chemical weapons capability and eleven others are in the same category for an offensive biological weapons capability1.
The member states of the Arab League, however, decided to boycott the treaty as long as Israel did not adhere to the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. Nevertheless, four Arab states, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, broke this boycott and signed the treaty, followed later by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The refusal of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea to sign the chemical weapons convention implies that the threat of using chemical weapons is still virulent in two sensitive regions and concerns countries whose efforts to obtain theatre and strategic missile technology are well known.
Furthermore, whereas international authorities are seeking to establish ways and means of reviewing, strengthening and extending the nuclear non-proliferation treaty which will expire in 1995, North Korea announced on 12th March 1993 that it was withdrawing from the treaty which it signed only two years ago, following its dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was asking to inspect military sites in the country where production of weapons- grade plutonium was suspected.
In this context it is noteworthy that the Government of India confirmed at the end of March 1993 its decision not to join the non- proliferation treaty which it considers as a discriminative treaty. South Africa, which had joined the treaty on 10th July 1991, admitted at the same time in public that the country had produced nuclear weapons in the seventies and eighties but they had been totally destroyed in 1990.
In the area of the missile technology control regime (MTCR), the United States and its partners in the regime adopted on 7th January 1993 revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons. Initially, the MTCR was intended to control the proliferation of missile systems capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads of at least 500 kg over a distance of at least 300 km. The new guidelines mandate "a strong presumption of denial" for the transfer of "any missiles which are judged to be intended to carry any weapon of mass destruction, not just nuclear weapons"2. Consequently, partner governments would presumably deny the transfer of all missiles with a 500 kg payload capacity and a minimum range of 300 km, plus any other missiles that "might be intended for use with any weapons of mass destruction - chemical, biological or nuclear"3.
In March 1993, member countries of the MTCR agreed on further details of the enforced control regime welcomed Iceland as a new member and noted the application of Argentina and Hungary to become members. The major suppliers of missiles which are not members of the MTCR regime are Israel, China, Russia and North Korea. Whereas the first three abovementioned countries made more or less firm commitments to observe MTCR guidelines, North Korea has expressed no intention of observing them.
In the area of comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures, the ratification procedure of the Open Skies Treaty seems to be progressing smoothly so that the treaty may enter into force before the end of this year. The possibilities offered by agreed unarmed aerial observation over almost the whole northern hemisphere might be an additional useful means of detecting missile production and deployment. But all the more it is important to extend such a regime to other regions, including the Far East and the southern hemisphere.
During the Rome symposium, the consequences of the new United States administration's security and defence policy on the American anti-missile defence programme and in particular on the future of the United States strategic defence initiative organisation (SDIO) was not yet foreseeable. The Clinton administration had not appointed a new SDIO director. In the absence of new political guidelines, no SDIO representative was able to present the official United States position at the symposium.
Yet in the Pentagon the 1994 budget proposal by the SDIO met with a critical reaction and the new United States Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, had directed the SDIO to make theatre defences its top priority in cutting the agency's 1994 budget proposal by $2.5 billion to $3.8 billion, the same as its 1993 funding1. Defences of the United States territory were to be given second priority and Brilliant Pebbles was to be at the bottom of the priority list.
On 13th May 1993, however, the United States Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, announced in public2 the "end of the Star Wars era":
"We are renaming and refocusing the Strategic Defence Initiative Office to reflect the Clinton administration's changes in priorities. From now on, the SDIO will be the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation...That is why we have made theatre ballistic missile defence our first priority, to cope with the new dangers in the post-cold war, post-Soviet world. After theatre missile defence, BMDO's priorities are going to be the national missile defence, which is a defence of the American people from ground-based systems. And the third point of emphasis or third priority will be the follow-on technologies that offer some promise in both tactical and strategic defence. These changes represent a shift away from a crash programme for deployment of space-based weapons designed to meet a threat that has receded to the vanishing point - the all-out, surprise attack from the former Soviet Union.
... Since its inception in 1984, SDIO has reported directly to the Secretary of Defence. The new
arrangement has tbe MBD organisation reporting to the Under-Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Technology, who is John Deutsch. This shift reflects the fact that the programme will be shifting from research to development - to the development and acquisition of systems. And it will allow us to manage our work on ballistic missile defence in a away appropriate to its place in the overall defence programme."
These new orientations, the consequences of which will still need careful examination, will also affect the follow-up of the United States-Russian dialogue on the creation of a global protection system (GPS) initiated in June 1992 by the then United States President George Bush and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
In Europe most governments were absorbed by the continuing problem of finding a solution to the continuing Balkan crisis or by various internal political difficulties or elections. Thus the Rome symposium was held in a period during which none of the governments and countries concerned was in a position to present final concepts or even detailed and agreed assessments on the symposium subject.
All the more, the Assembly should be grateful for the very helpful and interesting orientation given by the Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Ando, in presenting an anti-missile defence system as a possible universal confidence- and hence stability-building measure, open for wide participation, and not just as a means of deterrence and protection of a privileged group of states against other countries with supposed hostile intentions.
According to such a concept developed by Mr. Ando:
"... a system of anti-missile protection, mainly the detection and the monitoring components, might be able to carry out some of the following essential functions:
- observing, possibly with the assistance of its sensors, the proliferation of missiles in relevant areas;
- deterring states intending to use their capabilities for terrorist intimidation purposes from
taking any such action;
- on a reciprocal basis, offering a guarantee to countries participating in the system.
A defence system restricted to the North Atlantic or NATO Europe might fulfil the first of these two
functions; conversely, if the system of protection were to be global and open to the participation of other countries, even if they had different levels of economic and technological means, it might fulfil all three functions. By this I mean that globalisation - and I use this word to indicate a tendency and not an immediately attainable goal - of such a protective network might encourage greater confidence and subsequently give rise to a mechanism allowing crises to be controlled.
The need to increase confidence is confirmed by the growth, in and around Europe, of tensions and conflicts that are often marked by great violence."
The following task of analysing the lessons to be learned from the Rome symposium should be carried out starting from such an initial political approach.
III. Risk assessment, a task never completed
One of the most difficult enterprises is defining the appropriate criteria which should govern the method of identifying sources of possible new security dangers for Europe. One method is to collect and keep all available information and data on who develops and supplies to whom any kind of sophisticated weaponry.
But this method has to be combined with an effort to explore the motivations for such activities and analysis of the political situation and evolution in the relevant world region. In this respect, the exposes presented by Mr. Nativi, General Jean and Mr. Tan Eng Bok were particularly helpful.
Regarding the political risks, Mr. Nativi mentioned the growing pressure from Islamic fundamentalists in countries such as Algeria and Egypt, whereas General Jean feared that democratisation and political pluralism in a number of Mediterranean countries would in the short term help the accession to power of these fundamentalist forces which openly declare that, once in control, they would eliminate the democratic institutions imported from the corrupt West in order to restore the purity of Islamic law.
Islamic fundamentalism can in fact become a potential security risk for Europe when it is combined with a complex of inferiority vis- a-vis the technical superiority of the western world. In this context, both Mr. Nativi and Mr. Minicucci came to noteworthy identical conclusions with regard to possible motivations of countries seeking to obtain ballistic missile technology.
Mr. Nativi considered that, studying the lessons of the last part of the second world war today, countries which do not have the aircraft to conduct a strategic bombing campaign might adopt the less complicated and less costly alternative of an indiscriminate missile attack.
Mr. Minicucci's assessment comes to a similar assessment when he says that:
"Paradoxically, success in the Gulf war stimulated proliferation because it showed that it was impossible for third world states to withstand the West's high technology conventional megasystems, particularly those of the United States, whatever the scale of conventional weapons held by the third world.
The only possibility still open to trouble-makers, apart from the choice of guerrilla warfare and
terrorism, is to impose restrictions on the massive use of the West's high technology military power. The only means of doing this is to threaten western territories and peoples with direct retaliation and to limit operation and logistic concentrations of intervention forces by threatening to use missile-borne weapons of mass destruction."
If one follows such considerations, one has to admit that a potential risk for Europe would be directed first and foremost at populations and cities as underlined by a number of other speakers, such as General Graham, Mr. Steinicke and Mr. Burnham.
However, one should assess the motivations of recipients of missile technology and also those of the producers and suppliers. Mr. Barthelemy rightly remarked that little had been said during the symposium about the motivations of the proliferating countries. According to his assessment, they are probably mainly regional, in terms of prestige, power or security, there is sometimes also talk of aggressive sanctuarisation.
A very comprehensive study of these questions made by Andrew W. Hull1 identifies three main motives: the desire for self sufficiency in key defence areas, the desire to demonstrate high-level technological advancement in order to place the country on the same general industrial phase as the most technologically-advanced western nations, and, thirdly, economic motives by gaining foreign exchange in exporting their military products. As an example, only 10% of Brazil's total defence industrial output stays in the country, but 95% of its aerospace production goes abroad.
According to the same author, the interest in earning foreign exchange by exporting missile technology may be especially developed in countries like North Korea, China and Russia and Ukraine too. Yet motivations may differ considerably from country to country and should be studied carefully2.
No clear picture could be gained from the situation regarding the People's Republic of China. It is therefore interesting to note that Mr. Karp did not name China as main proliferator in one of the three categories of supplier countries he had established. On the other hand, Mr. Tan Eng Bok underlined the increase in China's military expenditure, and its technical co-operation with Iran and Pakistan for the development of theatre ballistic missiles.
In spite of China's assurance to comply with the MTCR regime, there are still reports about Chinese exports of ballistic missile components, namely to Pakistan concerning the Chinese M-11 missile, which has a range of about 400 km and a payload of 800 kg.
After all, one should bear in mind the concluding remarks of Mr. Tan Eng Bok when he said that:
"A stable, prosperous China would do more good for international security and the common interest of the West as a whole than a new outbreak of disorder. China's political stability is still fragile because of post-Deng Xiaoping uncertainty and paradoxically, the success of economic reforms without a political quid pro quo. This precarious balance should not be jeopardised by openly encouraging democratisation which is certainly necessary but might lead to the reversal of a progressive evolution. Finally, Beijing's isolation on the international stage would remove any reason for it to take part in limiting nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the third world in general
and in the Middle East in particular."
The important role of North Korea as a missile supplier was already mentioned in the committee's previous report3. This role was confirmed by Mr. Tan Eng Bok, stressing that a successor of the Rodong 1 missile, the Rodong 2, with a range of 1 500 to 2 000 km, is now being developed in North Korea. However, it appears that assessments of North Korea's capabilities are not unanimous. Thus Mr. Karp said that, with a 1 000 km version under development, North Korea has reached the limits of Scud technology and seems unlikely to make further advances unless a new source of technology can be found.
Turning to the technical nature of future risks, one should not neglect the words of those who stressed that other threats than those stemming from ballistic missile technology should be taken into account. John R. Harvey, in a comprehensive article on "Regional ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft"4, stresses that, by focusing too strongly on ballistic missiles, we risk diverting attention from proliferation of other advanced weapons which may be more destructive".
Thus several speakers at the symposium, such as Mr. Nativi, Mr. Zalonis, Mr. Delaye and Mr. Minicucci, underlined the growing problem of cruise missiles. According to Mr. Nativi:
"The devastating effects of the cruise missiles launched by United States naval surface vessels and
submarines and air force bombers during the 1991 Gulf war certainly attracted the attention of many countries which are now actively pursuing the aim of procuring or, better, developing weapons similar in design independently.
Ranges vary from a few hundred kilometres to 2 500 or 300 km. Cruise missiles can be launched from the ground or from ships, submarines or aircraft. The usual weight of warheads ranges from 500 to 1 000 kg. In the last few years, several types of warheads have been developed: high explosive, chemical or nuclear with a choice of sub-munitions or special conventional unitary warheads. The miniaturisation of nuclear devices allows countries such as China to develop small nuclear warheads compatible with the stringent requirements of a typical cruise missile.
While the low speed facilitates the work of air defence radar and interception by surface-to-surface missiles and fighter aircraft, in reality the small dimensions of the missiles, the low-level flight profile, the use of ground features to conceal the weapon from radar, the use of stealth technology to reduce RCS (radar cross section) as well as IR signature and the great flexibility in preparing the flight plan and penetration run make cruise missiles very difficult targets, even for integrated, modern air defence systems.
For a number of years, cruise missile development was a matter for the superpowers alone, but today several development projects are under way in a number of countries, including India and China. To be more detailed, China's scheduled procurement of the technology and production tools (this is a typical turnkey contract) needed to procure small turbo-fan engines from the United States firm Garrett should be considered part of this picture. The crisis in the former Soviet Union now makes it easier for Russian cruise missiles to proliferate in several countries. It is estimated in the United States that, by the end of the century, both Iran and Iraq will be able to deploy this type of weapon. During the IDEX military show in Abu Dhabi (UEA) a few months ago, Russia, for the first time, exhibited the air-launched cruise missile AS-15 (X-65CE) in an anti-ship version armed with a conventional warhead and a redesigned fuselage embodying stealth technology to reduce RCS. Even in this version, the Russian cruise missile, weighing 1 250 kg and 6 m long, armed with 410 kg. warhead and having a range of 280 km, is quite interesting, but it should not be forgotten that its strategic version is credited with a range of 2 500 km. This is only one example of the noteworthy Russian cruise missile design range. The Russians considered AS-15 technology to be obsolete and a new-generation weapon was being developed: the AS-19 Koala, which is to be 10 m long with a range of 4 000 km. This programme has now been stopped, as has work on the SS-N-24 Skorpion, but the SS-N-21 Sampson, with a range of 1 700 km, has been in service for a few years and is considered to be the Russian equivalent of the United States Tomahawk.
Several countries are currently working on stand-off long-range missiles as well as self-propelled
launchers, not to mention surveillance RPVs and even some target drones that can easily be converted into a type of cruise missile."
In the SDIO, too, thought is given to finding the most cost- effective way to address the missile threat, "without closing our eyes to the fact that there also is the threat from aircraft, cruise missiles and unmanned/remotely piloted vehicles".
According to a new Pentagon report on missile proliferation, low- flying cruise missiles are even becoming the number one proliferation threat. The report concludes that Syria, Iran and China will have cruise missiles with some low-observable or stealth capabilities between 200 and 2010. All three countries are expected to have both chemical and biological warheads for their cruise weapons5.
Consequently new plans are being considered in the United States air force and navy to counter cruise missiles whereas some Pentagon planners believe that SDIO has erred by focusing on ballistic missile defence and paid short shrift to the cruise missile threat6.
There are however more radical voices denying the usefulness of anti-missile protection, claiming that "if a terrorist or fanatical dictator gets a nuclear bomb, he should deliver it with a fishing trawler rather than risking it on a ballistic missile7". But such an opinion cannot explain why so many countries with dubious reputations or uncertain intentions make such efforts to obtain missile technology/or nuclear, chemical or biological capability.
If one tries to sum up the situation, none of the speakers at the symposium was able to define an absolute imminent concrete threat directed against Europe stemming from a specific country or region if one excludes the particular danger of the Balkans which is of a different type. While it was stressed that the old saying that today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies was never more topical, this is not altogether a new discovery.
There was a clear consensus, however, that continuous proliferation of missile technology constitutes the main threat today and has to be considered as a reality. Furthermore, overall concern was expressed that a possible danger would affect first and foremost the civilian populations and that it was crucial for the population not to be put at risk.
It might be useful at this stage to quote from the latest threat assessment issued on 24th March 1993 by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of the German Defence Ministry answering a parliamentary question on the following lines:
"1. There is no longer any well-defined military threat from the CIS. Nevertheless, the military potential of the CIS and China continues, in principle, to be a risk. The use of this potential against
Germany or its NATO partners seems very unlikely at present, however.
Real risks are now emerging from hotbeds of political instability throughout the world, this instability being accompanied in certain cases by a build-up of armaments.
2. The Gulf war has recently demonstrated the military and political importance of ballistic means of delivery, particularly for third world countries, and has led, in the crisis area that extends from
Morocco to India, to intensive armaments efforts in this area. These armaments efforts are of special importance since they aim to associate these means of delivery with non-conventional warheads.If the range of these missiles were increased, the NATO countries would come increasingly within the range of weapons held by third world countries.
3. The present position of arsenals which include operational ballistic means of delivery outside NATO allows the following conclusions to be drawn:
- Germany is within range of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) belonging to the CIS and China;
- NATO territory is within range of ballistic missiles with conventional and chemical warheads from Iran, Syria and perhaps even Iraq. If the third world countries manage to increase the range of their ballistic missiles, all the countries round the shores of the Mediterranean will be in danger.
Furthermore, intervention forces deployed in the third world are exposed to an increasing risk of attack by ballistic missiles."
IV. Strategies for protecting Europe from existing and future security dangers
The in-depth study of possible risks and their reasons in the previous chapter has been discussed at such length because your Rapporteur is convinced that appropriate answers can be given only if the assessment of the situation is appropriate. The problem of accidental attacks by a nuclear-armed ballistic missile or such an attack by terrorist groups mentioned at the symposium must not of course be neglected.
In spite of the absence of a high-level political presence at the symposium (with the exception of the Italian Defence Minister) and in spite of the overwhelming industrial representation, it is to be welcomed that the contributions and proposals were certainly not one- sided.
Of course, the important choice to be made is whether the political or the defence and technological approach should have priority in coping with the new challenges. But perhaps there will be no real contradiction between the two approachs.
Before evaluating the different scenarios, it might be interesting to see how the German Government answered the abovementioned parliamentary question about what measures of protection it is considering taking in this respect.
The answer was as follows:
"The Federal Government will give high priority to the pursuit of its efforts to strengthen the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In the context of a policy of co-operation concentrating on confidence-building, the government is endeavouring to eliminate the tension that is at the origin of the build-up of military equipment. However, an active non-proliferation policy will not, in the near future, remove the risks linked with proliferation (transfers of nuclear weapons). That is why long-term plans are also being implemented in parallel in order to give air defence systems that already exist or are being developed a limited anti-ballistic missile defence capability."
It is interesting to note that the importance the German Government attaches to a policy of co-operation concentrating on confidence-building in this field finds a certain corollary in the approach of Mr. Ando already quoted. This kind of approach was nevertheless fairly isolated at the symposium.
Only General Jean and Mr. Karp developed ideas in this direction. General Jean stressed the efforts to create a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) following the CSCE example, mentioning:
"... the Euro-Arab dialogue between the European Community and the Arab League; the Five plus Five Group for the western Mediterranean to which the European Community and Germany belong; the MAU (Maghreb Arab Union) which has started a regional dialogue and which, at the Casablanca conference in October 1991, laid the foundations for its institutionalisation; the Mediterranean conference, which has taken interesting co-operative initiatives in ecology and civil protection."
Finally, on security problems in the Mediterranean, he proposed the following European measures:
(a) "installation of a multilateral safety belt to protect itself against the instability and crisis prevalent among the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, priority being granted, inter alia, to deterring clandestine immigration, at least until Europe has solved the problems of Eastern Europe and can concentrate its efforts on the development of the South;
(b) mainly bilateral co-operation between the various western countries and countries of the South, the latter being divided into areas of economic influence; this would be supported by regional policing countries such as Egypt and Turkey backed by mobile reinforcements provided mainly by the United States; encouragement would be given to policies of co-operation and development directed initially towards the economic interests of each of the European countries;
(c) multilateral co-operation in security, the economy, demography, etc., centred on development
The third solution, i.e. multilateral co-operation, particularly in terms of stability and security, is
certainly the most effective and the one that would lead to the greatest stability."
With regard to the necessary fight against the proliferation of mass destruction and missile technology, the overwhelming majority of speakers emphasised the importance of continuing the efforts in this direction. But most of them were convinced that the fight against missile proliferation would at best slow down proliferation but would not be able to stop it once and for all.
On the other hand, nobody discussed or explained the contradictions stemming from the fact that while ballistic systems and their technologies are the target of vigorous export control efforts, the export of advanced strike aircraft by a number of western countries and Russia to third world countries does not arouse similar alarm.
In spite of the progress made recently in extending regional and universal disarmament and arms control regimes as described in Chapter II, only one speaker, Mr. Karp, came to the conclusion that "it may be true that the battle against missile proliferation cannot be won in an absolute sense, for there will always be future threats, but nor need the battle be permanently lost".
In this context he made some interesting proposals of which the idea of a ballistic missile test ban might be the most original and also the most controversial. According to Mr. Karp,
"A ballistic missile test ban is one way to ameliorate not only competitive pressures for regional missile acquisition, but also their prestige. Such proposals have been around since the Eisenhower administration, but won little support so long as ballistic missiles played a major role in great power forces. Now that the United States and Russia agreed at the June 1992 Washington Summit to eliminate all but a few hundred ground-based ICBMs, the prospects for a test ban are much better. Unlike nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles cannot be developed without extensive testing nor can
operational missiles be kept reliable. Many serious problems would have to be resolved first, including differentiating allowable space launchers and the status of sea-launched missiles, but these do not seem insurmontable.
The most straightforward and extreme answer to missile proliferation would be an outright comprehensive ballistic missile ban. Previously students of missile proliferation have gone no further than to advocate a global INF treaty, banning the missiles of greatest danger in most regions. But this does not satisfy regional demands for equal treatment since it would leave great power ICBMs and SLBMs. The Bush-Yeltsin Washington Summit, however, made the universal elimination of ballistic missiles seem feasible for the first time. The biggest obstacles are the independent nuclear forces. Tailoring a proposal to permit some SLBMs would meet the objections of Britain and France, but Chinese and Israeli resistance may be harder to overcome. While a ballistic missile ban remains
distant, it no longer can be dismissed as fanciful."
It is worth noting in this context that, according to Indian sources, India might agree to such a global missile ban but only if it also prohibited sea- and air-launched cruise missiles.
It is obvious that such an approach brings us to the hub of the problem and the fundamental question of how to find a synthesis between four main strategies, such as
- extending global disarmament and arms control agreements to comprehensive weapon bans;
- maintaining nuclear (and conventional) deterrence;
- maintaining the option of preventive or pre-emptive offensive strikes;
- establishing a system of protection against missile strikes.
The idea of a test ban creates the most difficult problems. Apart from the fact that such a policy would raise major difficulties for a number of western countries, in particular France, with regard to their plans for developing the new strategic missiles M-5 and M-45, as well as a new cruise missile weapon, but also Great Britain with respect to its Trident programme, the more fundamental problem is to define the criteria which could determine when a new weaponry is considered so dangerous that a test ban should be imposed. That could apply, for instance, to stealth bombers, laser weapons and many others and would lead to the unrealistic endeavour to stop researching and developing new military technology.
Incidentally, there is a certain contradiction in Mr. Karp's approach when he at one and the same time advocates the development of active defences against the missile threat which of course means comprehensive anti-missile weapon tests.
Nevertheless one should not rule out continuing in-depth study of these ideas since the nuclear limited test ban agreed between the two principal world powers after all had exemplary and positive results.
Future reliance on deterrence was mentioned by several speakers, but it is not surprising that opinions were divided in this respect. Whereas General Stainier came to the conclusion that, in the Kuwait crisis, deterrence did not work and that it could work only between adversaries well informed and rational, Dr. Payne considered it would still continue to be useful in some cases, but could not, however, be considered a reliable substitute for missile defence in the emerging international environment. Mr. Martre considered deterrence was still an essential means but underlined that its methods of implementation must be diversified to be able to respond to all situations and that the dialectics were still uncertain. It is thus inevitable that the doctrine of deterrence will need careful reconsideration in all relevant European and Atlantic institutions.
The option of pre-emptive offensive strikes was presented by Dr. Payne who admitted however that this means might be appropriate in some circumstances but that it generally would not be politically acceptable and could prove very difficult to implement effectively.
Coming now to the option of creating an anti-missile protection system, it might be useful to recall, as Mr. Barthelemy did, that the French Government proposed in the United Nations, as a measure of confidence-building in space, arrangements aimed to notify ballistic missile firings and space launches with provisions for world-wide data processing that might be supplied by regional warning or observation satellites.
This approach constitutes the necessary link to the fundamental problem of defining and elaborating the nature, objective, range, feasibility, and participants of a protection system based, first and foremost, on technological means.
In this context, the presence of both American and Russian representatives at the symposium was particularly useful. Europeans, who are still in a phase of forming their opinion, cannot remain indifferent to the fact that the United States entered into serious discussions on this topic with the Russian Federation, on which the Assembly had so far obtained very little precise information8, in particular regarding its objective.
One might speculate on the reciprocal motives for these contacts. According to certain sources, the United States objective in launching these talks was to modify the anti-ballistic missile treaty (ABM) to enable a truly global defence to be deployed, whereas the Russians, on the other hand, seek access to United States technology and wish to ensure that America does not proceed unilaterally with a global defence system9.
More important for Europe are two factors: first, the fact that, as practised in several previous cases, the United States engaged negotiations on a subject in which Europe has vital security interests, exclusively with their main counterpart, the Russian Federation, as successor of the Soviet Union, in the absence of Europe - NATO was informed only after the negotiations; secondly, the advanced stage these talks have already reached.
The information released so far at the symposium by the American and Russian representatives was not very comprehensive nor consistent, but it now seems more clear that the concept envisaged is to establish a multinational anti-missile force and create a global protection centre (its location still has to be determined) "where former Soviet states and other United States allies could witness missile launches and intercepts"10.
The implementation of the project is envisaged in three phases:
- in the first phase, the United States as well the Russian Federation would provide each other with early-warning information;
- in the second phase, the early-warning system would be enlarged to other participants, and
- in the third phase beginning 1995 both a multinational anti- missile force and a global protection centre (similar to the United States Canadian early-warning centre in Cheyenne Mountains, Colorado) would be established, where missile-launches could be detected and tracked on an electronic display11.
According to Defense News:
"Details of the administration's plan were presented to Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian officials, in October and November and talks were continuing through early January, Pentagon sources said. Graham, co-chairman of a GPS working group established to promote the global protection pact, said he and other administration colleagues have briefed NATO officials as well as officials from Israel, Egypt, Japan, Korea and Australia."
According to General Graham, nations outside NATO would be welcome to participate, including East European states, but he was convinced that NATO was the only existing international organisation capable of planning and co-ordinating such a global protection system.
The fact that the United States-Russian talks have been adjourned since the beginning of 1993 allows a first assessment regarding the consequences Europe should draw from these United States-Russian initiatives. For this purpose the presence of an official representative of the Russian Government, Mr. Tchuvakhin, was particularly helpful. It appeared from his presentation that major differences still existed between the two negotiators.
First, there are continuing differences over the future role of the ABM Treaty which, according to Mr. Tchuvakhin, was to be maintained and strengthened. It was even considered as a Russian condition for the implementation of the START I and START II treaties. Second, the Russian representatives insisted on the importance of developing all international agreements limiting armaments and proliferation. In this context, it was particularly noteworthy that he made a special reference to the MTCR regime which he wished to strengthen and render more effective. At the same time, he challenged a number of "ambiguities" in this regime which favoured missile proliferation within the western alliance and the European Community which, in his opinion, made it difficult for Russia to join the regime as announced in principle by President Yeltsin.
Thirdly, his positive reaction to the French proposal12 already mentioned to create within the United Nations a system based on previous notifications of ballistic missile firings which could lead, at a later stage, to an international space control centre. According to the Russian view, the creation of an early warning centre discussed with the United States could constitute a first step in this direction.
Fourthly, the Russian assessment that it was unlikely that third world countries would possess in the near future ballistic missiles with a range of more than 2 000 or 2 500 km.
Even if some important ambiguities and uncertainties remain, in particular regarding different notions and intentions, one conclusion may be drawn already at this stage. The idea of creating an international early warning and surveillance system is a matter which seemed to secure the agreement of the majority of the participants concerned. An early warning system open to all interested countries would not arouse the concern mentioned by Mr. Fituni, regarding a global protection system which could be considered as "an endeavour of most developed industrial nations. Thus the less-developed countries would permanently feel threatened by it" with the danger of intensifying political and strategic division between the North and the South.
The question of participating in a multinational anti-missile force under United States leadership or of creating a proper European anti-missile defence system depends on purely political and military decisions. So far, in Europe, preliminary studies are being conducted in both NATO and WEU, but European governments are far from having reached reached firm individual, not to mention joint positions.
On the other hand, the comprehensive and convincing presentations of all the different industry representatives at the symposium have clearly demonstrated that the European industries have the capabilities and the technical means for establishing a protection system in all its possible variants and architectures. Your Rapporteur can rely on the very detailed presentation made and by the summary of the General Rapporteur, Mr. Martre, when he said:
"It would appear that all the technology necessary for producing an ATBM defence system is available in Europe. For warning and targeting, infrared sensor satellites and communications satellites are necessary.
Europe has produced few military satellites, but its effort in the civil space area has given it excellent
capabilities and made it very competitive in the area of satellites and launchings. It may therefore be thought that the satellites necessary for an ATBM system might be derived from existing civil satellites and even that some communication satellites might be used in part for the ATBM system. In view of these capabilities and for simple warning system adapted to the needs of Europe alone, the cost of a warning system might be about $250 million.
The command and control system of an ATBM system raises the problem of the overall architecture of the system and depends on national and allied authorities who would be required to intervene in the process. Such a system may be conceived as an extension of existing air defence systems or as an independent system. It is essential to ensure the interoperability of the various components of the system to ensure its integrated operation. In all these areas, European countries have excellent mastery of the main system and good experience.
For firing units, there must be high performance electronic scanning radars and missiles on board
infrared sensors and considerable mobility. Several types of missiles might be considered, some endo-atmospheric and other upper endo-atmospheric or even exo-atmospheric. In this area, anti-missile systems are now being developed in Europe for defence against cruise and air-to-surface missiles, for instance the FSAF family being produced in the framework of EUROSAM. Consideration might be given to developing an ATBM system on the basis of these projects and research conducted elsewhere."
At this stage it seems to be important to make certain reservations concerning in particular the idea of using civil space capabilities for military purposes. While it was common practice in the past to use the civil satellite network as a basis for military means, one should be very cautious about establishing a general rule enforcing mixed co-operation between the military and civil sectors in space matters. This question arises notably when it is to be discussed whether the European Space Energy Agency (ESA) could be used for developing or operating systems in connection with anti-missile defence. This also concerns the question of whether the Ariane launcher may be employed for military missions too.
Regarding co-operation with the United States, Mr. Martre's assessment was of a remarkable clarity:
"The only parts of the American GPALS programme that might interest Europe are the warning system and the ATBM system. The space-based wepons system cannot be transferred to foreign countries under the ABM treaties in their present form and its achievement seems very improbable. Defence of the Grand Forks site against intercontinental ballistic missiles is a specifically American defence matter.
For the warning system, there might be co-operation between Europe and the United States, but this raises the problem of access to data in all circumstances. For ATBM systems, the Americans are studying certain types of missiles suited to such defence: Erint, Thaad and the terminal stage Leap which might be adapted for Patriot, for instance.
Co-operation between Europe and the United States for the establishment of an ATBM system in Europe seems possible and is certainly desirable if it can lead to savings being made. However, we must start from the idea that no system of this type exists at present and there is therefore no question of procuring a system off the shelf."
Even if it may be true that the main European interest should be concentrated on the establishment of a warning system and an eventual theatre anti-ballistic system capable of protecting our populations, the question of space-based weapons should not leave Europe indifferent because this question does not concern just the ABM Treaty, of which Europe is not a party, but also the more general question of the militarisation of space, which everybody wishes to be avoided in particular if this were to lead to an arms race in space.
It was therefore crucial to learn from the legal expert, Mr. von Kries, in Rome that, according to existing space law: "There are no legal restrictions on auxiliary and complementary anti-missile defence (ADM) systems like surveillance, reconnaissance and early-warning satellites. The stationing of space-based interceptors is permitted as long as they are non-nuclear and not of a similar mass destruction type."
The expert further explained that attempts to restrict the Outer Space Treaty (OST) arms control provision have not been successful:
"Italy's proposal of 1979 to prohibit not only weapons of mass destruction in outer space but also 'any other types of devices designed for offensive purposes', by adding a respective protocol to the OST, as well as the Soviet treaty proposal of 1981 aimed at banning 'weapons of any kind in outer space' did not come to fruition.
The same holds for the various proposals made during the eighties to keep outer space free from anti-satellite weapons, which could have an AMD potential. Also, efforts by certain nations to formally delineate an air/space boundary and thereby to clearly separate sovereign air spaces from the international outer space domain remained unsuccessful and very probably will not materialise in the forseeable future.
The military space law regime in place, as established by the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the OST in the sixties, therefore, has proved to be highly stable, and there are no signs of up-coming changes or alterations."
Your Rapporteur believes that this situation is not satisfactory and he would be in favour of using the general debate on the usefulness of and need for an appropriate anti-missile defence system for reviving efforts to complete international space-law.
In the extremely short time available for analysing the various contributions presented at the Rome symposium, the conclusions can be only provisional at the present stage.The symposium was held at a time when very substantial progress was being made in international disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures.
On the other hand, there is a continuing danger stemming from the Balkan crisis and a particular problem with the future policy of North Korea, one of the most important missile suppliers to the third world.
Europe has to face up to the question of what consequences it will draw from the situation in which, at present and in the near future, there is no clear risk of a deliberate attack on populations or targets in Europe by states processing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, as rightly states Mr. Leira, but in which the continuing proliferation of such weaponry into regions which may affect Europe constitutes an undeniable risk.
What is important for the decision-makers is that, according to estimates, by the beginning of the next century more than half a dozen countries may have ballistic missiles with ranges between 3 000 and 5 500 km.
Decision-makers must carefully assess the balance between the probability of the risk of endangering their populations (or their military forces) and the financial burden of creating a sophisticated production system, which European industry is quite capable of developing.
They have to decide how much time they have for taking appropriate decisions. The present situation, where American, Russian and European governments are reviewing their security policies, provides an appropriate opportunity for joint consultations on this matter.
The first priority in these consultations should be to strengthen and extend all arms control, non-proliferation and confidence-building measures to the Far East and the South.
All efforts to create a protection system based in the first instance on the establishment of a space surveillance system should be based on a policy of confidence-building measures in order to avoid a new arms race initiated by countries feeling excluded or threatened.
The Western European Union Council should assume a leading role in this respect bearing in mind their plan for creating an independant European space observation system.
11. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
22. Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Alternate for Mr. Palacios), (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Boehm, Bosco, Curto, Davis, De Paoli, Dimmer, Gonzalez-Laxe, Gottardo, Guzzetti, Lagorce, Le Grand, Litherland, Menzel, Poas Santos, Sarens, Sir Donald Thompson (Alternate: Sir Dudley Smith), MM. Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek, N....N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 11. Document 1339, 6th November 1992.
22. See Appendix I.
33. Document A/WEU/DG (93) 2 of 19th February 1993.
14. US Wireless File No. 37, 1st March 1993.
25. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, according to US Wireless File, No. 4, 8th January 1993.
36. Richard Boucher ibid.
17. Space News, 22nd-28th February 1993.
28. See Appendix II.
19. Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1993, International. 210. Cf. John R. Harvey, Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advance Strike Aircraft, International Security, Fall 1992, volume 17, No. 2. 311. Document 1339.
412. International Security, Fall 1992, volume 17, No. 2.
513. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1st February 1993. 614. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22nd March 1993.
715. Joseph Romm, Space News, 18th January 1993, volume 4, No. 3, page 15. 816. Document 1339, paragraphs 55-56.
917. Defense News, 22nd-28th February 1993.
1018. Defense News, 11th-17th January 1993.
1119. Defense News, 11th-17th January 1993.
1220. Paragraph 66.
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