REPORT ⁽¹⁾

Part 3 (3 parts)

As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the United Statesí BMD programmes are divided into TMD and NMD. The first of these has maximum priority and includes all the programmes described above.

The trends in international policy, mostly in the field of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile capabilities, represent a threat for the US and for this reason, the BMDO drew up the NMD programme. An NMD Joint Programme Office (JPO) was established to manage the multiple-service components of an NMD system and oversee their integration into an efficient architecture.

The main purpose of this programme is to protect the US against limited attack by long-range missiles and to provide a quick response to such attacks. The NMD programme has a deployment readiness posture that involves developing hardware that will be used in FY 1999 integrated system test (IFT-5).

This programme is composed of a number of segments that include the USAF SBIRS, the ground-based interceptor (GBI) able to destroy missiles outside the atmosphere and the ground-based radar (GBR) which provides the primary fire control sensor to support integrated NMD system testing on the US Army Kwajalein Atoll missile test range. An in-flight interceptor communications system (IFICS) prototype is planned for development with the aim of linking the various defence and management segments. In addition, the NMD BM/C3 project is focused on integrating the NMD interceptor and sensor operations in support of informed decision-making and to facilitate programme integration.

As can be seen, the United States is extremely concerned about missile defence and it is also involved in pushing NATO in this direction. This concern is visible not only in the number of programmes covering this area but also in the funds being made available. For this reason it is worth taking a look at the following tables showing a break-down of budgets by programme, year and user.

The BMDO budget presents several interesting aspects, particularly if considered from the point of view of different sources, as can be seen from the following tables:

Source BMDO Fact Sheet 97-36, July 1997, The Ballistic Missile Defence Fiscal Year 1997 Budget.

Moreover, your Rapporteur is aware that the BMDO also has funds for foreign policy use and to support foreign BMD programmes. In each FY an amount in US dollars is devolved to western Europe (66 million for FY 1997), East Asia (3 million for FY 1997); also, latterly, following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding, to Japan, to counter the threat represented by North Korea and maintain a balance in view of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, and to Israel (59 million) for obvious political reasons.

In February 1995, France, Germany, Italy and the United States signed an international Memorandum of Understanding setting up a NATO agency for the purpose of cooperation in the joint surface-to-air missile programme known as the Medium Extended Air-Defence System (MEADS). In May 1995, France withdrew from the programme on account of budgetary difficulties and the three remaining countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding covering the project definition and validation phase.

The aim of the programme is to develop a surface-to-air missile system (SAM) capable of defending troops and installations against a range of threats: tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and UAVs. Programme costs are shared as follows: United States 60%, Germany 25% and Italy 15%. The possibility of other NATO countries joining MEADS is envisaged, with the approval of the participant countries.

The programme, which is administered by a NATO agency, NAMEADSMA, based in Huntsville in the United States, is currently in its project definition and validation (PD-V) phase, which runs from 1996 to 1998. Phase 2 , Design and Development (D and D) will run from 1999 to 2005 with Phase 3, Production, possibly starting in 2003.

In the present initial PD-V phase, the aim is to produce a system specification, a primary end item specification document and a cooperative programme plan for the common development and production of MEADS. This phase involves two industrial teams, one comprising Lockheed Martin, Daimler-Benz, Siemens and Alenia and the other Hughes and Raytheon, Daimler-Benz, Siemens and Alenia. Both teams must compete with one another for the final contracts.

The part played by MEADS in ballistic missile defence architecture will be to fill the gap between man portable systems like the Stinger and the higher levels of the anti-missile defence structure such as the PAC-3 or the THAAD. Moreover MEADS will provide continuous cover for rapidly advancing manoeuvre forces. The particular characteristics of MEADS are its strategic and tactical mobility for easy in-theatre deployment and to provide support for forces on the move.

Once in service, MEADS will be the only anti-missile defence system capable of being transported alongside troops and of being brought into service immediately. It will also have greater fire-power but require less manpower than its predecessors. Finally, the fact that the system is based on a joint design should contribute to interoperability.

Integral to the MEADS system will be an airborne radar sensor providing early warning against low-altitude cruise-missile attack against aircraft targets, which can either be aircraft or helicopter-borne or UAV or aerostat-mounted. Furthermore MEADS will be fully interconnected with other systems such as Patriot, THAAD and FSAF Aster.

MEADS will replace the Hawk air defence system. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the US Army and Navy embarked on the CORPS SAM programme as an intended replacement for Hawk. Germany showed an interest in joining and France and Italy did likewise shortly afterwards. Once the international MoU was signed in February 1995, the CORPS SAM programme became known as MEADS.

MEADS is an important initiative in transatlantic cooperation. The international nature of the programme means it has enormous potential for promoting transatlantic interoperability. According to the BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation), MEADS "reaffirms the United Statesí commitment to stay involved in European security affairs and could spark a renaissance in transatlantic cooperation".

General Joulwan, the then Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, in July 1995 wrote a letter to the American Senator, Sam Nunn, in which he stated that "Politically, MEADS is a visible and important illustration of the US commitment to missile defence, to NATO and to Europe. MEADS is a model for future transatlantic cooperation efforts. Terminating MEADS now would have serious ramifications in other ongoing cooperative ventures and raise yet another round of poignant questions about US intentions regarding leadership in NATO". Finally, General Joulwan, in his determination to obtain the necessary budget support from the Senate, remarked that TMD systems were so dear that developing them unilaterally would put them way out of reach, and cooperation thus offered additional advantages: "it appears that we can protect our forces and interests while realising potentially large savings".

As far as Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) is concerned, there are two directorates within NATOís Defence Support Division: the Air Defence and Airspace Management (ADAM) and Armaments Planning, Programmes and Policy (APPP) Directorates. The ADAM Directorate supports the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC) chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, consisting of member country representatives at senior level and responsible for advising the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the air-defence policy of the Alliance.

The NADC has oversight of NATOís air defence plans and submits recommendations to the NAC on priorities for the organisationís future air defence system.

The NADC has two sub-panels, the Panel on Air-Defence Philosophy and the Panel on Air Defence Weapons (PADW), both of which have worked on TBMD in recent years. The PADW has concentrated in particular on maintaining a balanced air defence system which can cope with the complete spectrum of potentially threatening air vehicles since TMBD forms but part of what in total is termed Extended Air Defence (EAD).

PADWís primary responsibility is to advise and assist the NADC develop a rational air defence (including command and control aspects) and a coordinated programme for air-defence weapons, the Alliance Long-term Air-Defence Programme. The programme keeps abreast of national air defence procurement plans, maintains regular oversight of the same in order to identify areas where they might cause an imbalance in the Allianceís air defences and makes recommendations to avoid this happening.

Thus, as far as TMBD is concerned, note will be taken of any national plan to develop or procure a given capability and an opinion given on the impact such action could have on the Allianceís air defence policy.

The PADW has conducted a series of conceptual and operational studies on TBMD and sponsored other technological studies carried out by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG).

Lastly, concerning NATOís internal organisation of work on the TBMD, it should be noted that the APPP Directorate supports the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) which has responsibility for armaments cooperation. Within the same directorate, the Planning and Policy Section is tasked, inter alia with providing support to an ad hoc CNAD group with special responsibility for examining possible TBMD systems and identifying opportunities for multinational industrial cooperation.

Proliferation of ballistic missiles has been a source of growing concern in the Alliance for some years ñ a preoccupation reflected in its 1991 Rome Declaration and in the New Strategic Concept, published in November of the same year. In June 1992, the NAC indicated that the NADC would study various approaches towards meeting requirements for a tactical ballistic missile defence system. The NADC thus developed a conceptual framework for providing the Alliance and its forces with an extended air defence, paying particular attention to risks from ballistic missiles.

The framework envisages development of an extended air defence complementary to the existing integrated air defence system. The framework was approved by the Council in August 1993 and included a multinational integrated structure for surveillance and early warning against the threat of tactical ballistic missile attack and to support active and passive countermeasures.

The NADC also produced a report on tactical ballistic missile countermeasures and presented its Air Defence Programme for 1995-2010. At that same juncture, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) began work on a formal military operational requirement for theatre missile defence in Allied Command Europe.

The summit of Alliance heads of state and of government in Brussels in 1994 took an important step towards laying down a framework for the Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence (EAD/TMD) by its formal recognition of the threat to security presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. As a result, the NAC established the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP).

The work carried out by both groups led to the drawing-up of the Alliance Policy Framework on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, made public at the June 1994 NAC meeting. This highlighted the fact that a number of states on the periphery of the Alliance were continuing their attempts to develop or procure production capabilities for weapons of mass destruction, which implied a direct threat to member states and their forces. It also noted that proliferation could still occur, notwithstanding international non-proliferation legislation and treaties. Lastly it emphasised that the Allianceís response to such threats must be to endeavour to deter proliferation and the use of such weapons and, if necessary, defend NATO territory, populations and forces by political and military means.

From a political point of view the main Alliance objective is to deter proliferation, or, should it succeed, try and reverse it by diplomatic means. The international weapons control and non-proliferation regimes are instruments available to prevent or counter proliferation. Nevertheless the Alliance recognises that political means are not always sufficient. It has therefore tasked the DGP to study what capabilities are necessary to deter proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, to assess the threat from them or their use and to identify the means necessary to protect territory, populations and forces.

The DGPís work was divided into three phases. During the first, studies were made of risks for the Alliance deriving from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the June 1994 Summit Declaration referred to above, stressing that the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery means presented a real challenge in terms of NATOís security, was ratified. The Declaration also made reference to risks due either to illicit production or transfer.

The second phase, which was completed in November 1995 considered the implications of proliferation for Alliance plans, and identified a series of capabilities necessary to support the organisationís stance to contend with proliferation. In order to assess the implications of proliferation risks the Alliance studied threats and possible attacks on both NATO territories and populations and on forces deployed out of area (including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions). Among the most important capabilities identified for countering proliferation was extended air defence which includes tactical ballistic missile defence for deployed forces. It thus became clear that layered defences against tactical ballistic missiles could make a major contribution to the political and operational objectives of the Alliance.

DGPís third phase identified the areas in NATOís current military posture, including air defence, where progress must be made to counter proliferation risks.

In line with the above, Dr J David Martin, Deputy for Strategic Relations in the BMDO, concludes that an Alliance framework for EAD/TMD can provide guidelines for Alliance members as they continue to develop their respective national approaches to the proliferation problem.

Dr Martin also points out that in developing a framework for anti-missile defence, the Alliance must take into account present limited resources, leading to the assumption that cooperation in this area must be considered when it comes to finding a solution to proliferation problems. In his view such cooperation should take place at the levels of development, production and of fielding EAD/TMD systems and, in addition, that it is also essential from a military point of view since, if a common system design is taken as the starting point, forces can effectively be interoperable wherever they are deployed in any operation where their intervention is required.

Finally Dr Martin stresses the importance of the Alliance giving thought to the benefits of a layered missile defence system for deployed forces, which could incorporate both ground and sea-based assets; and as the delivery range of ballistic missiles grows longer, NATO will also have to consider multi-tiered, wide area defences for the protection of NATO territory and population.

All of the specific studies on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, undertaken at national or at NATO level, and the White Papers on security and defence published by different countries are in agreement in stating that this form of weapons proliferation represents a threat to international security and therefore in regarding it as necessary to establish an extended air defence/theatre missile defence (EAD/TMD) framework.

It is clear that in order to make progress in this direction and respond adequately to existing risks and threats, European governments have to make clear their political will and provide the necessary budgetary resources. Once the costs of such an undertaking have been evaluated, it can be brought to fruition only through cooperation ñ cooperation that has to be primarily European and transatlantic.

A few weeks ago at the symposium our Committee organised in Munich, Rear-Admiral Leira (NATO, Director of Armaments Planning, Programmes and Policy), stated that that NATO would be strengthened, not weakened, by greater European cohesion on defence and that such cohesion should rest on a solid foundation consisting essentially of its defence industrial base. In this connection he observed that unfortunately there were signs of asymmetric development on either side of the Atlantic. Rear-Admiral Leira went on to say that there was a growing technology gap between North America and Europe which could result in different doctrines, different force structures, and different operational concepts. If this were to occur, interoperability and the ability to mount joint NATO operations would, in his view, become academic.

In the first part of this report, submitted three years ago (Document 1435, to which we have referred several times) the need was stressed for WEU to stimulate debate on a European early-warning system to follow up the studies

already under way on developing a European space-based observation system. This debate has still not taken place.

It is necessary to make the point that a European early-warning system must be regarded as essential if a European anti-missile defence system is being proposed. It seems realistic to assume that the United States would not make its early-warning satellites available to NATO.

Europe must begin by acquiring its own early-warning system, comprising two geostationary satellites, initially with a single frequency and infrared sensors, leaving open the possibility of later supplementing these by a second, ultraviolet frequency.

Moreover, a whole series of European studies on anti-missile defence (in France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy...) are currently being completed or have already been completed. It is possible that some northern European countries think that a threat to the southern flank of the Continent would not affect them. Will they be able to make the same assumption 10 or 15 years hence?

A European study is absolutely necessary and here WEU should bring together studies done at national level and draft a genuinely European study on the basis of them. Such a study could consider two types of defence: ground-to-air and air-to-air. The Aster or MEADS systems could provide a satisfactory answer in the first of these cases.

Finally, your Rapporteur regards as entirely relevant and sustainable, the conclusions and recommendations contained in the first part of the present report, to which the WEU Council, three years after their submission, has still not replied. It is to be hoped that the present report and the recommendations that follow from it will lead the Council to agree to proceed in the direction that we have attempted to outline in its pages.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr Marshall (Chairman); MM Lenzer, Atkinson (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs Aguiar, Mr Arnau, Mrs Blunck, Mrs Bribosia-Picard, MM Cherribi, Cunliffe, Diana, Mrs Durrieu, MM Etherington, Feldmann, Fillon, Mrs Gelderblom-Lankhout, MM López Henares, Lorenzi (Alternate: Speroni), MM Luís, Martelli, Olivio, Polydoras, Probst, Ramírez Pery, Sandrier (Alternate: Le Grand), MM Staes, Theis, Valleix, Mrs Zissi. Associate members: MM Kiratglioglu, Yürür. N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
3. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. Bulgaria and Ukraine were in the process of joining at this juncture.
5. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 March, 1997.
6. Janeís Strategic Weapons, January 1997.
7. See Air et Cosmos/Aviation International No.1616, Friday, 6 June 1997.
8. Le Monde, 17 June 1997.

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