Homeland Defense / Domestic Preparedness

 

 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

White Paper

Supporting Homeland Defense

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

18 May 1999

Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate

 

 

 

 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command White Paper

SUPPORTING HOMELAND DEFENSE

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for U.S. Army support to homeland defense in a joint, interagency, and multijurisdictional context. It may serve as a guide for the development of Army doctrine on this subject.

DEFINITION

Doctrine must refine and codify the definition of homeland defense consistent with practice, policy, and National Command Authorities’ emphasis. Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides no official definition of homeland defense; therefore, the following is proposed.

Homeland defense is protecting our territory, population and critical infrastructure at home by

BACKGROUND

Homeland defense is a continuation of the Constitutional requirement to protect United States population and territory, a task in which the U.S. military has always had a key role. The Army's history is rich in providing support to the nation in a variety of endeavors—from disaster relief, to medical research, to the quelling of rebellion. The homeland has not always been as secure as it is today, and military support was necessary to protect civilians. In Pennsylvania in 1794, for example, President Washington employed the militia, the volunteer force that later became the National Guard (NG), in a show of force to suppress the insurrection known as the Whiskey Rebellion. During the War of 1812, the Army defended the nation against invasion. In 1916 it secured the southern border against bandit raids. During the Second World War it defeated the enemy occupying U.S. territory in the Aleutian Islands. As recently as the early 1990s, all three components of the Army deployed to Los Angeles to protect the population from riots.

What has changed is the architecture of national vulnerabilities, the capabilities of potential enemies to exploit these vulnerabilities to attack our people and assets, and the dedication of international terrorists to harm the United States. Reports like those of the National Defense Panel and Defense Science Board, Presidential Decision Directives, and legislation, as well as a new National Security Strategy, lend emphasis and focus to the role of the U.S. military in adapting to these changes.

The U.S. military provides domestic support to the nation primarily through Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). MACA is a broad program that addresses responses to both natural and man-made disasters, including DOD assistance to civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. In a broad sense, all of these missions are homeland defense. Support to homeland defense includes actions that deter, prevent, and defeat hostile actions and post-attack response. Also included are internal actions to protect the military’s freedom of action and its own assets, which are inseparable from the homeland.

Civilian agencies at the federal level are the primary agents for the coordination and employment of federal support to homeland defense. With the exception of protecting the nation from missile, air, naval, and ground assault, and the protection of military facilities and installations, the military will play a supporting role. DOD will be guided by civilian law and led by the principle that the federal government assists state agencies, except in terrorism and WMD incidents where the Federal government has primary jurisdiction. The provision of the Posse Comitatus Act restricts the circumstances under which military personnel may be used for civilian law-enforcement activities. When supporting state and local authorities, DOD usually does so through other federal agencies according to established agreements and plans; will not compete with the civilian or commercial sector. Its support will encompass all the capabilities of the joint community, and interagency cooperation is critical to success.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

Threats and Vulnerabilities

The current emphasis on homeland defense derives from the threat of WMD or computer network attack (CNA) against the people of the United States, their territory, and infrastructure. Other attacks in the homeland may be designed to focus the military’s attention inward to counter domestic threats. Hostile intent is a catalyst for much of the support to homeland defense. However, events may require immediate response without direct evidence of hostile actions, such as epidemics of questionable origin. Natural disasters sometimes called "nature’s terrorists", may also require military support, as might counterdrug and other law-enforcement needs.

With the current absence of a major world competitor, the United States faces regional powers, rogue states, and transnational groups who may threaten our national goals and those of our friends through actions at the lower end of the spectrum or continuum of conflict. The spread of technology has given some of these groups the capability to strike with over-the-horizon and computer network-based weapons and WMD. The reduction of forward-deployed units makes force projection of home-based elements essential. Possible adversaries may attempt to disrupt power-projection capabilities by attacking installations, information systems, or transportation nodes. Thus U.S. territory becomes part of the theater of operations—a communications zone of critical importance to the emerging notion of strategic maneuver.

Doctrine should consider the United States, its territories and possessions as the communications zone for generating and projecting our military forces.

Given the nation's vulnerabilities—some of which have been made manifest in such events
as the World Trade Center bombing—the potential consequences of an attack are grave. They include massive casualties, disruption or degradation of our information infrastructure, contamination; panic; degraded response capabilities, degraded force projection capabilities; disruption or delay of deployments, economic damage, loss of strategic world position, social-psychological damage; and political change. International terrorism, domestic terrorism, conventional attacks, and other transnational threats are the categories of threats for which we must be prepared.

Many factors make these threats more ominous. Foremost is U.S. preeminence as a world power, especially its conventional military strength. Groups opposed to the thrust of our policies have sprouted in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the weakening of restraints imposed by dominant powers over clients. The openness of U.S. society provides an opportunity for our enemies to operate with more freedom than they would have in more restrictive venues. Also exacerbating the threats is the global proliferation of cheap WMD and the means to disseminate knowledge about such weapons. Few U.S. cities are fully prepared to deal with incidents involving WMD. Critical infrastructure and the U.S. economy are becoming increasingly more reliant on information and computer-based technologies that are vulnerable to covert attack. Moreover, many military installations and facilities are key force-projection platforms susceptible to attacks from terrorists using WMD, from unconventional special forces formed from elements infiltrated into the United States, or from indigenous hostile elements.

Responsibilities

Homeland defense will involve extensive coordination and liaison among interagency, joint, multijurisdictional (state and local), and active and reserve component (AC/RC) entities.

Some clear but relatively unknown distinctions are important in terms of federal and state control and the differing roles of the key agencies involved in crisis and consequence management. Crisis management—measures to resolve a hostile situation and to investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal law—is a federal responsibility under the lead of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Consequence management—those services and activities essential to mitigating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering resulting from disasters or catastrophes, either man-made or natural—is primarily a state and local responsibility.

When state authorities request federal help, regardless of whether the disaster is natural or man-made, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is usually the lead agency and DOD is in a supporting role. The Army’s role, as part of DOD, will also be one of support. The Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for consequence management and the DOMS is the action agent for coordinating DOD support. These distinctions are embedded in federal law, the Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident annex, other federal plans, Army doctrine in FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, Joint doctrine in draft Joint Pub 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, and DOD directives and manuals.

The Army’s Role

The Army provides unique capabilities to support civil authorities in homeland defense operations. The Army can rapidly move large forces to the affected location using organic or Transportation Command assets. On arrival, Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-trained and equipped forces that can operate and sustain themselves in an austere environment with organic assets. The Army is a disciplined force with well-established procedures. When required, an Army force can deploy in support of a geographic CINC. The Army RC has special qualities, capabilities, and geographic dispersion to conduct operations. The long-term relationships of Army RCs with state and local officials are especially valuable for homeland defense.

 

The Army’s role in homeland defense will fall into the following broad categories: force protection, support to crisis management, support to consequence management, protection of critical assets, support to counterterrorism, deterrence/defense against strategic attack, and MACA missions. Doctrine must expand, revise, or develop new guidelines to address each of these categories.

Fundamental Activities and Functions

This paper uses the National Military Strategy (NMS) elements of shape, respond, and prepare now as a framework for discussing support to homeland defense. As noted in the NMS, "the military is a complementary element of national power that stands with the other instruments wielded by government." The new National Security Strategy reinforces the importance of homeland defense and specifically states that "Protecting our population and critical infrastructure at home is an intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy." In the case of homeland defense, the military is primarily in a support role with the exception of national missile defense, air defense, and internal DOD activities for force protection, antiterrorism, and critical asset assurance.

Doctrine must be in alignment with policy expressed in national-level documents and DOD directives and instructions.

Army support to homeland defense will consist of those shape, respond, and prepare now activities and functions executed throughout the depth, width, and height of the United States designed to accomplish the assigned mission. These activities may be executed sequentially in a tiered response (Figure 2) or, where possible, simultaneously (Figure 3) and against multiple events or a single event based on METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time and civil considerations).

Figure 2: Tiered Response

 

Figure 3: Near Simultaneous Response

Fundamentals include the use of military capabilities in a support role for most operations, and subordination of the military to civilian authorities according to U.S. law. The process of support must involve clear civilian control and accountability for military activities. Army leaders will have to pay special attention to interagency coordination, private sector prerogatives and needs, and assurance of Constitutional liberties within the civil population. Presidential and DOD directives; the Federal Response Plan and other interagency plans; JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations; and other existing and draft Army and joint doctrine contain detailed guidelines, procedures, restraints, and constraints.

 

Shape. In the context of support to homeland defense, shape consists of actions using the full range of military power and information superiority to gain and maintain the initiative and set the conditions for success. Intelligence activities, domestic preparedness, computer network defense, information assurance, and critical asset protection are shaping operations. Also included are proactive operations, which put early detection capabilities in place and preposition selected military assets for crisis management. Where warnings and indications allow, FBI, CIA, DIA, DOD, or other government elements may be able to interdict, prevent, or preempt hostile actions. These actions may deny an adversary entry to the homeland or the opportunity to compromise the electromagnetic spectrum; to gain access to computer networks and files; or to damage, degrade, or otherwise harm other critical assets. They may include efforts to destroy or degrade an adversary’s essential capabilities before they are projected to our shores.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Federal statues and Executive Branch policies restrict the military’s ability to collect intelligence on the U.S. population during homeland defense-related shaping operations. This is to safeguard important individual rights and to reinforce the subordination of the military to civil authorities as directed by the Constitution. Selected federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies are responsible for collecting and using U.S. criminal threat information or intelligence to plan operations and enforce the law.

Doctrine must stress restrictions associated with domestic intelligence collection.

Within the United States, terrorism, sabotage and other physical threats perpetrated by US persons are considered law-enforcement matters and are not within the purview of military intelligence. Foreign intelligence, international terrorism, subversion, espionage and foreign military are threats that military intelligence can monitor, exploit or neutralize.

When used in homeland defense operations, military intelligence assets will follow many routine procedures in support of the operational commander. These include determining and prioritizing information requirements (IR) and requesting information from other intelligence organizations.

When operating under appropriate DOD procedures, intelligence may be processed, collected, collated, and correlated into prepared intelligence products. These products may be retained and shared with other DOD agencies on a need-to-know basis and if the information indicates a violation of the law with federal, state, and local law enforcement. Under certain restrictions, it may also be shared with other members of the intelligence community.

Military intelligence assets will prepare time-sensitive intelligence on developments within their purview that could threaten the United States and its population. Routine intelligence estimates, assessments, briefings, and reports will be prepared for the operational commander. Included are data bases on known and potential enemy force capabilities. This is especially important to assist installation commanders to maintain the proper level of security for force protection.

Intelligence activities will constantly review the adequacy of their efforts to ensure that they are meeting their consumer’s requirements and that necessary adjustments are made. An active and close relationship with intelligence and law-enforcement agencies is key to appropriate and successful intelligence operations within the United States. Essential is a routine review of intelligence activities with the Staff Judge Advocate and Intelligence Oversight Officers.

Domestic preparedness. The pillars of domestic preparedness include training, exercises, expert assistance, and response. DOD’s role in facilitating domestic preparedness at the local level is perhaps the most important shaping function. An interagency agreement establishes the DOJ as "one-stop shopping" for equipment and training resources, and it has a National Domestic Preparedness Office, manned by officials from a variety of agencies to orchestrate this effort. The DOJ has also established a Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, AL. Currently, the U.S. Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command remains deeply engaged in implementing the City Training Program mandated by The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment.

Additionally, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), in close cooperation with federal, state, and local health organizations, presents courses in the medical management of nuclear, chemical, and biological casualties. These courses are widely attended via satellite by civilian medical responders.

Doctrine should take into account and provide guidelines for the employment of the extensive capabilities of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve in support of homeland defense.

In terms of prepositioning as a shape component, the Army—particularly the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)—are ideally suited to support localities because of their dispersion throughout the nation. The NG’s role as the first line of military capability under the control of state governors is an important factor in its viability to support homeland defense. Liaison and training are potential areas for expanding RC’s contribution to the homeland defense mission.

Currently, the ARNG—367,000 strong—makes up more than one-half of the Total Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces. Air National Guard (ANG) units have a total strength of 109,000. The ARNG has units in 2,700 communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The ANG has 88 flying units at more than 170 installations nationwide. Support capabilities within the AR/ANG are listed in Appendix A. Since each state and territory has an ANG unit, rapid deployment is enhanced.

The USAR has approximately 500,000 soldiers in an active or participatory status and another 600,000 in a retired status. It has more than 2,000 units in the United States, Guam, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Germany. USAR capabilities are at Appendix D.

The U.S. Army Reserve Command includes 10 regional support commands (RSCs), which provide geographic command and control of the types of units mentioned above. The RSC headquarters’ locations conform to the 10 FEMA regions. The USAR is the Army's primary source of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces. In fact, more than 40 percent of the CS and CSS forces are in the USAR. These types of units, essential to any military operation, are a means of support to homeland defense. USAR also provides Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers to assist in domestic support operations.

Force protection. Force protection is a critical component of both support to homeland defense and the ability of U.S. forces to deploy overseas when necessary. Military force protection programs, key elements of which are listed in Appendix B, are well defined in regulations, programs, handbooks, and directives. While not included in the definition for force protection, the AMEDD, by protecting an individual’s health, improves the individual's performance and unit effectiveness and minimizes demands for a more logistically intensive health restoration capability. It thereby serves as a force multiplier.

Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP). Now defined in a DOD directive, the CAAP is another important aspect of the shape component. The purpose of this program, which replaces the Key Asset Protection Program, is to identify critical assets and to assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and capability to support vital DOD missions across the full range of military operations.

Within DOD, assurance is a responsibility of the owning or controlling DOD component. However, the Secretary of the Army is DOD’s executive agent for the CAAP; the Director of Military Support is the Secretary’s action agent.

An emerging and evolving program, the CAAP must complement and leverage related national programs and activities in an interagency context. Examples are the National Infrastructure Protection Center of the FBI, the Army Computer Emergency Response Team, and the JTF Computer Network Defense, which is currently collocated with Defense Information Security Agency (DISA). The newly formed Joint Web Risk Assessment Cell, collocated with DISA, is another important asset. It leverages the talented personnel of the RC, who, in their civilian careers, are highly adept at using information technology.

Within DOD are more than a million and a half computers, 28,000 systems, and 10,000 networks scattered throughout 289 agencies. Among these are 2900 mission-critical systems. Moreover, the CAAP acknowledges that critical DOD equipment, facilities, and services are dependent on non-DOD assets—the international and national infrastructures, other facilities and services in the private sector, and those of other U.S. Government agencies and departments. It also recognizes that non-DOD assets essential to the functioning of DOD critical assets are also critical assets to the DOD. They include information and computer-based systems and networks that are distributive in nature. Many are in the civil sector and their security rests primarily with civilian owners or with local, state, and federal law-enforcement authorities.

Importantly, some DOD systems are also important in the civil sector. For example, DOD provides about 25 percent of the nation’s air traffic control. DOD components are also responsible for the Computer Emergency Response Team. In sum, CAAP is a complex, multifaceted, and monumental program requiring further development and interface with myriad agencies and civil entities.

Adequate computer defenses are important, not only against terrorists, but against a relatively new phenomenon dubbed "hacksterism"—committed by groups or individuals dedicated to attacking the web sites of any person or entity deemed responsible for oppression. The FBI’s National Information Protection Center, manned by various agency representatives, DOD’s JTF-Computer Network Defense, and the Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity are key players in this defense effort. Information operations may be used to dissuade hostile movement into the homeland by emphasizing declaratory policy options and the sure knowledge of an overwhelming capability to defend ourselves. A recent example was the official pronouncement that harboring terrorists could result in strong military measures by the U.S. against a nation involved.

Respond. Responding consists of those actions that apply simultaneous, overwhelming military capabilities to achieve the immediate objective. Such actions could include opening lines of communication for military assistance, evacuating casualties, reconnaissance, decontaminating or initially assessing of WMD, and a host of other activities like those employed in Oklahoma City in 1995. Included were bomb dogs, casualty and medical assistance, electrical and structural engineering, imagery, EOD, linguistics, mortuary affairs, ground transportation, and airlift. Involved units may be highly specialized, such as those skilled in WMD; others may be infantry or military police used to control civil disturbances.

Doctrine should provide considerations for the dual use of Army warfighting
capabilities for homeland defense and other missions.

Initial response to a WMD event will be primarily from local assets, but DOD participation may be quickly required. DOD will operationally support consequence management against WMD in the near future with the integration of RC units, such as the newly formed NG Military Support Detachments - Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID). These comprise the capability of an advance party, the tip of the military spear, to facilitate follow-on deployment of DOD assets in support of "first responders." To provide prompt response capability they serve under the control of the state adjutant general.

The capability provided by the RAID teams is to deploy to an area of operations in support of a local civil incident commander to assess a suspected WMD event. They can also advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions and facilitate requests for assistance to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. The mission of the other military elements may be to provide in-depth follow-up support to such key areas as decontamination, identification of causal agents, emergency and definitive medical care and related medical equipment, mortuary affairs, and restoration of local communications.

The capabilities required by such a team are multifunctional. These needed capabilities include communications and logistics as well as limited capability to treat contaminated members of the team, analyze samples, and advise on the treatment of WMD casualties. They will also be able to enter the contaminated area and collect samples, detect and identify agent concentration, and mark contaminated areas. It will be able to use both standard and nonstandard military and civilian equipment and be capable of deploying by ground or air. Monitoring, detecting, and analyzing equipment allows it to determine what actually happened and how to best utilize resources to mitigate the situation.

In addition to the RAID teams, the U. S. Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU) provides DOD and other federal agencies a unique immediate-response capability. Their worldwide missions include identifying, escorting, rendering safe, disposing of, sampling, and/or mitigating chemical, biological and hazardous material.

Doctrine should address WMD training peculiar to the homeland defense environment.

The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has expertise in all levels of chemical and biological response. SBCCOM's Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center has chemical and biological scientists, labs, and monitoring equipment; the SBCCOM Forensic Analytical Center has a fly-away laboratory capability; and the chemical storage activities at eight U.S. sites have trained emergency responders with decontamination and monitoring equipment.

When needed, a Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (CB/RRT) may also be deployed. This specialized team may be task-organized from the TEU; active Army NBC units; Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force explosive ordnance units; RAID teams; Army or Navy medical units; Naval and Army environmental and preventive medicine units; or assets from various other DOD agencies.

The CB/RRT normally operates in support of a unified commander or a JSOTF. In the case of the former, the CB/RRT may be under the operational control of one of the two Response Task Forces (RTF) chartered by the Army component command of U.S. Atlantic Command— Forces Command (FORSCOM)—to assist federal, state and local officials respond to acts involving WMD. There are currently two such RTFs available to USCINCACOM. One is at Fifth Army in the western United States and the other is at First Army in the eastern United States. When federalized, the newly formed RAID teams will be under the operational control of an RTF.

FORSCOM is the lead operational authority (LOA) for USACOM for planning, coordinating, and, when directed, executing MSCA and MACDIS. FORSCOM is also the LOA for the DOD Resource Data Base, an important source of information for responding to WMD events. FORSCOM also provides trained defense coordinating officers and defense coordinating elements for MSCA from existing Army AC/RC in execution of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) in the continental United States.

The AMEDD plays a key role in response efforts with its experienced clinicians, planners, and support staffs, who may provide professional insight to responding both tactically and technologically to homeland defense. No specific table of organization and equipment medical unit is designed to operate in support of homeland defense. Existing units may be tailored to provide combat health services (CHS) assets, the preponderance of which are in the Army reserve force structure. CHS requirements can be met in a number of ways, depending on the situation. With proper authorization, military medical personnel may be used to support local efforts. An Army AC/RC military field hospital can be deployed to the area of operations, or a military medical facility may be used as a trauma center when the capability does not exist locally.

The U.S. Army Medical Command’s (USAMEDCOM) fixed facilities are linked through the TRICARE program with the civilian health care system. Further, the subordinate commands of the USAMEDCOM maintain Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams (SMART), which rapidly provide assets to assist in medical assessment and response. Together, the SMART teams and fixed facility staffs provide a resource of trained military medical professionals that can assist and augment those local, regional, and federal authorities responsible for crisis and consequence management in the treatment and management of casualties.

The AMEDD can assist in planning for large numbers of casualties. Such actions will differ greatly from those required during conventional disasters. Mass casualties from WMD will require decontamination, antidotes, vaccines and antibiotics, and a surge of available medical resources, including mass evacuation capabilities and training. The sudden onset of a large number of casualties may also pose certain public health threats related to food, vectors, water, wastewater, solid waste, and mental health—all mission areas for the AMEDD. Furthermore, damage to chemical and industrial plants and secondary hazards such as fires will cause toxic environmental and public health hazards to survivors and responders, becoming AMEDD mission areas. Specific CHS capabilities are listed in Appendix C.

Prepare Now. The array of Army capabilities available for shaping and responding to homeland defense is extensive. These capabilities remain dynamic, and the Army will continue to confront the challenges of assimilating its history and lessons learned, new and evolving threats, national strategic requirements, and scientific and technological innovation by preparing now for an uncertain future. To respond effectively in the homeland defense environment, challenges need to be identified and resolved and DTLOMS continuously reviewed.

Doctrine. Doctrine for many aspects of homeland defense exists in various DOD and Army publications. Other government publications, such as The FRP, provide additional guidance. Current or draft doctrine addresses aerospace defense, special operations, domestic support, antiterrorism, rear area operations, NBC defense, and information and interagency operations. As new organizations and capabilities are created, TRADOC will support further doctrine development. Current plans include—

Doctrine should facilitate development of AUTL tasks.

Training. Training in homeland defense operations incorporates many of the collective skills that units already possess. Often, required operations will mirror tactical missions but the unit will operate in the civilian sector. Likewise, individual skills will remain identical. The TRADOC school system is essential to providing the training link between traditional tactical operations to support the civilian domain in homeland defense. Activities may include—

Equipping and training the force in state-of-the-art technology, especially in
nonstandard items, will add more training requirements.

 

Leader Development. Leaders will require traditional leadership skills in conducting support to homeland defense. However, with these activities taking place in a joint, interagency, and multijurisdictional context, more emphasis is required to develop the special skills, knowledge, and abilities needed by leaders in such operations, to include—

Does the Strike force have a doctrinal role in homeland defense?

Organizations. To meet the technological challenges and training requirements of homeland defense, certain organizations will have to be created and others modified.

Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN). The MANSCEN will activate in October 1999 at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, with the potential to—

Military support detachments (RAID). These NG units will be rapidly deployable to detect and assess chemical and biological events. The 10 full-time detachments are being manned, equipped, and trained to be operational by January 2000. The 44 military support detachments (RAID) (Light) are to be fully mission-capable by FY02.

Missile defense organization. The Army’s organization for National Missile Defense will be enhanced by the new Patriot PAC-3 and theater high-altitude area defense weapons systems.

National Capital Response Force (NCRF). The Army is developing this organization to respond to a potential use of a WMD within the National Capital Region. This force, if established, would have the capability to quickly respond to and render safe a WMD. The NCRF will have the capability to respond to and perform render safe procedures in a potential WMD crisis management situation and correspondingly provide limited consequence management response support.

Plans also include other RC capabilities, especially reconnaissance and decontamination assets, to be formed from existing Army chemical units, Army medical units, and Air Force patient decontamination teams. These type capabilities could provide support during a WMD incident to decontaminate chemically, biologically, or radiologically contaminated casualties. Casualty decontamination will be performed under medical supervision. These capabilities may be drawn from the following existing assets:

Doctrine should provide guidelines for overcoming any disconnects between Army and civilian equipment, such as communications systems.

Materiel. With the rapid advances in technology, material development must mature at a like speed to counter potential threats. While the Army creates new systems, especially in the area of command and control, the ability to integrate them into civilian-compatible procedures is a challenge. Special emphasis must occur in the areas of detecting and mitigating the effects of WMD, to include—

 

Soldiers. Quality soldiers trained and led by competent and caring leaders remain key to success in homeland defense operations. Soldiers face myriad challenges, some of which will cause unusual stress as they operate in their homeland amidst possible destruction and mass casualties. The requirement to maintain law and order, sometimes while using deadly force, will cause tension between soldiers and civilians and may cause additional stress on soldiers. Motivation to accomplish the homeland defense mission will be high, but the emotional impact of operating in a disastrous situation within the homeland will be great.

CONCLUSION

The Army must continue to improve upon existing readiness and develop the capabilities, technologies, and techniques that will be required to confront any form of attack on the U.S. homeland in the future. These are new but not entirely unfamiliar challenges to the Army. Its bond with the people it serves, particularly in its RC, remains strong. The U.S. public and their leaders remain supportive and vigilant. The Army’s commitment to our way of life, democratic ideals, and subordination of military to civilian authority is unquestionable. The strength of the Army’s system of DTLOMS development is peerless, as is its history of learning and adapting to change. With the need to support homeland defense a key feature of the new security environment, these strengths, combined with the dedication of the Total Army, will earn the continuing gratefulness of the nation to an institution it can count on.

 

Appendix A

KEY NATIONAL GUARD ASSETS

Distant Learning Locations. States and territories have centers that can be used to instruct soldiers and local state first-response units.

ARNG Air Ambulance Units. Twenty units are located throughout the country in proximity to the FEMA regions.

ANG Medical Detachments. Medical support detachments are organic to all air units. An ANG unit is in every state and territory.

ANG Patient Decontamination Units. The ANG has 21 units totaling 399 personnel.

ARNG Chemical Units. There are seven division chemical companies, one smoke/decon company, and one ACR chemical company.

ANG Explosive Ordinance Disposal Units. The ANG has 10 units totaling 60 personnel.

ARNG Military Police Units. The ARNG has two brigade headquarters, 11 battalion headquarters, and 78 company size elements.

Appendix B

FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES*

Implementation of random antiterrorism measures in daily operations.

Incorporation of force protection into command information programs to educate all relevant publics about the threat and measures to counter the threat.

Execution of required training.

Updating and executing security and emergency response plans.

Including Criminal Investigation Command, FBI, state and local law enforcement, fire, medical, and emergency responder community in contingency planning and formalizing relationships among all concerned.

Ensuring fully staffed force protection committees and working groups, chaired by installation commanders and key operators, that meets regularly. These should include key staff such as military police, resource managers, logisticians, military intelligence, medical, engineer, legal, public affairs, and consequence management personnel.

Formulating a response plan and having a threat dissemination mechanism in place for WMD and other emergencies.

Establishing, training and equipping guards and other installation "first responders." Procuring personal protective equipment for defense against WMD and body armor for military police.

Reviewing physical security plans, including mission-essential vulnerable areas, gates, fencing, lighting, barriers, intrusion detection systems, and manpower requirements for higher threat conditions.

Assessing the force protection posture and using findings to justify budget submissions.

* Term used as defined in JP 1-02 (See Glossary)

Appendix C

CHS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Management of mass casualty situations, to include triage, treatment, and evacuation.

Delivery of direct medical, nursing, and other health care and services to victims.

Medical evacuation support out of the immediate area.

Preventive medicine support to reduce rodent and arthropod breeding areas; establish sanitation facilities; provide education in field sanitation and personal hygiene; medical threat; collect, analyze, and interpret health information; and assess occupational/environmental exposure.

Veterinary personnel can provide expertise in the public health ramifications of zoonotic diseases and bio/chem agents.

Combat health logistics support to replenish exhausted medical supplies and equipment, to control and organize massive shipments of medical supplies, and to manage/ store/distribute donated medical supplies and equipment.

Mental health and combat stress control support to victims and caregivers.

Dental support on an emergency basis and for maxillofacial injuries.

Assisting in the restoration of the medical infrastructure.

Laboratory support for infectious diseases, environmental/occupational health hazards and NBC agents.

Specific medical organizations that can provide support to homeland defense include:

Appendix D

KEY U.S. ARMY RESERVE ASSETS

Appendix E

REFERENCES

Laws:

  1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Sec 2332a of Title 18, U.S. Code, and the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, Title 14, Sec 1403.
  2. Public Law 104-201 Title XIV, September 23, 1996 "National Defense Authorization Act. for Fiscal Year 1997. Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act."
  3. Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 10001-18502, Reserve Components
  4. Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 331-334, Civil Disturbance Statues
  5. Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 371-382, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, particularly section 382, Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction
  6. Title 18 U.S. Code, section 1385, The Posse Comitatus Act.
  7. Title 42 U.S. Code, sections 5121-5204c, The Stafford Act, Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act, as amended, Title 42 U.S. Code.
  8. Title 10 U.S. Code, section 382, Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction, January 6, 1997.
  9. Title 18, U.S. Code, section 831, Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials.
  10. Title 31 U.S. Code, section 1535, The Economy Act.
  11.  

    National Strategy and Policy:

  12. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, "The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection," May 1998.
  13. PDD 62 "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland" May1998.
  14. Presidential Decision Directive 39, "United States Policy on Counterterrorism," June 1995.
  15. National Security Strategy For A New Century, The White House, October 1998.
  16. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997.
  17. Defense Directives, Military Doctrine and Handbooks:

  18. DOD Directive 5160.54 Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP), January 20, 1998.
  19. DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 15 January 1993
  20. DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 4 Feb 1994.
  21. DOD Directive 3025.1M, DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies, June 1994.
  22. DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), 15 January 1997.
  23. DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 21 Feb 1986, reissued incorporating Change 1, 20 Dec 1989.
  24. JP 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America, 4 November 1996.
  25. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 April 1998.
  26. JP 3-07.2, JTTP for Anti-Terrorism, 17 March 1998.
  27. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counter-drug Operations, 9 August 1994.
  28. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, 9 October 1996.
  29. JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Operations, 28 May 1996.
  30. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense, 10 July 1995.
  31. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October 1998.
  32. JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, 28 August 1996.
  33. JP 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, 30 May 1995.
  34. Draft (PC) JP 3-07.7, JTTP for Domestic Support Operations, 20 August 1997.
  35. Field Manual (FM) 8-42 Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations, 27 October 1997.
  36. Field Manual (FM) 19-15, Civil Disturbances, December 1985.
  37. Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, August 1996.Authorities (MSCA), 15 January 1993.
  38. Field Manual (FM) 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, July 1993.
  39. U.S. Army Forces Command Readiness Program Handbook, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," September 1998
  40. "Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction," Department of Defense, January 1998.
  41. "Handbook of DOD Assets and Capabilities for Response to a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Incident," Department of Defense, August 1996.
  42. Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness, CJCS Handbook 5260, January 1997.
  43. Military Support Detachment "Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Operations" Handbook, Draft as of 17 December 1998.
  44. Plans:

  45. The Federal Response Plan, Terrorism Incident Annex, June 1998.
  46. ACOM FUNPLAN 2501, Annex T, "Consequence Management," 2 February 1998.
  47.  

    Reports, Testimony and Speeches:

  48. Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement for the Record before the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, February 4, 1999.
  49. The Emerging Digital Economy, (Wash., DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998).
  50. William Cohen, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," National Press Club Luncheon, Federal News Service, March 17, 1998.
  51. GAO Report "Combating Terrorism: Observations of Crosscutting Issues," April 23, 1998.
  52. GAO Report, "Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy," September 26, 1997.
  53. GAO Report, "Combating Terrorism—Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domemici Domestic Preparedness Program," October 2, 1998.
  54. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997.
  55. "Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010," CB 2010 Study, November 1997.
  56. GEN Dennis J. Reimer, USA, "One Team, One Fight, One Future."
  57. National Guard Report to the Congress of the United States of America: Weapons of Mass Destruction Study, Scheduled to be published Spring 1999.
  58. Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pursuant to S.Con.Res. 27, 79th Congress.
  59. John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee," June 4, 1998.
  60. The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DOD Response to Transnational Threats, Volume 1, Final Report, October 1997
  61. "The Health of Chemical Biological Defense in the U.S. Military, A White Paper by the NBC Industry Group," November 1977.
  62. William S. Cohen, Defense Reform Initiative, February 2, 1998.
  63. Books and Articles:

  64. Brad Roberts, "Between Panic and Complacency: Calibrating the Chemical and Biological Warfare Problem," in Stuart E. Johnson, Ed., The Niche Threat: Deterring the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Wash., DC: National Defense University Press, 1997).
  65. W. Seth Carus, Working Paper Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: the Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, (Wash., D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, November 1998 revision).
  66. Richard Danzig, "The Next Superweapon: Panic," The New York Times, Nov 15, 1998, WK 15.
  67. Lt. Col Raymond S. Shelton, USMC, "No Democracy Can Feel Secure," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, August 1998, p. 40.
  68. David C. Gompert, "National Security in the Information Age," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1998.
  69. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press), 1998.
  70. Richard J. Rinaldo, "Consequence Management: The Mother of all MOOTW," Common Perspective, April 1998.
  71. James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersion Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1 Mar 98.
  72. Richard A. Falkenrath ,"Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism, Survival," Vol. 40.3, Autumn 1998.pp 43-65.
  73. Ron Meyer,"The Scope of Full-Dimensional Protection," Joint Vision 2010 Journal Full Spectrum, April 1998.
  74. COL Richard J. Larsen, USAF, and LTC Robert P. Kadlec, USAF, "Biological Warfare: A Silent Threat to America’s Defense Transportation System," Strategic Review, Spring 1998.
  75. Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998.
  76. John Donnelly, "IG: Chem/Bio Battle Training Falls Short," Defense Week, August 3, 1998, p.1.
  77. Amy Harmon, "Hactivist’s of All Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the Web," The New York Times, October 31, 1998.
  78. Leonard A. Cole, "The Specter of Biological Weapons," Scientific American, December 1996.
  79. LTC Terry N. Mayer, USAF, "The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation’s Weapon of Mass Destruction," in Battlefield of the Future, Air Force University Press.
  80. Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1998, p.26.
  81. Charles L. Mercier, Jr., "Terrorists, WMD, and the U.S. Army Reserve," Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 1997, p. 98.
  82. Richard Preston, "Annals of Warfare: The Bioweaponeers, " The New Yorker, March 9, 1998.
  83. Brad Roberts and Graham S. Pearson, "Bursting the Biological Bubble: How Prepared Are We for Biowar?," Jane’s International Defense Review, April 1998.
  84. Commentary-August 6, 1997,"Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?," The Journal of the American Medical Association.
  85. William Safire, "On Language: Weapons of Mass Destruction," New York Times April 19, 1998.
  1. COL Thomas R. Lujan, USA, "Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army," Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 1997.
  2. "The New Terrorism: Coming to a City Near You," The Economist, August 15-21, 1998.
  3. Captain Chris Seiple, USMC, "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction," Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 1997.
  4. John G. Roos, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Defense," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1998.
  5. LCDR Andy Wilde, USN, "Information Operations," A Common Perspective, USACOM Joint Warfighting Center’s Newsletter, Vol.6,No.2, October 1998.
  6. LTC Clinton Esarey, USA, MAJ Benjamin C. Huff, USAF, and MAJ Anthony C. Vesay, USA, "Terrorism: The Most Challenging Asymmetric Threat to Force Protection," A Common Perspective, USACOM Joint Warfighting Center’s Newsletter, Vol.6, No.2, October 1998.
  7. David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson, "Forgotten Mission: Military Support to the Nation," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1997.
  8. Ronald F. Rokosz and Charles H. Hash, "Changing the Mindset-Army Antiterrorism Force Protection," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1997-98.
  9. "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare", Textbook of Military Medicine Series, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America, 1997.
  10. "Medical Consequences of Nuclear Warfare", Textbook of Military Medicine Series, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America, 1989.

GLOSSARY

TERMS

AC active component

AMEDD Army Medical department

ANG Air National Guard

ARNG Army National Guard

AUTL Army universal task list

BMD ballistic missile defense

CAAP Critical Asset Assurance Program

CB/RRT chemical biological rapid response team

CGSOC Command and General Staff Officers Course

CHS combat health services

CINC commander in chief

CNA computer network attack

CND computer network defense

CS combat support

CSS combat service support

DISA Defense Information Security Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

DOMS Directorate of Military Support

DTLOMS doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, material,

and soldiers

EOD Explosive Ordinance Demolition

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FM field manual

IA information assurance

IO information operations

IR information requirements

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

LOA lead operational authority

LOC lines of communication

MACA Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

MANSCEN Maneuver Support Center

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil considerations

MSCA military support to civil authorities

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NG National Guard

NMS National Military Strategy

RAID rapid assessment and initial detection

RC reserve component

RSC regional support command

RTF response task force

SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

TEU Technical Escort Unit

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

WMD weapons of mass destruction

DEFINITIONS

Crisis management. Measures to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law.

Consequence management. Those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services and activities may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. (DODD 3025.15)

Domestic Terrorism. Involves groups or individuals whose activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.

Force Protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported intelligence and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

Homeland defense. Protecting our territory, population and critical infrastructure at home by:

International terrorism. Activities undertaken by or in support of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum. DODD 5240.1-R

Military assistance to civil authorities. Those DOD activities and measures covered under MSCA (natural and man-made disasters) plus DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement.

Military support to civil authorities. Those activities and measures taken by DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparing for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (DODD 3025.15)

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be high explosives or NBC and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separate and divisible part of the weapon. (Joint Pub 1-02)