
Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review

January 9, 2002



- **Congressional Requirement**
- **New Security Environment**
- **Capabilities-Based Force**
- **Long Term Goals and Commitments**

Congressional Requirement

- **Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress**
- **Written report from Secretary of Defense**
- **Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials**
- **Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy**
- **Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment**

Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today

Cold War

Context

- Enduring hostility of Soviet Union
- Known ideological, peer opponent
- Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies
- Survival stakes



Implications

- Emphasis on deterrence
 - Required high confidence
- Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces
- Nuclear planning reflected continuities
 - Threat-based
 - Some flexibility for a few contingencies
 - Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification

New Era

Context

- Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges
- New relationship with Russia
- Spectrum of contingencies
- Varying and unequal stakes



Implications

- Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat
 - Uncertainties of deterrence
- Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense
- Nuclear planning
 - Capabilities-based
 - Greater flexibility for range of contingencies
 - Unilateral reductions preserve flexibility; transparency

Extant and Emerging Threats to the U.S., Our Friends, and Allies

- Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems continues unabated
 - 12 nations have nuclear weapons programs
 - 28 nations have ballistic missiles
 - 13 nations have biological weapons
 - 16 nations have chemical weapons

New Environment and the President's Direction

- Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: “new framework”
- Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate
- End relationship with Russia based on MAD
- Deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the U.S., its allies and friends
- Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties
- Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permits
- Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons

QDR: Defense Policy Goals

Assure Allies and Friends	Deter Aggressors
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments• Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces• Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent• Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary's attack plans• Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats
Dissuade Competitors	Defeat Enemies
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition• Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.• Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets• Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails

The New Capabilities-Based Force

Traditional Threat-Based Approach


- U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat
- Nuclear offensive emphasis
- Some flexibility in planning
- Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing

Capabilities-Based Approach


- Capabilities for multiple contingencies and new threats in a changing environment
 - Capabilities required are not country-specific
 - Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority
 - Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur
- Includes active defense and non-nuclear capabilities
 - Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence
 - Non-nuclear strike forces (conventional strike and information operations) reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent
- Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning

A Capabilities Based Concept: The New Triad

Cold War Triad



New Triad



The New Triad offers a portfolio of capabilities and the flexibility required to address a spectrum of contingencies

Sizing the Nuclear Force

- A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies
 - Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies
 - Responsive force for potential contingencies
 - Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies
- Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals
 - Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia
- Force structure and downloaded warheads preserved for the responsive force


Sustainment of Current Nuclear Forces

- Current force projected to remain until 2020 or longer
 - Average ages of current systems are: MM-III 26 yrs; D-5 SLBMs 9 yrs; B-52 bombers 40 yrs; B-2 bombers 5 yrs; SSBN 10 yrs
 - Life extension programs for all systems
 - Study alternatives for follow-ons
- Fully fund Trident D-5 SLBM life extension program
- Accelerate DOE's test readiness
 - Last underground nuclear test in 1992
 - No change in Administration's position on nuclear testing
 - Oppose CTBT ratification
 - Continued adherence to testing moratorium

Building the New Triad

- **Non-Nuclear Strike:**
 - Improved capabilities against hard and deeply buried targets
 - Conversion of four Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles
- **Missile Defense:**
 - Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program
 - Deploy limited and effective missile defenses
- **Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning:**
 - Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces
 - Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for Hard and Deeply Buried Targets and mobile targets
 - Upgrade STRATCOM's capability for adaptive planning

The Journey to Reduction and a New Triad



NPR Decisions Made

- Reduce operationally deployed warheads to 1700-2200 over next decade
 - Retire Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs beginning in calendar year 2002
 - Remove 4 Trident submarines from strategic service
 - Will not retain capability to return B-1 to nuclear role
 - Download warheads from operationally deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
- Planned reductions will be completed in phases
 - By FY 07, reductions to ~ 3800
 - Beyond FY 07, reductions to 1700-2200 will be completed by 2012

- NPR charts the path for the first step in military transformation
- More accurately reflects new security environment
- Replaces dependence on nuclear weapons with synergies between all parts of defense
- Balances near-term risks with longer-term risks