News

Hard.Copy - 14 November 1997

ARTICLE CITATIONS GATHERED FROM COMMERCIALLY PUBLISHED JOURNALS AND NEWSLETTERS.


Weldon In Negotiations To Save TMD Plus-Up. 
Aerospace Daily, Nov 10, 1997, p 218
Rep Curt Weldon (R-PA) is trying to negotiate with Democrats and
congressional leadership to try and save all or a part of the theater
missile defense plus-up bill, to deal with the developing Iranian
missile threat. 

Flexibility Said Key To NMD Lead System Integrator Work. 
Aerospace Daily, Nov 14, 1997, pp 247-248
The NMD LSI will be responsible for tying together all of the various
systems and components of a NMD system, even though the total cost and
the likelihood of deployment are unknown. This requires the contractor
who wins to be very flexible. 

'True Test' Of DoD Initiative Will Be Implementation, Spence Says.
Aerospace Daily, Nov 11, 1997, p 227
HNSC Chairman Floyd Spence (R-SC) commended SecDef Cohen on the Defense
Reform Initiative, expected to save billions of dollars. 

House Votes Sanctions On Russian Missile Sales To Iran. 
Aerospace Daily, Nov 14, 1997, p 251
House members have approved a bill that would impose three forms of
sanctions on those entities who have transferred missile technology to
Iran for the Russian SS-4 and Iranian Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 long range
missiles. Under this bill the president is required to submit reports to
Congress identifying entities where "credible evidence" suggests they
have transferred key missile components or technology to Iran. 

NMD LSI Competitors Propose Commercial, Minuteman III Boosters.
Aerospace Daily, Nov 13, 1997, pp  239, 242
Proposals for the NMD LSI were submitted yesterday and included the
option of using both commercial and Minuteman III first stage boosters.
The LSI contract will include development, deployment and support of the
NMD architecture making it one of the largest contracts in Pentagon
history. 

Washington Outlook: Going Ballistic. 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, James R. Asker, Nov 10, 1997, p 31
Curt Weldon (R-PA) is concerned that Iran's new Shahab-3 ballistic
missile, which could have a range of up to 1,300 km and be operational
in 12-18 months, is threatening US troops in the Middle East. With the
backing of 106 of his House colleagues, he's introduced an "Iran Missile
Protection Act" to speed TMD work. Weldon's camp says he shouted, "I
can't trust you," at Lyles because Lyles' deputies earlier had outlined
for him how they would spend an extra $325m he wants to give to BMDO.
But BMDO officials maintain they were only answering a question, not
supporting any new funding to speed up TMD. BMDO says technological
challenges, not money, are the problem. 

The Likelihood Of A Presidential Veto Of The FY98 Defense Authorization
Bill. 
Defense Daily, Nov 13, 1997, p 6
President Clinton has until Nov 18 to sign the FY98 Defense
Authorization Bill. Some senior advisers are recommending that the
president veto the bill saying that the language is biased in favor of
the public sector and could cost DoD billions of dollars of potential
savings. The National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and SecDef Cohen
have not yet taken a position. 

New DoD Agency To Check Weapons Of Mass Destruction.
Defense Daily, Bryan Bender, Nov 12, 1997, p 5
As part of his Defense Reform Initiative, SecDef Cohen is standing up a
new Threat Reduction and Treaty Compliance Agency to focus on the threat
posed by weapons of mass destruction. To address these challenges the
new agency will manage counterproliferation activities such as
Cooperative Threat Reduction and NATO's Partnership for Peace, and
monitor compliance with arms control treaties. It will also be
responsible for providing expertise on weapons of mass destruction,
nuclear weapons stockpile support, and threat reduction. 

US General Applauds Security Of Russia Nukes. 
Defense News, Jeff Erlich, Nov 10, 1997, p 40
According to the US top general overseeing nuclear issues, Russia's
nuclear weapons are safe. 

NDP Will Seek Billions To Equip US Forces. 
Defense News. Jeff Erlich, Nov 10, 1997, p 4
According to the high-level NDP panel, the Pentagon should set aside a
growing pool of money starting in 2000 for cutting-edge weapons and
tactics. 

THAAD Life-Cycle Costs Nearly Double Since Last Year. 
Defense Week, John Donnelly, Nov 10, 1997, pp 1, 15
The estimated cost to buy and support the Army's Theater High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system has nearly doubled since
last year, growing from $18b to $33b, according to officials and
documents. 

Reporters Notebook: Testy Over Testing. 
Defense Week, Nov 10, 1997, p 4
Rep Curt Weldon (R-PA), chairman of the House National Security
Committee's research panel, believes the THAAD system is being slowed by
Pentagon underfunding. Weldon wants to authorize about $390m for BMDO
that the agency says it can't prudently spend. 

Pentagon Looks For $6 Billion In Savings Through 'Defense Reform
Initiative'. 
Inside the Pentagon, Douglas Berenson, Nov 11, 1997, p 8
Defense Secretary William Cohen and other senior Pentagon officials
announced a series of reforms to the defense bureaucracy. The Defense
Reform Initiative would save billions of dollars from additional base
closures, increased outsourcing of support functions, shifting to
paperless contracting and publishing and reducing personnel employed by
the OSD. This special report includes an excerpt from the Defense Reform
Initiative that describes organizational changes that will be made to
OSD. 

Air Force Challenged To Meet Congressional Goals For Space-Based Laser.
Inside the Pentagon. Gigi Whitley, Nov 13, 1997, pp 5-6
The AF Space-Based laser project must attempt to fill Congressional
expectations of an on-orbit demonstration in 2005 while still meeting
its own standards. Two challenges to the program are; falling within the
projected funding levels and decisive performance against ballistic
missiles. 

Israel To Deploy Arrow Missile A Year Early. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Ed Blanche, Nov 12, 1997, p 29
Israel's Channel 2 said the Arrow-2 anti-tactical ballistic missile is
eliminating one development phase to go straight to production. It
reported that the Arrow would be "partly operational" by mid-1998, a
year earlier than scheduled and that the Israeli Air Force has already
selected a site for the first battery and has ordered construction of a
radar station for the facility. The Ministry of Defence and the missile
manufacturer (IAI) made no comment on the report. 

Countering Weapons Of Mass Destruction: USA Moves To Block Weapons
Danger. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Barbara Starr, Nov 12, 1997, pp 39-40
In the chemical arena, the US DoD estimates that Iran's chemical program
has grown significantly since it used mustard gas and cyanide agents
against Iraqi troops in 1987. It is now believed that Iran has several
hundred tons on blister, blood and choking agents. Some weaponization
has occurred, probably with artillery shells, to support ground combat
operations. It is also believed that Iran could deliver chemical bombs
by aircraft at strategic targets in the region. Article includes table
of Iraqi BW agents and delivery systems. 

Russian's SS-27 May Be Operational By Mid-98. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Barbara Starr, Nov 12, 1997, p 4
Russia is expected to achieve initial operating capability in mid-1998
of its planned SS-27 mobile intercontinental nuclear missile, Gen Eugene
Habiger, commander-in-chief of the US STRATCOM, was told on his recent
visit to Russian's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). The single nuclear
warhead missile is expected to be fielded with an improved mobile
launcher and turning radius. Habiger also said that research and
development is continuing on a nuclear air-launched cruise missile. 

Special Report: North Korea's Deadly Industries Revealed. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Nov 12, 1997, pp 54-57
While civilian industry is managed and administered through the State
Administration Council, the defense industry is essentially controlled
through one organization - the Second Economic Committee (SEC). The SEC
is the single most powerful and influential economic organization in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It exercises overall
responsibility for the planning, financing, production and distribution
of defense related equipment. It is also responsible for all foreign
military related sales and purchasing.

Cohen Comes Out Against THAAD, Despite Missile Threat. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Nov 12, 1997, p 3
US SecDef Cohen is opposing Congressional efforts to add funding to the
THAAD program. In a letter to Curt Weldon (R-PA), a member of the House
National Security Committee, Cohen said he opposed any extra funding for
TMD. He said budget constraints would mean that the funds might have to
come from other "vital" programs and could commit the Pentagon to
long-term funding requirements. The letter came as the HNSC heard
testimony from LtGen Lyles, director BMDO, on the Iranian MRBM threat
and the THAAD program. "This specific Iranian capability appears to be
emerging more quickly than previously expected," Lyles said. 

Nuclear Deterrent May Not Be Relevant. 
Jane's Defence Weekly. Nick Cook, Nov 12, 1997, pp 41, 43
UK Strategic Defence Review is unlikely to recommend any radical action
on anti-ballistic missile defenses when it reports early next year -
despite the fact that there is a glaring gap in UK's high altitude air
defense system with the lapse in significant activity several years ago
on Staff Target (Air) 1235, the UK's Medium surface-to-air missile
requirement. If the UK was threatened by an aggressor with a long range
ballistic missile inventory armed with biological or chemical warheads,
its primary means of defense for the foreseeable future would be (after
diplomacy fails) reliance on the nuclear deterrent. 

Countering WMD: US Concepts Target Counterforce Mission. 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Nov 12, 1997, pp 44, 47
The BMDO architecture that would eventually be deployed to the Persian
Gulf in a crisis has always been envisioned as a layered defense to
attack ballistic missile that have already been launched. "No single
system can perform the entire TMD mission," said LtGen Lester Lyles,
BMDO director. The first layer of US attack against enemy targets would
come in the boost phase of the ballistic missile. The proposed YAL-1A
airborne laser system (ABL) would already be deployed in a theater, on
combat patrol, and ready to fire its laser just as the missile comes off
the launcher. Missiles "leaked" through the ABL envelope would be
engaged by the THAAD and the Navy's Upper Tier or Theater Wide systems.
Covering a smaller footprint would be the PAC-3, the Navy's Lower Tier
missile and the proposed MEADS. 

Demise of the Killer Satellite. 
Physics Today, Irvin Goodwin, Nov 01, 1997, p 52
Meteorological considers weighed against a test of the MIRACL laser
against an aging US satellite. However the test provoked calls by arms
control experts who believed that any test might encourage others to
develop similar capability. 

NASA Eyes Upgrades For X-33. 
Space News, Anne Eisele, Nov 10, 1997, pp 1, 26
With more than two years left in the $1 billion effort to develop the
X-33 reusable launch vehicle (RLV) prototype, NASA is considering
upgrades of some of its major components, a step that would drive up
X-33 costs by "hundreds of millions" of dollars, according to Gary
Payton, NASA director of advanced space transportation. 

Despite Launch Failure, Brazil Presses Forward. 
Space News, Warren Ferster, Nov 10, 1997, p 14
The failure of Brazil's first orbital launch vehicle on Nov 2 has not
shaken the country's resolve to develop an indigenous satellite launch
capability, according to Brazilian space officials. 

X-33 Passes Critical Review, Paving Way To Craft Construction. 
Space News, Leonard David, Nov 10, 1997, p 15
The X-33 has passed a critical design review, paving the way for
construction of the vehicle NASA and Lockheed Martin will use to test
the technology needed to build reusable launchers. 

International Control Of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots And
Sticks. 
The Nonproliferation Review, Ronald B. Mitchell, Oct 01, 1997, pp 40-53
This article develops a theory of classification that goes beyond the
"logic of consequences" as to why regime members can influence and have
influenced proliferation decisions by manipulating the opportunities,
information, and goals states and seek. Mitchell discusses six
strategies of social control and then establishes five different
propositions which members can institute for behavioral change. 

Surprise Down Under: The Secret History Of Australia's Nuclear
Ambitions. 
The Nonproliferation Review,  Jim Walsh, Oct 01, 1997, pp 1-20
Over the course of four decades Australia has gone from a country
actively seeking nuclear weapons to one that now supports their
abolition. This article attempts to answer several questions concerning
Australia's evolution of thinking concerning nuclear weapons. What
factors influenced the Australian government's nuclear decision making?
What does the Australian case suggest about the nature of state behavior
and the kinds of policies that are most likely to retard the spread of
nuclear weapons? Walsh attempts to answer these questions by examining
two phases in Australian nuclear history; the attempted procurement
(1956-1963) and the indigenous capability phase (1964-1972). 

US Senate Ratification Of The CWC: Lessons For The CTBT.
The Nonproliferation Review. John V. Parachini, Oct 01, 1997, pp 62-72
The difficult political battle for Senate approval of the CWC is a
reminder of the support for formal negotiated arms control agreements in
the US. This article discusses the key factors and difficulties that led
to the approval of the CWC in the hope of assessing the prospects for
the CTBT ratification by the current Senate. 

Viewpoint: The Duma-Senate Logjam On Arms Control: What Can Be Done?.
The Nonproliferation Review, George Bunn; John B. Rhinelander, Oct 01,
1997, pp 73-87
This essay examines the roots of the current Duma-Senate logjam in the
area of arms control and nonproliferation treaties and then considers a
series of alternative measures to direct treaty ratification that have
been taken in the past. Reciprocal unilateral measures, political
commitments and executive measures are three alternatives that do not
require legislative ratification. Although these do not replace
treaties, this essay argues that they can provide meaningful temporary
steps until political conditions change for formal legislation. 

US Policy On Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade
(1987-1997). 
The Nonproliferation Review, Wyn Q. Bowen, Oct 01, 1997, pp 21-39
This article discusses the first decade of the MTCR, its challenges,
effectiveness in restraining proliferation, and direction for the
future. The article has several objectives; to identify pivotal points
in the regime's formulation, to evaluate how effective the regime has
been in controlling the spread of ballistic missiles and its technology
and to shed some light on the politics surrounding the regime both in
the US government and member states. 

Viewpoint: US Missile Nonproliferation Strategy Toward The NIS And
China: How Effective?. 
The Nonproliferation Review, Victor Zaborsky, Oct 01, 1997, pp 88-94
This article suggests that the "carrots' the US uses to contain nuclear
proliferation are stronger than those used to manage missile
proliferation. Zaborsky argues that missile proliferation should be
given a higher priority in American policy and that the Clinton
Administration should adjust the balance of incentives and
disincentives. 

Syria's Chemical And Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities And
Motivations. 
The Nonproliferation Review,  M. Zuhair Diab, Oct 01, 1997, pp 104-111
This report examines the role of chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
in Syria's strategic outlook and military posture. The analysis is
organized into sections dealing with Syria's CBW capabilities,
motivations for acquiring CBW, perception of their military utilizations
and the implication of the entry into force in April 1997 of the CWC. 

Iran's Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close To The Bomb?.
The Nonproliferation Review,  
Andrew Koch; Jeanette Wolf, Oct 01, 1997, pp 123-135
This study analyzes the information on Iran's nuclear program and
outlines its potential for success by tracking activities and
capabilities in each of the fuel cycle technologies: from mining and
milling uranium to fissile material product.