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The DTIC Review, Dec 1997

Antimissile Defense: Strategic Interception
(AD-A329949)

Bibliography of Related Documents Available from DTIC

AD NUMBER: A326905

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ANTI- BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY.

MAR 97 37P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BRUCE, ELTON C.

ABSTRACT: (U) The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, has for 24 years served as a pillar for nuclear deterrence. Under this treaty both cold war powers agreed to leave their population centers vulnerable to strategic nuclear missile strike by limiting the number of Anti-Ballistic Missile sites. In the post cold war, the United States is clearly the only remaining superpower, however, Russia continues to posses its nuclear arsenals. Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 1 and 2, the United States and Russia have agreed to reduce their ballistic missile arsenals and no longer target the other's homeland. Although start will reduce the largest nuclear arsenals existing in the world today, the perception of a ballistic missile strike against the United States' homeland by a rogue state has intensified debate over employing national missile defenses which are not ABM Treaty compliant. The ABM Treaty prohibits multiple national missile defense sites. This study will address the ABM Treaty and National Missile Defense issues by analyzing the emerging missile threat along with other pertinent arms control issues; the conclusion being that by year 2010 the United States will no longer adhere to the ABM Treaty.

DESCRIPTORS: *THREAT EVALUATION, *TREATIES, *BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, *NATIONAL DEFENSE, NUCLEAR WARFARE, USSR, , STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, STRIKE WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, DETERRENCE,

AD NUMBER: A326902

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: A NEW MISSION FOR THE TOTAL FORCE.

APR 96 37P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: UTECHT, RICHARD J.

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper explores the concept of a future National Missile Defense (NMD) System deployed, integrated, and manned by the national guard. It first looks at the current status of the NMD discussion within the context of an emerging threat to north America by other than Russian or former soviet union states. Framed by that foundation, the paper reviews an historical case study concerning the contribution of the national guard in the performance of a similar national defense mission, compared to a proposed concept of operations for NMD. The focus of this comparison is on the success of past performance with an expectation of future capability for this critical mission. The paper concludes with an organizational development analysis of this emerging mission and what key attributes should characterize a weapon system which represents a significant investment of our national treasury directly under the operational control of the reserve component.

DESCRIPTORS: *NUCLEAR WARFARE, *NATIONAL GUARD, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMBAT READINESS, THREAT EVALUATION, CONFLICT, NATIONAL DEFENSE, DETERRENCE.

AD NUMBER: A326672

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

PREVENTING BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION: LESSONS FROM IRAQ.

DEC 96 115P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: TALAY, BRIAN J.

ABSTRACT: (U) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is now one of the greatest threats to the United States and its allies. Efforts to contain WMD proliferation, particularly the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have had limited success and must be improved to deal with new arms proliferation challenges. This thesis examines the case of Iraq to assess the performance of the missile nonproliferation regime since 1970. By analyzing the methods used by Iraq to obtain missile systems and missile technology, this thesis assesses the ability of the international community to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. Understanding Iraq's past capabilities as well as its post-war efforts to rebuild weapons programs and procurement networks, this thesis provides suggestions for improving the regime' s performance. This thesis finds that (1) prior to 1992 the MTCR failed in its attempts to prevent proliferation; (2) the existence of the MTCR, while necessary to slow proliferation, is not sufficient to prevent proliferation; and (3) additional enforcement is needed to counter WMD acquisition by resourceful and determined states.

DESCRIPTORS: *IRAQ, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, MILITARY HISTORY, NATIONAL SECURITY, THESES, THREAT EVALUATION, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, MILITARY PROCUREMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

AD NUMBER: A326588

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

THE POOR MAN'S AIR FORCE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVOLVING CRUISE MISSILE THREAT.

APR 97 33P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BOWEN, JOHN T.

ABSTRACT: (U) For several years, the United States has expended considerable resources on countering The Theater Ballistic Missile Threat. During this time, we have relatively ignored a growing land attack Cruise Missile threat. Land attack Cruise Missiles have the potential to be even more deadly than Ballistic Missiles, able to deliver similar payloads over similar distances with much greater accuracy. advanced Cruise Missiles can penetrate existing air defenses, giving potential regional adversaries a significant ability to conduct strategic attack and interdiction against our Military Forces, a Poor Man's Air Force. additionally, Cruise Missiles, synchronized with employment of Ballistic Missiles and manned aircraft, can have a synergistic effect. Efforts to prevent Cruise Missile proliferation have been ineffective, and highly lethal systems will likely be in the arsenals of many third world nations within the next decade. Our nation needs to pursue Theater Air Defense capability to detect, identify, track, engage, and destroy advanced Cruise Missiles to be prepared for this evolving threat.

DESCRIPTORS: *UNITED STATES, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *CRUISE MISSILES, *DEFENSE PLANNING, AIR DEFENSE, AIR FORCE, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, AIRCRAFT, EMPLOYMENT, THREATS, INTERDICTION, ATTACK, ARMY FACILITIES, ACCURACY, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, LETHALITY, STRATEGIC WARFARE, ORDNANCE, MANNED, ADVANCED WEAPONS, LAND AREAS, SYNERGISM.

AD NUMBER: A326401

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) -- HAS ITS TIME COME?

JAN 97 37P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BARRETT, DAVID K.

ABSTRACT: (U) The issue over deploying National Missile Defense (NMD) to counter strategic Ballistic Missiles has been on going since the 1950's. During the Cold War, the debate shifted from considering the viability of deploying territorial defense to counter the Soviet threat to one of agreement by both superpowers to limit missile defenses for fear they would undermine strategic stability and increase the chances for nuclear war. Without missile defenses, it was understood that the populations of both countries would be subject to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) should a nuclear war ever break out between the sides. With the Cold War over, the debate has shifted once again. The issue is whether or not the threat posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems warrants a reevaluation of cold war arguments against NMD and MAD. Contrary to the views of the current administration, the author outlines that NMD deployment is needed now more than ever for the United States to effectively operate in the 21st Century and to ensure the American population is never again threatened by direct attack.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *NATIONAL DEFENSE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, DEPLOYMENT, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, THREAT EVALUATION, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, STRATEGIC WARFARE, MILITARY PLANNING

AD NUMBER: A326358

NYLAND ENTERPRISES IDAHO SPRINGS CO

ASPECTS OF THE FREEDOM TO MIX CONCEPT.

FEB 97 28P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: NYLAND, F. S.

ABSTRACT: (U) The purpose of this report is to examine certain aspects of a concept called freedom to mix offensive and defensive forces. Under this concept, the Russians and the United States would be free to reduce elements of their strategic offensive forces, and replace deactivated warheads with Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) interceptors.

DESCRIPTORS: *NATIONAL SECURITY, *ARMS CONTROL, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), GUIDED MISSILES, STABILITY, UNITED STATES, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, REDUCTION, RUSSIA, STRATEGIC WARFARE, NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

AD NUMBER: A325993

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NATO ALLIANCE RELATIONS.

DEC 96 134P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: RAFFIER, JOHN P.

ABSTRACT: (U) Short-range missiles in third world arsenals pose a serious threat to forward employed U.S. and Allied Military Forces. The acquisition of longer-range missiles has the potential to extend that threat to the population and territory of the United States and its allies. while NATO member states have agreed to develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Systems to support forward-deployed troops, they continue to dispute which TMD Systems ought to be developed and whether territorial or population defenses ought to be built. in this long-standing dispute, the United States has often found itself at odds with its European allies. This thesis argues that Ballistic Missile Defense remains a potential source of friction between the United States and its European allies, but for substantially different reasons than in the Cold War era.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, DEVELOPING NATIONS, NATO, SOURCES, UNITED STATES, THREATS, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, ARMY FACILITIES, THESES, POPULATION, COLD WAR, ORDNANCE, FRICTION, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE.

AD NUMBER: A325793

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE: JOINT DOCTRINAL IMPERATIVE.

FEB 97 21P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: SPACY, WILLIAM L., II

ABSTRACT: (U) The theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) threat is serious and growing. to counter this threat, the United States intends to build an integrated Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) with an active defense system capable of operating in a fully automated mode. since doctrine, by definition, prescribes the method for employing combat forces, it is incumbent on the U.S. Military to determine the best doctrine for employing this JTMD system. Current doctrine is inadequate in that it fails to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the guidance necessary to organize the theater for JTMD. future doctrine should, as a minimum, guide the JFC in making the organizational, informational and operational decisions necessary to deploy the JTMD system. In light of the continued rapid proliferation of TBMS, this doctrine must give the JFC the guidance necessary to make optimum use of JTMD assets.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, GUIDED MISSILES, UNITED STATES, OPTIMIZATION, AUTOMATION, DECISION MAKING, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, ACTIVE DEFENSE, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, CENTRALIZED, COMBAT FORCES, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE.

AD NUMBER: A323638

ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY BETHESDA MD

ACTIVE, PASSIVE, ATTACK OPERATIONS, BATTLE MANAGEMENT/COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE - PILLAR INTEGRATION (APAB-PI).

AUG 96 41P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ENGELMANN, KARSTEN

ABSTRACT: (U) In 1995, the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command and the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency Rapid Response Low-Resolution Theater-Level Theater Missile Defense Model. This report discusses how the active, passive attack operations battle management/command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence - pillar integration (APAB-PI) model was developed to meet these objectives. the purpose of the APAB-PI study was to develop a methodology and a supporting model which simulated all of the missile battles that together comprise the missile defense campaign for an entire theater. A process which allows the examination of the entire campaign enables analysts to answer decision makers' questions regarding the effect of different aspects of the Tactical Ballistic Missile/Theater Missile Defense on that campaign.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ARMY OPERATIONS, *ARMY INTELLIGENCE, *THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, SCENARIOS, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, ATTACK, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES

AD NUMBER: A322454

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIV NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: RISK AND FUNDING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SPACE-BASED INFRARED LOW COMPONENT.

FEB 97 32P

ABSTRACT: (U) In 1995, the Department of Defense (DoD) made plans for the Space and Missile Tracking System-the low satellite component of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBRIS)-to be deployed in fiscal year 2006. In February 1996, the Congress directed the secretary of Defense to restructure the SBRIS program and deploy the first Space and Missile Tracking System (hereafter referred to as SBRIS-Low) satellite in fiscal year 2002. The Congress also appropriated $264 million above DoD's fiscal year 1996 and 1997 budget requests to support this deployment acceleration. The purpose was to ensure that the Space and Missile Tracking System provided support to national and Theater Ballistic Missile defenses sooner, rather than later.

DESCRIPTORS: *INFRARED EQUIPMENT, *LAUNCH VEHICLES, *AIR FORCE BUDGETS, *SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEMS, GUIDED MISSILES, CONGRESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPLOYMENT, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, RISK, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, ACCELERATION, INFRARED RADIATION, NATIONAL DEFENSE, SPACE BASED.

AD NUMBER: A320857

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

MATHEMATICAL SIMULATION OF USING DECOYING AND KILLING MISSILES TO COUNTER ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES.

JAN 97 14P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ZHOU, SHUIGENG; TAO, BENREN

ABSTRACT: (U) A new method of intercepting Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM) using Decoying and Killing Missiles (DKM) is proposed in this paper. (Decoying and Killing Missiles are actually Surface-to-Air Missiles with their guidance heads replaced by decoying jammers.) A mathematical model is set up to carry out a mathematical simulation of the physical process of using DKMS to intercept arms. Simulation results show that this plan is theoretically feasible.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *GUIDED MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES, *ANTIRADIATION MISSILES, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, TRANSLATIONS, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, RADAR SIGNALS, RADAR JAMMING, CHINA, RADAR DECOYS, CHINESE LANGUAGE.

AD NUMBER: A320754

ARMY MISSILE COMMAND REDSTONE ARSENAL AL

SYSTEMS SIMULATION AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE PAC-3 MISSILE 30-YEAR LIFE CYCLE AND STREAMLINING.

JAN 97 13
PERSONAL AUTHORS: DANESH, MOHAMMAND H.

ABSTRACT: (U) This report will provide an overview of the problems, approaches, and solutions applied to developing a product assurance program for the Patriot Pac-3 Missile. The Pac-3 Missile System requires hit to kill capability and is being developed/procured under acquisition streamlining.

DESCRIPTORS: *WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS, *SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, *QUALITY ASSURANCE, ACQUISITION, KILL PROBABILITIES, HIT PROBABILITIES, STREAMLINE SHAPE.

AD NUMBER: A320272

PRATT AND WHITNEY SAN JOSE CA CHEMICAL SYSTEMS DIV

HIGH PERFORMANCE BOOST PROPULSION FOR NAVY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE,

SEP 96 8P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: KEARNEY, W. J.; CASILLAS, E. D.

ABSTRACT: (U) Future Tactical and Defensive Missile Propulsion Systems must provide a high degree of mission versatility and robustness at low cost with minimum development risk. The Navy's Standard Missile has successfully demonstrated an evolutionary philosophy of guidance and propulsion upgrades over its long operational history. Replacing the existing 13.5-in diameter MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motor (DTRM) with a full 21 -in. Diameter high performance motor offers increased propulsion capability and weapon system options. An improved performance stage-two motor, consistent with the MK 72 booster's 21-in. Diameter, provides an upgraded Missile System with expanded range, greater throw weight and higher velocity increments. Expanded propulsion capability can be achieved with low development risk commensurate with improvements in the Vertical Launch System (VLS) canister. The benefits of this upgraded full Caliber Motor compatible with the existing MK72 booster and VLS interfaces is presented.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, GUIDED MISSILES, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, BOOST PHASE, LOW COSTS, WEAPON SYSTEMS, PROPULSION SYSTEMS, VERTICAL ORIENTATION, MISSIONS, HISTORY, LAUNCHING, EVOLUTION(GENERAL), GUIDANCE, TACTICAL

AD NUMBER: A320002

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

AIRBORNE INTERCEPT: BOOST- AND ASCENT-PHASE OPTIONS AND ISSUES.

96 42P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: VAUGHAN, DAVID R.; ISAUCSON, JEFFREY A.; KVITKY, JOEL S.

ABSTRACT: (U) This report documents an analysis of countering Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMS) by using manned aircraft with onboard radar sensors in an airborne intercept role. Although current defense planning does not anticipate such a role for manned aircraft, more- advanced airborne intercept options harbor significant uncertainties with respect to development, and it remains to be demonstrated that they will prove practicable in the decade ahead. Thus, the approaches we analyzed and similar ones may be revisited as nearer- term options in the future. Moreover, although recent discussions have focused almost exclusively on Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI), Ascent-Phase Intercept (API) has significant operational merits that should not be dismissed wholesale. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the development of a dual BPI-API capability should be strongly considered for the reasons cited in this report.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *BOOST PHASE, *INTERCEPTORS, *BOOSTER ROCKET ENGINES, GUIDED MISSILES, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, EMERGENCIES, AIRCRAFT, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, AIRBORNE, INTERCEPTION, PATHS, RADAR, SEQUENCES, EXOSPHERE, ONBOARD, ARMOR PIERCING AMMUNITION, MANNED.

AD NUMBER: A319989

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON DC

NMD DEPLOYMENT READINESS PROGRAM OVERVIEW,

SEP 96 10P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: MCNIERNEY, DAVID F.

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper summarizes America's National Missile Defense Deployment readiness program and describes the defenses we are developing to defend the United States against ICBMS from the Third World. Some countries, including North Korea, are developing ICBMS indigenously but relatively slowly, while others could obtain ICBMS in the near term through proliferation. Effective defenses against such threats would include space based and ground based sensors for early warning, ground- based sensors at sites within the United States and, if needed, at forward bases, for identifying and tracking threat objects, ground based interceptors at one or more sites, and a battle management, command, control, and communications system for controlling the architecture and relaying its messages. Such a system, even with only one interceptor site, could defend all 50 states with high effectiveness against a few missiles from a Third World country. The uncertainties associated with when such a threat might appear, and from where, and with what characteristics, have dictated that we adopt a highly flexible and evolutionary "Deployment Readiness" Acquisition Program.

DESCRIPTORS: *DEPLOYMENT, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *COMBAT READINESS, *OPERATIONAL READINESS, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, DEVELOPING NATIONS, NORTH KOREA, FORWARD AREAS, MILITARY FACILITIES, UNITED STATES, DETECTORS, DECISION MAKING, THREATS, SITES, TRACKING, LONG RANGE(DISTANCE)

AD NUMBER: A319966

TEXTRON SYSTEMS DIV WILMINGTON MA

GROUND-BASED PORTABLE MINIATURE INTERCEPTOR FOR CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE,

SEP 96 9P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: THYSON, NOEL A.; SHUI, VEN H.; FLAHERTY, ROBERT J.

ABSTRACT: (U) A ground-based Portable Miniature Interceptor Weapon System has been conceptualized to fulfill the important mission of killing/negating cruise missiles in flight. A preliminary PMI design concept offers a weapon weighing under 150 pounds with an approximately hemispherical intercept volume having a diameter of about 10 miles. The paper describes the CONOPS, PMI design, component characteristics and packaging, and performance against cruise missiles in a representative mission scenario.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *CRUISE MISSILES, SCENARIOS, PORTABLE EQUIPMENT, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERCEPTION, MISSIONS, INFLIGHT, PACKAGING, GROUND BASED, INTERCEPTORS, HEMISPHERES, MINIATURIZATION.

AD NUMBER: A319965

AEROSPACE CORP LOS ANGELES CA

INTERCEPTOR CONCEPTS FOR THE US UAV BPI PROGRAM,

SEP 96 12P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BROWN, STEVE; ZONDERVAN, KEVIN L.; BARRERA, MARK; URBANO, REYNALDO; SVOREC, RAY

ABSTRACT: (U) The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is managing the us Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) program. the program's goal is to investigate the potential of UAV-Based Interceptors to provide a boost- phase defensive tier against Theater Ballistic Missiles. A technology assessment and risk mitigation effort is underway to determine the requirements of a UAV BPI System. The Advanced Systems Directorate, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Material Command (AFMC/SMC/ADE) has been selected to lead the Interceptor Integrated Product Team (IPT) . The Interceptor IPT's efforts during its first year have been focused on surfacing attractive interceptor conceptual designs and selecting a preliminary design. this paper presents the requirements and rationale leading to the preliminary interceptor design. The pros and cons of the alternative interceptor concepts are examined, leading to a single concept. A preliminary interceptor design is then presented for this concept.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERCEPTORS, REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES, GUIDED MISSILES, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, AIRCRAFT, RISK, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, BOOST PHASE, AIRBORNE, INTERCEPTION, SURFACES, UNMANNED VEHICLES

AD NUMBER: A319962

ROME LAB ROME NY

COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING FOR THE GROUND BASED INTERCEPTOR,

SEP 96 8P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: HADYNSKI, GREGORY J.

ABSTRACT: (U) The task of developing a communications system to support the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) program is a challenging one. The majority of the challenge stems from the fact that the communications link must be designed to be survivable in the potentially nuclear scintillated environment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) System. Operation in a potentially nuclear environment requires the use of Extremely High Frequency (EHF) communications technology with a waveform optimized for survivability. A communications system of this type has never been built for an application with the stringent size, weight, and power requirements of a Ballistic Missile interceptor, but the air Force's Rome Laboratory is responsible for developing a prototype transceiver for BMDO. The prototype transceiver will consist of 44 ghz uplink components, 20 ghz down link components, and a modem, which is capable of the required waveform.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATION AND RADIO SYSTEMS, *INTERCEPTORS, GUIDED MISSILES ENGINEERING, GROUND BASED, *BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY.

AD NUMBER: A319961

LITTON SYSTEMS INC AGOURA HILLS CA

DATA SYSTEMS DIV TMD BATTLE MANAGEMENT,

SEP 96 11P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ARMENIAN, H. K.; COLLIER, J. D.; DENNIS, P. W.; FAGARASAN, J. T.; SIMON, B. J.

ABSTRACT: (U) A key objective of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is to defend multiple as- sets spread over a wide theater, simultaneously threatened by numerous Ballistic Missiles. battle management, therefore, has to efficiently assign weapons and sensors to incoming threats to achieve intercepts, minimizing total leakage or total damage to assets. To analyze the TMD battle management problem to counter Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM), threat propagation and radar models to predict antenna occupancy and track accuracy are developed. interceptor flyouts are modeled to support candidate one-on-one fire control solutions. in addition, algorithms are developed for threat assessment, battle space- time analysis to determine shot opportunities satisfying system constraints, many-on- many weapon-target-sensor assignment to achieve optimality of the objective function, as well as engagement scheduling to determine the best intercept position and time.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, ALGORITHMS, GUIDED MISSILES, SCENARIOS, PROPAGATION, POSITION(LOCATION), TEST BEDS, COMPUTATIONS, DETECTORS, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MODELS, INTERCEPTION, ATTACK, ACCURACY, RADAR, WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS, THREAT EVALUATION, ANTENNAS, *GUIDED MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES.

AD NUMBER: A319957

LOCKHEED MARTIN VOUGHT SYSTEMS CORP DALLAS TX

THE PATRIOT PAC-3 MISSILE PROGRAM - AN AFFORDABLE INTEGRATION APPROACH,

SEP 96 13P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: O'REILLY, PATRICK; WALTERS, ED

ABSTRACT: (U) The affordable Pac-3 System upgrade approach is based on innovative, joint consolidation and integration of existing industry and government assets. through the integrated use of a network of geographically dispersed simulation, hardware in the loop, and test facilities, the Pac-3 Missile design and performance is being analyzed and verified prior to first missile flight. This process begins with the thorough and rigorous testing of missile components. it then continues with the use of integrated simulations which is a key activity to verify and predict patriot system performance with Pac-3 upgrades. the process is culminated with system level and flight testing conducted at white sands missile range, New Mexico. During the Gulf War, the Patriot Air Defense System made its now-famous battlefield debut against Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMS). Through a succession of improvements and modifications to refocus its mission on missile defense, patriot helped defend coalition forces and Israeli territory from Iraqi Scud Missile attacks.

DESCRIPTORS: *INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, SYSTEMS APPROACH, *SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES,*BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, AIR DEFENSE, SIMULATION, WARFARE, IRAQ, INDUSTRIES, MODIFICATION, ATTACK, RADAR, INTEGRATION, RECORDING SYSTEMS, LETHALITY, NEW MEXICO, RANGE(DISTANCE), BATTLES, AUTOMATIC, TACTICAL WEAPONS, TEST FACILITIES, GUIDED MISSILE COMPONENTS, ADVANCED WEAPONS, WARHEADS.

AD NUMBER: A319955

ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS CENTER HANSCOM AFB MA

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIRST CAPABILITY INCREMENT OF THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) BATTLE MANAGEMENT/COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (BMC3) SOFTWARE,

SEP 96 11P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BLANK, JEFF; URBAN, MARY L.; WILKINSON, CHARLES K.

ABSTRACT: (U) A demonstrator system for the battle management, command, control, and communications element of the national missile defense system is being built in seven increments. this paper reports lessons learned from development of the first increment. four lessons are discussed. first, a relatively informal requirements baseline, generated and iterated by the contractor, was found to meet the needs of the program. second, benefits from use of object oriented methods and ADA 95 will not be realized until later increments. third, there were successful alternatives to the reviews and documents eliminated in acquisition streamlining. Lastly, vigilance to keep process versus product emphasis in balance was needed. the aim of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program is to develop a system of systems with the capability to defend the nation from the threat of limited Ballistic Missile attacks.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, REQUIREMENTS, DEPLOYMENT, DETECTORS, DECISION MAKING, ACQUISITION, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, SPACE ENVIRONMENTS, DEMONSTRATIONS, VIGILANCE, ATTACK, BASE LINES, GROUND BASED, INTERCEPTORS, *NATIONAL DEFENSE, SPACE BASED.

AD NUMBER: A319953

OFFICE OF THE PROJECT MANAGER PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEM REDSTONE ARS ENAL AL

INTEGRATION OF THE PAC-3 MISSILE SEGMENT INTO THE PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM,

SEP 96 10P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: NESLINE, MARK; LINZ, JOHN; KENGER, MARTIN; COOK, FELICIA

ABSTRACT: (U) The Patriot Air Defense System has been developed as a modular system with a high level of integrated software-driven functionality providing a broad range of inherent flexibility. The system has evolved from its initial, basic design which provided defense against the Air Breathing Threat in complex countermeasure environments with a single patriot missile type to the Patriot Advanced Capability 2 (Pac-2) which provides defense against a combination of the Air Breathing and Tactical Ballistic Missile threats utilizing four missile types. The Patriot Air Defense System continues to evolve to the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (Pac-3) configuration which incorporates radar and communication upgrades as well as the Lockheed Martin Vought Systems (LMVS) Pac- 3 Missile, a fifth missile type. as part of this capability, scheduled to be fielded in 1999, the Patriot Project Office (PPO) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) have contracted with Raytheon for the integration of the Pac-3 Missile segment into the Patriot Air Defense System.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, OPTIMIZATION, KILL PROBABILITIES, *COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, DATA LINKS, ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FIRE CONTROL RADAR.

AD NUMBER: A319950

SPACE WARFARE CENTER FALCON AFB CO

SHIELD PHASE II. TRANSFERS SUCCESSFUL LEGACY FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE APPLICATIONS,

SEP 96 13P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: FRASER, CHRISTOPHER; MCCLUNG, SEAN D.

ABSTRACT: (U) The purpose of this paper is to identify how the successful legacy of the shield project is being directly applied to the development and transition to operations of an emergency response system for National Missile Defense (NMD) Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3), and how existing elements and infrastructures are being optimized to provide a functional, capable system in the near-term for use in the execution of NMD. Most NMD functions are not unique to the Air Force nor to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). Surveillance and warning, event detection, threat assessment, and attack characterization all currently exist in AF support architectures for Theater and ITTW/ infrastructures. in addition, the AF MMIII has been shown to be an accurate and effective weapon which can be of significant use during the reapportionment of existing strategic resources for defensive purposes.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *AIR FORCE PLANNING, MEASUREMENT, GLOBAL, EMERGENCIES, DETECTION, DETECTORS, RISK, COST EFFECTIVENESS, SPACE SYSTEMS, INTEROPERABILITY, STRUCTURES, RESPONSE, THREAT EVALUATION, RESOURCES, TRANSITIONS, NORMALIZING(STATISTICS), ARCHITECTURE, NATIONAL DEFENSE, STRATEGIC MATERIALS, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE.

AD NUMBER: A319376

NYLAND ENTERPRISES IDAHO SPRINGS CO

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES AND RUSSIAN RETALIATION ISSUES.

MAR 96 33P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: NYLAND, F. S.

ABSTRACT: (U) An examination of the degradation of a Russian Retaliatory Nuclear strike if the U.S. and Russia were to deploy theater or anti-ballistic missile defenses in their homelands. Consideration is given to efforts for restoring the effectiveness of a Russian retaliation, and the effects on first strike stability of deployments of theater missile defenses in one or both homelands.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *NUCLEAR WARFARE, GUIDED MISSILES, USSR, STABILITY, DEPLOYMENT, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, DECOYS, RUSSIA, STRIKE WARFARE, FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY.

AD NUMBER: A319248

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

EFFECTIVENESS OF OFF-BOARD ACTIVE DECOYS AGAINST ANTI-SHIPPING MISSILES.

SEP 96 56P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: TAN, TUN-HOU

ABSTRACT: (U) Radar Guided Anti-Shipping Missiles are the primary threat for most modern navies. The inherent nature of the Monopulse Radar employed by most Anti-Shipping Missiles makes it highly resistant to active ECM techniques. Decoys are attractive because they provide a source of radiation that can capture the radar seeker and direct the missile away from the ship. However the time and direction of launch are critical parameters which determine the operational success of the decoy. this thesis evaluates the protection provided by active off- board decoys which are deployed by ships during an engagement against a Radar Guided Anti-Shipping Missile. The research emphasizes launching active decoys. Many of the operational characteristics of the launching decoy are investigated, including direction of launch, timing of launch and the RF characteristics of the decoy.

DESCRIPTORS: *COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, *RADAR COUNTERMEASURES, *ANTISHIP MISSILES, SHIP DEFENSE SYSTEMS, RADAR DECOYS, GUIDED MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES, SCENARIOS, SOURCES, RADIATION, DEPLOYMENT, SHIPS, THREATS, PARAMETERS, THESES, LAUNCHING, MONOPULSE RADAR, RADAR HOMING, MODEMS, SHIP MODELS, RADIOFREQUENCY, BUOYS.

AD NUMBER: A318780

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA

WEAPONS SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS AND MINIMUM COST FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES,

96 10P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: KOHLBERG, IRA; GREER, WILLIAM

ABSTRACT: (U) The use of Scud Missiles by the Iraqis in the 1991 Gulf War signaled the emergence of a new threat against which current U.S. Defenses are limited. One message from the Gulf War is that defending ports, strategic off-load air fields, marshaling areas, and population centers against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) will be of mounting concern in future conflicts. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), in conjunction with the military services, is currently evaluating various Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Systems to defend critical friendly assets (called targets in this paper) against current and projected short range, medium range, and long range TBMS. The cost for defending these assets depends on the number and type of threat TBMS that emerge, and the mix of defensive missiles arrayed against them. There are several problems associated with designing the most cost effective mix of TBMD Systems.

DESCRIPTORS: *COST EFFECTIVENESS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS, *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *GUIDED MISSILES, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, STRATEGY, SURVIVABILITY, LONG RANGE(TIME), TIME, LONG RANGE(DISTANCE), TARGETING, SHORT RANGE(DISTANCE)

AD NUMBER: A318704

LITTON SYSTEMS INC AGOURA HILLS CA DATA SYSTEMS DIV TMD DEFENSE PLANNING,

96 12P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ARMENIAN, H. K.; COLLIER, J. D.; DENNIS, P. W.; SIMON, B. J.; YIN, M.

ABSTRACT: (U) A key objective of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is to defend multiple assets spread over a wide theater, simultaneously threatened by numerous missiles. To counter such scenarios, BM/C3 is decomposed into the battle management and defense planning problems. The objective of battle management - analyzed in previous studies - is to assign weapons and sensors to minimize total damage as the battle unfolds in real-time, while the objectives of defense planning are to evaluate the effectiveness of specified defense designs against given attack scenarios, and determine improved interceptor launcher and sensor plans. This study focuses on the TMD Land-Sea Based defense planning problem where multiple Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) and Theater Cruise Missiles (TCM) are launched from numerous Missile Threat Origins (MTO) against many assets, and are countered by Upper Tier (UT) and Lower Tier (LT) sensors and weapons located at different sites.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, DEFENSE PLANNING, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, WEAPONS, ALGORITHMS, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, GUIDED MISSILES, SCENARIOS, TEST BEDS, DETECTORS, THREATS, DISTRIBUTION, ATTACK, PROTOTYPES, PROBLEM SOLVING, INTEGRATION, CRUISE MISSILES, INVENTORY, INTERCEPTORS, LAUNCHERS.

AD NUMBER: A318703

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN DIV VA

OPTIMAL THRUST ALLOCATION FOR TBM INTERCEPTOR MIDCOURSE GUIDANCE,

96 13P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: LAWTON, JOHN A.; MARTELL, CRAIG A.; JESIONOWSKI, ROBERT J.

ABSTRACT: (U) Interceptors for Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense typically are conceived to have midcourse phases that make corrections to the original interceptor free-flight path based on updated threat state estimates from the filter associated with a remote sensor. some concepts call for one midcourse correction, while others call for more frequent corrections. The goal of this study is to find the optimal frequency of midcourse corrections from the point of view of minimizing the terminal error, as well as to determine, for a given design, the optimal allocation of thrust resources. It is found that the more frequently the corrections are made, the less the errors are that are handed over to the terminal phase. Furthermore, even when less fuel is available than that required to take out all known errors, the optimal strategy is to make corrections as soon as the amount of correction required just equals the amount of divert available for each burn, until midcourse divert fuel is exhausted.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERCEPTORS, *MIDCOURSE GUIDANCE, FREQUENCY, *GUIDED MISSILES, OPTIMIZATION, STRATEGY, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THREATS, , FUELS, REMOTE SENSORS

AD NUMBER: A318537

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD WASHINGTON DC

REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD/POLICY BOARD TASK FORCE ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE.

JAN 96 86P

ABSTRACT: (U) Attached is the final report of the DSB/DPB Task Force on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). significant TMD policy, budget and program initiatives were undertaken during our deliberations, and thus we make no pretense at having kept up with these moving targets. The report, reflecting guidance the task force received when we delivered an interim report last year, focuses on four topics: coping with uncertainties about futures paths of the Theater Missile Threat, demarcation between Theater and Strategic Missile Defenses, meeting the challenge of developing joint TMD, and lastly, setting priorities for specific TMD programs and projects.

DESCRIPTORS: THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, TASK FORCES, GUIDED MISSILES, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THREATS, MOVING TARGETS, REFLECTION, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, GUIDANCE.

AD NUMBER: A317760

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS DIV FOREIGN MISSILE THREATS: ANALYTIC SOUNDNESS OF CERTAIN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

AUG 96 17P

ABSTRACT: (U) The General Accounting Office was asked to evaluate certain National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) prepared by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) that analyze the threat to the United States from Foreign Missile Systems. GAO's reporting objectives were to compare the content and conclusions of NIE 95-19, emerging missile threats to North America during the next 15 years, November 1995, with the content and conclusions of two previous NIES prepared in 1993; to evaluate whether these three NIES appear to be objective and supported by facts; and to describe the conclusions of recent, unclassified studies on the threat to the United States from Foreign Missile Systems. This report supplements a June 12, 1996, briefing and is an unclassified version of GAO's classified report.

DESCRIPTORS: GUIDED MISSILES, FOREIGN, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THREAT EVALUATION, ENEMY, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES, THREATS, ESTIMATES, NORTH AMERICA.

AD NUMBER: A314548

ARMY RESEARCH LAB FORT HUACHUCA AZ

FORT HUACHUCA FIELD ELEMENT INFORMATION DETAIL AND DISPLAY CONCEPTS FOR CRITICAL DECISIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

AUG 96 38P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: MARKERT, WENDY J.; KNAPP, BEVERLY G.; REYNOLDS, KENNETH C.

ABSTRACT: (U) The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THD) System is a Missile Defense System being developed for the United States Army. Previous studies have been conducted regarding (a) information categorization, (b) attention direction and focusing, and (c) information criticality in order to aid designers in interface display design for the thd Operator System Interface (OSI). In particular, results from these studies have told designers (a) what information areas were critical and needed to be presented at a high level in the display, and (b) what information items within these information areas were critical and needed to be displayed in a prominent manner.

DESCRIPTORS: ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), GUIDED MISSILES, DECISION MAKING, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERFACES, DISPLAY SYSTEMS, AMPLIFICATION, ARMY, OPERATORS(PERSONNEL), ATTENTION. LIMITATIONS (ALPHA): AVAILABILITY: DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ILLEGIBLE.

AD NUMBER: A314531

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

NAVAL THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (TBMD)--DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS.

JUN 96 155P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BRINTZINGHOFFER, DANIEL M.

ABSTRACT: (U) As the United States moves into the next century one of the biggest threats facing her national interests is the proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Systems, with their potential for carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In order for the United States to 'project power', the Navy must play a large role in the protection of friendly assets from TBM attacks. Thus, the Navy is continuing to develop new systems and technologies as it attempts to migrate older weapons systems to fulfill this mission into its initial Ballistic Missile Defense concept, Navy Area Defense (NAD). This thesis looks at the differences between the current 'As Is' physical/information architectures for the Anti- Air Warfare Commander and the future 'To Be' physical/information architectures for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Commander.

DESCRIPTORS: INFORMATION EXCHANGE, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, AIR DEFENSE, GUIDED MISSILES, REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES, ACQUISITION, WEAPON SYSTEMS, PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, THESES, PLATFORMS, CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INFORMATION CENTERS, POWER, ARCHITECTURE, AREA DEFENSE, ONBOARD, INFORMATION PROCESSING. LIMITATIONS (ALPHA): AVAILABILITY: DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ILLEGIBLE.

AD NUMBER: A313312

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

MENACE OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES AND SHIPBORNE LASER WEAPONS,

JUL 96 20P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: QIWAN, FANG; ZHIXIANG, YIN; CHUANFU, JIANG

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper discusses the menace of Antiship Missiles, the difficulties of Operational Shipborne Short Range Antimissile Defense Systems, and a survey of the development of Shipborne Laser Weapons.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *ANTISHIP MISSILES, *LASER WEAPONS, SHIP DEFENSE SYSTEMS, SHIPBOARD, TRANSLATIONS, SHORT RANGE(DISTANCE), CHINA.

AD NUMBER: A312387

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THEATER MISSILES.

MAR 96 187P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: RILEY, CRAIG A.

ABSTRACT: (U) The U.S. Military has never been able to prevent Theater Missiles (TMS) from being launched at U.S. and Allied or Coalition Forces and citizens. Post-War analysis of interdiction efforts during World War II and the Persian Gulf War could not identify a single instance where either a German V Weapon or an Iraqi Scud Missile was destroyed before launch. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the best estimate that the Air Force could provide the National Command Authority was that ninety percent of the Soviet Missiles in Cuba would be destroyed by an airstrike. To correct this deficiency, the military developed Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) Doctrine. This doctrine attempts to integrate synergistically all U.S. Military assets and capabilities. However, this doctrine does not fully integrate Special Operations Forces (SOF) into attack operations against TMS. additionally, the Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTPS) needed to implement this doctrine have not been developed.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, WEAPONS, GUIDED MISSILES, USSR, WARFARE, AIR FORCE, IRAQ, RECOVERY, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PERSIAN GULF, TARGET ACQUISITION, INTERDICTION, ATTACK, THESES, AIR STRIKES, CUBA, MILITARY TACTICS, POSTWAR OPERATIONS, MATERIALS RECOVERY, GERMANY(EAST AND WEST).

AD NUMBER: A312236

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

IMPROVING THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

MAY 96 29P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: SCHLIENTZ, STEVEN C.

ABSTRACT: (U) The proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMS) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) throughout developing nations is so widespread that over 20 states may have an operational capability to deliver WMD using TBMS by the turn of the century. As was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War, even cheap, unsophisticated, and militarily insignificant TBMS such as the Al Hussein (Modified Scud-B) can pose a psychological impact so severe that a strategic center of gravity such as the cohesion of alliances and coalitions may be threatened. the enormity of this threat will rapidly exacerbate with improvements in the accuracy, range, and lethality of TBMS. In recognition of this emerging threat, Congress has drastically increased funding for the development of various robust systems for Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD). However, the first active defense systems and supporting space-based sensors that will provide a true area protection will be fielded no earlier than the middle of the next decade. Joint Force Commanders (JFCS) cannot rely solely on Patriot.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS,*ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS,*MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, WEAPONS, DEVELOPING NATIONS, *GUIDED MISSILES, CENTER OF GRAVITY, WARFARE, CONGRESS, DETECTORS, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, IMPACT, ACTIVE DEFENSE, PERSIAN GULF, COMPUTERS, ATTACK, ACCURACY, PROTECTION, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, LETHALITY,

AD NUMBER: A312226

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: STRENGTHENING THE GLUE THAT HOLDS THE PUZZLE TOGETHER.

MAY 96 24P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ROWDEN, THOMAS S.

ABSTRACT: (U) The proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMS) and their use as Weapons of Terror as demonstrated during the Gulf War clearly demonstrate the need to be able to defend against this type of weapon. The United States Military must address this need and demonstrate it's resolve to adequately defend not only it's own forces but friendly forces, cities and populace as well. The potential use of Warheads which are Nuclear, Chemical, or Biological further complicate this issue.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, *NUCLEAR WARFARE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *GUIDED MISSILES, UNITED STATES, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PREPARATION, ACTIVE DEFENSE, MILITARY DOCTRINE, BATTLEFIELDS, ATTACK, POPULATION, SYNERGISM, WARHEADS, PASSIVE DEFENSE, FRIENDLY FIRE.

AD NUMBER: A311233

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

TWIXT SCILLA AND CHARYBDIS: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM TREATY.

JAN 96 51P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: FAGGIOLI, VINCENT J.

ABSTRACT: (U) In 1972 the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to leave their territories vulnerable to Strategic Missile Attack. This agreement was manifest in the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This treaty prohibits deployment of nation-wide defenses against Strategic Missiles. Since then a new threat has arisen, Theater Missiles (TBMS), which threaten U.S. deployed forces and may impede the freedom of movement of those forces. In response to this new threat the U.S. has proposed a formidable response - state of the art Theater Missile Defense (TMD). In order to clarify the interplay between the ABM Treaty and TMD President Clinton has proposed a 'Demonstrated Capability' standard to distinguish between prohibited Strategic Missile Defense and permitted Theater Missile Defense.

DESCRIPTORS: USSR, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, TREATIES, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), GUIDED MISSILES, DEPLOYMENT, MILITARY STRATEGY, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, COMMUNITIES, THREATS, ATTACK, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, STRATEGIC WARFARE.

AD NUMBER: A311147

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS DIV BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: ISSUES CONCERNING ACQUISITION OF THD PROTOTYPE SYSTEM.

JUL 96 17P

ABSTRACT: (U) The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Army Plan to acquire a Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THD) User Operational Evaluation System (UOES)-an early prototype version of the final THD System. UOES is intended to (1) allow military users to influence the THD System design, (2) permit an early operational assessment of the system's capabilities, and (3) provide a system that could be deployed in a national emergency. UOES will consist primarily of refurbished components acquired for the system's demonstration and validation phase, although the Army plans to purchase 40 UOES interceptors to provide the deployable system capability.

DESCRIPTORS: *ACQUISITION, PROTOTYPES, *BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, AREA DEFENSE, ARMY PROCUREMENT, *CONGRESS, *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPLOYMENT, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, *NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGENCIES, PRODUCTION, VALIDATION, DEMONSTRATIONS, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, HIGH ALTITUDE, USER NEEDS, INTERCEPTORS, ARMY PLANNING.

AD NUMBER: A311138

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

PROBABILITY MODELS FOR ASSESSING THE VALUE OF BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST SEQUENTIAL THEATER MISSILE ATTACKS.

MAR 96 60P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: SONG, SHING- JEN

ABSTRACT: (U) This thesis seeks to use probability models TOM investigate the effects and value of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) information availability on sequential tasks encountered in the defense against missile attacks. Different levels of information will have different impacts on the outcome of the battle. Additional information could increase the effectiveness of the Defensive Weapon System. On the other hand, the enemy could use deception techniques, Electronic Warfare (EW) and decoy measures on the information- gathering methods to disrupt the acquisition of information which would decrease the effectiveness of defensive weapons. In the models, we show how to best allocate limited resources; i.e. the available kill time, to maximize the reward.

DESCRIPTORS: *MATHEMATICAL MODELS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, KILL PROBABILITIES, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, WEAPONS, GUIDED MISSILES, MEASUREMENT, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, DECISION MAKING, ACQUISITION, WEAPON SYSTEMS, PROBABILITY, ATTACK, THESES, SEQUENCES, TIME, AVAILABILITY, DECOYS, BATTLES, DECEPTION.

AD NUMBER: A310979

NYLAND ENTERPRISES IDAHO SPRINGS CO

THE ABM TREATY AND NATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE OPPORTUNITIES.

MAY 96 30P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: NYLAND, F. S.

ABSTRACT: (U) This report provides an examination of the potential capabilities of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems that comply with the ABM Treaty, methods of analyzing the effects and consequences of various doctrines for allocating interceptors are derived. Attacks by Russia, China, or Third World Nations are considered. Limited Missile Defense Systems with up to 100 interceptors based at one site, given that they meet certain performance goals, could be used to counter threats envisioned in the post cold-war world.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *GUIDED MISSILES, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THREATS, SITES, ATTACK, ALLOCATIONS, DECOYS, RUSSIA, *TREATIES, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERCEPTORS, COUNTERMEASURES, CHINA.

AD NUMBER: A310623

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

DISCUSSION OF RADAR ANTI- ANTIRADIATION MISSILE TECHNOLOGY- -ALARMING PLUS DECOY SYSTEM,

JUL 96 25P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: LIAN, WEIJIE

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper briefly introduces the current development of Antiradiation Missiles (ARM) in overseas military circles, as well as some major tactic technical measures, taken in some countries in the area of Anti-Arm Threat Air-Defense Radar, also it discusses the necessity, feasibility and key techniques of ARM Threat Alarming plus decoy arrangement, the effectiveness of deception type ARM Decoy System and the significant role it plays in simplifying alarming equipment. Finally, it advances several basic ideas which are worth noticing in designing Anti-Arm Threat measures.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIRADIATION MISSILES, *AIR DEFENSE, DECOYS, TRANSLATIONS, CHINA, OVERSEAS, CIRCLES.

AD NUMBER: A310542

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE LASER WEAPONS AT HOME AND ABROAD: AN OUTLINE,

MAY 96 18P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: JI, SHIFAN

ABSTRACT: (U) This article describes Tactical Missile Defense as an important task of Modern Air Defense and Tactical Air Defense Laser Weapons as effective weapons. It also details the history and present condition of Laser Weapons developed by the three branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and briefs the research and development of Laser Weapons in the Soviet Union, Germany, France and the People's Republic of China.

DESCRIPTORS: *AIR DEFENSE, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, *LASER WEAPONS, CHINA, USSR, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FRANCE, GERMANY, TRANSLATIONS, TACTICAL WARFARE.

AD NUMBER: A310409

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

LASER TECHNOLOGY (SELECTED ARTICLES).

APR 96 49P

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper presents High- Energy CW HF/DF Chemical Lasers developed under the U.S. Navy Sealite Program and the Alpha program of the DARPA Triad Program, and a brief account of Soviet Chemical Lasers. continuous Wave HF/DF Chemical Lasers were developed starting in the late sixties as high- power lasers of consistent interest to military circles. These are lasers that have the most matured technology among present-day high- energy lasers. It is hoped that in the near future CW HF/DF Chemical Lasers can be developed into a Space Laser Weapon to deal with ICBMS. CW HF/DF Chemical Lasers are an integration of technologies in gas dynamics, chemistry, fluid chemistry, optics, and lasers. by using the branching chain reaction of heat liberation, inversion of the population ratio is generated to obtain lasers.

DESCRIPTORS: *LASER WEAPONS, *STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, *CHEMICAL LASERS, HIGH POWER, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, SPACE SYSTEMS, SURVIVABILITY, GAS DYNAMICS, TRANSLATIONS, SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES, CHAIN REACTIONS, CHINA, CONTINUOUS WAVE LASERS, CHINESE LANGUAGE.

AD NUMBER: A309930

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

ESTIMATION AND PREDICTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TRAJECTORIES.

96 94P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ISCSON, JEFFREY A.; VAUGHAN, DAVID R.

ABSTRACT: (U) To examine the capabilities satellites can bring to bear in a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) environment, the authors describe a methodology, based on Kalman Filtering, for the estimation and prediction of Ballistic Missile trajectories and then apply the methodology to a National Theater Ballistic Missile. One useful application is in estimating the uncertainty associated with the location of a missile launch. Determining missile location uncertainty at any point along the trajectory is another application. filters optimized for random errors alone as well as random plus bias errors are outlined. Harnessed in a theater of operations, the type of information described in this report can be used to enhance the capability of active and passive defenses and attack operations.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PREDICTIONS, ESTIMATES, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *BALLISTIC TRAJECTORIES, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *GUIDED MISSILES, POSITION(LOCATION), UNCERTAINTY, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *KALMAN FILTERING, PASSIVE SYSTEMS, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, ERRORS, LAUNCHING. LIMITATIONS (ALPHA): AVAILABILITY: DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ILLEGIBLE.

AD NUMBER: A309658

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE.

96 31P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: HARMATZ, HOWARD I.

ABSTRACT: (U) Since the 1991 Gulf War, the United States has recognized the critical need for a Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) capability. The Department of Defense (DoD) has subsequently taken appropriate steps to develop it. In 1994, DoD established a joint organization to manage JTMD Research and Development (R&D), Acquisition, and Structure. then the Joint Staff developed the Joint Doctrine required for the conduct of Synchronized Theater Missile Defense (TMD) throughout the depth of a Theater of Operations. This paper briefly presents U.S. TMD initiatives to date. it identifies the threat, reviews current joint doctrine, and then presents a case that only through a true joint approach and effort will U.S. JTMD be postured to defeat any future employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by Theater Missiles (TM) against U.S. Forces or our Allies. It also makes the point that DoD needs to further take the initiative to establish a JTMD operational proponent to best synchronize JTMD operations for Theater Warfighting CINCS.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *AIR DEFENSE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *CRUISE MISSILES, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, *BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS, *AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES.

AD NUMBER: A307733

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE: THE EFFECTS OF TMD ON U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS.

MAR 96 111P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: SPURLOCK, KENNETH R.

ABSTRACT: (U) This thesis examines the continued pursuit of Co- Production efforts by the United States with Japan. The President has identified the development of Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) as a priority to counter the proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). in keeping with the priorities set forth by the President. The Secretary of Defense has made several proposals to the Japanese government in regards to the purchase, increased technical exchanges and Co-Production of TMD Systems. This study reviews the potential impact such efforts may pose on the future of the U.S.-Japan Security relationship and the ability of the United States to exert its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The environment which led to the initial Security Agreement in 1951 has been significantly altered and many believe that TMD may be the necessary tool to restore stability to the relationship. Through the Application of Three Alliance Theories this thesis analyzes the U.S. decision to pursue Joint TMD production with Japan. This thesis provides background information for three theories and applies them to the history of the U.S.-Japan Alliance the FS-X Co-Production effort and the extended TMD proposals. based on this application and analysis this study concludes that Co-Production of TMD will impede the production of TMD, and therefore not in the direct interest of the United States.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, THESES, JAPAN, THREAT EVALUATION,

AD NUMBER: A307605

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT MAXIMIZING OPERATIONAL PROTECTION IN THE FACE OF THE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT: 1996-2006.

FEB 96 19P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: STEINDL, DAVID F.

ABSTRACT: (U) In response to the proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missiles, the U.S. has invested a great deal of technological resources into the development of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Systems. but this technological focus can prove ineffectual if the broader TBMD issues at the operational level of war are not also addressed. TBMD is a vital element of operational protection and contributes to the successful accomplishment of many of the principal components of operational protection.

DESCRIPTORS: * THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *GUIDED MISSILES, CENTER OF GRAVITY, DEPLOYMENT, THREATS, PASSIVE SYSTEMS, PROTECTION, AREA DEFENSE.

AD NUMBER: A307604

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

DISJOINTED: U.S. DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERING AIR AND MISSILE THREATS.

FEB 96 17P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: BEAUMONT, WILLIAM W.

ABSTRACT: (U) In the wake of the Cold War, the United States is reexamining the roles and missions of the Armed Services. Doctrine published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) establishes different missions by the responsibilities and procedures necessary to conduct joint operations. Unfortunately, current U. S. Doctrine for countering air and missile threats is disjointed because the Armed Services: do not share the same vision on how Theater Air Defense should he conducted, do not trust how the doctrine will be implemented, and do not have impartial representation on the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) staff. Charges of parochialism have plagued Joint Doctrine since its inception. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, CJCS selected services to act as 'lead agents' in developing the various joint publications. CJCS should abolish the 'lead agent' concept establish a joint command to forge a central vision for multiservice operations. The Unified Commander-in-Chiefs can assist in promoting trust in joint counterair operations by establishing a Theater JFACC staff. This joint staff will ensure impartial service representation, end ease Inter-Theater cooperation and training. with the decline of the military budget, joint defense offers the best solution for providing the U.S. with the decisive combat power it needs to defeat future air and missile threats.

DESCRIPTORS: *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, AIR DEFENSE, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, *UNITED STATES, THREATS, FORGING, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, COLD WAR, MILITARY BUDGETS, *AERIAL WARFARE, COOPERATION, MILITARY TRAINING.

AD NUMBER: A307443

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: OPERATIONAL SCHEME AND JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ATTACK CAPABILITIES,

JUN 96 30P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: DI GESU, GARY F.

ABSTRACT: (U) Following the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. Military and civilian leaders identified significant shortcomings in the conduct of U.S. Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) Operations and applied the lessons learned to improve the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) ability to execute such operations more effectively in the future. Four pillars of JTMD were doctrinally established: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and C41. This scope of this paper is specifically limited to JTMD attack operations and related C41 capabilities which are designed to be employed against an adversary capable of launching Ground-Based Theater Missiles at U.S. Forces and/or their allies during a regional conflict. to be effective, procedural improvements and the execution of JTMD attack operations cannot be implemented in a vacuum; they must be coordinated and integrated as part of a JFC's overall operational design. thus, by using four integral elements of operational scheme (application of forces and assets; synchronization; coordination; and operational fires) as a framework of analysis, this paper will critically evaluate the present/near-future effectiveness of JTMD Attack Systems and C41 capabilities to support and implement the JFC's overall operational design.

DESCRIPTORS: *LESSONS LEARNED, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *GUIDED MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *GUIDED MISSILES, WARFARE, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, ACTIVE DEFENSE, ATTACK, LAUNCHING, CONFLICT, GROUND BASED

AD NUMBER: A307336

NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT SECURITY FROM LAND-ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE THREATS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER.

FEB 96 21P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: O'NEAL, JAMES, JR

ABSTRACT: (U) The United States will increasingly find itself faced with deploying combat forces in response to major regional contingencies. at the operational level, it is inevitable that U.S. Operational Commanders will contend with one or more hostile powers intent on threatening order and stability using advanced weaponry. With proliferation of Land- Attack Cruise Missiles, the Operational Commander is now faced with a ever burgeoning, and quite capable threat to his forward deployed forces. As with any other military threat, once recognized and validated, careful planning must be accomplished to mitigate the potential effects. currently, the United States continues to place emphasis on neutralizing the Tactical Ballistic Missile threat to forward deployed forces. But, the tide is turning, and many third world players are acquiring Cruise Missiles to replace or complement their Ballistic Missile inventories. thus, the Operational Commander must fully recognize this threat and accomplish effective planning within the framework of current Joint Theater Missile Defense Doctrine to obviate it.

DESCRIPTORS: *DEVELOPING NATIONS, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THREATS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, DEPLOYMENT, *LAND WARFARE, *CRUISE MISSILES, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, INVENTORY, MILITARY COMMANDERS, COMBAT FORCES, TACTICAL WEAPONS, LAND AREAS.

AD NUMBER: A306465

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN HIGH- POWERED MICROWAVE WEAPONS AND PROSPECTS OF FUTURE APPLICATIONS IN SPACE-BASED TARGET DEFENSE AND AIR DEFENSE,

MAR 96 34P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: LI, HUI; WANG, ZIBIN

ABSTRACT: (U) This paper outlines the development of Foreign High- Power Microwave Weapons and their technologies and, by introducing High-Power Microwave sources and effects, analyzes the prospects of their applications in space-based target defense and air defense.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MICROWAVES, ELECTRONIC *COUNTERMEASURES, *DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, MICROWAVE INTERFEROMETRY, HIGH POWER, AIR DEFENSE, USSR, UNITED STATES, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, *TRANSLATIONS, CHINA, ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSES, CHINESE LANGUAGE, *SPACE BASED.

AD NUMBER: A306460

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE REVIEW FOR THE YEARS 1993 TO 1994,

MAR 96 43P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: LI, ZHONGBO

ABSTRACT: (U) This document discusses the Russian Missile Defense Systems, cooperation between the United States and Russia, Russia's attitude toward global protection and Antimissile Systems, and Treaties.

DESCRIPTORS: *STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, *AIR DEFENSE, *FOREIGN POLICY, UNITED STATES, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, RUSSIA, TRANSLATIONS, TREATIES, INTERCEPTORS, CHINA, EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS, CHINESE LANGUAGE.

AD NUMBER: A306427

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

A TYPE OF METHOD USED TO STUDY ANTIBALLISTIC WEAPONS SYSTEM PRECISION,

FEB 96 19P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: NINGPING, LIU

ABSTRACT: (U) This article presents one type of method for studying precision--the Montecarlo method. It discusses in detail several keys to utilizing Montecarlo methods--the production of initial state sets, the introduction of error, the selection of statistical sets. Finally, it gives two examples of the use of Montecarlo methods.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS, *MONTE CARLO METHOD, PRECISION, TRANSLATIONS, CHINA, AEROBALLISTICS, CHINESE LANGUAGE.

AD NUMBER: A306336

NATIONAL AIR INTELLIGENCE CENTER WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

HIGH SPEED ANTIMISSILE COMMAND INERTIAL PRECISION GUIDANCE SYSTEMS,

FEB 96 10P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: ZHIHONG, ZHANG

ABSTRACT: (U) This article is a written translation of a voice recording of a lecture made by the author at the Moscow International Ballistic Missile Defense Symposium on 24 November 1993. It primarily discusses guidance and control methods associated with close and medium range high speed Antimissile Missiles to intercept in the atmosphere Ballistic type missile warheads. Exposition is primarily of command inertial guidance methods opted for to use in High Speed Missiles within dense atmosphere as well as control methods associated with predetermined impact points. It gives the structures currently associated with this type of guidance method control system. The author of the lecture is a member of the Russian 'Trail Blazer' (Honarop Design Bureau, specializing in the development of High Speed Antimissile) missiles. As far as the lack of illustrations in the original article is concerned, the appended Fig.'s in the article were added as supplements by the translator on the basis of the contents of the recorded lecture and the principles it concentrated on. They are only provided for reference.

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *INERTIAL GUIDANCE, *GUIDED MISSILES, USSR, CONTROL, *CONTROL SYSTEMS, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, GRAPHICS, RECORDING SYSTEMS, TRANSLATIONS, GUIDANCE, ATMOSPHERES, *VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, IMPACT POINT, COMMAND GUIDANCE, LECTURES, DENSE GASES.

AD NUMBER: A305993

SCHAFER (W J) ASSOCIATES INC ARLINGTON VA

SETA SUPPORT FOR SDIO KEY TECHNOLOGIES.

APR 96 43P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: STROBEL, ERIC L.

ABSTRACT: (U) Work performed under this contract was in support of the Lethality and Target Hardening (LTH) Program. This activity addressed the effects of LTH Program data and results on government Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) efforts in other areas, supporting the program manager's efforts to impress upon the BMD community the broad relevance of LTH products. This activity also performed special studies as directed by the LTH Program management. due to the varied nature of this effort, as well as the duration of the contract, only a sampling of support items are presented, along with summaries of several key analyses. (mm)

DESCRIPTORS: *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, ALGORITHMS, KILL PROBABILITIES, HIGH ALTITUDE, LETHALITY, *INTERCEPTORS, KINETIC ENERGY PROJECTILES, *AREA DEFENSE, HARDENING.