Unknown Troops of the Vanished Superpowerby Col-Gen (Ret) Yu.V. Votintsev
Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 9, 1993 pp 26-38
In Combat With Intruder AircraftIn the spring of 1959, the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov, inspected the Separate Turkestan Air Defense Corps. The corps was considered noncombat ready. The commander was relieved of his duties. S.S. Biryuzov from Tashkent called his first deputy, Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev1, and ordered that he formalize my appointment to the position of commander of this corps within three days.
The first meeting with the command of the large unit made an oppressive impression on me. The chief of staff and chiefs of the branches of troops had poor knowledge of the state of affairs in the units and subunits and did not have control of the situation. It took me two months to become familiar with the units, including with personnel of individual radar companies at the Pamir stationed along the Osh-Khorog road at elevations from 3,000 to 5,000 meters. I concluded that the effective strength of the corps deployed on the country's southern borders was not capable of accomplishing the assigned missions.
In one year I managed to completely revitalize and strengthen the corps supervisory personnel, mainly through the best officers from the special-purpose army. They helped to put order in the subunits and units. Only one unit evoked a feeling of satisfaction in me--the 9th Guards Fighter Regiment in Andizhan, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Goryunov. The first regiment of Soviet aces scrupulously preserved combat traditions and successfully carried out combat training missions; the pilots vigilantly stood alert duty. But one episode that we touched upon in a conversation with the regiment commander pricked up my ears...
The radar company, located in Andizhan together with the regiment, had the only new, for those times, P-30 radar. Approximately a year and a half before my appointment, it was an operator of this radar who detected an airborne target at an altitude of 20,000 meters. Goryunov launched a fighter with an experienced pilot--a squadron commander. After climbing to the maximum altitude for the MiG-19--17,000 meters, the pilot reported that observed the cruciform configuration of an aircraft approximately 3,000 meters above him. After this incident, the commander of fighter aviation of the National Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General of Aviation Ye.Ya. Savitskiy2, arrived at the regiment. He talked with the pilot, analyzed all data about the overflight of the mysterious aircraft, and came to the same conclusion as the experts from the General Staff at the command post of the special-purpose army near Moscow in 1957: there cannot be such an aircraft. The pilot from the regiment was immediately transferred. I could not meet with him.
I had already developed a different opinion, but could not confirm it factually. In 1959, I submitted to the commander in chief a report on the need to renovate the corps equipment and armament. I soon received a reply that my request had been included in the plan and that deliveries would be made in 1961-1962. However, reality changed these plans.
On 9 April 1960, in the vicinity of the Pamir, a foreign aircraft was flying over from the direction of Pakistan. "Due to a criminal lack of concern, radar posts of the Separate Turkestan Air Defense Corps detected the intruder at 4:47, after it had penetrated more than 250 km into our territory"--this is a quotation from the materials of the commission of the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces investigating the violation of the state border. Actually, the company's radar, badly placed east of Khorog, could not have detected the aircraft due to returns on the screen from local mountains. Stable tracking of the aircraft began to be accomplished by the Kara-Kul company detectors positioned to the north. At this time I was located at the corps command post, and when the route of the intruder was put on the plotting board, I launched four MiG-19 fighters from the Andizhan airfield. Despite the vectoring, the interceptors, brought to an altitude of 16,000 meters, did not detect the target.
Later on, the intruder made several passes with impunity over a range of the National Air Defense Forces in the vicinity of Lake Balakhash. At that time there were no combat missiles at the launch site where the new S-75 surface-to-air missile [SAM] system was being tested. The chief of the range, Lieutenant-General of Artillery S.D. Dorokhov3, had not had time to deliver them from the technical base located 80 km away. The aircraft turned around, flew around the Baykonur Test Range, and departed for the border via Mary. The aircraft intruder was located over our territory for at total of six hours and 48 minutes. Neither the air defense corps nor the 73d Air Army had either the forces or assets to put a stop to this violation that was unprecedented in length. I was informed from the central command post of the National Air Defense Forces that the commander in chief stood at the plotting board in silence for six hours. Only twice did S.S. Biryuzov demand my personal confirmation that the intruder's altitude was remaining unchanged--20,000-21,000 meters, which he also reported to the minister of defense. As the intruder approached the state border, I did not rule out the possibility that it would descend. I reported this to S.S. Biryuzov and received authorization to send a pair of MiG-17's to catch up with the violation of Iran's border. The commander of the fighter regiment, Lieutenant Colonel P.Ye. Kuzin4, tasked two pilots to fly to the border and, if the intruder descended, destroy it, using a ram if necessary. Two MiG-17's went 250-300 km beyond the border, but the intruder did not descend and was not detected. The aircraft returned to the Mary-2 airfield with difficulty, on nearly empty tanks. After my report, S.S. Biryuzov said that I and the others responsible would be punished severely by the minister of defense for missing the spy aircraft conducting reconnaissance of our most secret ranges. And he added: "Do not lose heart. In air defense, one who has been flogged is worth not two, but a dozen who have not. Remember this."
Incidentally, the government of Iran did not make any statements concerning the border violation by our fighters. By order of the minister of defense, I was warned about incomplete duty compliance. While pondering what needed to be done to prevent such violations, on 1 May 1960 another aircraft was detected approaching the state border at the Pamir. The crew of the radar company was awarded orders and medals for timely detection of the violator: Major V. Kulagin--the Order of the Red Star; senior lieutenants V. Urbanovich and K. Shchleshchinskiy, Corporal G. Lysov, and Private G. Startsev--the Distinguished Service Medal. The aircraft, flying on a heading toward Moscow, was shot down by a S-75 SAM system already deployed by that time in the Urals.
According to the testimony of the American pilot Powers, who bailed out of the aircraft, a U-2 strategic reconnaissance aircraft was used to violate USSR airspace. Its service ceiling was 21,000-24,000 meters. It was accepted into service in 1956, which was unknown to our intelligence. Otherwise, at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo in April 1960, the chairman of the State Committee for Aviation Equipment, P.V. Dementyev5, and aircraft designer A.I. Mikoyan6 would not have stated that there is no aircraft in the world that could fly at an altitude of 20,000 meters for 6 hours 48 minutes. It turns out that they could and did, and even by that time had made almost 30 reconnaissance flights.
In 1960-1961, the corps received ahead of time 5,000 officers and about 20,000 soldiers and noncommissioned officers, more than 100 S-75 SAM systems, and a considerable number of new radars, including 12 P-14 radars, at that time the most modern.
These fixed radars were deployed most successfully in the 41st Radar Regiment, which was commanded by D.N. Solodchenko7. Much credit belongs to him and his subordinates--officers N. Kozlov, A. Romazanov, and A. Shendrik. In addition to the two existing ones, the corps was reinforced with four more fighter regiments and renamed the 30th Separate Air Defense Corps. It was necessary to activate and retrain on new equipment, with subsequent live firing at the range, 11 SAM brigades and two regiments. In addition, it was necessary to reactivate and reinforce the radiotechnical troops. Flight training and setting up facilities of fighter units became a subject of special concern. The matter was complicated due to the many types of aircraft in the fleet: MiG-15's, MiG-17's, MiG-19's, Yak-25's, Yak-28P's, and Su-9's. The commander of the Turkestan Military District, General of the Army I.I. Fedyuninskiy8, treated us with much sympathy and understanding of the problems that had arisen. The leaders of the Central Committee and government of the union republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and local authorities also helped. This made it possible already by 1964-1965 to station people in well-equipped camps.
Officers of the staff and headquarters of the corps worked in a new way in the situation that had developed: I.I. Frolov9, P.A. Krymskiy10, N.I. Naumov11, Ya.N. Yefromeyenko12, O.P. Yefimov13, S.A. Sandrigaylo14; division commanders V.S. Deyev15, V.D. Slyusar16, A.D. Kotov17; brigade commanders N.V. Chemerikin18, D.P. Pavlushchenko19, M.B. Shelomkov20, and fighter regiment commander P.Ye. Kuzin.
In May 1963, the corps was deployed into the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. However, strengthening the air defense on the USSR's southern border did not rid the neighboring side from the temptation to make provocative flights over our territory. In the summer of 1963, L.I. Brezhnev21 arrived on a visit to Iran. It was at that time, when he was speaking at the medzhlis, that a reconnaissance aircraft penetrated our airspace. Alert forces of the 156th Fighter Regiment--flight commander Stepanov and wingman Sudarikov--intercepted it and shot it down. Nevertheless, the intruder aircraft was able to reach Iranian territory and fell in the city of Mominabad, 30 km from the border. A note was disseminated among the medzhlis deputies--Soviet pilots over the territory of Iran had just shot down an Iranian civilian aircraft. The shah asked L.I. Brezhnev to interrupt his speech until the circumstances of the incident were clarified. It was established right then that an Iranian aircraft had departed toward the Soviet border without the notification or authorization of civilian authorities. After apologies by the shah of Iran, L.I. Brezhnev continued his speech. Then I was warned a second time about incomplete duty compliance. It is unpleasant to recall how then-Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Forces V.A. Sudets22 at the Military Council in Moscow, tendentiously examining the circumstances of what had taken place, demanded that pilots Stepanov and Sudarikov be brought before a court martial. But to this I responded that in such a case I would be forced to submit a request to be removed from my position and face a court martial together with the pilots--I had issued the order to shoot down the aircraft. I also said that such a precedent could make pilots afraid of being responsible for explicit fulfillment of an operation order. The Military Council was forced to agree with my arguments. Returning from Iran, L.I. Brezhnev made a stop in Tashkent. I was among those meeting him at the airfield together with the district commander, I.I. Fedyuninskiy. Calling us to the side, L.I. Brezhnev said: "Our relations with Iran are returning to normal. So, I ask you, comrades--be a little more careful at the border."
We fulfilled this request literally. Exactly one year later, the same Condor-type aircraft violated the air border. It was intercepted by flight commander I. Zhuravlev. In the air, at the moment of the intercept, the crew of the violator "raised their hands" in a friendly manner and, implicitly obeying Zhuravlev, landed at the airfield in the vicinity of Mary. When asked why they did not try to head for the border like their predecessors did, they replied: "In your country, you see, they kill you immediately..."
According to the results of the investigation conducted by the chief of staff of the National Air Defense Aviation, General I.P. Bashilov, it became clear that in both instances the intruder aircraft were performing flights in the interests of an Iranian-American geographic and cartographic company. However, given all the reconnaissance equipment on the aircraft and the crew's special training under the direction of American instructors, it was convincing proof that it was affiliated with the CIA.
During the border violations, the interceptors were controlled from the command post by the commander of the 17th Air Defense Division, A.D. Kotov, the commander of the 156th Fighter Regiment, P.Ye. Kuzin, and the commander of the 12th Radiotechnical Brigade, L.B. Goshchinskiy23. All punishment imposed on me earlier was dismissed, and the actions of my subordinates were held up as an example for the National Air Defense Forces.
Such episodes, of course, will never be forgotten. They are the ones that provide an opportunity to deeply realize the meaning of our service and really check the degree of readiness to carry out the assigned mission in any conditions. All the same, this is the workaday routine. True, a combat routine.
The Country's Antiballistic-Missile ShieldIn late April 1966, the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, General of the Army P.F. Batitskiy, unexpectedly summoned the commander of the Turkestan Military District, Colonel-General N.G. Lyashchenko24, and me to the State Central Testing Range at Lake Balakhash. From there we flew on his aircraft to Alma-Ata. We had barely gained altitude and turned on a heading for the Kazakh capital, when the commander in chief informed us of the Military Council's decision to recommend me for a higher position. The position itself was not mentioned, and my question went unanswered. My persistent request to be given an opportunity to continue to command the Army and complete implementation of the plans, supported by N.G. Lyashchenko, was not taken into consideration and only irritated P.F. Batitskiy.
P.F. Batitskiy, who jointly with organizations of industry directly supervised the work to create an antiballistic-missile [ABM] and space defense [SD], managed with great difficulty to obtain the consent of the General Staff and on 30 March 1967 to get a directive to organize a new branch of ABM and SD troops as part of the National Air Defense Forces.
Development and creation of these defensive weapon systems began back in the early 1960's. Lead facilities were created; military units were formed. For air defense, all work was performed by special directorates, which were headed by Major-General of Artillery M.M. Kolomiyets25 and Major-General of Artillery I.Ye. Baryshpolets26, subordinate to the Main Procurement Directorate, the chief of which was Colonel-General of Aviation G.F. Baydukov27.
The directorates of M.M. Kolomiyets and I.Ye. Baryshpolets performed important procurement functions, monitoring the progress and status of construction and installation work and training of personnel to participate in it.
For P.F. Batitskiy, creation of a troop structure for ABM and SD was a done deal. The candidate for the position of commander of the troops being created was also determined. And he had flown to the testing range primarily to discuss the matter about my appointment with the leaders of the republics, D.A. Kunayev28 and Sh.R. Rashidov29, and also with the commander of the Turkestan Military District, Colonel-General N.G. Lyashchenko.
The very fact that I was the one chosen was a complete surprise. As a rule, those nominated for key posts in our troops were from the Moscow Air Defense District. P.F. Batitskiy had been in command for 11 years and treated his charges very jealously. Nevertheless, I was soon summoned to Moscow for an interview at the CPSU Central Committee.
I was received by the head of the administrative bodies department of the Party Central Committee, N.I. Savinkin30. Having prepared for a detailed conversation, I admit I was somewhat disheartened by its brevity. The result--further uncertainty about the situation. Savinkin merely informed me that the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, D.F. Ustinov31, was studying my personal file. Ustinov expressed surprise that the National Air Defense Forces could not propose a prominent engineer for the position. Savinkin concluded the conversation by saying that I should not be upset in the event Ustinov objected.
The next morning, Savinkin and I entered Ustinov's office. Dmitriy Fedorovich gave us a friendly welcome and with an energetic motion of a hand invited us to sit next to him. We lit up a cigarette. After several protocol questions, he suggested that I report in detail how I assessed the condition of armament in the Air Defense Forces. I decided to speak straight from the shoulder, although I knew that it was Ustinov who was the first person responsible for supplying the Army with weapons and equipment.
I began by saying that the S-75 SAM system was unable to destroy aircraft and cruise missiles at low and extremely low altitudes and required a significant upgrade. Reinforcing SAM groupings with the low-altitude S-125 system would require large additional expenditures. The Su-9 fighter-interceptors, modern for that time, and the YaK-28P aircraft, not in service but being series produced, had extremely unreliable engines, booster system, and radar sights. This has resulted in an increase in the accident rate and unjustified pilot deaths. The RS-2US air-to-air missiles had a target kill effectiveness of only 0.6-0.7. The radars of the Radar Troops had low protection against jamming, which made it necessary to have radars of a different band. Due to this, we had to increase the number of radars in each grouping and consume their service life. In conclusion, I asked for acceleration of the commissioning of the MiG-25 fighter-interceptor, which is able to detect low-flying targets against background of the earth and destroy them. D.F. Ustinov did not interrupt me a single time, and only rarely made some notes. When I finished, he looked at me closely and said that I was among those few who in this office did not spout slogans and praise our armament. Then he asked a question: Would I be able to report all this to L.I. Brezhnev, which for him is important. I said I would, without hesitation. In parting, Ustinov said: "Yuriy Vsevolodovich, I have an urgent request for you. In your future service you will have to work with general designers comrades Mints and Kisunko. Each of them now is working on creating their own local weapon system, and your job is to try to combine these efforts"--in saying this, Dmitriy Fedorovich clasped his hands together in the typical gesture. "This will make it possible to reduce the time for creating them and state spending."
Only after leaving Ustinov's office did I understand that his parting words signified nothing more than concurrence with my appointment. Soon after, a smiling Savinkin came out of the office, extended his hand to me, and said that Brezhnev would see me right after the May holidays.
On 11 May 1967, accompanied by Savinkin, I entered the office of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Leonid Ilich was standing at an open window and smiling. He interrupted my report with the words: "No need to make a fuss..." He hugged me by the shoulders and offered me a seat. After reading some kind of paper on the desk in front of him, he said: "The Central Committee blesses your appointment. Yes, by the way, Dmitriy Fedorovich asked me to listen to you. But you saw how many people are in the waiting room. Therefore, let us do it this way: in the near future I will be at one of your installations, and we can talk about everything in detail there."
Brezhnev never visited a single one of our installations. The need to create a new defensive branch of troops was dictated by no means by the ambitions of politicians and the military, as some journalists are now trying to present it, but by the dangerous toughening of the U.S. military doctrine and the arms race imposed upon us.
At that time as well as now, the American military doctrine is based on the fact that military force is the main and end means of settling controversial foreign policy problems--the "arbiter of the last instance." It was in the United States that the strategy of "massive retaliation" was developed, at the basis of which was the principle of nuclear superiority. As a result of a change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in the early 1960's, the American military-political leadership adopted the "flexible response" strategy, which called for preparing and waging various types of war with a dosed use of military force commensurate with the scale of danger to U.S. "vital interests." In 1967, in accordance with the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine, creation of the strategic triad was concluded in the United States: intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines, and strategic bombers. The potential of U.S. strategic offensive forces was about 5,000 nuclear weapons.
After taking over as commander of the ABM and SD Troops, I spent two months becoming familiar with the collectives and the content of work being performed in a number of scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and at installations being created. The headquarters was formed. With the approval of the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, prominent engineers who had a good schooling in the surface-to-air missile troops and primarily in the special-purpose army were appointed to the main positions in the headquarters. Among them were A.M. Mikhaylov32, V.A. Yedemskiy33, Ye.D. Tsvetkov34, A.K. Mikhaylov35, V.V. Golubev36, V.T. Timofeyev37, A.P. Blinov38, and V.M. Shumilin39.
An Insurmountable Barrier for `Pershings'Back in 1953, it became known that the United States was developing and testing intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] which could become a means of delivering nuclear strikes against targets on the territory of the USSR. In August 1953, seven Marshals of the Soviet Union, after assessing this circumstance, together with Chief of the General Staff V.D. Sokolovskiy, sent a memorandum to the CPSU Central Committee requesting it consider the possibility of creating ABM weapons in our country.
Despite the novelty and complexity of the task and the skeptical attitude of many prominent scientists, the creators of the S-25 system, led by Doctor of Technical Sciences G.V. Kisunko, undertook the work. By 1955, proposals for a test-range antiballistic-missile defense prototype were prepared--system "A."
Then work was launched to create a range for the National Air Defense Forces near Lake Balakhash. Military construction workers under the direction of A.A. Gubenko, organizations of industry, and range personnel participated in the work. By 1961, in addition to other facilities, everything necessary for full-scale testing of system "A" was prepared. Special note should be made of the contribution in this by the chief of the range, Major-General of Artillery S.D. Dorokhov.
On 4 March 1961, an antiballistic of general designer P.G. Grushin40, equipped with a fragmentation warhead, destroyed the warhead of an R-12 ballistic missile launched from the Kapustin Yar Range. During 20-29 March, a group of designers and military personnel left on an artillery prime mover to the steppe in the vicinity of where the warhead fell, which was also found destroyed by a direct hit. Its fragments were spread out over the flight path, 1-2 km apart. Kusinko's deputy, M.G. Minosyan41, reported to him on the results of the search. Kisunko unexpectedly asked: "Do you have anything to drink?" Receiving a positive answer, he said: "You can celebrate this event! You and I! " The enormity of this achievement is confirmed by the fact that the United States accomplished the non-nuclear destruction of a ballistic missile only 23 years later. A pedestal with an antiballistic missile was placed at the sixth launch site of the range. Four lines, composed on the spur of the moment by G.V. Kisunko that spring day, are stamped on it: "Tulips were burned on the launch so tulips could bloom throughout the country."
Our achievements in the area of ABM defense were kept silent for a long time and not given the proper assessment. Meanwhile, the act of destroying a ballistic missile was, without a doubt, an important event. It is not by chance that in the summer of that same year N.S. Khrushchev, speaking at an international forum, could not restrain himself and said that there are skilled craftsman in the Soviet Union who can hit a fly in space.
The successful experiment made it possible already in June of 1961 to complete the development and produce a conceptual design of the A-35 ABM system designed to protect Moscow. The project called for a system to be created to destroy Titan-2 and Minuteman-2 single-warhead ballistic missiles, which were in service in the U.S. Army in 1963 and 1965. This system was to have a command post, eight radars forming a circular long-range detection field, and 32 firing complexes.
In the fall of 1962, the conceptual design of the A-35 system was defended. The commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, Colonel-General P.F. Batitskiy, was appointed chairman of the commission.
There were hectic debates at the commission's final meeting. Batitskiy became tired of this and turned to G.V. Kisunko:
"Well, Grigoriy Vasilyevich, are you going to disappoint us? Will everything be as you say?"
"Of course, Pavel Fedorovich, I swear to you," replied Kisunko.
"Well, okay, I believe you... And all of you here," he turned to the hall, "be quiet."
With these words Batitskiy hugged and kissed Kisunko.
However, Batitskiy did not take into account that the experiment-operation "K" was carried out back in December 1956 at the Semipalatinsk Range based on experiments conducted at KB-11 (now known as Arzamas-16) by Academician Yu.B. Khariton42, now already by the forces of officers from the Sixth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, scientific associates of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and designers of the missile equipment. The scientific director was the most prominent expert in the field of the theory of nuclear detonations, Academician M.A. Sadovskiy43, and his deputy was the chief of the Scientific Research Department of the Main Procurement Directorate of National Air Defense, M.G. Mymrin44.
According to the results of operation "K," it became clear that the fragmentation warhead of an antiballistic missile could be replaced with a nuclear warhead, and this significantly increased the kill radius and effectiveness. In this connection, reducing the number of firing complexes to 16 and updating the functioning principles of the system were substantiated in the new conceptual design produced in 1964.
Construction and installation work was begun at the system installations: at the command post, Dunay-3 (chief designer V.P. Sosulnikov45) and the improved Dunay-3U (chief designer A.N. Musatov46) sector radars, and firing complexes; a technical base was created for preparing and maintaining the antiballistic missiles; and maximum use was made of circular roads, cable communications links, and part of the other structures of the S-25 system, which was efficient and helped reduce spending on the new weapon system.
At the same time, an experimental model of the A-35 system--the "Aldan"--was created at the range by 1967. This set the beginning of real urgent work to intercept ballistic missiles for the purpose of testing the system and later supporting live firings by ABM units near Moscow.
For the sake of fairness, it must be said that the A-35 system was created in 15 years, from the start of construction in 1962 until the testing was conducted. During this time, the United States was developing and testing at an accelerated pace land- and sea-based ballistic missiles: Minuteman-3, Polaris A-3T, Poseidon C-3 with multiple warheads, having from 3 to 10 warheads. The A-35 system was unable to destroy such missiles, especially in conditions of jamming and use of a system for ABM penetration (a large number of light and heavy decoy targets and active jammers, camouflaging the warheads themselves on their flight trajectory), which became obvious already by 1971. What is more, the A-35 launchers in this system were ground-based exposed launchers and always had missiles on them, fueled with corrosive propellant components and loaded with a powerful nuclear charge, which was simply impermissible. In the event of an accident or sabotage in the heavily populated areas near Moscow, a dangerous area of radiation contamination could arise. The Americans, having taken all these circumstances into account, in 1976 made the decision to remove the Safeguard ABM system from alert status, which was set up at the Grand Forks missile base, and partially dismantle it.
I will anticipate a question: Why did we not reject the A-35 system? By 1971, only four of the eight Dunay sector radars and eight of the 16 firing complexes had been built. The construction work at these installations was almost completely done, deliveries and installation of technological equipment were completed, and testing had begun. State testing under the direction of the first deputy commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General A.F. Shcheglov47, was conducted at the lead complex of the system, consisting of: the main command and computer center (in abbreviated form), one Dunay-3 radar, and three firing complexes. Testing confirmed the correctness of the scientific and technical decisions supporting the combat functioning of the new, complex, and completely automated system for destroying a single-warhead ballistic missile. The system could not work against ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. In this connection, the decision was made, supported by the military-industrial commission (VPK), to finish building the facilities already started: at the second Dunay-3U radar and at five firing complexes. All the rest of the work for deployment of a full-strength system was halted. At the insistence of a majority of the members of the commission, the system was accepted only into experimental operation and virtually returned to industry for modernization with the task of destroying complex ballistic missiles.
Personnel under the supervision of the chief of the ABM Directorate, Lieutenant-General of Artillery I.Ye. Baryshpolets, with the active participation of officers of my directorate, were persistently mastering the new combat equipment. The experience acquired by the troops during the period from 1972 to 1977 in the course of experimental operation produced the desired result. The new combat equipment was successfully mastered, particularly by the engineers, many of whom could carry on a dialogue with the designers as equals, including when operating the 5E-92B computers (chief designer V.S. Burtsev48) and their algorithm software.
I must mention the personal contributions of the chief of the ABM Engineer Troops, Major-General A.P. Penkov49. He was the one who developed a method of operating the complex automated weapon system (A-35 ABM system) and repairing it, as well as the organization and establishment of operational departments in armament services of large units and units.
In turn, the chief of the combat employment department at the large unit's headquarters, Colonel A.G. Kubarev50, justified the need for creating and the structure of departments of combat algorithms and programs. Later on, this experience was adopted and extended to all the ABM and SD troops. In 1973, general designer G.V. Kisunko justified in a technical report the basic scientific and technical decisions for modernizing the system to destroy a complex ballistic missile.
I recall how in the summer of 1975, when Grigoriy Vasilyevich and I were at the main command and computer center analyzing the results of the functioning of the combat program to destroy a complex ballistic missile in different variants of its launch, the "Kremlin" phone rang. The duty officer reported that the minister of the radio industry, P.S. Pleshakov51, was calling and asking to speak with the general designer.
Grigoriy Vasilyevich told me: "Finally, the minister remembered the system and will probably help." He went to the telephone smiling, but I saw how his face began to grow gloomy during the conversation.
The minister told Kisunko that he had signed an order relieving him from his position and duties as general designer. To Kisunko's objection that he had been approved by the CPSU Central Committee and that Pleshakov had exceeded his authority, the minister replied that he had coordinated with the Central Committee on this matter. Actually, concurrence, with virtually no grounds, was given by the head of the defense office, I.D. Serbin, a party apparatchik with a long tenure, a dishonorable person, and a typical opportunist.
Thus, an outstanding and gifted designer literally on the upsurge was put out of commission in the prime of his life and outstanding organizational capabilities as a result of intrigues at the Ministry of the Radio Industry. Chief designer I.D. Omelchenko52 supervised further completion of the modernization work.
In May 1977, the A-35M ABM system was presented for state testing. This system became a weapon of the separate corps commanded by Major-General N.I. Rodionov53. Thorough preparation made it possible to conduct testing over one month and obtain favorable results. The A-35M ABM system was now able, with some limitations, to destroy complex ballistic missiles, and the time for preparation and delivery of the ABM missiles from the technical base to the exposed, ground-based launch positions in a crisis situation was reduced significantly. The A-35M ABM system was accepted into service and placed on alert status in 1978. The antiballistic missiles were fueled with propellant components and equipped with a warhead only at the technical base. Electrically weighted mock-ups were installed at the launch positions.
In 1979, it became known that the United States was planning to station 108 new Pershing-2 medium-range ballistic missiles on the territory of the FRG in 1983-1985 in place of the shorter-range Pershing-1 missiles.
The Pershing-2 missile, with a firing range of 2,500 km and a single warhead of two types (nuclear and conventional), is designed to destroy both ground-based and hardened underground targets and is able to penetrate to a depth of 70-100 meters and then detonate. The high firing accuracy was determined by the circular error probable of 20-40 meters. According to our calculations, the Pershing-2's flight time to Moscow was only 10-12 minutes. It was completely obvious that this was a very serious threat and a real possibility of surprise destruction of hardened command and control facilities of the state and the Armed Forces.
In essence, the Pershing-2 missiles were a cocked pistol held to the Moscow's head.
In this connection, Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov held a meeting, to which he invited the chief of the General Staff, N.V. Ogarkov54, the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, V.G. Kulikov55, the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, A.I. Koldunov56, the commander in chief of the Navy, S.G. Gorshkov57, the first deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Yu.A. Yashin, the first deputy chief of the General Staff, V.I. Varennikov58, and me.
When the minister asked if the Air Defense Forces were able to detect the launch of Pershing-2 missiles no later than 2-3 minutes after launch, A.I. Koldunov, always thoroughly prepared for such meetings, reported that this mission was partially being accomplished. The minister demanded an explanation from me, as an expert. I said that the Dunay-3U long-range detection radar from a separate ABM corps, oriented to the west, is capable of accomplishing this mission in this search sector covering the northern and central part of the FRG. The southern part of the FRG territory is not monitored by our assets at extremely low angles. D.F. Ustinov right then instructed the chief of the General Staff to assign the appropriate task to the scientific research institutes and design bureaus.
As the meeting progressed, the missilemen were tasked to prepare to move up two medium-range missile brigades to the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The seamen were tasked to increase the number of missile-carrying submarines on combat patrol and to move them closer to the United States.
The military-political conclusion drawn by the USSR minister of defense from the actions being planned by the United States had special significance. In the event the Americans used the Pershing-2 missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union reserved the right to strike the United States with all its nuclear might. The Americans knew this. Thus, their risky plan to take cover beyond the ocean in the event a nuclear war was unleashed in Europe fell through.
Academician V.S. Semenkhin59 became involved in the work to solve the problem of detecting the Pershing-2 missiles, 27 of which were deployed in the southern part of the FRG. Several projects were developed, requiring much time and expenditures. As often happened during my time in the service, the solution came not from a scientific research institute or design bureau, but from the troops. A group of officers, innovative engineers--T.Ye. Kozhemyakin, A.A. Peresypkin, and V.A. Shelopin--under the direction of the deputy for technical affairs of the Dunay-3U sector radar, I.S. Lipatov, substantiated and submitted a proposal to modify the transceivers. Such a seemingly simple solution made it possible to expand the search sector and reliably cover the entire territory of the FRG.
Of course, opponents immediately came up with proposals in response. Experts at the Ministry of the Radio Industry maintained that modifying the transceivers and increasing the power load on them would inevitably lead to a fire. As a result, it was necessary to conduct several experiments and hectic meetings of the military-industrial commission. Being the nerve center and coordinator in the matter of ensuring the defense capability of the USSR, it sort of crowned a distinctive pyramid of the country's military-industrial complex. Frequently, the parochial interests of the defense ministries, departments, and planners and designers of new types of equipment and armament were at variance with the customers, that is, the military. And thanks only to the authority of the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, L.V. Smirnov60, who headed the VPK and possessed broad powers granted him by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, were we able to preserve priority positions in the world in supplying the armed forces with first-class weapons. In the area of ABM and SD, as a rule, the determining scientific and technical position was that which was defended by the deputy chairman of the VPK, L.I. Gorshkov, and also V.M. Karetnikov61 and V.S. Dubrovskiy62.
A regularly scheduled meeting at the office of the minister of defense examined and discussed several projects, including one by Academician M.S. Semenikhin, who proposed using a group of altimeters of the Radiotechnical Troops. According to my report, it was decided to immediately modify the transceivers and combat program of the radar, taking additional steps for fire safety.
The radar was modified in a short time with minimal costs. The officers directly involved in this work were awarded orders--V.T. Blotskiy, V.D. Barabanov, V.I. Maslov, I.S. Lipatov, P.K. Turygin--and medals--G.A. Latyshev, Ye.I. Filin, S.V. Klemanov, N.M. Yepaneshnikov, and Warrant Officer P.M. Astrakhantsev. The deputy chief designer of the radar, Ye.N. Belkin, and his associates made a great contribution to this work. Direct on-site supervision of the work was accomplished by the unit commander, V.N. Kryukov, and also the commander of the separate ABM corps, V.A. Savin63, and deputy chief engineer V.A. Malikov. Scientific and technical supervision was accomplished by Doctor of Technical Sciences A.I. Leonov. The experience of creating and operating the A-35M system equipment was used in future work on systems for missile attack warning, space defense, and monitoring outer space. Many commanders and engineers, and in particular I.Ye. Baryshpolets, N.I. Rodionov, B.A. Savin, A.P. Penkov, A.G. Kubarev, V.A. Malikov, D.P. Pushkarev, I.D. Bashtan, M.I. Parfenov, I.V. Poddubnyak, M.T. Tyurin, Yu.V. Sokolov, I.R. Orel, A.Ye. Zikeyev, and V.N. Kryukov, went down in the history of the ABM and SD troops as pioneers in creating the newest types of combat equipment and armament.
Based on the ABM experience, it was possible to create for the first time in the National Air Defense Forces strong offices of combat algorithms and programs in each unit and large unit. Of great importance in the matter of increasing combat readiness were the repair and testing bases created at each installation and equipped with bench equipment and instrumentation. In September 1967, I was appointed chairman of an inter-departmental commission for examining new ABM system and equipment designs. And there were several. The commission included prominent scientists, general and chief designers, and prominent experts from the Ministry of Defense and defense sectors. Among them were M.G. Mymrin, B.V. Bunkin64, R.A. Valiyev, V.M. Glushkov65, P.D. Grushin, G.V. Kisunko, S.A. Lebedev66, G.S. Legasov67, A.L. Mints, and Yu.B. Khariton.
The basic comprehensive conceptual design of G.V. Kisunko for the Avrora ABM system was rejected, since it did not meet a number of effectiveness and reliability requirements. But the proposed Argun multichannel firing complex with a rotating phased-array antenna, which is still serving effectively to this day, was recommended for creation at the range as the main measuring device. Also rejected were designs by A.L. Mints for the Don-2N multifunctional radar and Yu.G. Burlakov68 for a fundamentally new Neman radar, although a reduced prototype of it was created at the range for solving problems of discrimination of complex ballistic targets.
The main reason for rejecting designs was that they did not resolve the main problems of antiballistic-missile defense with the required effectiveness:
- --discrimination of ballistic missile warheads against a background of dummy targets and in conditions of intensive jamming and nuclear detonations;
- --creation of a new generation of computers with a speed of hundreds of millions of operations per second;
- --creation of effective weapons for destroying a missile in various portions of the flight trajectory using various physical principles.
Scientific research institutes and design bureaus continued research on problems of ABM defense. Taking into account the recommendations of the inter-departmental commission, an extensive program of scientific research and experimental design work was defined under the "Fon" program. The work was extremely complex, and funds for it were not increased, but were reduced. In addition, the scientific research institutes and design bureaus did not have the proper experimental base.
Nevertheless, by June 1975 it was already possible to clearly define the purpose and time periods of development and creation of the new Moscow ABM system. A.G. Basistov69 became the general designer. V.K. Sloka70 was the chief designer of the multifunctional Don radar. The main developer of algorithm software and information matching of the ABM system with warning and space monitoring systems was deputy general designer M.G. Minosyan. I had the opportunity to be chairman of the commission for examining the conceptual design jointly with the collective of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute, which will be discussed in the next part of the article. A.G. Basistov headed the Council of Chief Designers, who were working on a new effective ABM system. The system was created by 1989. Thus, the 30 years of labor on solving problems of ABM defense produced a positive result, but the main thing is that it preserved cadres of enthusiasts capable of accomplishing the most complex scientific and technical tasks. And this was done with total observance of the provisions of the ABM Treaty concluded with the United States in 1972.
Anticipating a subsequent presentation, I would like to say that in 1968, V.I. Markov71 was appointed to the position of deputy minister of the radio industry. His name is inseparably linked to the further vigorous development of the ABM and SD armed forces. Heading a sector, Markov created the gigantic scientific and technical association "Vympel." This was 10 institutes and an equal number of plants. Development of antiballistic-missile and space defense complexes and systems was accomplished under a unified leadership.
Today, the association has become an inter-departmental corporation with the same tasks and participants, now not only on the territory of Russia but also in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
(To be continued.)
Footnotes1. Nikolay Dmitriyevich Yakovlev (1888-1972)--marshal of artillery. From 1955 first deputy commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces. 2. Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy (1910-1990)--marshal of aviation, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1948 commanded Air Defense Fighter Aviation. From 1966 was deputy commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces. 3. Stepan Dmitriyevich Dorokhov (1913-1966)--lieutenant-general of artillery. Chief of staff of artillery of the 6th Guards Army and a surface-to-air missile [SAM] corps. Chief of the State Air Defense Test Range 1956-1966. 4. Pavel Yefimovich Kuzin (born 1923)--colonel. In 1963 was chief of fighter aviation of the 17th Air Defense Division. In 1965 was chief of a pilot-cosmonaut flying club. 5. Petr Vasilyevich Dementyev (1907-1977)--colonel-general engineer, Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1965 minister of the aviation industry of the USSR. Chairman of the State Committee for Aviation Equipment 1957-1965. 6. Artem Ivanovich Mikoyan (1905-1970)--aircraft designer, colonel-general of the engineer and technical service. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. 7. Dmitriy Nazarovich Solodchenko (born 1918)--colonel. In 1960 was commander of the 41st Radiotechnical Regiment. In 1964 was deputy chief of the Radiotechnical Troops of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. 8. Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninskiy (1900-1977)--general of the army, Hero of the Soviet Union. Commander of the Arkhangelsk, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan military districts 1954-1965. 9. Ivan Ivanovich Frolov (born 1916)--major-general. In 1963 was chief of the political department and member of the Military Council of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. In 1968 was department chief at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. 10. Petr Aleksey Krymskiy (1918-1968)--major-general of artillery. In 1961 was deputy commander of the 30th Separate Air Defense Corps. In 1963 was deputy commander for combat training of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. 11. Nikolay Ivanovich Naumov (born 1918)--major-general of artillery. In 1961 was chief of the SAM troops of the 30th Separate Air Defense Corps. In 1963 was chief of the SAM troops of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. 12. Yakov Nikanorovich Yefromeyenko (1917-1992)--major-general of aviation. In 1963 was chief of aviation of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. In 1968 was chief of a national air defense aviation inspectorate. Honored military pilot of the USSR. 13. Oleg Petrovich Yefimov (1918-1979)--major-general engineer. From 1963 chief of the radiotechnical troops of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. 14. Sergey Andreyevich Sandrigaylo (born 1923)--major-general. In 1963 was chief of the headquarters operations department of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. In 1966 was chief of staff of the Directorate for Creating Space Defense Facilities. 15. Vladimir Stepanovich Deyev (born 1920)--major-general. In 1962 was commander of the 7th Air Defense Division. In 1970 was commander of an air defense corps. 16. Viktor Dmitriyevich Slyusar (born 1922)--major-general. In 1965 was first deputy chief of staff of the 12th Separate Air Defense Army. In 1967 was commander of the 15th Air Defense Division. In 1972 was deputy commander for combat training of the 2d Separate Air Defense Army. 17. Aleksey Dmitriyevich Kotov (1920-1990)--lieutenant-general. In 1961 was commander of the 17th Air Defense Division. In 1966 was first deputy commander of the 6th Separate Air Defense Army, civil defense chief of staff of Leningrad and the oblast. 18. Nikolay Vasilyevich Chemerikin (born 1920)--colonel. In 1961 was commander of the 132d SAM brigade. In 1965 was chief of staff of the 7th Air Defense Division. 19. Dmitriy Pavlovich Pavlushchenko (born 1918)--colonel. In 1961 was commander of the 145th Guards SAM Brigade. In 1969 was senior adviser in an air defense division in Egypt. 20. Mikhail Borisovich Shelomkov (born 1921)--colonel. In 1961 was commander of the 87th SAM Brigade. In 1964 was garrison chief in the city of Alma-Ata. 21. Leonid Ilich Brezhnev (1906-1982)--Marshal of the Soviet Union, four times Hero of the Soviet Union. From May 1960 to July 1964 was chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. First secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 1964-1966 and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from 1966. 22. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sudets (1904-1981)--marshal of aviation. Hero of the Soviet Union. Commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces and deputy minister of defense of the USSR 1962-1966. 23. Lev Benyaminovich Goshchinskiy (born 1924)--colonel. In 1963 was commander of the 12th Radiotechnical Brigade. In 1965 was chief of the radiotechnical troops of an air defense corps. 24. Nikolay Grigoryevich Lyashchenko (born 1910)--general of the army. From 1963 commander of a number of military districts. 25. Mikhail Markovich Kolomiyets (born 1918)--lieutenant-general. Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1963 was chief of the Directorate for Creating Space Defense Facilities. 26. Ivan Yefimovich Baryshpolets (1916-1976)--lieutenant-general. In 1963 was chief of the ABM Troops Directorate. 27. Georgiy Filippovich Baydukov (born 1907)--colonel-general of aviation. Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1961 was chief of the Fourth Main Armament Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. 28. Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev (1912-1993)--party figure and statesman, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, academician of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences. From 1964 first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. 29. Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov (1917-1983)--party figure and statesman. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. From March 1959 first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. 30. Nikolay Ivanovich Savinkin (1919-1993)--from 1968 head of the administrative bodies department of the CPSU Central Committee. 31. Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov (1908-1984)--party figure, statesman, and military leader. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of the Soviet Union. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 1965-1976. 32. Aleksey Mikhaylovich Mikhaylov (born 1920)--lieutenant-general engineer. In 1967 was first deputy commander of the ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 33. Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Yedemskiy (born 1920)--lieutenant-general engineer. In 1961 was chief engineer at the Kapustin Yar Range. In 1963 was chief engineer of the Directorate for Creating an ABM System. In 1967 was deputy commander and chief engineer of the ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 34. Yevgeniy Danilovich Tsvetkov (born 1920)--colonel-engineer. In 1961 was department chief in the Directorate for Creating an ABM System. In 1967 was department chief in the armament service of the Directorate of ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. 35. Anatoliy Konstantinovich Mikhaylov (born 1936)--colonel. In 1968 was chief of the computer department at a radiotechnical warning center. In 1970 was senior engineer in the armament service. In 1979 was chief engineer of the sector for warning equipment in the Directorate of ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. 36. Vladimir Valentinovich Golubev (1931-1982)--major-general. In 1965 was assistant chief of the operational and combat training department of a separate ABM corps headquarters. In 1967 was senior officer in a combat employment department. In 1974 was deputy chief of staff in the Directorate of ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. 37. Vladimir Timofeyevich Timofeyev (born 1945)--colonel. In 1975 was deputy chief of the operations department of a separate ABM corps headquarters. In 1982 was a senior staff officer. In 1988 was deputy chief of staff in the Directorate of ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. 38. Anatoliy Petrovich Blinov (born 1945)--colonel. In 1976 was senior engineer of the armament service; in 1989 was senior staff officer of the command of the Missile and Space Defense Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. 39. Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Shumilin (born 1947)--colonel. In 1976 was chief of a combat crew in a space warning system department. In 1992 was a senior officer in the Combat Training Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces. 40. Petr Dmitriyevich Grushin (born 1906)--scientist and designer in the field of aviation and missile equipment. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Winner of the Lenin and State Prizes. 41. Mikhail Gareginovich Minosyan (1929-1993)--deputy general designer for the Moscow ABM system. Doctor of technical sciences. Winner of the State Prize. 42. Yuliy Borisovich Khariton (born 1904)--scientist and designer in the field of nuclear physics. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Thrice Hero of Socialist Labor. Winner of the Lenin Prize and three State Prizes. 43. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sadovskiy (born 1904)--physicist, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1963 was director of the Earth Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Winner of the Lenin Prize and four State Prizes. 44. Mikhail Grigoryevich Mymrin (1918-1984)--lieutenant-general. From 1956 deputy chief of the Fourth Armament Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Candidate of technical sciences. Winner of the State Prize. 45. Vladimir Panteleymonovich Sosulnikov (born 1921)--from 1958 deputy director for scientific work of the Long-Range Radio Communications Scientific Research Institute [SRI]. From 1966 chief designer of the Dunay-3 long-range detection radar and the Krona space monitoring radar. Doctor of technical sciences. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 46. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Musatov (born 1925)--chief of the scientific and technical department at the Long-Range Radio Communications SRI. Chief designer of the Dunay-3U long-range detection radar and developer of the principles of building the Volga warning radar. 47. Afanasiy Fedorovich Shcheglov (born 1912)--general of the army. Hero of the Soviet Union. First deputy commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces 1966-1974. 48. Vsevolod Sergeyevich Burtsev (born 1927)--scientist and designer in the field of computer technology. Director of the Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology Institute. Chief designer of the 5E-92B, 5E-51, and Elbrus computer systems. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Winner of the Lenin Prize and two State Prizes. 49. Anatoliy Pavlovich Penkov (born 1922)--major-general engineer. In 1960 was commander of a SAM regiment. In 1962 was deputy commander and chief engineer of a separate air defense corps. Candidate of technical sciences. Winner of the State Prize. 50. Aleksandr Georgiyevich Kubarev (born 1930)--major-general. In 1967 was chief of the combat employment department of the Directorate for Creating an ABM System. From 1977 combat training chief of the headquarters of the Directorate of ABM and SD Troops of the National Air Defense Forces. Candidate of military sciences. 51. Petr Stepanovich Pleshakov (1922-1987)--deputy chairman of the State Committee for Electronics of the USSR Council of Ministers. Minister of the Radio Industry of the USSR. Doctor of technical sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor. Winner of the Lenin Prize and two State Prizes. 52. Ivan Dmitriyevich Omelchenko (born 1919)--colonel-engineer. Hero of Socialist Labor. Chief designer of the A-35M system. Deputy for scientific affairs of the director of the Radio Instrument Building SRI. Candidate of technical sciences. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 53. Nikolay Ivanovich Rodionov (born 1930)--lieutenant-general. In 1975 was commander of a separate ABM corps. From 1980 commander of a separate missile attack warning army. 54. Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov (born 1917)--Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of the Soviet Union. From January 1977 chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces--first deputy minister of defense of the USSR. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 55. Viktor Georgiyevich Kulikov (born 1921)--Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1969 commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces--first deputy minister of defense of the USSR 1971-1977. From 1977 commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 56. Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov (1923-1992)--chief marshal of aviation. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1975 first deputy commander in chief and from 1978 commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces--deputy minister of defense of the USSR. Winner of the Lenin Prize. 57. Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov (1910-1988)--Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Commander in chief of the Navy--deputy minister of defense of the USSR 1956-1985. Winner of the State Prize. 58. Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov (born 1923)--general of the army. Hero of the Soviet Union. From 1979 chief of the Main Operations Directorate and first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Until 22 August 1991 was commander in chief of the Ground Forces--deputy minister of defense of the USSR. 59. Vladimir Sergeyevich Semenikhin (born 1918)--scientist in the field of automation and telemechanics. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. From 1965 supervised scientific research organizations. Winner of the Lenin Prize and the State Prize. 60. Leonid Vasilyevich Smirnov (born 1916)--statesman and party leader. Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1963 deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers--chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK). 61. Viktor Mikhaylovich Karetnikov (1919-1989)--lieutenant-general. Department chief of the VPK for armament of the ABM and SD Troops. 62. Vyacheslav Sergeyevich Dubrovskiy (born 1920)--colonel. From 1962 deputy chief of combat training at the headquarters of the commander of the National Air Defense SAM Troops. Deputy department chief of the VPK for ABM. 63. Viktor Andreyevich Savin (born 1933)--lieutenant-general. In 1972 was commander of a separate antiballistic-missile center. In 1967 was commander of a missile attack warning division. In 1981 was commander of a separate ABM corps. 64. Boris Vasilyevich Bunkin (born 1922)--scientist in the field of physics and electronics. General designer of the S-75, S-200, and S-300 SAM systems. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Winner of the Lenin and State Prizes. 65. Viktor Mikhaylovich Glushkov (born 1923)--scientist in the field of mathematics and applied cybernetics. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1962 director of the Cybernetics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Winner of the Lenin and State Prizes. 66. Sergey Alekseyevich Lebedev (1902-1973)--scientist and designer in the field of electrical engineering and computer technology. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1953 director of the Precision Mechanics and Computer Technology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Winner of the Lenin Prize and two State Prizes. 67. Gennadiy Sergeyevich Legasov (born 1921)--lieutenant-general. In 1951 was a chief of a test team at the State Testing Range of the National Air Defense Forces. In 1962 was chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the National Air Defense Forces. Candidate of technical sciences. Winner of the Lenin and State Prizes. Chief expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1992 received the Prize imeni Yu.A. Gagarin. 68. Yuriy Grigoryevich Burlakov (born 1928)--scientist and designer in the field of systems engineering and radar. In 1956 was deputy director of a scientific research institute for scientific work and chief designer. In 1968 was the chief designer of the Neman radar. In 1986 was deputy chief designer of the Salyut Design Bureau. Candidate of technical sciences. 69. Anatoliy Georgiyevich Basistov (born 1920)--lieutenant-general of aviation. Scientist and designer in the field of radar and control systems. In 1976 was general designer of the Moscow ABM system. Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Hero of Socialist Labor. 70. Viktor Karlovich Sloka (born 1932)--scientist in the field of radar and information processing. In 1972 was chief designer of the Don multifunctional radar. From 1976 director and scientific manager of the Radio Engineering Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences imeni A.L. Mints. Doctor of technical sciences, professor. Winner of the State Prize. 71. Vladimir Ivanovich Markov (born 1921)--lieutenant-general of aviation. In 1968 was deputy minister of the radio industry of the USSR. In 1981 was director of the Long-Range Radio Communications SRI. Candidate of technical sciences.