Closing the Gaps
Securing High Enriched Uranium in the
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
by Robert L. Civiak
Download Full Report
(2 MB PDF)
Home
Executive Summary
Introduction
Proposal 1
Proposal 2
Proposal 3
Conclusion
Appendix A
Appendix B
Notes
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary

Closing the Gaps

Securing High Enriched Uranium in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

It it most likely that a terrorist seeking to manufacture a nuclear weapon would attempt to do do using high-enriched uranium (HEU) as its fissile material. At the same time, the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union has made the supply of HEU in that region particularly vulnerable to theft or diversion. This report proposes three ways in which these stockpiles of HEU can be reduced, facilitating efforts to prevent the diversion of HEU to terrorist organizations. All three are low cost options that could be started and would produce results quickly.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements HTML | PDF
Executive Summary HTML | PDF
Introduction HTML | PDF
  The Threat of Diversion of Nuclear Weapons or Weapon Material from Russia
  HEU Stockpiles - A Serious Threat, A Solvable Problem
  Three Proposals to Expand Efforts to Reduce HEU Stockpiles in Russia
Proposal 1: Rapid Blend-Down of All Excess Russian Weapons-Origin HEU HTML | PDF
  A Large HEU Stockpile Remains in Russia Outside of the HEU Deal
  Proposal for Rapid Blend-Down of Additional Russian HEU
  Cost Estimate for Doubling the Blend-Down of Russian HEU
  Benefits from Expanding the HEU Blend-Down
Proposal 2: Remove HEU Stockpiles from Smaller, Less Secure Facilities HTML | PDF
  Small Facilities are More Vulnerable to Theft
  The DOE Materials Consolidation and Conversion Project
  Limitations of the MCC Project
  Funding Issues
  Recommendations to Enhance the MCC Project
Proposal 3: Replace HEU Fuel in Soviet-Built Research and Test Reactors with LEU Fuel HTML | PDF
  Soviet-Built Research Reactors
  Why Fuel Conversion?
  US-Russian Cooperation to Reduce Enrichment of Research Reactor Fuel
  Moving Forward
  Strengthening the US RERTR Program
Conclusion HTML | PDF
Appendix A: Overview of US Efforts to Control the Spread of Russian Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise HTML | PDF
Appendix B: The Existing HEU Agreement HTML | PDF
Notes HTML | PDF
Acronyms and Abbreviations HTML | PDF
Glossary HTML | PDF