UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY
THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND
ON MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you
for this opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.
and action drove the year 2001 for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
In February, USS Greeneville collided with and sank the Japanese fisheries training
vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the
loss of nine Japanese lives. Soon
after, a Chinese fighter jet collided with one of our EP-3s, resulting in the
loss of the Chinese pilot and the detention of our crew on Hainan Island for 11
days. During this time, seven
USPACOM personnel from Joint Task Force–Full Accounting died in a helicopter
crash in Vietnam. Then came the
terrorist attacks of 11 September. We
have gone on the offensive against terrorism while sustaining our readiness,
improving the readiness of regional forces to contribute to coalition
operations, and transforming the capabilities of our forces.
The men and women of USPACOM have been busy.
We cannot provide adequate protection to our
citizens and our forces while only playing defense.
Since 11 September, combating terrorism on U.S. territory and throughout
the Asia-Pacific region has been USPACOM’s top priority.
We are succeeding, largely as a result of cooperation among many nations.
Countering terrorism has accelerated
security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, but has not fundamentally
altered the region’s security challenges.
A secure, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region remains very much
in the interests of America and the world.
An uncertain Asia will present crises and dangers.
We continue to base our power and influence on our
values, economic vibrancy, our desire to be a partner in this critical region,
and our forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces of USPACOM.
Overall, we are in better shape than we were
a year ago. We have gone on the offensive against terror organizations we
did not know the name of a year ago. Although
there are persistent deficiencies, particularly in facilities upkeep and
replenishment of precision weapons, our readiness is on its way to a
satisfactory level. If we can
maintain our momentum, the future is bright for the U.S. Pacific Command.
The terrorist threat in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) consists primarily of local groups with links to al-Qaida that are hostile to the United States and our friends. These groups have plotted attacks against American forces, embassies, and other citizens, and have provided transit assistance to al-Qaida members. Our understanding of the threat has increased greatly since 11 September, as we brought more intelligence resources to bear and shared intelligence with other countries. Jemaah Islamiyah, which has plotted against U.S. and other nations’ citizens, vessels and facilities in Singapore, is one group of concern. The Governments of Singapore and Malaysia moved quickly against this al-Qaida-linked group. Continued vigilance, actions such as this, and enhanced cooperation among governments, will keep terrorists on the run and root them out over time.
present, no “Afghanistans” – sanctuaries for active terrorist
organizations with governments fully supporting them – exist in this Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Governments
throughout the region fundamentally support the campaign against international
terrorism. Each country in the
region faces different circumstances and unique challenges, and each has varying
capabilities in contributing to the international war on terrorism. Domestic political considerations are factors in countries
such as Indonesia and Bangladesh. However,
nations in this region are cooperating with the United States in many different
ways, and this cooperation is succeeding against international terrorism.
have actively engaged our regional partners to support Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Our
Asia-Pacific allies and regional partners have condemned the terrorist attacks
of 11 September, and many are contributing resources. We appreciate the many military contributions of our allies
and regional partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
invoked the ANZUS Treaty immediately following 11 September for the first time
in the 50-year history of this treaty. In
addition to its ongoing naval contribution to Maritime Interdiction Operations
supporting UN Security Council Resolutions against Iraq, Australia provided
additional ships to the Arabian Gulf and aircraft to Diego Garcia.
Australia was one of our first allies to deploy ground troops to
Afghanistan. New Zealand has
provided a contingent of its Special Air Service for operations as well.
Government of Japan has implemented major policy and legislative changes to
allow Japan to provide force protection and logistical support to U.S.
installations in Japan. The Japan Air Self Defense Force has flown relief missions to
Pakistan and lift missions for our forces in the USPACOM AOR.
For the first time since World War II, the Japan Maritime Self Defense
Force is at sea far from Japanese waters, providing fuel and other support to
coalition naval forces.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is providing air
and naval logistic support to OEF. Several
other countries [c1] have
given overflight rights and seaport and airport access to our aircraft and
bottom line is that our previous bilateral and regional cooperation with the
countries of the APR has paid off in valuable cooperation with regard to the war
Force Protection Program has effectively protected our armed forces and
supported civilian authorities throughout the Asia-Pacific region since the 11
September terrorist attacks. We
activated Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) to counter the threat and
accelerated the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program.
integrate the defensive measures by all the military units in the same location
– Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Japan and Korea.
In addition, they coordinate Department of Defense (DoD) efforts with
federal, state, and local agencies. JRACs
have written and exercised plans and are fielding the Area Security Operations
Command and Control (ASOCC) system. Over
the past year, we have made significant progress identifying and protecting
critical infrastructure by making CIP part of all major exercises and using
JRACs to protect critical assets. We
are also accelerating the fielding of the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System
in Hawaii and Alaska to improve coordination efforts between civilian
authorities and their JRAC counterparts.
USPACOM’s JRACs and CIP program are widely recognized as the model for interagency
coordination, combined scenario-based
training events, and unprecedented cooperation and information sharing.
Following the attack on the USS Cole,
USPACOM began a full reassessment of vulnerabilities at foreign ports we visit.
We have established plans and increased deployable security measures at
all these ports. To date, we have
completed 25 force protection memoranda of agreement (MOA) with U.S. embassies,
including MOAs with embassies in India, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, the
Philippines and China. These
agreements clearly delineate U.S. responsibilities for all our military forces
in Asia-Pacific countries.
major challenge is to sustain these intense efforts over the long-term.
Substantial resources are required to maintain higher Force Protection
Conditions (FPCONs) that will be a way of life for many years to come.
long as we are engaged around the world, terrorists will look for soft spots for
further attacks. On every
deployment, every exercise and especially now at home stations, force protection
is an essential mission.
USPACOM forces – USS Kitty Hawk, John C. Stennis,
and Carl Vinson battlegroups,
patrol aircraft, and USS PELELIU
Amphibious Ready Group with the 15th and 13th Marine
Expeditionary Units – played major roles in the successful Afghanistan
campaigns. At the same time, we
have gone on the offensive in the Pacific region.
have already deployed personnel to U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia and India to better integrate our operations with interagency country
teams. We have established a
Directorate for Counter-Terrorism to fuse all sources of intelligence, to plan
and coordinate operations, and to begin true interagency integration across the
region. We have sent equipment and
an assistance team to the Philippines. Our
Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) has rapidly improved its support to
the counter-terrorism mission. Analytical
depth and breadth of the terrorism threat in the AOR has significantly improved,
with increased collection, analysis, and reporting in this area.
build coalition support for our offensive efforts since 11 September, I have
visited the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Japan
and Korea, and met with each country’s U.S. ambassador, and key senior
government and military leaders to discuss our intentions, and how their support
can help. The response to our plan
has been positive, and we are building capability to act with other countries
We continue to foster interagency
participation in our planning and operations.
While our counter-terrorism cell includes a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group to seamlessly interconnect with the national architecture as
it is established, a Joint Interagency Task Force with direct tasking authority
that transcends agency stovepipes would be a more effective organization.
Legislation mandating a 15 percent
headquarters manpower reduction over 3 years was passed before 11 September.
As we launched the war on terrorism, we brought additional Reserve
Component (RC) personnel on board to handle the increased workload.
On 12 October 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense waived the FY01 10
percent headquarters manpower reduction. As
long as the war on terrorism continues, there will be more requirements for
intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and planning officers on
USPACOM combatant headquarters staffs.
war on terrorism has created new manpower requirements.
Over 5,000 additional billets are needed to
address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism, and counter-terrorism
missions throughout USPACOM. Examples
of additional manpower requirements include increased shore and harbor security
patrols in response to enhanced Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs), additional
teams to assess security of foreign ports and airfields we visit, and
around-the-clock manning of JRACs and crisis action teams.
We are working to address these manning and management challenges from
within existing endstrength levels.
Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CBT RIF)
obtained through CBT RIF continues to play a major role in addressing emergent
requirements. This initiative
provides the geographic CINCs additional avenues for resourcing against emerging
threats. Some examples of USPACOM
funded CBT RIF projects include weapons/metal detectors and explosive vapor
detectors for Marine Corps Base Okinawa and blast mitigation windows for Yongsan
Base in Korea. USPACOM
received $3.95 million in CBT RIF funding in FY01.
USPACOM received nearly $3.9 million more in the first allocation of FY02
funding, including $850,000 for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
However, USPACOM still has over 1,070 unfunded Anti-Terrorism Force
Protection (ATFP) projects totaling nearly $1.5 billion to achieve full
compliance with current standards. Service
funding will meet some of these requirements, but the CBT RIF program fills the
Military Financing (FMF)
is an essential tool for our allies and partners to improve their capabilities
against international terrorist groups and their supporters.
A detailed discussion of FMF funding requirements, with particular
emphasis on FMF for the Philippines, is included at pages 34-35.
remains America’s oldest ally in the Asia-Pacific region.
Last year we celebrated the 50th anniversary of our defense
treaty. Australia’s steadfast
support has been a key facet of our counter-terrorism campaign in the
armed forces remain in the lead role in East Timor and in the shaping of East
Timor’s new defense force. In
addition, Australia maintains an important presence in Papua New Guinea,
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, ensuring peace and security in these
problematic areas. The Australian
government has been active in promoting the return of democracy in Fiji and
security and peaceful development throughout the archipelagic states of
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.
relationship with Australia is mature and as strong as it has ever been.
USPACOM works hard through bilateral and multilateral fora to keep the
ANZUS Treaty relationship with Australia healthy and looking forward.
We are currently conducting a strategic top-down interoperability study
with Australia’s armed forces. It
will return great long-term dividends in acquisition, information technology,
operations, research and development, and further strengthening the relationship
with this trusted ally.
hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel and 14,000 additional sailors
afloat with the Seventh Fleet. It
contributes $4.57 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally.
These forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces
are key to the U.S. commitment to defend American interests throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan
alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and fundamental
to regional security and peaceful development.
the past year, Japan and the United States have made steady progress in
strengthening our alliance. We
signed the first bilateral defense plan under the 1997 revised Defense
Guidelines. It incorporates
additional Japanese support for U.S. operations, and opens new areas for defense
After 11 September, Japan passed historic
legislation to assist U.S. combat operations.
For the first time since World War II, Japan sent its Self-Defense Force
(JSDF) overseas to support a combat operation and work with other countries in a
roles and capabilities are evolving to meet future challenges.
In addition to Japan's military contribution in support of OEF, the JSDF
will deploy a 700-member engineer battalion to East Timor in March 2002, and
will continue to provide a 45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan
Heights UN Disengagement Observer Force. The
JSDF has also worked closely with USPACOM components in restructuring bilateral
exercises to develop skills for humanitarian assistance; search and rescue;
non-combatant evacuation; consequence management for chemical, biological and
nuclear incidents; and complex contingency operations likely to occur in the
future. I am also encouraged by the
increased attention the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed forces
– the ROK in particular.
successfully completed the search and recovery effort on the Ehime
Maru last October with the recovery of eight out of nine missing
crewmembers. The U.S. Navy’s intense efforts and our two nations’
exceptional cooperation overcame the effects of the tragedy, and even
strengthened the ties between our two countries in many areas.
continue to work to be good neighbors on our bases in Japan.
Japan closed the industrial waste incinerator next to the U.S. Naval Air
Facility Atsugi, ending an environmental hazard.
Because of steady progress made under the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO), a relocation site for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been
selected in northern Okinawa, and detailed discussions have begun over the type
and scale of the facility.
Japan's timely, meaningful and visible
contribution to the campaign against terrorism is a new stage in our alliance
relations. This lynchpin
relationship is vital for security and peaceful development in Asia.
events on the Korean Peninsula in 2000 appeared to indicate a new era.
However, progress stalled last year.
Since March 2001, the North has canceled events and refused to meet
regularly with the ROK. At the same time, North Korea’s “military-first” policy
remains. Its training cycles in
2001 were at normal levels, but the ongoing 2002 winter training cycle has
featured unusual corps-level activity. North
Korea continues to maintain more than 60 percent of its forces within 100
kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The North remains a formidable force that we must guard against and
2001, the U.S. and the ROK successfully negotiated several important alliance
issues. Our military relationship
is on a stronger footing every year.
Special Measures Agreement (SMA), once completed, will significantly increase
contributions to the maintenance of U.S. troops on the Peninsula.
Under the SMA, the ROK will cover 50 percent of the non-personnel
stationing costs for U.S. forces by 2004. The
Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has also reached a tentative agreement
with the ROK government on a Land Partnership Plan (LPP) that will consolidate
U.S. force presence. The plan will
reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 26 while enhancing
training and combined warfighting capability.
Commander USFK and the ROK Ministry of National Defense have agreed to
review the 1990 agreement to relocate Yongsan Army Garrison, the home of USFK,
from its location in downtown Seoul.
must continue to enhance the quality of life for our troops and their families
stationed in Korea. The
ROK provides critical Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) support.
However, HNFC, coupled with the current level of U.S. Military
Construction (MILCON) funding, is inadequate.
of the facilities, including unaccompanied
personnel housing and family housing, are
of Korean War vintage. Personnel
live in inadequate barracks, apartments, even Quonset huts and “temporary”
Vietnam-era buildings that we have maintained at increasing cost as age,
infestation, and Pacific weather have taken their toll.
The FY03 funding shortfall for
facility construction and modernization across Korea is estimated at $315
million. Congressional support of
MILCON funding for Korea in the FY01 supplemental and FY02 MILCON Appropriations
bills was sorely needed and very appreciated.
seek your continued support for MILCON and sustainment, restoration and
maintenance funding as provided in the President’s FY03 budget.
ROK increasingly contributes to regional security by deploying over 400 troops
to the peacekeeping mission in East Timor, in addition to its other peacekeeping
commitments in Western Sahara, the Republic of Georgia, Cyprus and the
India-Pakistan border region. ROK
forces participate in exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval
exercise), PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise also involving naval
forces from Japan, Singapore and the United States), and COPE THUNDER (a
multilateral air exercise in Alaska). Most
recently, the ROK and USCINCPAC co-hosted a Multilateral Planning Augmentation
Team (MPAT) workshop in Korea. Hosting
an exercise with over 20 non-U.S. participants, including Japan, was a
significant first for the ROK.
the 11 September tragedy, the ROK aggressively supported our efforts to combat
terrorism. They have dispatched
forces to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, currently deploying four C-130
aircraft, a naval tank landing ship (LST) and a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
(MASH) unit. The ROK has also sent
liaison officers to the headquarters of USCINCPAC and Commander in Chief, U.S.
Central Command to coordinate ROK government support for the Afghan campaign and
continuing war. The ROK has worked closely with USFK to fully ensure the highest
levels of protection of U.S. forces on the Peninsula.
This is in addition to the $45 million pledged for the reconstruction of
joining the coalition to combat global terrorism and participating in
peacekeeping missions and USPACOM’s regional exercises and cooperative
initiatives, the ROK plays a very positive role in the region.
Although there has been little or no substantive progress toward
normalization and reunification of the Peninsula, the United States and the ROK
have strengthened our alliance, and the ROK has continued its contribution to
relationship with the Republic of the Philippines (RP), a long-time U.S. ally,
had major developments last year. The
RP continued to be a strong partner in regional security initiatives – hosting
various conferences, the annual bilateral BALIKATAN exercise linked to the
regional TEAM CHALLENGE exercise, and numerous Joint Combined Exchanges for
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are challenged by budgetary constraints,
logistical problems and a lack of adequately trained personnel.
These factors hamper the AFP's ability to deal with internal insurgent
groups, like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that also has ties to al-Qaida and poses
a threat to Americans.
Arroyo has championed Philippine and regional support for the international
counter-terrorism campaign. During
her November 2001 visit to the United States to commemorate the 50th
Anniversary of the U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty, she and President Bush agreed
that the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, and the terrorist
activities of the ASG (which now holds Filipino and American hostages in the
Southern Philippines), underscore the urgency of ensuring that the two countries
maintain a robust defense partnership into the 21st century.
The two leaders agreed to strengthen the military alliance on a sustained
basis, through increased training, exercises, and other joint activities.
Finally, they declared that the American and Filipino people stand
together in the global campaign against terrorism.
USPACOM has deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) to the
Southern Philippines and has organized a substantial program to improve the
maintenance of AFP equipment. The
JTF package includes: a training/advisory team of Special Operations
ground, naval and air personnel to train the AFP from their Southern Command
Headquarters potentially down through company level.
Training will focus on effective counter-terrorism campaign planning,
intelligence/operations fusion, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil-military
operations (CMO) and field tactics. Additionally, civil affairs (CA), maintenance, medical, and
other support personnel round out the Special Forces team.
JTF initial deployment of advisors was approved during implementation planning
in January 2002. The recently
concluded Terms of Reference (TOR) provided both governments with the necessary
framework for executing our deployment to the Philippines.
war against the ASG will not be won by military operations alone.
Improvements in law enforcement, intelligence, economics, business,
information, media, academia, community leadership and religion will have
enduring and important roles in the battle.
A solid, sustainable socio-economic program by the Government of the
Philippines in the affected areas is also essential.
USPACOM is working on a civil affairs assessment to support the JTF
Our training, assistance, and maintenance package will improve the
AFP’s CT capabilities. Continued U.S. support to the Philippines through the FMF program is
critical to the success of the AFP’s campaign against terror.
is one of the nations in Asia most committed to building regional approaches to
the future challenges of counter-terrorism (CT), counter-drug (CD) interdiction,
peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance (HA), and other
transnational concerns. The TEAM
CHALLENGE multilateral training event to improve multinational
capability/interoperability is held in Thailand.
Thailand has taken a leading role
in Southeast Asia in support of peacekeeping operations (PKO) by maintaining
battalion strength forces in East Timor and again supplying the UN military
commander there. Thailand has also
sponsored several multilateral PKO seminars.
We have supported humanitarian demining in Thailand and are transferring
that program to Thailand in FY02. USPACOM
continues to respond to Thailand's request for U.S. assistance to the Royal Thai
Army in combating drug traffic across the Burma-Thai border. Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) is the standing
task force for all CD issues in the theater and has the lead in training,
equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to assist the Thais with
their CD mission. Full funding of FY02/03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for
Thailand is critical to our efforts to help Thailand sustain its CD and PKO over
the next 2 years.
Since 11 September, Thailand has
coordinated fully with the United States in combating terrorism by supplying
access to Thai military facilities, granting overflight permission, making
formal public statements of support, and cooperating in information sharing and
in investigation of terrorists using Thailand for a transit point and for other
support. During a December 2001
trip to Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Thaksin offered the U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Thai security contributions to multilateral presence in
Our effective military-to-military
cooperation with Thailand meets the security concerns of both our countries.
Our attention to Thai political and military priorities supports our
ability to call for access to military facilities.
Thailand will continue to be our key ally in Southeast Asia.
March 2001 completion of the deep-draft pier at Changi Naval Base, constructed
entirely at Singapore’s expense, will support continued U.S. presence in the
region for many years to come. USS Kitty
Hawk was the first aircraft carrier to berth pierside at Changi.
Though not a formal treaty ally, Singapore is a solid security partner in
the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal proponent for U.S. access, and strong supporter
of U.S. counter-terrorist efforts. Additionally,
Singapore supports and hosts many significant multilateral activities.
Last year, it hosted Exercise PACIFIC REACH, participated in Exercise
COBRA GOLD and numerous anti-piracy regional conferences, and hosted a Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) regional Mine
seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. armed forces. It views high technology and advanced hardware as a deterrent
and is increasing its cooperation with the United States in several projects.
Singapore participated with Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB)
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and is active in other
developments such as the Joint Mission Force (JMF) and Asia-Pacific Area Network
has worked against terrorist groups in the country who were targeting U.S.
interests. Immediately following
the 11 September attacks, Singapore was unwavering in its support to Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, allowing our aircraft to use its airfields and increasing
protection to vital shipping in the Strait of Malacca.
arrest of 13 al-Qaida-linked terrorists in December led to additional arrests in
Malaysia and the Philippines in January. Information
sharing between these countries provided unprecedented insights into the al-Qaida
network in the Asia-Pacific region.
has rapidly matured into a solid regional partner in a strategic location.
military relations with India have greatly expanded over the past year.
India offered rapid and valuable assistance to the United States in
conducting military operations in Afghanistan.
USPACOM officers have met with their Indian counterparts and agreed on
programs and exercises for the next 6-18 months.
The primary areas of cooperation focus on peacekeeping,
counter-terrorism, special operations training and naval activities.
We are closely following India’s
current confrontation with Pakistan. Throughout
our interaction with our Indian counterparts, we continually stress the
importance of a peaceful negotiated long-term solution to the Kashmir issue.
and the United States have many common interests and our growing military
cooperation will support this increasingly important security relationship.
continues to go through a complete transition toward a modern democracy and a
market economy. A key factor
influencing Indonesia’s political transformation and the prospects for its
stability and unity are the Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI.
reform made some progress last year, but more remains to be done, especially in
the areas of accountability and professional conduct. Separatist and sectarian violence in Aceh, the Moluccas,
Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, and inadequate TNI resources and capabilities have
slowed the momentum of reform. TNI’s
future course is central to Indonesia’s development and important to U.S.
interests in combating terrorism, maintaining freedom of navigation on important
trade lanes, and supporting regional security.
Indonesian government has condemned terrorism and approved overflights of U.S.
aircraft supporting the war on terrorism. It
has improved security for our citizens and the U.S. embassy in Jakarta.
However, Indonesia’s very geography makes it vulnerable to terrorist
penetration. With many challenges
on its plate, and diminishing resources, Indonesia’s security apparatus does
not have full control of its borders. Moreover,
Indonesia has not aggressively investigated domestic elements that are
sympathetic to the aims of al-Qaida. We
need to strengthen cooperation with Indonesia on terrorism.
Current restrictions on our interaction with the TNI limit our
effectiveness. However, the newly
established Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program may offer us a
valuable tool to provide TNI mid-grade officers non-lethal training focused on
counter-terrorism and combating transnational threats.
We look forward to exploring this possibility with the Congress.
activities with TNI include inviting some officers to multilateral conferences,
subject matter information exchanges, senior officer visits, and the annual
naval Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise focusing on
humanitarian assistance and anti-piracy. CARAT
2002 will now include a counter-terrorism element.
responsible, developing Indonesia is key to the security and development of the
Southeast Asia region; it is in our interest to help ensure the security of this
Timor is preparing for independence in May of this year.
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) support has been
successful in assisting and guiding East Timor toward independence.
USPACOM forces in U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET) played a vital
role in supporting this monumental international effort.
USGET has provided a significant U.S. presence, vital civic actions,
humanitarian assistance, and regular ship visits.
Today, East Timor is generally secure from the militias, and ready to
face the challenges of a democracy.
East Timor’s independence, USPACOM will transition from civic action
orientation in East Timor to a more traditional military cooperation program.
This program will support an international effort, led by Australia, to
further develop the East Timor Defense Force into a viable self-defense force.
Many important political, economic,
and military developments occurred in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
last year, and Chinese actions affected U.S. military relations with the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Last year’s military exercises in
the PRC showed a measurable increase in quality, as the PLA continued to
modernize its forces, with an emphasis on integrating ground, air and naval
forces into a viable joint capability, and on creating a more professional
officer and noncommissioned officer cadre.
In addition to basic maritime combat skills, the 2001 exercises
demonstrated efforts to conduct joint amphibious operations combined with
missile and air strikes against key targets, such as airfields, naval ports and
China continued to build and
exercise its force of short-range ballistic missiles ranging Taiwan.
It still seeks to develop a range of military options to influence and
intimidate Taiwan, and has not abandoned the option of using force to resolve
Across the Strait, Taiwan’s armed forces continue to
restructure and modernize. They are
reorganizing and modernizing command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR). The U.S. government last
year approved the sale of naval, ground and air equipment to maintain Taiwan’s
sufficient defense in the near term. Taiwan
still needs to focus on developing and modernizing C4ISR, integrated air and sea
defense, and the ability to integrate its armed forces to conduct effective
The PLA is still years away from
the capability to take and hold Taiwan. Continued
improvements in Taiwan’s capabilities and development of USPACOM capabilities
will be necessary to maintain sufficient defense.
The April 2001 EP-3 crisis was
eventually resolved – the crew and airplane returned.
However, the aggressive behavior of the Chinese pilot who caused the
collision and the detention of the crew for 11 days damaged China’s relations
with the United States.
Military-to-military relations are
resuming slowly, and in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act.
It is in the interests of the United States to interact with the PLA to
address common interests, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations,
search and rescue, counterdrug, counterpiracy, and humanitarian assistance.
These interactions should be reciprocal and transparent and serve to
reduce misunderstandings and the risk of miscalculations on both sides.
Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues progress on the fullest possible
accounting of Americans unaccounted-for as a result of the war in Southeast
risks of this noble mission were sadly underscored by the helicopter crash on 7
April 2001. Seven American service
members and nine Vietnamese tragically died in Quang Binh Province, Vietnam,
while conducting advance work for the 65th Joint Field Activity (JFA).
We may never know the exact details of the accident, but a report by the
U.S. investigator indicated that deteriorating weather conditions, poor
visibility, and pilot error were factors. This
tragic incident was a deep loss for USPACOM, the task force, and the American
and Vietnamese people.
FY01, JTF-FA conducted nine JFAs - three in Vietnam, five in Laos, and one in
Cambodia where 211 cases were investigated and 37 sites excavated.
One JFA in Vietnam was canceled due to the tragic helicopter crash.
JTF-FA continues to maintain its pace of operations in FY02, with 10 JFAs
scheduled - 4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia.
year, 44 sets of remains were identified and returned to their loved ones.
JTF-FA recovered and repatriated 27 remains still to be identified, but
believed to be Americans unaccounted-for (16 from Vietnam, 10 from Laos, and 1
remain committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting of Americans still
missing in Southeast Asia and to the return of all recoverable remains.
We seek continual support for funding of this mission.
Ready forces are the foundation for
USPACOM’s cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.
They reassure our friends and partners, and dissuade our potential
enemies. During 2001, we maintained
a strong program of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) designed to maintain
coalition warfighting skills for deterrence, and build regional coalition
capabilities to carry out common missions, from peacekeeping through combating
The three primary goals of TSC - influence,
access, and competent coalition partners – led to an active program that
proved its worth after 11 September. All countries in the Asia-Pacific region
declared support for the global war on terrorism, and contributed in many ways.
simulations and multilateral exercises are inexpensive and powerful ways to
develop the capabilities to work effectively -- as coalitions in complex
contingencies (such as East Timor); as partners in countering terrorism, illegal
drug trafficking, and piracy; in managing the consequences of chemical,
biological or nuclear attacks, natural disasters and accidents; in evacuating
citizens caught in the path of violence; in search and rescue of mariners and
airmen in distress; and in providing humanitarian assistance.
TSC develops a cadre of competent coalition partners able to contribute
when called upon.
Such a call came 11 September.
Under the banner of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, many of our partners in
enhanced regional cooperation stepped forward to make significant contributions
to the emerging OEF coalition. We
have also focused on building long-term, strategic relationships necessary to
plan and execute the protracted theater campaigns to eradicate terrorism.
Many of our efforts with key allies and friends, such as Australia,
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, are expanding on strong
foundations nurtured by TSC to improve our counter-terrorism capabilities.
With other strategic nations in our theater, such as India, the events of
11 September are the catalyst for accelerating more meaningful
military-to-military contact and cooperation.
Finally, many nations, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma, have
offered varying levels of support and cooperation to the global campaign against
terrorism. Their proposed contributions and offers, although perhaps not
strategically significant, forecast meaningful regional cooperation on a threat
that affects all Asia-Pacific nations.
We will continue to cultivate and
maintain the necessary operational access and coalition cooperation
(diplomatic/financial/military) to plan and execute current and future
operations. For all these purposes, USPACOM should maintain a baseline of
multilateral conferences and International Military Education and Training (IMET)
for every country.
TEAM CHALLENGE 2002 links the multilateral COBRA GOLD
exercise in Thailand with the bilateral BALIKATAN in the Philippines to address
bilateral and multilateral training objectives, and to improve the readiness of
regional armed forces to contribute to multilateral operations.
Singapore will participate again this year alongside Thai and U.S. forces
in COBRA GOLD. Observer nations
(with an eye toward possible participation in future years) will include Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, France,
ROK, Mongolia, Russia, China, India, Cambodia, Tonga and Sri Lanka; Vietnam has
In TEAM CHALLENGE, we will exercise elements from the full spectrum of
missions that our combined forces may be called upon to do together, from
complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance. TEAM CHALLENGE continues to be our largest multilateral
exercise in theater, while serving as our premier Combined Joint Task Force
is the cornerstone of our Theater Security Cooperation Program.
It provides education opportunities for personnel from foreign armed
forces to study U.S. military doctrine and to observe U.S. commitment to the
rule of law, human rights, and democratic values.
It is the best means for promoting professionalism within foreign armed
forces, and exposing foreign armed forces to the principle of a military
responsive to civilian control. IMET
is an effective tool for assisting armed forces to develop in ways that meet
their own and U.S. objectives. Indonesia is a case in point, where officers from the Indonesian armed
forces have not attended professional U.S. military education courses since
1992, with an attendant loss of U.S. influence on an entire generation of
Indonesian company/ field grade officers.
The Regional Defense
Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements the IMET program.
DoD funding will be used to send foreign military officers to U.S.
military institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal education.
This program will provide the regional CINCs with additional flexibility
in executing our security cooperation strategies, and it will have an immediate
and positive impact in encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional
cooperation in addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.
for acquiring U.S. military articles, services and training enables key friends
and allies to improve their defense capabilities and improve their potential
contributions as a coalition partner. In
response to our original FY02 FMF request, three USPACOM countries were granted
FMF funds: Mongolia ($2 million), the Philippines ($19 million), and [c2] East
Timor ($1 million), which gains its independence 20 May of this year.
prosecute the global war on terrorism, it is in the U.S. interest to provide
equipment to select countries facing threats.
The administration is reviewing potential threats and options.
The Philippines FMF Maintenance
Program is the foundation for effective security assistance to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) in their campaign against terror. We are in the first year of a 5-year, $68 million FMF plan to
sustain critical AFP military capability while promoting clear and positive
actions to correct budgetary and logistics deficiencies.
We have developed courses of action to improve AFP readiness rates for
specific systems such as C-130 aircraft, UH-1 helicopters, 2 1/2-ton trucks, and
78-foot Fast Patrol Craft. We have
also developed a statement of work to implement contractor management assistance
and ways to track improvements in readiness rates.
Full funding over the 5-year program will enable the AFP to sustain
higher readiness levels for key weapons systems. This funding is essential for
the AFP to achieve a self-sustaining capability.
As the efforts in the Philippines
evolve, possible opportunities to maximize effectiveness of counter terrorism
operations may require additional resources.
FY03 FMF funding for the Republic of the Philippines Maintenance Program
remains key to achieving one of our long-term goals of improving AFP readiness.
programs promote standards for peacekeeping doctrine, training, and education at
the institutional level. In FY01,
five USPACOM countries (Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines and Thailand)
received a total of $2.227 million to achieve this goal.
In FY02, we hope to add Fiji, Madagascar, Tonga and India to this list.
While EIPC programs are not as visible as IMET or FMF grants, EIPC plays
a key role in developing host country self-sufficiency to train its forces to be
effective players in worldwide peacekeeping efforts.
funding supports U.S. efforts to reduce threats posed by international
terrorists, landmines, and stockpiles of excess weapons, as well as by nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and their associated technologies.
We have received limited funds in the past, primarily for demining
activities in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, India and Vietnam.
Our war against terrorism could benefit by any expansion of these
programs. We will work closely with U.S. Country Teams to ensure we use
these limited funds wisely.
appropriation provides the critical ability to respond to humanitarian needs in
the Asia-Pacific region and is the primary source of DoD financing for foreign
disaster assistance, demining, excess property donations and other humanitarian
projects. While other federal
agencies also have responsibilities to respond to man-made and natural
disasters, armed forces are frequently called upon first.
Additionally, our annual assistance programs provide important access to
some countries where other means of security cooperation are inappropriate.
These non-threatening programs demonstrate the peacetime capabilities of
DoD to our Pacific neighbors without impacting readiness.
Approved FY02/03 Humanitarian Assistance requirements for construction
projects and property donations total approximately $5.1 million.
The U.S. armed forces continue to conduct operations in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers and humanitarian assistance during ship visits. FY02 engineering priorities include water plant, electrical system, and health clinic projects. The State Department programmed $4.8 million in FMF funds in FY01-03 to assist in developing the East Timor Defense Forces (ETDF) logistics support system and to conduct training to develop the skills necessary for self-sufficiency. We will need to look at avenues to provide the ETDF the support they need to provide for their own security. There should be no haven for terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, in countries with histories old or new.
APCSS regional study, conference, and research center continues to do great
work. Graduates from its 3-month
executive course total 764 from 41 countries, including Pakistan.
I meet many of the outstanding graduates when I travel, and all are
convinced that the regional approach works.
The APRI program increases USPACOM access, regional readiness and U.S.
influence in the Asia-Pacific region. APRI
funding supports a wide range of exercises, programs, and training symposiums
such as Exercise TEAM CHALLENGE, the PACIFIC REACH multi-national submarine
rescue exercise, the annual multilateral Chiefs of Defense conference, and
search and rescue and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercises.
by the APRI program, APAN provides information exchange throughout the region
that directly supports Theater Security Cooperation. It functions as an interactive Web-based network that is
attracting ever-widening attention and participation. APAN’s membership has grown from about 300 users from 17
countries in June 2000 to more than 4,000 self-registered users (by 1 January
2002) from every country in the Pacific region except Burma and North Korea.
APAN has also attracted users from over 20 other countries outside the
region. The Web site supports regional exercises and conferences, and
provides information resources to functional areas such as peacekeeping
operations, disaster management and counter-terrorism.
More importantly, it has been a catalyst to the creation of multinational
information-based relationships and collaboration.
Since APAN’s operational capabilities and information are entirely
unclassified, they are available to government agencies and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that are important as participants in complex humanitarian
emergencies and as partners in any combined military effort.
After 11 September, APAN began a commercially secured Web site for
Hawaii’s Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) effort, a multi-agency effort
comprising 17 federal state and local agencies in Hawaii responsible for
critical infrastructure. APAN is
working with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a similar commercially secured
operational network capability for multinational collaboration in the Northwest
Pacific and with the Department of State for similar collaborative sites to
support ASEAN Regional Forum Confidence-Building Measures in Counter-Terrorism
and possibly Maritime Security. Part
of the international experience of 11 September has been overcoming resistance
to new operating methods and information-based relationships.
APAN has encouraged regional countries and United Nations organizations
and NGOs to use and contribute to building experience in network centric
operations that will pay off in future multinational force operations.
MPAT Program, also funded through APRI, brings together expert military planners
from nations with Asia-Pacific interests that can rapidly augment a
multinational force headquarters. Using
standardized skills, they would plan and execute coalition operations in
response to small-scale contingencies in the region. Through a series of workshops and planning exercises, MPAT
members have developed a knowledge base of the various national
crisis-action-planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific region and strong working
relationships with each other. MPAT
members have also begun developing common crisis-action planning procedures that
any lead nation could use during a crisis.
We have successfully completed three MPAT workshops each
involving over 25 countries, co-hosted by the Philippines, Thailand, and Korea
respectively. We have also
completed six concept and standard operating procedures (SOP) workshops.
The strength of the MPAT
program lies in its ability to foster the development of a consensus on
multinational responses to crises in a region with only a strong bilateral
plays an important role in our pursuit of key strategic objectives in USPACOM.
COE engages countries in the Asia-Pacific region, builds burden-sharing
relationships among our friends and allies, and prepares U.S. forces to perform
effectively in complex contingencies. COE’s
mission in disaster management, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations
offers a low profile tool to engage civilian and military communities throughout
the theater that might otherwise be hesitant to work with us.
COE’s support of our peace operations capacity building efforts in the
Asia-Pacific region have helped improve capabilities in the Philippines,
Thailand, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Malaysia.
Finally, by promoting broader collaboration among non-traditional
partners, COE contributes to the creation of an environment less hospitable to
war on terrorism along with ongoing commitments throughout the Asia-Pacific
region place heavy pressures on our troops and their families.
It is especially important today, that our young men and women in uniform
feel the support of our country. The
quality of life (QoL) initiatives included in the FY02 National Defense
Authorization Act are welcome and let our people know their elected
representatives value their hard work and sacrifices.
Thank you for supporting the
Administration’s request for the largest pay raise in two decades.
Competitive pay is essential to attract and retain the highly skilled
personnel critical to our national defense.
There are areas where compensation has
failed to keep up with the times. For
example, most American families today own two cars for parents’ jobs, school,
and children's extracurricular activities.
This is a necessity, not a luxury. At
present, our military families are only allowed to transport one vehicle when
transferred to and from overseas duty stations in the United States.
Developing programs to meet the needs of today’s military families will
go a long way toward improving retention.
much-needed improvement is reducing Permanent Change of Station (PCS) out of
pocket expenses. We calculate the
average military family pays $1700 above reimbursements when moving to Hawaii.
Legislation like that in the FY02 Defense Authorization Act, to increase
partial reimbursement of mandatory pet quarantine fees incurred by members
transferred to various overseas locations within and outside the United States,
helps reduce this financial burden. The
removal of entitlement limits that previously excluded junior personnel from
receiving proper reimbursement for expenses incurred during their first PCS move
is also a standout. Even a
seemingly small gesture, like helping our volunteer Reserve or Guard members
deal with excess accrued leave as they move from hot spot to hot spot, sends a
message that we care.
past conflicts, Reserve Component (RC) personnel have mobilized to serve in and
around combat zones. For the war on
terrorism, we have mobilized thousands of reservists and guardsmen to protect
our military bases and civilian facilities like airports.
The President has clearly stated that the war on terrorism will continue
for years. RC support will be a
vital part of the war effort. In
USPACOM, our reservists have done a magnificent job.
The flexibility and support of their employers has been a key element of
this successful mobilization.
need to reexamine RC polices and programs to sustain the war on terrorism over
the long term. Cold War-era
regulations and public laws still sometimes prevent RCs from providing the
responsive and flexible capability they are so eager to deliver.
applaud the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint
Staff to push for improvements to law, policy, and regulations.
I support ways not only to increase funding but also to modernize the
rules that govern RC support. To do
this, we need more full-time support to perform tasks like managing manning
documents, pre-screening medical records before recall, and providing support at
the locations where the RC personnel are frequently mobilized.
we are fortunate to have many eager and talented volunteers willing to make
sacrifices to serve their country in times of crisis, I am concerned about the
long-term impact of reliance on recalled reserve augmentation forces.
Given the nature of our protracted war on terrorism, we
need to take a hard look at active duty force levels required in the next 5-10
years to combat terrorism, because now is the time to make recruitment and force
family housing remains one of our top QOL priorities. We are working to replace
or renovate substandard military family housing by 2007.
Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Pacific Air
Forces (PACAF), and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) will meet this goal with their
current master plans and programs. We
must continue to restore and increase funding to ensure that our military family
housing is safe, modern, and secure. Congressional
efforts last year resulted in a welcome and much needed increase in attention to
overseas MILCON in USPACOM. I
applaud your efforts to fix the grossly inadequate housing in Korea and other
deficiencies throughout the AOR. There
is still so much to do.
and Maintenance (O&M) Funding
The second important component of
readiness is sufficient operations and maintenance funding for training and
Last year I testified that with
regard to our funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) “news is not
positive” and, “accordingly the readiness of our component commands is not
expected to reflect any significant increase this fiscal year.”
I am happy to report this year, due to supplemental funding, our
readiness picture is more optimistic.
Funding for training and
maintenance across Service components has been adequate to keep units trained
and their equipment in good repair. This
readiness was proved in combat as USPACOM carrier battlegroups (CVBGs),
amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and marine expeditionary units (MEUs) deployed
on short notice to Afghanistan and were effective in combat immediately.
Let me highlight my current
support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) has significantly reduced the
already limited worldwide stocks of precision munitions across all services,
especially the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The President’s FY03 budget request contains aggressive
programs to restore inventories to adequate levels.
Sustained funding to restore/increase PGMs stockage levels to support the
spectrum of military operations – counter-terrorism (CT) operations,
small-scale contingencies (SSCs), major theater wars (MTWs), training/testing
expenditures, theater positioning and combat-sustainment requirements – must
remain a priority.
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Aircraft
AOR requires more ISR aircraft coverage to meet operational demand.
While I cannot provide exact numbers in this forum, our collection rates
of required intelligence information is dangerously low.
Recent funding of ISR aircraft as part of the counter-terrorism (CT)
supplemental will help, but this projected increase must be realized in
increased surveillance units in this theater.
New aircraft must also be developed to replace aging ISR assets.
The projected retirement of aircraft over the out years puts at risk
Service commitments to maintain a minimum number of operational ISR aircraft.
Mission Capable (MC) rates for Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)/ Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) aircraft and cannibalization of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) aircraft continue to be major readiness concerns in USPACOM. Availability of repair parts is a significant contributor to aircraft readiness shortfalls. Although funding for repair parts for Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft has improved in the past two years, shortages still exist, causing cannibalizations on PACAF aircraft and crossdecking/temporary equipment loans in PACFLT. Of PACAF aircraft tracked from January to December 2001, 80 percent did not meet the aircraft standard for cannibalization rates.
Logistics Inventories, and Related Support
final component of readiness is infrastructure, logistics inventories, and
related support. This component
still requires attention.
combined effects of aging facilities and years of under funding have produced an
enormous backlog of restoration and replacement projects.
The current recapitalization backlog was caused by a combination of
factors. Funding intended for
facilities sustainment has often been diverted.
When bases closed in the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii, SRM funds were
not redistributed for remaining facilities but were reduced as part of the
“peace dividend.” Rising
utility costs and higher costs to accomplish base-operating support by contract
further reduced funds available for SRM. As
a result of inadequate funding, bases, camps, posts and stations across the
Asia-Pacific region are shabby and deteriorating to a point we can no longer
ignore. Our people deserve much
better than this; they deserve to live and work in a quality environment.
current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) funding levels, the $5.3 billion
USPACOM recapitalization backlog will nearly double over the FYDP.
USPACOM requires an additional $8.4 billion over the FYDP to eliminate
the backlog and prevent future backlog growth through proper sustainment.
funding shortfalls not only affect quality of life, but also impact readiness,
operation plan (OPLAN) execution, retention, and force protection.
Unfunded backlog projects affect OPLAN execution in Korea, Guam and Wake
Island. Without additional funding,
recapitalization backlogs will continue to grow if we do not realign or close
any installations or facilities, and will further deteriorate, jeopardizing
critical functions throughout USPACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).
on the Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific Command Center at Camp Smith is underway and
going vertical. Completion is
scheduled for December 2003. We
appreciate the restoration of $3 million included in the FY02 MILCON
Appropriations Act to fund critical design elements, including antiterrorism
force protection (ATFP) and information security requirements.
Unfortunately, this funding was reduced by over $400,000 due to an
across-the-board reduction of all FY02 MILCON funding, creating an unexpected
shortfall just as critical ATFP and information technology security requirements
are being addressed.
needs a single shared intelligence complex on Oahu, Hawaii, that optimizes the
missions and operations of both Kunia
Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) and the Joint Intelligence
Center Pacific (JICPAC). The
current KRSOC is obsolete. The
facility was built in 1945, and the last major renovation occurred in 1979.
Current estimates for necessary renovations to ensure a 30-year continued
use exceed $185 million, with annual operating costs of approximately $8
million. Construction costs for a
new KRSOC facility, incorporating Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) Pearl
Harbor and NCPAC, are currently estimated at $220 million, with annual operating
costs of $6 million. Additional
savings in renovation costs to NSGA Pearl Harbor and NCPAC are estimated at $9
million. Thus, it would be less
costly in the long term to build the new facility.
The JICPAC theater intelligence production facility has force protection vulnerabilities due to its location on a main civilian thoroughfare. Co-locating with KRSOC would lead to savings of roughly $30 million over 4 years in JICPAC operating costs, and enhance fusion of all-source intelligence. The PSAC presents an unprecedented opportunity for immediate in-depth collaboration between the premier signals intelligence and production centers.
exercise activity, training complexities, and command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence (C4I) modernization have outgrown USPACOM's exercise
simulation infrastructure and support capabilities.
This deficiency significantly reduces the ability to train USCINCPAC and
Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders in crisis action readiness procedures;
degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the
region; and contributes to increased operating tempo (OPTEMPO), training time
and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to contingencies.
The current facility does not support future technologies or meet
force-protection requirements. The
planned state-of-the-art simulation center will link with simulation centers
throughout the Asia-Pacific region to train joint integrated forces, rehearse
mission requirements, provide commanders with quick-reaction combat analyses,
and exploit information from open sources.
It will transform USPACOM through the use of advanced simulations,
collaborative tools, and C4I systems in joint experiments.
Island remains critical for support of strategic deployment of forces for major
theater wars (MTWs). The funding in
the Air Force program is the first year of a multi-year program that must be
maintained to ensure availability of this critical asset to meet wartime
depends on continued funding of the programmed C-17 aircraft buy and the C-5
aircraft Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program and Avionics
Modernization Program. Equally
important are our efforts to exploit advanced sealift technology to reduce our
dependency on premium airlift. Over
the past year, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has been testing and
evaluating off-island deployments using a leased High Speed Vessel (HSV).
Initial analysis of the HSV suggests considerable cost savings while
significantly reducing in-transit deployment time for Marine forces.
Based on these encouraging initial returns, we are pursuing the HSV as a
theater-lift asset in USPACOM.
world operations in other theaters are impacting USPACOM’s exercise program.
We are beginning to face regular shortages of airlift and aerial tankage. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to train soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines that we are depending on to execute ongoing
operations. For example, to send
the 3rd Wing to Red Flag to prepare them for deployment to Operation Southern
Watch, we will need to contract civilian airlift at a cost of approximately $1.1
million. The original budget was
$250,000 using KC-10. Overall,
the PACAF exercise program has been cut $734,000 and the JCS exercise program
was cut $1.2 million. Successful
achievement of combat readiness training will hinge largely on sufficient
funding for exercises.
events of 11 September have introduced additional requirements on our already
heavily tasked national and tactical intelligence systems.
The demand for precise and timely intelligence has never been greater,
including in-depth understanding of long-term potential adversaries, regional
hotspots, and transnational threats – terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
National and tactical SIGINT
systems must be modernized to meet the advances in global telecommunications
technology. National Security
Agency (NSA) and Service SIGINT capabilities are key to our daily operations and
the execution of OPLANs and contingencies in the USPACOM AOR.
They must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT collection
capabilities against both modernized militaries and terrorists.
Funding is also needed to replace the Kunia Regional Security Operations
Center (KRSOC) and accompanying land-based collection architecture.
Our support to Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) has exacerbated our peacetime shortage of intelligence collection
aircraft. While additional aircraft
are in the pipeline, we still need more in the inventory to help us reach and
maintain our longstanding minimum theater requirements, and we need them soon.
We encourage development of a follow-on to current manned aircraft and
await availability of high altitude, long dwell, unmanned aerial vehicles.
We must also upgrade the collection equipment on the aircraft. This is especially true for SIGINT, where existing collection
equipment is ineffective against modern communication technology.
Similar land and maritime collection capabilities also need upgrades.
USPACOM fully supports integrated, joint development of the next
generation signals collection tools, along with further consolidation of funding
to hasten this event. Extra
aircraft and new collection tools are meaningless, though, if we lack trained
personnel to exploit the information. The
existing shortage of linguists has worsened due to the war on terrorism.
We now face regional languages and dialects never considered important
before 11 September.
Requirements for imagery continue
to grow. New platforms are
producing an increasing flow of data, but our ability to exploit this data has
not kept pace. We are doing well on
the Tasking portion of the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
(TPED) of imagery, but insufficient communications and lack of imagery analysts
hamper the remaining aspects of the process.
Additional funding is needed to realize the full potential of this
intelligence source. USPACOM still
requires a robust theater-level intelligence gathering capability against the
entire threat spectrum.
Information technology (IT)
continues to influence warfare at every turn.
C4 is the unsung workhorse of any operation, requiring 24 hours a day/7
days a week reliable, timely and uncorrupted service.
As evidenced by the world’s recent response to terrorist events, the
need for information sharing between service, joint, and coalition partners, as
well as local, state, and federal organizations, has increased exponentially.
This requirement places a strain on an already antiquated and stressed
communications network. Since C4
encompasses a wide spectrum, I will focus on three primary areas of continued
need: 1) an end-to-end communications infrastructure, 2) information assurance,
and 3) interoperability.
First, the end-to-end communications enterprise provides
the foundation to electronically link garrison and forward-deployed forces to
commanders at all levels. USPACOM’s
vast AOR, mostly separated by ocean and encompassing countries with
under-developed C4 infrastructures, requires forces to rely heavily on satellite
communications (SATCOM). We
continue to make great strides in many of the SATCOM programs and I thank you
for your continued support. However,
aging equipment and specifically, limited
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM capacity over this AOR, is fast becoming a
factor in my ability to command and control forces.
With the recent terrorist attacks and our ongoing efforts to root
out terrorism as a whole, SATCOM connectivity to our highly specialized forces
is more critical than ever before.
The new challenge is to ensure that critical SATCOM upgrades, the
fielding of new satellite programs, and the launching of new satellites remain
on track to replace the aging fleets currently orbiting the earth in support of
As an inseparable partner with the
space segment, we must inject similar technology advances into the base, post,
camp, and station infrastructures. In
the Pacific Theater, we still operate on cables and wiring installed as far back
as the 1960s. These cables are no
longer dependable. Coupling this
condition with the ever-increasing user requirements for more and more
information, we must quickly modernize to support the growing bandwidth and
increased speed requirements of our intelligence gatherers, planners and
warfighters. Information is truly a
Our second focus area is information assurance (IA).
How we protect our sensitive information from potential adversaries while
providing access to, and sharing it with, our coalition partners is probably the
toughest challenge we face in today’s C4 environment.
we have made significant strides to improve IA in USPACOM, we are far from 100
percent protected. Cyber
warfare never rests. Our
USPACOM networks continue to receive daily cyber probes and potentially
dangerous virus and hacker attacks.
They can occur at any time and any place in the theater and the
consequences can be severe, if we are not on guard around the clock. The payback for IA is not always as easily recognizable as
with the production of new airplanes, ships, or tanks. You cannot touch and feel information protection, but a loss
of critical or time-sensitive information, or a denial of service, can be far
more detrimental to national security than any single weapon system.
An example of the heavy IA investment needed for
additional hardware is the protection afforded by current cryptographic
equipment to secure networks for command and control of daily operations.
Replacement parts for this aging equipment are difficult to obtain - a
limiting factor as technology increases the speed, connectivity, and capacity of
our networks. Cryptographic
modernization programs are essential to improve the effectiveness of the U.S.
Government cryptographic inventory. For
example, airline flight schedules and blueprints of our embassies are simply
tidbits of information. But, that
information in the wrong hands may improve the enemies’ chances of producing
devastating results as evidenced by recent terrorist incidents.
IA improvements will require a continued heavy investment in equipment, training
and technically skilled people. I
ask for your support as we strive to implement a “defense in depth” posture
into our daily information operations.
The third C4 area is
interoperability. The events of 11
September have caused us to concentrate hard on interoperability, especially
with civilian and coalition partners in support of global counter-terrorism
efforts. We must reassess our
processes in these areas.
firmly believe we must revamp our acquisition system, especially in the area of
IT. Long-term replacement programs
are detached at an early stage from the dynamic reality of operations and
warfare. They emerge decades later
with new systems that are better than what they replace, but not as good as what
they could or should be in meeting the needs of the warfighter.
system does not put engineers together with the operators to fix real
operational problems, deal with real war plan deficiencies and emerging threats,
or take advantage of real opportunities. The
current system, which drives the actions of the detached bureaucracy of
requirements writers, contracting officers and program managers, is only
tenuously connected to what our forces need to operate and fight better.
must integrate the engineers with the operators in a spiral development approach
in which we build a little, test a little, and then build a little more.
Let them see firsthand the interoperability problems that exist between civilian, joint
and coalition organizations. For
example, our Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders use service variants of our
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), because the joint version is not as
capable as the service variant and is not fully fielded across the theater.
As another example, the land mobile radio systems that our police and
fire departments use are not interoperable with our military systems.
These incompatibilities prevent key personnel from sharing critical
information in a timely fashion, and could easily lead to catastrophic results.
We can address many of these
interoperability issues by using this spiral development approach, and putting
engineers in the field during joint exercises, training maneuvers and technology
demonstrations. Initially, this
approach comes with an increased cost until we can identify capabilities in
programs that we do not need. But
the timely and increased operational capabilities provided to the warfighter as
result of it more than justify the initial expense.
our leading edge in C4 technology, assuring our critical information and
improving interoperability with our coalition partners are essential to
protecting American security interests in the 21st century.
Our command is working hard to mitigate these limitations; however, we
need increased C4 funding to maintain the operational edge over our adversaries.
and reconstitution of Air Force Harvest Eagle bare base assets are key to both
current operations plans (OPLANs) and USPACOM operations in support of the
global war on terrorism. Harvest
Eagle’s tent-based housing modules allow forward-deployed or reinforcing units
to establish airfield operations where local infrastructure is austere or
lacking. Degraded before their use
in current operations, our deployable bare-base assets capacity will continue to
be a limiting factor to executing OPLANs and contingencies without fully funding
refurbishment and reconstitution.
in pre-positioned equipment and supplies to support combat operations in the
Korean Theater of Operations are also of major concern.
The Army maintains a strategic inventory of sustainment supplies as part
of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). These stocks
sustain forward-deployed and initial follow-on ground forces, and include major
end items such as engines, repair parts, medical supplies, packaged petroleum
products, barrier/construction materials, operations rations, and clothing
required to sustain combat operations.
we have significant shortfalls in Army APS-4 Sustainment Stocks designated to
replace projected combat losses, especially critical during the early stages of
a major theater war (MTW) on the Korean Peninsula. Within these sustainment stocks, Class VII (Major End Items)
and Class IX (Repair Parts) have the most serious shortfalls.
Finally, less than 30 percent of Joint Service Lightweight Integrated
Suit Technology chemical protection suits (to support operations in a nuclear,
chemical, biological environment) are available in sustainment stocks.
The combination of these shortfalls degrades our ability to conduct sustained combat operations on the Korean Peninsula.
enemies and potential enemies are working hard to develop ways to defeat the
U.S. Armed Forces. We cannot allow
our current military dominance to lead to complacency and future defeat.
Force transformation is a priority at USPACOM.
We have made rapid progress over the past year in developing Joint
Mission Force capabilities, in our Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and in aligning force
transformation with our Joint Training and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
plans. Experimenting as we exercise
and operate is becoming routine. Individual
commanders are also making advances through their own initiatives, with service
and USPACOM support. Examples
include the High Speed Vessel (HSV) that Marine forces on Okinawa have leased to
make movement within the theater faster at less expense and the development of
numerous networking and decision support capabilities.
We continue to work closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the
executive agent for joint force experimentation, and are increasing the
involvement of allies and coalition partners to enhance interoperability and
combined force capabilities as we transform U.S. forces.
objectives of USPACOM’s JMF concept are to enhance the speed of action,
precision, and mission effectiveness of Theater Joint Task Forces (JTFs).
Our vision is to create a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific Theater
response force capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions, from a
complex contingency through humanitarian assistance (HA), and serving as the
leading edge during a major war. This
transformation effort has moved from its concept development in war games to
implementation in exercises that enhance our ability to rapidly form and deploy
Through the JMF concept, Battle Staff Rosters supported by service components now provide tailored on-call augmentation for key billets at USPACOM’s designated JTF headquarters. These staffs are trained to provide the performance of a Standing JTF Headquarters, without incurring the overhead of a separate organization. Command relationships for designated JTF and component commands are already established and rehearsed to enable rapid activation and deployment.
control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) baseline requirements
have also been established and are routinely tested in our command and control
exercise program to ensure our ability to establish a common operating picture
and theater network for collaborative planning. Our JTFs now use newly published CD-ROM based and
Web-accessible standard operating procedures (SOPs) internally linked with
checklists and templates. Information
management serves as the foundation for the SOP, and is supported by a
standardized JTF Web site that facilitates Web-centric information pull.
Our primary JTFs now train to assigned missions with packaged,
mission-oriented training standards, including new tasks designed to
examine draft doctrine linked to technology, for integrated and synchronized
fires and maneuver.
current focus for transforming JTF capabilities are in the areas of joint fire
and maneuver, battle space situational awareness and the common operational and
tactical pictures, coalition force integration, force protection, and rapid JTF
Based on 3 years of development, the JMF concept is our prototype standing JTF Headquarters. JMF provides greater flexibility for multiple crises, capitalizes on component core competencies, requires no additional manpower, and allows for normal service rotations and deployments.
Exercise KERNEL BLITZ (EXPERIMENTAL) in June 2001, we demonstrated Wide Area
Relay Network (WARNET) technologies in the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB)
ACTD. Our follow-on JTF WARNET
initiative will provide our JTFs with organic, wireless, and secure connectivity
for planning and execution at the tactical level.
The JTF WARNET communications network, associated applications, and
interfaces support joint forces across a widely distributed battlespace to
provide real-time and near real-time command and control (C2), collaboration,
common tactical picture and joint fires across service boundaries.
Under the technical leadership of the Office of Naval Research with substantial funding support from OSD, JTF WARNET development
continues for prototype deployment with operational forces in 2004.
JMF concept is an essential part of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).
To improve regional readiness for coalition operations, we are developing
a Multinational Force (MNF) SOP tailored from the JTF SOP we built last year.
This more generic document will include broad operational considerations
that our multinational partners can readily implement when one acts as the lead
nation with the United States serving in a support role. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) serves as
the instrument for MNF SOP development. The
MPAT conducts collaborative development of the document over the Asia-Pacific
Area Network (APAN) and at workshops in the region. Joint Experimentation with coalition partners is
coordinated in bilateral venues such as the Annual Staff Talks with
Singapore and Australia. This
spring, USPACOM will fully involve coalition partners by hosting a Coalition
Transformation Workshop as part of our annual ACTD conference.
JTFJEP focuses on transforming JTF operations and is fully coordinated with the
JEP of USJFCOM. Our JTFJEP includes
technology insertion experiments during exercises to advance our practice of JTF
operations, both in the U.S. and coalition venues.
year we have planned two major experiments.
The first experiment will occur as part of our command and control
exercise (C2X) series where we train for rapid formation of a JTF.
Our C2Xs over the past year made significant advances in sharing common
procedures and a common operational picture (COP) among JTF subordinate
commanders, and in collaborative planning.
We will experiment next with advanced capabilities to manage and control
information flow on the JTF networks, and incorporate advanced fires management
capabilities. Our second experiment will be in a coalition environment
during Exercise COBRA GOLD with Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia.
By experimenting as we exercise, we provide a continuous series of
field-tested warfighting improvements in joint and combined operations before we
make key procurement decisions.
am a strong supporter of USPACOM’s Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
(ACTDs). They provide important
near-term joint and combined warfighting capabilities.
Since I last spoke with you, USPACOM has been awarded six new ACTDs,
bringing the number of ACTDs involving USPACOM to 18, more than any other major
command. Almost all our service
Component Commanders, designated JTF Commanders, Subordinate Unified Commanders,
and each of my Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more
ACTDs. USPACOM forces are involved in transformation across the
six new ACTDs will provide new operational and tactical capabilities.
The Micro Air Vehicle ACTD will provide small units
enhanced situational awareness using miniaturized sensors on a man-portable
unmanned air vehicle.
The Language and Speech Exploitation Resources ACTD
will reduce language barriers and improve coalition operations by providing a
tool to automatically translate languages.
The Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal - Knowledge
Technology Operations Demonstration ACTD will provide Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) teams in the field with a portable, rapidly updateable,
computerized database for safely disarming explosive devices in the field.
The SPARTAN ACTD will provide enhanced battlespace
awareness and increased force protection for surface and subsurface operations,
by demonstrating the capabilities of unmanned surface vessels with modular
sensor packages. SPARTAN is also
the leading candidate for an improved TSC initiative involving co-development of
advanced capabilities with coalition partners.
The Singapore Armed Forces are interested in co-developing this system
The Thermobaric Weapon ACTD provides a standoff
weapon for attacking tunnels and underground facilities.
This program potentially provides two to three times the lethality over
currently fielded penetrating weapons.
The Signals Intelligence Processing ACTD provides
improved capabilities to collect and process signals.
parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along coalition
partners. Last year, I testified
that, thanks to your strong support, we were starting work on our Coalition
Theater Logistics ACTD.
is an important initiative, co-sponsored by Australia, to demonstrate how
coalition logistics information can be exchanged at the national, operational
and tactical levels. Over the last
year, we’ve finalized operational requirements; signed a project arrangement
with Australia that leverages technology from both countries, and embarked on a
technical development program that puts us on the brink of providing a coalition
force with a breakthrough capability - plan and execute coalition force
deployment through selective information exchange between existing national
logistics information systems. Continued
support will ensure that we achieve all our objectives.
have also partnered with Thailand and are beginning discussions with Singapore,
Korea, and Japan to partner with them during future phases of ACTD development.
In parallel with transforming our forces, we must also bring along
is the designated-host Commander in Chief for the FY02 and FY03 execution of the
Joint Staff J6I-sponsored JWID. Despite
numerous other interoperability and transformation initiatives in progress, JWID
has exceptional potential to address the real and near-term command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) interoperability challenges facing joint and coalition operations.
Working with the U.S. Marine Corps, this year’s lead service, USPACOM
has broadened the scope of challenges being investigated, focused the
operational environment underpinning JWID to simulate demands of current
military operations, expanded the list of countries participating to include
Pacific Rim countries for the first time, and introduced warfighter rigor in
executing the demonstration period and assessment
of proposed technology solutions.
industry and government activities have responded to the call for
interoperability solutions that span the C2 spectrum from strategic to tactical
and that embrace new approaches to challenges in the situational awareness,
common operating picture, decision support, collaboration, logistics,
multi-lingual, joint and coalition fires, multi-level security, and medical
arenas. For the first time, there
will be incipient focus on support for humanitarian assistance and
disaster-relief enablers. Due to
success in our JMF program, USPACOM has introduced a Combined Task Force
Web-portal interface for organizing, visualizing, and transferring the products
produced by various JWID demonstrations and interoperability trials.
have also made a concerted effort to enhance the understanding and participation by other Commanders in Chief to
ensure that the results from JWID will deliver solutions to the C4ISR challenges
that each of them confront in routine and contingency operations.
unresolved challenge of furthering coalition readiness in the Pacific is the
problem of multi-level security. Our
intelligence-sharing relationships with our theater partners vary from country
to country. Therefore, completely
separate structures for passing classified information are required to
interoperate with each individual country.
To meet this requirement, developing and accrediting multi-level security
technology, such as the MDDS, remain a high-interest item in USPACOM.
Such technology and capability is imperative toward fully realizing our
engagement strategy for any Pacific coalition force.
In summary, the forward deployed and forward-stationed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command are making a difference in promoting American interests in security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region. We are relentlessly pursuing terrorists that threaten American citizens and interests. With a sustained effort and support of regional partners, we will succeed in rooting them out. U.S. Pacific Command’s priorities remain readiness, regional (theater) security cooperation, and transforming U.S. forces to achieve a revolution in military affairs. The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command appreciate this opportunity to tell their story and the support that you give them.
[c1]OSD/ISA/AP (LTC Kim, 703-695-1190) change/deletion. Rationale: ““All three countries consider support for OEF to be a sensitive issue that should not be discussed openly.”
[c2]OSD/ISA/AP (LTC Kim, 703-695-1190) deletion. Rationale: “Mentioning Thailand’s FMF in this sentence as a response to FY02 FMF request gives false impression that State Dept. approved the request. FMF was restored after CINCPAC made a direct appeal to the SAC. This statement may not be well received by State Dept. In addition, it is ISA/AP’s understanding that the actual amount was $2.3M, not $1.3M.”