Congressional Documents
105th Congress Rept. 105-135
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
_______
June 18, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 1775]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
The bill as reported............................................. 2
Purpose.......................................................... 11
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee
intent......................................................... 12
Scope of committee review........................................ 12
Committee findings and recommendations........................... 13
Areas of Special Interest........................................ 15
Shortfalls in All-Source Analysis............................ 15
``Downstream'' Intelligence Activities....................... 17
Clandestine Humint Funding................................... 18
Present funding of Clandestine Humint.................... 18
Budgeting for the Future................................. 19
Technical Investments........................................ 19
A Corporate and Flexible Community........................... 20
Quadrennial Defense Review of Intelligence................... 21
Intelligence System Interoperability......................... 22
FBIS Reorganization.......................................... 23
DCI Nonproliferation Center.................................. 24
Declassification............................................. 26
Review of National Drug Intelligence Architecture............ 27
Joint Military Intelligence Program.............................. 28
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities..................... 45
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 53
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 53
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 53
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 53
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 53
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 54
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 54
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 54
Title III--General Provisions................................ 54
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 54
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 54
Section 303--Administration of the Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence................................ 55
Section 304--Detail of Intelligence Community Personnel--
Intelligence Community Assignment Program.............. 55
Section 305--Application of Sanctions Laws to
Intelligence Activities................................ 56
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 58
Section 401--Multiyear Leasing Authority................. 58
Section 402--CIA Central Services Program................ 59
Section 403--Protection of CIA Facilities................ 59
Title V--Department of Defense............................... 61
Section 501--Authority to Award Academic Degree of
Bachelor of Science in Intelligence.................... 61
Section 502--Unauthorized Use of Name, Initials, or Seal
of National Reconnaissance Office...................... 62
Section 503--Extension of Authority for Enhancement of
Capabilities of Certain Army Facilities................ 62
Title VI--Miscellaneous Community Program Adjustments........ 63
Section 601--Coordination of Armed Forces Information
Security Programs...................................... 63
Section 602--Authority of Executive Agent of Integrated
Broadcast Service...................................... 63
Section 603--Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle............ 63
Section 604--U-2 Sensor Program.......................... 63
Section 605--Requirements Relating to Congressional
Budget Justification Books............................. 64
Section 606--Joint SIGINT Program Office................. 64
Section 607--Discontinuation of the Defense Space
Reconnaissance Program................................. 65
Section 608--Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office...... 65
Committee position............................................... 65
Findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight........................................... 65
Oversight findings............................................... 65
Fiscal year cost projections..................................... 66
Congressional Budget Office estimates............................ 66
Committee cost estimates......................................... 67
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of
this legislation............................................... 67
Changes to existing law.......................................... 68
Minority views................................................... 79
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998''.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 1998 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $147,588,000.
Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and
Applications Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are
authorized a total of 313 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1998.
Such personnel may be permanent employees of the Community Management
Account elements or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts authorized to
be appropriated by subsection (a) and the personnel authorized by
subsection (b)--
(1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year
1998 such amounts, and
(2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30,
1998,
for the Community Management Account, as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (as added by section 304 of this Act), during
fiscal year 1998 any officer or employee of the United States or member
of the Armed Forces who is detailed to an element of the Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis; except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available
for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount,
funds provided for research, development, test, and engineering
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 1999, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2000.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States
funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the Center may not be
used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1998 the sum of
$196,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for
administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
SEC. 304. DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL--INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community
assignment program
``Sec. 113. (a) Detail.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the head of a department with an element in the intelligence
community or the head of an intelligence community agency or element
may detail any employee within that department, agency, or element to
serve in any position in the Intelligence Community Assignment Program
on a reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
``(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as are agreed
to between the heads of the parent and host agencies, up to a maximum
of three years, except that such details may be extended for a period
not to exceed 1 year when the heads of the parent and host agencies
determine that such extension is in the public interest.
``(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An employee detailed
under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance, travel,
or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the organization
from which they are being detailed.
``(c) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
a report describing the detail of intelligence community personnel
pursuant to subsection (a) for the previous 12-month period, including
the number of employees detailed, the identity of parent and host
agencies or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the program.
``(2) The Director shall submit the first of such reports not later
than March 1, 1999.
``(d) Termination.--The authority to make details under this section
terminates on September 30, 2002.''.
(b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the National
Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as sections 110, 111, and
112, respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in the first
section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to
sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
``Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United
Nations.
``Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence
community assignment program.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) of this
section shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1,
1997.
SEC. 305. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is
amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``1999''.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as paragraphs
(1) through (6), respectively;
(2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.'';
(3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so
redesignated;
(4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as so
redesignated, and inserting ``; and'';
(5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph:
``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United States
Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years that are not
otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this Act.''; and
(6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under
subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided in
advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months of the
lease and the Government's estimated termination liability.
``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause (B) of
paragraph (1)--
``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that
the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as
defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not
provided specifically for that project in an appropriations Act
in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United States
Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs in respect
of such lease shall remain available until the costs associated
with termination of such lease are paid;
``(C) funds available for termination liability shall remain
available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of such
lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease is not
terminated early, but only to the extent those funds are in
excess of the amount of termination liability in that
subsequent year; and
``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be
used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 months
beginning any time during the fiscal year.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies
with respect to multiyear leases entered into pursuant to section 5 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection
(a), on or after October 1, 1997.
SEC. 402. CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``central services program
``Sec. 21. (a) Establishment.--The Director may--
``(1) establish a program to provide the central services
described in subsection (b)(2); and
``(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(b) Establishment and Purposes of Central Services Working Capital
Fund.--(1) There is established a central services working capital
fund. The Fund shall be available until expended for the purposes
described in paragraph (2), subject to subsection (j).
``(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment, salaries,
maintenance, operation and other expenses for such services as the
Director, subject to paragraph (3), determines to be central services
that are appropriate and advantageous to provide to the Agency or to
other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis.
``(3) The determination and provision of central services by the
Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2) shall be subject
to the prior approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
``(c) Assets in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of money and assets, as
follows:
``(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial
monetary capitalization.
``(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law for
the purpose of supplementing the Fund.
``(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets,
including inventories and equipment on order, pertaining to the
services to be carried on by the central services program.
``(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to
transfer to the Fund.
``(d) Limitations.--(1) The total value of orders for services
described in subsection (b)(2) from the central services program at any
time shall not exceed an annual amount approved in advance by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
``(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-Federal entity
by the central services program.
``(e) Reimbursements to Fund.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Fund shall be--
``(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments, from
applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency, other
Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal agencies, for
the central services performed by the central services program,
at rates that will recover the full cost of operations paid for
from the Fund, including accrual of annual leave, workers'
compensation, depreciation of capitalized plant and equipment,
and amortization of automated data processing software; and
``(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from sale or
exchange of property, including any real property, or in
payment for loss or damage to property, held by the central
services program as assets of the Fund.
``(f) Retention of Portion of Fund Income.--(1) The Director may
impose a fee for central services provided from the Fund. The fee for
any item or service provided under the central services program may not
exceed four percent of the cost of such item or service.
``(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation of the
Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net receipts of the
Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year thereafter may be
retained, subject to subsection (j), for the acquisition of capital
equipment and for the improvement and implementation of the Agency's
information management systems (including financial management,
payroll, and personnel information systems). Any proposed use of the
retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall only be
made with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget and after notification to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year,
amounts in excess of the amount retained under paragraph (2) shall be
transferred to the United States Treasury.
``(g) Audit.--(1) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of the Fund within three
months after the close ofeach fiscal year. The Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall determine the form and content of the
audit, which shall include at least an itemized accounting of the
central services provided, the cost of each service, the total receipts
received, the agencies or departments serviced, and the amount returned
to the United States Treasury.
``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit, the
Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `central services program' means the program
established under subsection (a); and
``(2) the term `Fund' means the central services working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Fund $5,000,000 for the purposes specified in
subsection (b)(2).
``(j) Termination.--(1) The Fund shall terminate on March 31, 2000,
unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress prior to that date.
``(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget--
``(A) may terminate the central services program and the Fund
at any time; and
``(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for
dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants,
contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of
appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds
held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available
in connection with such Fund, as may be necessary.''.
SEC. 403. PROTECTION OF CIA FACILITIES.
Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(2) by striking ``powers only within Agency installations,''
and all that follows through the end, and inserting the
following: ``powers--
``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound
and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the
zone beginning at the outside boundary of such Compound and
property and extending outward 500 feet; and
``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the
streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning at
the outside boundary of any such installation and extending
outward 500 feet.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under
paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such
personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such
personnel reason to believe that their performance of such functions
and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical
attack or threats of attack upon the Agency installations, property, or
employees.
``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or
limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency or of any other Federal police or Federal protective
service.
``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director and shall only be
applicable to the areas referred to in paragraph (1).
``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director
shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate that describes in detail the exercise of the
authority granted by this subsection, and the underlying facts
supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal
year. The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector
General of the Agency.''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO AWARD ACADEMIC DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees
``Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the
president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may, upon
recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer upon a graduate of
the college who has fulfilled the requirements for the degree the
following:
``(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI).
``(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
(BSI).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to that section in the
table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of such title is
amended to read as follows:
``2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.''.
SEC. 502. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL OF NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of Authorities.--
Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies
``(a) Prohibition.--Except with the written permission of the
Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in connection with
any merchandise, retail product, impersonation, solicitation, or
commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the
impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the
Secretary of Defense, any of the following (or any colorable imitation
thereof):
``(1) The words `Defense Intelligence Agency', the initials
`DIA', or the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(2) The words `National Reconnaissance Office', the
initials `NRO', or the seal of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
``(3) The words `National Imagery and Mapping Agency', the
initials `NIMA', or the seal of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
``(4) The words `Defense Mapping Agency', the initials `DMA',
or the seal of the Defense Mapping Agency.''.
(b) Transfer of Enforcement Authority.--Subsection (b) of section 202
of title 10, United States Code, is transferred to the end of section
425 of such title, as added by subsection (a), and is amended by
inserting ``Authority To Enjoin Violations.--'' after ``(b)''.
(c) Repeal of Reorganized Provisions.--Sections 202 and 445 of title
10, United States Code, are repealed.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II
of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 202.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of
chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:
``424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information:
exemption for Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance
Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies.''.
(3) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of
chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 445.
SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF
CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.
Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat.
974) is amended by striking out``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''.
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS
SEC. 601. COORDINATION OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS.
(a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a military
department or the head of a defense agency may not obligate or expend
funds for any information security program of that military department
without the concurrence of the Director of the National Security
Agency.
(b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 602. AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICE.
All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for intelligence
information data broadcast systems may be obligated or expended by an
intelligence element of the Department of Defense only with the
concurrence of the official in the Department of Defense designated as
the executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service.
SEC. 603. PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.
(a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the functions
described in subsection (b) with respect to the Predator Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force.
(b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to those
functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the organization within the
Department of Defense known as the Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office
with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
(c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all unexpended
funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that are
within the Defense-Wide Program Element number 0305205D are transferred
to Air Force Program Element number 0305154F.
SEC. 604. U-2 SENSOR PROGRAM.
(a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The Secretary of
Defense shall ensure--
(1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are
equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and
(2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is maintained
in a manner necessary to counter available threat technologies
until the aircraft is retired or until a successor sensor suite
is developed and fielded.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 605. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
BOOKS.
(a) In General.--The congressional budget justification books for any
element of the intelligence community submitted to Congress in support
of the budget of the President for any fiscal year shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(1) For each program for which appropriations are requested
for that element of the intelligence community in that budget--
(A) specification of the program, including the
program element number for the program;
(B) the specific dollar amount requested for the
program;
(C) the appropriation account within which funding
for the program is placed;
(D) the budget line item that applies to the program;
(E) specification of whether the program is a
research and development program or otherwise involves
research and development;
(F) identification of the total cost for the program;
and
(G) information relating to all direct and associated
costs in each appropriations account for the program.
(2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or
reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the
time of submission of those materials.
(3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes.
(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given
that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a).
(2) The term ``congressional budget justification books''
means the budget justification materials submitted to Congress
for any fiscal year in support ofthe budget for that fiscal
year for any element of the intelligence community (as contained in the
budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).
(c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to
fiscal year 1999.
SEC. 606. COORDINATION OF AIR FORCE JOINT SIGINT PROGRAM OFFICE
ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
(a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the
Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not
modify, amend, or alter a JSAF program contract without coordinating
with the Secretary of any other military department that would be
affected by the modification, amendment, alteration.
(b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military Requirements.--
(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint
Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not enter into a
contract described in paragraph (2) without coordinating with the
Secretary of the military department concerned.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development relating to a
JSAF program that may directly affect the operational requirements of
one of the Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction
of intelligence requirements.
(c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term
``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint Signals Intelligence
Avionics Family of programs administered by the Air Force Joint
Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office.
(d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 607. DISCONTINUATION OF THE DEFENSE SPACE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM.
Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a
program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and
(2) close the organization within the Department of Defense
known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management
office for that program).
SEC. 608. TERMINATION OF DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the Department of
Defense known as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is
terminated. No funds available for the Department of Defense may be
used for the operation of that Office after the date specified in
subsection (d).
(b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4),
the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Defense Intelligence
Agency those functions performed on the day before the date of the
enactment this Act by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office that
are specified in paragraph (2).
(2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the Defense
Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include functions of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office relating to its responsibilities
for management oversight and coordination of defense airborne
reconnaissance capabilities (other than any responsibilities for
acquisition of systems).
(3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions are
appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making that
determination, the Secretary shall ensure that responsibility for
individual airborne reconnaissance programs with respect to program
management, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for
acquisition, and for operations and related line management remain with
the respective Secretaries of the military departments.
(4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency under
this subsection is subject to the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
committees named in paragraph (2) a report containing the Secretary's
plan for terminating the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and
transferring the functions of that office.
(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.
(d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of
the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for (a)
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c)
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1998
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central Intelligence
to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 1998 for any
Intelligence element up to two percent above the authorized
levels, with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug
Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Authorize the Intelligence Community Assignment
Program, which is intended to develop a ``corporate''
perspective among senior Intelligence Community employees
participating in the program;
(5) Extend the authority of the President to defer the
imposition of sanctions through January 6, 1999, when to
proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an
intelligence source or method, or an ongoing criminal
investigation;
(6) Provide the Central Intelligence Agency with multiyear
leasing authority;
(7) Authorize the establishment of a ``Central Services
Program'' within the Central Intelligence Agency that will help
reduce costs and streamline operations within the Intelligence
Community, and authorize the obligation of $5 million from
among the funds authorized to be appropriated to the CIA, which
will be utilized to cover management and overhead costs of the
Central Services Program, with reporting requirements to both
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
oversight committees of Congress;
(8) Provide the CIA with additional authority to protect
its facilities and employees from criminal and terrorist
threats;
(9) Authorize the Joint Military Intelligence College to
award Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and Masters of
Science of Strategic Intelligence degrees, pursuant to
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense;
(10) Prohibit the unauthorized use of the name, initials,
or seal of the National Reconnaissance Office;
(11) Extend the Army's flexible transfer and reprogramming
authority to rectify infrastructure and quality of life
problems at Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations;
(12) Require the coordination of all defense and military
information security systems programs by the National Security
Agency;
(13) Allow the obligation of funds for intelligence and
intelligence-related data broadcast systems only with the
concurrence of the Integrated Broadcast Service Executive
Agent:
(14) Transfer those functions relating to the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle to the Air Force;
(15) Require the maintenance of a specific number of U-2
Reconnaissance Aircraft with sensor suites;
(16) Require that the Congressional Budget Justification
Books for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the
Congressional Justification Books for the Joint Military
Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities of the Department of Defense supply more detail to
Congress than is currently provided;
(17) Discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program;
and
(18) Abolish the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and
transfer its current functions to the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the Committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. It is the intent of
the Committee that all intelligence programs discussed in the
classified annex to this report be conducted in accord with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associate language
therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated directly into
this legislation. The classified annex is available for review
by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XLIII of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (``NFIP''), the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities of the Department of Defense (``TIARA''),
and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (``JMIP'').
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the Drug
Enforcement Administration; (10) the National Reconnaissance
Office; and (11) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance ant target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The programs
comprising TIARA also fall within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on National Security in the House of Representatives.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g. Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence),
or function (e.g. satellite support, aerial reconnaissance).
The following aggregations are included in the JMIP: (1) the
Defense Cryptologic Program (``DCP''); (2) the Defense Imagery
and Mapping Program (``DIMAP''); (3) the Defense General
Intelligence Applications Program (``DGIAP''), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(``DARP''), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program
(``DITP''), (c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies
Program (``DISTP''), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug
Program (``DICP''), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance
Program (``DSRP'').
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 1998 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review
continued to reflect the Committee's belief that intelligence
activities must be examined by function as well as by program,
thus, was structured across program lines and intelligence
disciplines and themes. The Committee held seven full Committee
budget-related hearings and two Subcommittee budget hearings on
the following issues: Intelligence Requirements; Airborne
Reconnaissance; Technical Intelligence; Overhead Collection;
Human Intelligence; Covert Action; Analysis and Production;
Counterintelligence; and Personnel and Legislative Issues. The
Committee also held full Committee briefings on subjects such
as the Future Imagery Architecture, Unconventional SIGNINT
Capabilities, and some selected sensitive DoD collection
platforms. There were, in addition, over 100 staff briefings on
programs, specific activities and budget requests.
The Committee continued to place heavy emphasis on
understanding and addressing the future needs of the
Intelligence Community, and the several distinct roles that it
plays in national security. At the national level, the goal of
intelligence is to make the national-level policy maker and
decision maker aware of impending events so that appropriate
actions are taken, especially those than might avoid or contain
conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, intelligence is now
incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military
operational activities, whether forces are being utilized to
conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale
conflict. To serve national security objectives, the
Intelligence Community must act throughout the spectrum. Too
often, however, the Intelligence Community has not maintained a
balance between the diverse strategic and tactical demands it
now faces and will face in the future. Specifically, in recent
years, the Community has emphasized fleeting current
intelligence issues, often at the expense of keeping a watchful
eye on those areas that are likely to be tomorrow crises. The
Committee believes that a balance must be reached and
maintained.
The value and necessity of intelligent are such now that
intelligence plays much more than a support role. Whether a
decision maker is planning policy or responding to a fast-
breaking situation, intelligence is now regularly a part of the
debate, often a prerequisite. Whether that response involves
law enforcement, diplomacy or military forces, or even if the
issue involves our nation's commercial or trade interests,
intelligence data are the bedrock on which such a response is
built. Moreover, in an era that is leading to the
``digitization'' of the armed forces, intelligence will be as
much a part of operations as firing a weapon.
Techology enhances intelligence capabilities as well as
provides new intelligence challenges. As suggested previously,
information technology has created new areas of opportunity in
intelligence operations. It also greatly facilitates
intelligence exploitation, analysis and dissemination. But, the
fact that access to and understanding of various technologies
are expanding on a world-wide basis, is creating an era in
which the United States may not enjoy the exclusive
technological edge that it once had. It also is clear that in-
depth knowledge and usage of technology no longer applies
exclusively to governments, but is present in organizations and
individuals as well, some who would do harm to the U.S. or its
interests. Consequently, although intelligence opportunities
are enhanced, so too are the threats to our own technology-
based infrastructures. Our ability to protect U.S. systems,
detect attempts to affect those systems and respond to such
threats, also rely on an active, strong intelligence
capability.
Likewise, our national security is affected by a broader
set of issues, that, heretofore, have not been so readily
identified with our global interests. These issues range from
economics to environmental concerns, and to the mass migration
of people. Developments in these areas greatly expand the
universe of problems with which the Community must grapple--
problems than demand a world-wide view and a highly flexible
set of resource.
The types of threats that face our nation demand that the
Intelligence Community be ever vigilant on both the strategic
and tactical levels. Countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the
activities ofinternational organized crime, by definition, call
for the types of intelligence collection, analysis and reporting that
emphasize the need to produce the hardest information--intentions, for
example--and that substantiates the need for a dynamic intelligence
capability. In short, in the world we face today and tomorrow, the
United States must have its ``eyes and ears'' more than ever before to
protect its freedom--politically, economically and militarily.
With these points in mind, the Committee review was guided
by two key questions. First, what programs are properly
structured and sufficiently prepared for future needs and
requirements, such that we can feel confident about our
preparedness? And, second, what are our unmet needs?
Unfortunately, the Committee review suggested a paucity of
areas where the Intelligence Community is well situated for the
future and an overabundance of unmet needs. Clearly, there are
specific areas within specific programs where the Intelligence
Community is functioning well and is ready for the future. But,
by and large, the Committee finds several large areas of
concern. Principal among these are:
The Community's very limited analytical capabilities
to meet the myriad challenges ahead, especially to be
more strategic and predictive in viewpoint;
the uncertain commitment and capability to collect
``human intelligence'' on a world-wide basis, through
espionage;
the growing capabilities of other nations and groups
to deny information, especially from our overhead
sensors, by employing ``denial and deception''
techniques, and the Community's slow realization and
limited ability to recognize and overcome these
efforts; and
the ever-growing demand for detailed, actionable
intelligence to law enforcement to support
prosecutions, while still protecting intelligence
sources and methods.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the Director of Central
Intelligence to work rapidly toward alleviating these concerns
during this period when the nation is less at risk, in the
physical sense, than during the Cold War. This Committee is
prepared to assist in this effort. To that end, the Committee
examined the Community's most immediate unmet needs, and has
begun a process to address them. The basis for many of the
Committee's decisions was formulated not only from examining
these needs, but also from a set of themes that are important
to establishing the type of Community that is vital to our
future national security. These themes are basically included
within the first five Areas of Special Interest of this report,
and will be used to help focus the Committee's activities in
the future.
Areas of Special Interest
shortfalls in all-source analysis
The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community
(IC) lacks the analytic depth, breadth and expertise to monitor
political, military, and economic developments worldwide while
maintaining in-depth expertise on critical countries and
issues. Problems associated with analytic shortfalls include: a
largely inexperienced workforce; lack of foreign language
skills and limited in-country familiarity among all-source
analysts; and a predominant focus on current intelligence that
is eroding the IC's ability to conduct comprehensive strategic
analysis.
The Committee believes that the IC must make a concerted
effort to enhance both substantive and linguistic expertise
among its analytic corps. Moreover, the IC must maintain a
basic level of knowledge about trends and developments
worldwide, while maintaining the capability to warn of
impending crises and ``surge'' resources during such crises. In
addition, the IC must find ways to augment its analytic
capability during crises without diminishing the ability to
monitor other areas of the world.
The Committee is very concerned with the fact that over the
past several years, the IC has shifted analytic production to
focus on short-term, event-driven analysis. While such a shift
provides strong analytic coverage of day-to-day events, it
comes at the expense of basic research and analysis. Not only
does basic research and analysis provide the foundation for
short-term, event-driven analysis, it also is critical to
producing in-depth, long-term/strategic analysis of issues that
will pose challenges to U.S. national security in the future.
The Committee believes that the ability to process and
analyze all-source information is crucial to the quality and
utility of all-source analytic products. Unfortunately, the
IC's ability to do thorough, truly all-source analysis may be
hampered by the difficulties associated with prioritizing,
processing, and analyzing the vast amounts of open source data
available to analysts. Another area of concern in this regard
is the ability of the IC's all-source analysts truly to have
access to all sources of information. Bureaucratic barriers
have been erected that have prevented access by all-source
analysts to information from other departments, from other
agencies within the IC and, in some cases, from other offices
within the same agency. The Committee will continue to monitor
initiatives to improve the IC's ability to collect, process,
and analyze open source information, and of the ability of IC
all-source analysts to gain sufficient access to all sources of
information.
Given the fact that resources for the IC are unlikely to
increase significantly in the future, the Committee believes
that the IC must find other ways to address shortfalls in
analytic depth and breadth. The IC must examine the importance
of all-source analysis relative to the importance of collection
and support activities. The Committee is particularly concerned
about the imbalance between collection and ``downstream''
processing of intelligence. Expending resources to collect
intelligence that is not being analyzed is simply a waste of
money.
In order to enhance analytic expertise, the IC must improve
training and better target its recruitment efforts. In
addition, the IC must identify ways to fill analytic gaps and
surge analytic resources without creating gaps elsewhere in the
process. For the past several years, the Committee has strongly
urged the IC to develop a ``civilian'' reserve capability that
would tap into the expertise of former IC employees, non-IC
experts, and linguists. Certain elements within the IC already
have taken steps to augment analytic capabilities; the IC as a
whole must do the same. In the fiscal year 1998 intelligence
authorization bill, the Committee again has provided funds for
the establishment of a pilot civilian reserve program. The
Committee will closely scrutinize progress made in this area.
Several new initiatives already are underway that will help
the IC to maintain a worldwide information ``base'' and to
augment existing analytic efforts. The Committee supports
efforts to create ``knowledge databases,'' including the
nascent World Basic Information Library (WBIL). Such efforts
will help to ensure that the IC retains a baseline of knowledge
on countries that often receive little attention until a crisis
arises. The Committee also supports the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program (JRIP), a cost-effective program that
utilizes the substantive and linguistic expertise of military
reservists to augment the IC's analytic efforts.
The Committee strongly believes that the IC must restore
its capability to conduct long-term predictive analysis and
warning. Core groups of analysts should be dedicated to doing
research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues.
In addition, the IC must educate its customers about the
importance of long-term analysis. If the focus on near-term
analysis is maintained at the expense of long-term analysis and
research, the ability of policymakers and military commanders
to deal effectively with future crises will be severely
diminished. The main function of the IC is to provide its
customers with predictive analysis and warning; if the IC loses
the capability to do so, it will fail to meet its most basic
mission.
``downstream'' intelligence activities
For the past several years, the Committee has expressed
concern about the imbalance between intelligence collection and
related ``downstream'' intelligence activities. The Committee
is disturbed by the fact that the IC continues to spend
billions on high-tech collection platforms without allocating
adequate resources to those who review the raw product, analyze
it, and put it before policymakers and military commanders in a
useable format. This is not to say that there should be no
funding for new collection systems (see the Areas of Special
Interest item on Technical Investments), and this year's
authorization provides for such investments. But to do so
without alsoplanning investment for processing, exploitation,
analysis and dissemination, serves to diminish the purpose and utility
of the collection.
The emphasis on collection at the expense of downstream
activities permeates the IC at all levels and in most
collection disciplines. The Defense Science Board, for one, has
noted the fact that collection platforms have performed
extremely well in Bosnia but that the ``warfighter'' has been
overwhelmed by the amount of collected raw data, much of which
remains unprocessed. In the Committee's analysis and production
budget hearing, witnesses testified that the IC is ``binning''
(i.e., not exploiting) much of the broad-area search imagery
that is collected. In addition, hard target analytic depth
studies by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) conclude
that the IC is ``awash'' in unexploited open source
information. Finally, program managers consistently budget for
satellite and launch requirements for new overhead collection
systems, but largely ignore the need for funding sufficient
ground processing capabilities.
The Committee's fiscal year 1998 budget authorization
emphasizes, among other things, the need to address processing,
analysis and dissemination activities. For example, the
Committee authorizes funds to create an open source
requirements management system, enhance Measurement and
Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) processing and exploitation,
and advance the acquisition and fielding of analytic tools.
These efforts, which are important first steps for addressing
the collection-downstream imbalance, are only a small part of
the solution.
The Committee believes that the IC no longer needs, nor can
it afford, to continue pouring vast amounts of money into
expensive, high-tech collection platforms if the collected data
is not exploited. Put simply, collecting information that is
not processed and analyzed is simply a waste of taxpayer
dollars. In the future, the Committee expects to see greater
effort and resources placed on downstream activities and a more
rational approach to collection activities. Requirements must
be clearly and precisely articulated and collection decisions
must be coordinated across the collection ``stovepipes.'' The
Committee urges the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in
concern with IC managers, to address the collection-downstream
imbalance in future budget submissions.
Clandestine HUMINT Funding
The Committee is concerned about the apparently ad hoc
nature of annual funding for clandestine Human Intelligence
(HUMINT). We believe that such funding should, instead, reflect
a periodically adjusted and refined projection of the long-term
needs of analysts and consumers for the product of clandestine
HUMINT collection. To tie the funding of clandestine HUMINT to
these long-term needs, the Committee recommends that the DCI
establish an interagency task force to assess long-term
collection needs and from that assessment, define the role of
the clandestine service in the future and the funding profile
necessary to build and sustain its capabilities.
Present funding of clandestine HUMINT
The Committee is aware of three attempts by analysts in
recent years to quantify the importance of the types of
intelligence collection: A survey of the January 1993 National
Intelligence Daily (NID), the 1994 Strategic Intelligence
Review (SIR) process, and the 1995 Comprehensive Capabilities
Review (CCR). In all three studies, clandestine HUMINT made a
surprisingly strong showing, considering the small part of the
intelligence budget that it consumes. In the NID survey, CIA/DO
reporting was the dominant source cited for covertly acquired
intelligence. In the 1994 SIR process, HUMINT was, in
aggregate, the most important source of intelligence for the
376 intelligence needs evaluated. In the CCR, clandestine
HUMINT and SIGINT were found to be roughly of the same value in
pursuing the various top-tier issues of Presidential Decision
Directive 35. Uncounted in any of these studies, and adding
enormously to the value of clandestine HUMINT, is its
contribution to clandestine technical operations and in
compromising foreign cryptographic materials.
The importance of the clandestine service in the future has
not been lost on those looking at the future of the IC as a
whole. Studies undertaken in the last two years by the ``Aspin-
Brown'' Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and this
Committee have all emphasized that the intelligence targets of
the future will be such that clandestine HUMINT will be even
more important than it is today. The likely rapid spread of
encryption technologies and the move towards declassifying
imagery capabilities will only accelerate the reliance on
clandestine human sources to crack the hardest targets.
Yet, the cost of clandestine HUMINT remains a single digit
percentage of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget
and has dropped in real dollar terms. As our actions in the
authorization for the CIAP demonstrate, this Committee
questions whether the annual funding requests for clandestine
HUMINT collection are sufficiently grounded in the long-term
needs of policymakers and in the operational requisites for
satisfying those requirements. We have, for example, made
recommendations for augmenting support for clandestine HUMINT
collection that we understand will be necessary for collecting
in the new environments of the post-Cold War. Underlying these
recommendations, and others, is a concern that funding for the
clandestine service enable it to begin to develop operational
capabilities and techniques now that it will need to deploy in
the future in order to meet the evolving needs of policymakers
in changing technical and political environments.
Budgeting for the future
To achieve a less ad hoc and more forward-looking budget
request for clandestine HUMINT collection, we recommend that
the DCI appoint a task force to project the needs of
policymakers for clandestine HUMINT collection over the next
two decades and report its findings to, inter alia, this
Committee. Because of the evolving needs of policymakers since
the end of the Cold War, the advance of information
technologies, and the explosion of open source information,
this Committee believes that the all-sourceanalyst is in the
best position to predict what information gaps may exist in the future
and which gaps cannot be filled except by clandestine HUMINT
collection. Accordingly, we recommend the task force be chaired by the
Chairman of the NIC with the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence Production of the DIA as Vice-
Chairs.
With these findings in hand, the DDO, as the National
HUMINT Collection Manager, should be in the best position to
predict what capabilities, techniques, and operational profiles
in the clandestine service will best fulfill the needs
identified by the all-source analysts. On these bases, the DDO
should prepare a long-term fiscal program and strategic plan--
perhaps building on the DO's internally prepared strategic plan
of 1995--in consultation with the DS&T, the Defense HUMINT
Service, and other operational partners in the Intelligence
Community. This program and strategic plan, as validated by the
DCI and shared with the CIA Comptroller and this Committee,
should then become the program of record for clandestine HUMINT
within the Intelligence Community and a major premise for the
annual funding request for clandestine HUMINT collection.
technical investments
The impact of technology--including both commercial and
government investments--on the IC has had a dramatic effect in
almost all intelligence activities and operations, and the
potential for future effects is even greater. The Committee has
taken a position in previous authorization bills that
technology, and more appropriately, the application of new
technologies, are becoming key to the enhancement of all
intelligence activities, whether in the form of analytic tool
development or technical collection support to clandestine
operations. Indeed, the Committee believes the world-wide
proliferation of technologies presents new opportunities--and
challenges--for intelligence collection operations. Moreover,
with the Department of Defense's move toward a ``digitized''
force, the IC must become more adept at not only collecting,
analyzing and reporting tactical information, but must do so
within a time frame and in a digital form that is usable to the
military. The use of advanced, and in many cases, commercial,
technologies is the key to doing this.
One of the more substantial areas that can benefit from
modern technologies is overhead collection. Although heavily
influenced by leading-edge technologies already, those who
manage current and future overhead collection programs must
deal with new, again, often commercial, technologies that are
rapidly developed, made readily available and, in equally rapid
fashion, are eclipsed and outdated by even more modern
technologies. Those who remain comfortable with unjustifiably
long development and procurement times will fail.
It should also be noted that the current broad base of
technological development expands the commercial availability
of many of these evolving technologies. For example,
technologies used in overhead imagery, once the sole purview of
the Intelligence and Defense communities of the U.S. and only a
handful of other nations, are now either verging on, or are
already being employed by commercial entities worldwide.
Moreover, there are several areas where such technologies
are having a definite impact on overhead collection. Technology
is allowing for the development of smaller and less costly
satellites, which some believe will match, if not surpass,
current capabilities. The effective use of these technologies
will require increased innovation by the intelligence program
managers to ensure that the nation maintains a technological
edge over potential foes. At the same time, the availability,
and indeed the proliferation of such technologies should allow
for streamlined acquisition and significant cost savings.
The worldwide development and availability of new
technologies, combined with the continuous increase in
knowledge and understanding of U.S. collection systems and
their capabilities, also will affect how the IC collects
information and on what ``targets'' remain viable. The
Committee believes the Community must invest in new and
sometimes unanticipated collection areas/techniques to remain
viable.
In this year's authorization, the Committee is continuing
its support for more flexible systems that address the future
challenges technology is forcing on the Community. These
investments include promoting smaller systems and ensuring that
larger systems are technologically and financially justifiable.
This also includes investments in a variety of research and
development programs, and the Committee hopes the
Administration will bring forward its own new ideas in the
future. The Committee acknowledges the successes of past
overhead collection programs and hopes that the initial steps
shown in new efforts such as the Future Imagery Architecture
signal recognition of the need for new and innovative
approaches to address the challenges of the future.
a corporate and flexible community
For the past several years, the Committee has emphasized
the need for the IC to be more flexible and function as a
``corporate'' whole. In today's complex world, the IC must have
the capability to address many issues simultaneously anywhere
in the world. With fewer resources and a more diverse set of
challenges, the IC must be able to work across programmatic and
`'stovepipe'' boundaries and be flexible enough to ensure that
resources can be shifted or augmented throughout the IC when
necessary.
The Committee is encouraged by progress toward improving
coordination across IC agencies and across collection and
analytic disciplines. The DCI's Hard Target working groups have
proven that a coherent, multidisciplinary, coordinated approach
to collection is an excellent way to identify and address
collection gaps. The Committee strongly urges the DCI to
consider applying such a ``cross-INT'' approach to the process
of determining collection and production strategies for lower-
tier countries.
The Committee is less satisfied with the IC's progress in
addressing ``surge'' issues. The Committee believes there are
several problems associated with the current method of surging
resources. First, when resources are shifted to cover a crisis,
collection and analytic gaps may be created elsewhere. Second,
it is exceedingly difficult for analysts and some collectors--
particularly HUMINT-- to became instant experts on an area in
which they have little experience or background. The Committee
believes that although the IC should maintain global coverage,
agencies do not need in-house expertise on all topics.
Intelligence agencies must, however, be able to determine where
expertise resides within the IC and be able to tap that
expertise, wherever it exists, when the need arises. In
addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the IC must
consider creating a civilian intelligence reserve capability to
augment existing analytic and linguistic expertise.
The Committee strongly encourages the IC to continue and
expand efforts to work across traditional bureaucratic
boundaries and to implement measures to enhance flexibility.
The Committee believes that such efforts are absolutely
essential if the IC is to succeed in dealing with increasingly
complex and diverse threats to U.S. national interests.
quadrennial defense review of intelligence
The Committee is concerned on several accounts about the
handling of intelligence in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has
promulgated a set of new operational concepts known as Joint
Vision 2010. As the QDR report and the CJCS's congressional
testimony stress, information superiority or ``dominant
battlefield awareness'' is the underpinning for the CJCS's
concepts. The QDR, however, made almost no changes in the
Department's plans for intelligence, the notable exception
being the reduction of the planned procurement of Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft.
This recommendation prompted the National Defense Panel (NDP)
to suggest that the Department's investment decisions were not
fully in keeping with its emphasis on improving intelligence
and surveillance support. The other intelligence issues that
the QDR raised were deferred to the normal internal summer
budget review process.
The QDR was focused, to a large extent, on finding ways to
enhance the Department's investment budget. It has been
reported that DoD intends to increase the amount of procurement
funding steadily over the future years defense play (FYDP),
until the level reaches approximately $68 billion in 2003, an
increase of over $25 billion over the fiscal year 1997 dollar
levels. Yet, intelligence spending is to remain essentially
flat. Again, this does not seem to be in synchronization with
the Chairman's ``dominant battlefield awareness'' vision.
The Secretary of Defense recently announced the creation of
a special task force to find ways to reduce the costs of the
Department's infrastructure and support systems, with an
emphasis on defense agencies. Since defense agencies make up
the overwhelming majority of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, if the task force generates substantial savings, much
of these could come from the intelligence budget. Given the
need to ``rebuild'' our intelligence resources to ensure that
they can meet future needs, especially within Defense, the
Committee believes that such a step could well be disastrous in
terms of our military's abilities to engage in whatever
situation there might be. The Committee will observe carefully
the direction of this effort, with an eye toward examining the
long-term effects on the Community and weighing them against
the short term gains.
Finally, the Committee is very much aware that the
aggregate intelligence budget generally increased at a quicker
pace than the overall national defense budget during the high-
growth period of the 1980s, and that it declined more modestly
than the overall defense budget in the years since.
Intelligence has clearly received some preferential budgetary
consideration, reflecting an appreciation that intelligence
plays an increasingly important role in military effectiveness.
Therefore, it seems, given the CJCS's focus on information
dominance and the increased role of intelligence in military
operations, that intelligence programs should continue to be
specifically and staunchly supported as the Administration
carries out its renewed and appropriate commitment to increase
funding for modernization. Therefore, again, the Committee will
closely watch these budgeting developments.
intelligence system interoperability
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request included
significant funding for Command, Control, Communications,
Computer and Intelligence (C4I) support, system development and
interoperability, and for establishing a virtual intelligence
analysis environment. The systems included the following
programs:
1. The Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
(JIVA);
2. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
(JDISS);
3. The All Source Analysis System (ASAS);
4. The Joint Maritime Communications Information
System (JMCIS);
5. The Combat Intelligence System (CIS);
6. The Intelligence Analysis System (IAS);
7. The JDISS--Special Operations Command Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES).
The Committee supports the Department's efforts to provide
an interoperable intelligence dissemination architecture and a
``virtual'' analytic environment with which analysts world-wide
can collaborate. The Committee believes, however, that the
various projects reflected in the President's request do not
have the necessary direction and control to require the sharing
of developments and to ensure that duplication of effort is
minimized. This is easily determined by a thorough review of
the various budget request documents.
Further, the Committee believes that these systems, can be
broken down into the basic components of (1) a high powered
workstation with communications; (2) an operating environment
that, by direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
must be Defense Intelligence Infrastructure (DII) Common
Operating Environment (COE) compliant; and (3) a set of
applications software. Although a common stated goal of the
above systems is to provide support to analysts and operators,
the program managers of these separate systems rarely, if ever,
work together to achieve the common goals by sharing ideas and
developments.
The Committee is convinced there is a need to establish a
management structure and focal point within the Department that
would include representation from each of the service and
agency system program offices. The mission of this organization
would be to provide oversight, integration and development of
collaborative applications for the associated C4I systems. The
function of this organization would not be to dictate specific
service/agency hardware solutions or unique software
applications, but to provide for the development of common
applications, act as a conduit for sharing analytical ideas and
processes, and to ensure world-wide interoperability via
standards. The Committee does not support the concept of
centralizing funding for these efforts, since these systems are
the responsibilities of the various services and agencies. The
Committee would however, support the ability of such a
coordinating organization to be an approval authority for
expending service/agency funds. The Committee believes both the
JDISS program office and, particularly, the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program have been at the forefront of C41 system
collaboration, and would be good candidates to be chartered
with this integration.
Therefore the Committee is fencing 50 percent of all
authorized and appropriated fiscal year 1998 funding for the
above systems, until the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
provides to the defense and intelligence authorizing committees
a plan for creating a management structure and focal point
within the Department with a charter encompassing the goals
outlined above.
FBIS Reorganization
The Committee supports the further establishment and
maintenance of a strong open source capability within the IC. A
comprehensive open source collection, translation, and analytic
effort is crucial to the IC's ability to maintain global
coverage and to understand developments both in ``lower'' and
``higher'' tier countries. Not only do open sources provide
insight into open societies, careful scrutiny of ``closed
society'' media (e.g., Iran, North Korea) can also reveal
valuable information on trends, new developments, and
leadership plans and intentions.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) re-
engineering strategy calls for using more modern and
commercially available technologies as FBIS's operational
linchpin and to transition from traditional large-scale, static
collection and processing centers toward a more agile and less
expensive architecture. The Committee applauds CIA's efforts to
adapt FBIS's infrastructure and operating practices to
incorporate new technologies and to meet intelligence
requirements more efficiently. The Committee has several
concerns, however, about the current FBIS re-engineering plan.
First, the Committee is concerned that important resource
allocation decisions are being made without fully taking into
consideration ``customer'' requirements; there currently is no
formal, direct open source requirements system that can be
tapped to help translate requirements into rational resource
allocation decisions. In addition, it is unclear to many FBIS
customers what regions of the world will be affected by
significant decreases in collection, translation an analytical
activities. The Committee believes that open source customers
must be kept fully informed of what changes in services they
will see as a result of the re-engineering. The Committee also
believes that open source collection should be driven by the
direct input of major customers, particularly the all-source
analysts who best understand where their information gaps lie.
It should be noted that the Committee will closely
scrutinize any fiscal year 1997 FBIS reprogramming request to
determine whether the request fits into the overall
reengineering strategy. The Committee requests that it be kept
fully and currently informed of the plans and implementation of
the re-engineering effort. In addition, the Committee requests
that the DCI submit a report on the FBIS re-engineering plan to
the intelligence oversight Committees by 1 September 1997. The
report should include the following information:
What is the timeline for implementing the re-
engineering plan?
What is the mechanism for reviewing the progress and
effects of the re-engineering plan?
For what countries/regions/issues will FBIS reduce
its coverage (collection, translation, analysis)?
What countries/regions/issues will FBIS no longer
cover?
How will the ``new way'' of doing business be managed
(i.e., telecommuting employees, regional hubs, etc.)?
What disruptions in service are anticipated? and
How will FBIS work with ``customers'' to ensure their
requirements are being met?
dci nonproliferation center
Collecting against, analyzing, preventing and countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction present some
of the most difficult challenges facing the IC today.
Nonproliferation-related intelligence programs and personnel
are numerous and widely dispersed throughout the IC and the
Defense Department. When the DCI's Nonproliferation Center
(NPC) was established in 1991, one of its core missions was to
coordinate the disparate IC nonproliferation activities,
improve communication between programs and eliminate
duplication of effort. As coordinator of IC assessments
onproliferation topics, but not an analytic group per se, the NPC was
to serve as a one-stop nonproliferation information shop for policy
makers.
After its formation, the NPC took on a number of additional
responsibilities. It developed strategic plans to help guide
the U.S. Government's response to the proliferation problem and
provided support to CIA's Operations Directorate (DO), as well
as other collectors and law enforcement agencies. The NPC also
worked on collection deck development and produced a ``gaps''
study that identified deficiencies in proliferation-related
collection activities. The NPC was also chartered to review the
IC's performance on proliferation activities and to make
relevant budget recommendations. In addition, the NPC Director
was designated the issue manager for nonproliferation
activities. With these and other responsibilities, the NPC has
made numerous contributions to the IC's nonproliferation
effort.
The NPC has attempted to bring a Community focus to the
proliferation issue, but has been thwarted in these efforts by
internal (CIA) and external turf battles. Because of this, the
NPC has not been able to position itself as the focal point for
IC-wide nonproliferation activities. Nonetheless, the NPC has
several successes of which to be proud. For example, the NPC
review of the IC's proliferation budget gave this Committee
insight into how proliferation resources were obligated within
the Community. This budget review function should be continued,
fully endorsed by the DCI, and done much earlier in the budget
process to make it more useful to this Committee in its annual
budget review process. In addition, the NPC has promoted or
sponsored several new biological and chemical weapons research
and development efforts that are successful because of the
concentrated focus NPC brings to these issues.
In the past, the Committee has noted that there were
serious questions regarding the NPC that pertained less toward
its contributions--which have been significant--than to its
future form and function. In recent years, the NPC has been
reorganized. For example, the operational support section was
relocated to the DO, within the newly created
Counterproliferation Division, that brought centralized
management to the DO's counterproliferation activities. In
addition, NPC authority, personnel and budgets have been
affected by downsizing. Moreover, the NPC Director is no longer
the nonproliferation issue manager. Some question the
appropriateness of the reductions, reorganizations and changes;
others maintain that the NPC still has too many resources
compared to other intelligence programs.
In 1992, the Committee conducted a detailed study of NFIP
proliferation programs, with a specific focus on the new NPC.
This year, the Committee plans to conduct a follow-up study on
this topic. The Committee assessment will involve a thorough,
top-down review of the NPC organization, mission and
activities. The Committee will: review the NPC's efficacy as
coordinator of nonproliferation programs; review NPC funding
levels and staffing assignments; consider where the NPC should
be located within the IC; examine NPC's relationship with the
CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI) and Operations (DO);
and examine the NPC's role in the collection and issue manager
processes. Likewise, the Committee will review other
proliferation-related programs throughout the IC, including
within the DI and DO, with an eye toward recommending a logical
construct to the Intelligence Community's efforts on the
proliferation issue.
The Committee believes that additional support for the NPC
and its objectives is warranted, and remains concerned about
future commitment to the NPC. The Acting DCI's (ADCI's)
suggestion that better coordination of IC and Defense
proliferation efforts might be obtained through National
Security Council (NSC) control is highly debatable. Regardless,
the Committee believes that NSC control over this issue may not
adequately address the management of critical interagency
nonproliferation requirements that must be satisfied. Although
the Committee firmly believes that the NPC's roles and missions
need to be evaluated further, it continues to see utility in
NPC's existence and its efforts.
declassification
The Committee has authorized additional resources in the
fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA classification management,
including declassification activities in support of Executive
Order 12958. It should be noted, however, that the Committee is
highly skeptical that the true costs of declassification have
been determined accurately. It is possible that additional
resources for declassification may be required to ensure that
it is accomplished without compromise of intelligence sources
and methods. In addition, the Committee is very concerned about
the criteria and techniques used in the process of
declassifying intelligence documents. Over the next year, the
Committee will study carefully a range of declassification and
collateral intelligence sharing activities across the NFIP to
determine what resources are needed for these efforts and
whether current declassification and intelligence sharing
activities adequately protect sources and methods.
Specifically, the Committee will examine the
declassification programs of various intelligence agencies,
including issues relating to personnel qualifications,
contractor support and training in declassification
methodologies. As part of this review, the Committee will
examine the implementation of bulk declassification
techniques--that may be used in lieu of page-by-page review--
and consider the applicability of both methods for
declassifying documents with differing classification levels.
In addition, the Committee will review specific
declassification case histories to assess the performance of
the ``risk management'' approach to declassification.
Furthermore, the review will examine the process and progress
of Community-wide efforts to declassify archival records. Any
lessons learned from problems and successes related to current
declassification activities should be used to redirect present
day information handling and storage policies and make future
declassification efforts less problematic.
The Committee also will examine the Community's processes
for sharing intelligence with military consumers and allied
partners. The Committee also believesthat in the area of
intelligence information management, there is a need for improved
security controls and audit capabilities. Likewise, the Committee will
examine issues relating to risk management, personnel training and
qualifications, accountability, and record keeping.
Finally, the Committee will focus in detail on the GULFLINK
case. The recent GULFLINK damage assessment report concluded
that the declassification process associated with Gulf War
intelligence documents resulted in serious damage to
intelligence sources and methods. Those working on
declassifying Gulf War intelligence documents were directed to
declassify an enormous amount of documents in a relatively
short amount of time. Furthermore, the Department of Defense
directed those declassifying these documents to err on the side
of declassification and post documents on the GULFLINK Internet
site unless instructed otherwise on a case-by-case basis, by
officials at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.
Clearly, the reported damage done to intelligence sources and
methods in the case of GULFLINK are directly due to these
declassification criteria. The Committee will closely examine
the declassification processes and requirements used in the
GULFLINK project to ensure that such mistakes are not made in
future declassification projects.
review of national drug intelligence architecture
Given the magnitude of the illicit drug problem and the
threat that it poses to the national security of the United
States, many believe that the IC should become even more
actively involved in the effort to ``combat illicit''
international drug trafficking. Before any changes are
undertaken in this area, however, there should be an assessment
of structure and performance of the existing drug intelligence
collection and analysis activities. Moreover, since the
establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in
1988 and the creation of the CIA's Counternarcotics Center in
1989, there has never been a comprehensive effort by the
executive branch to evaluate the effectiveness of the national
security and law enforcement drug intelligence systems--the
drug intelligence architecture.
The Committee recommends that the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, in coordination with the DCI's Crime and
Narcotics Center (CNC) and the Community Management Staff,
undertake a study of current drug intelligence programs, with
the view toward developing an architecture for a national drug
intelligence system to provide the best possible support to all
levels of the international counternarcotics effort: policy
development, strategic and operational planning, targeting,
tactical execution, and information dissemination. The
recommended architecture would include suggestions for clear
and specific mission statements for each drug-control entity
(including principal support roles), an articulation of the
relationships among the centers and activities and an ADP/
communications plan that will facilitate processing of
appropriate drug intelligence information at all levels. The
report, which would be furnished to the President and the two
intelligence oversight Committees, is due on March 31, 1998.
Joint Military Intelligence Program
National Imagery and Mapping Agency civilian personnel, -$15.0 million
The budget request contained $680.3 million for in
Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide, running the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA) mapping and geospatial
information operations, including funding for 6,389 civilian
personnel positions.
The Director of NIMA has stated that NIMA's Digital
Production System (DPS) will no longer be operational by the
year 2000, and that NIMA's primary role in mapping will evolve
to that of maintaining information databases instead of
producing imagery and other intelligence products. If realized,
this approach should result in a greater decline in required
personnel over the current mandatory downsizing reductions,
since the majority of NIMA personnel currently support the
development of intelligence products. The Committee supports
the effort to move away from DPS. The Committee believes,
however, that NIMA has failed to properly take into account the
effect this plan will have on personnel. Therefore, the
Committee recommends a decrease of $15.0 million in civilian
personnel funds to accelerate the downsizing of NIMA's
personnel consistent with the DPS phase out.
Further, personnel costs account for more than half of
NIMA's operations and maintenance request and consequently,
more than half of its budget. The Committee believes that NIMA
must drastically reduce its workforce and become more efficient
if it is to be able to fulfill its mission in the information
age. Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NIMA to
submit a personnel plan to the Congressional defense and
intelligence committees. This plan should include an assessment
of the types of skills required in the future versus what NIMA
now possesses, a breakdown per year of the types of personnel
slots that shows how NIMA's demographics will change as NIMA
moves to its required skill mix, an assessment of whether
cartographer personnel slots can be transformed into imagery
analyst slots and the potential for retaining cartographers
into imagery analysts, and an assessment of the challenges and
obstacles facing the agency in achieving the necessary
personnel reductions, including suggested remedies for such
obstacles. An interim response is requested by August 31, 1997
with a final report due by December 1, 1997.
U.S. imagery and geospatial system production, -$40.0 million
The budget request contained $541.8 million for continued
operations of National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA)
Geospatial System Production and Customer support.
The Director of NIMA has officially stated that, because of
the large operations and maintenance cost of older production
equipment, the Agency will completely phase out the legacy
Digital Production System (DPS) by the year 2000. Although the
overall NIMA operations and maintenance budget decreases
slightly in fiscal year 1998, very little of this decrease is
due to a reduction in legacy system funding. The committee
notes that migration away from DPS began in fiscal year 1997,
and a more significant decline in O&M should have resulted in
fiscal year 1998.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$501.4 million for this activity, a decrease of $40.0 million.
Mission support, -$10.0 million
The budget request included $147.6 million for National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) facilities management.
As NIMA consolidates facilities, the Committee expects to
see a marked decline in mission support costs. Such a decline
is not apparent in the budget request documentation. Therefore,
the Committee recommends a decrease of $10.0 million. Further,
the Committee requests that the Director of NIMA submit a
facilities plan that lays out locations and functions of all
current facilities, and describes NIMA's strategy to
consolidate and reduce its facility holdings. The Committee
requests this plan be submitted to the defense and intelligence
committees no later than August 31, 1997.
Synthetic aperture radar for mapping, +$10.0 million
The budget request included $109.4 million in program
element 0305102BQ, line 130, partially to develop the
capability to use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data for
providing geospatial information for customers.
The Committee believes that the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) specifically, and the intelligence
community generally, has focused insufficient attention on the
use of SAR data for geospatial product development. The
Committee believes this technology can provide critical data,
in all weather conditions, and that it should be exploited more
extensively than it has been in the past.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional $10.0
million in this program element to improve current, limited
NIMA capabilities to use SAR data to provide geospatial
information.
Cancellation of interferometric synthetic aperture radar, -$23.2
million
The budget request included $23.2 million to continue
development of the Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar
(IFSAR) mission to collect Digital Terrain Elevation Data
(DTED) level 2 information. The IFSAR mission is scheduled to
fly on the Space Shuttle in the 2000 timeframe. The IFSAR
mission itself will cost $163.3 million, with $98.4 million
remaining to be spent through fiscal year 2000.
The Committee continues to believe that there are other,
more cost-effective alternatives to the IFSAR mission for
collecting DTED level 2 data. One such alternative appears to
be an algorithm developed by commercial industry that allows
DTED level 2 data to be derived from the European Resource
Satellites (ERS-1 and ERS-2). The Canadian RADARSAT also
appears to be able to satisfy this requirement. Additionally,
new processes for aircraft with SAR capabilities hold great
potential. Therefore, the committee recommends cancellation of
the IFSAR mission and corresponding reduction of $23.2 million
in the National Imagery and Mapping Agency budget.
U.S. imagery and geospatial system improvements, +$15 million
The budget request included $109.4 million in Research and
Development, Defense-wide, for National Imagery and Mapping
Agency's (NIMA) development, procurement and integration of an
end-to-end imagery production capability for geospatial
information.
The Director of NIMA has officially embraced the Defense
Science Board's (DSB) direction to move NIMA from production of
products to the maintenance of geospatial information, a move
the committee strongly supports. One of the DSB's
recommendation included trading off production of lower
priority products and less critical functions in order to fund
NIMA's more pressing technical needs, thereby allowing it to
move quickly to its future technical capabilities. Based on
NIMA's request, the committee does not believe NIMA's
technology investment is sufficient to efficiently and
effectively move to this new leading-edge technological
capability.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a total of $124.4
million in this account for developing and fielding the modern
imagery and mapping technologies. The Committee believes this
increase of $150.0 million will provide needed capital that
will effectively reduce NIMA operating costs in the near-term.
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, transfer $15 million
The budget request included $15.0 million in program
element 0305205D, line 138, for modifications to the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
The Committee is concerned by the overly bureaucratic
management and acquisition structure the Department of Defense
has put in place for the Predator. The Committee believes the
DoD's efforts to maximize UAV ``jointness,'' by directing all
tactical UAV development and procurement through the Navy-led
UAV Joint Program Office (JPO), has had the unintended
consequences of forcing funding transfers between services,
slowing Predator procurement and minimizing contracting
flexibility. It appears that, even though Predator is owned and
operated by a single service, the basic management concept of
unity of control has been violated.
The Committee believes the management and control of all
aspects of Predator funding, contracting, procurement and
operation need to be with the Air Force. Therefore, section 603
directs all Predator functions currently maintained within the
UAV JPO be transferred to the Air Force. It also directs that
all Predator funding within the Defense-wide program element
0305205D be transferred to the Air Force program element
0305154F.
Further, the Committee is aware of the Air Force's
``Lightning bolt'' acquisition initiatives in general, and the
Big Safari streamlined acquisition program, specifically. The
Committee has been keenly interested in the rapid, flexible,
and innovative acquisition approaches that hallmark Big Safari,
and it strongly urges the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) to consider using the Big Safari streamlined
acquisition and management program for Predator.
Finally, the Committee is aware of a past demonstration
wherein the Predator UAV was launched via the land-based ground
control station and handed off to a submarine-based mini-
control station. This demonstration unquestionably proved the
flexibility of, and the potential need to have, a down-sized
portable ground station that can be forward deployed. Such a
ground station could be used to take direct control of a
Predator UAV for those missions (special operations, for
example) where an Air Force forward control element that has
been physically deployed with a Navy (or other Service/Agency)
element is the best possible mode of operation. The Committee
firmly believes that, as the Air Force brings the Predator
forward into the operational realm, such unconventional
missions will dictate the need for a deployable control
capability. Therefore, the Committee strongly urges the Air
Force to consider such a capability when planning for future
multi-service support with Predator.
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle, -$57.5 million
The budget request contained $122.0 million for Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAV) in program element 0305204D,
including $87.5 million for the Outrider Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program and $34.5 million for
the Tactical Control Station.
The Committee understands that the purpose of the Outrider
ACTD is to assemble and demonstrate a significant new tactical
reconnaissance capability that is based on mature technology.
The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) established
the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JTUAV) program from
two previously unsuccessful programs, the close range and the
maneuver UAVs. In May 1996, the DARO conducted a competitive
selection that evaluated nine candidate air vehicles, chose the
Hellfox TUAV and awarded a twenty-four month contract for the
Outrider JTUAV. The ``best value'' selection was based on the
Hellfox's superior aircraft design and capabilities and the
winning contractor's presumed ability to successfully develop
and deliver, within the 24 months, six ACTD Outrider UAV
systems, each consisting of four air vehicles, a ground control
station and associated equipment. The Committee isinformed that
Outrider ACTD is well behind schedule and experiencing serious
performance problems. In fact, its first flight, scheduled for November
1996, did not occur until March 1997.
The Committee supports efforts to streamline the
acquisition process and enable demonstrated capabilities to
transition quickly to production and operation. However, the
Committee is extremely concerned that the Outrider ACTD appears
to have circumvented important acquisition criteria and
milestones, including the need for the program to address a
validated military requirement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has failed to formally
validate a joint operational requirement for the JTUAV.
Therefore, the JTUAV ACTD appears to contradict the
Department's own guidance that ACTDs must address validated
user requirements clearly enough to be able to firmly establish
operational utility and system integrity.
The Committee is fully aware of the technical problems that
have plagued development of the Outrider UAV. The ACTD is
experiencing serious shortcomings that indicate that the joint
Outrider program is not using mature technologies, despite
being based on the successful Hellfox UAV technologies
demonstrated in the competition phase. The Committee
understands that the program is under special review by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and
is being considered for cancellation by the Department. This,
coupled with the Outrider's technical problems and recent
observations/statements by the Director, DARO, that the
Department was ``going to cut its losses'' on the program,
appear to lend credibility to this notion.
The Committee therefore recommends an authorization of
$64.5 million for TUAV, with no funding authorized for
continuation of the Outrider ACTD. The Committee recommends
that of the funds authorized, $10.0 million be provided to
support a vertical takeoff and landing UAV competition that was
recently initiated by the DARO. The Committee recommends $11.5
million be made available to provide a dedicated Predator UAV
system and associated equipment, including at least two
aircraft equipped with synthetic aperture radar and Ku-band
link, for operational experimentation and testing of the common
UAV Tactical Control System (TCS). To ensure a viable
transition from the Outrider ACTD, elsewhere in the report the
Committee recommends an additional $10.0 million in operations
and maintenance, Army, for operating currently owned Hunter UAV
systems. The Committee does not authorize additional or
attrition Hunter air vehicle purchases, nor does it authorize
technical improvements to the air vehicle or its electronic
systems. The Committee notes that this is a Congressional
interest item and directs that the Army receive prior defense
and intelligence Committee approval before redistributing these
funds for any purpose other than that authorized above.
Finally, the Committee believes there are a number of
existing tactical UAVs, including the Hellfox, the Prowler, and
others, that could satisfy the Army TUAV requirements.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $20.0 million in aircraft
procurement, Army, for purchasing an ``off-the shelf'' tactical
UAV. The Committeerequires the Army to provide a purchase plan
before any of these funds can be obligated or expended.
Airborne reconnaissance advanced development, -$3.0 million
The budget request for Airborne Reconnaissance Advanced
Development in program element 0305206D included $4.5 million
for continuing refinement of the Joint Airborne Reconnaissance
Architecture (JASA) standards. Included in this amount was
funding for verifying compliance and interoperability of new
upgrades and developments.
The Committee recommends a total of $1.5 million for this
effort, a decrease of $3.0 million.
Airborne reconnaissance advanced development, -$3.0 million
The budget request for Airborne Reconnaissance Advanced
Development in program element 0305206D included $3.0 million
for initiating development of a heavy fuel engine for the
tactical UAV.
Department of Defense budget documentation shows
justification for developing an HFE both within this program
element and within program element 03035204D. Additionally, the
Committee is aware that previous authorizations and
appropriations for this effort have not been fully obligated or
expended. Therefore, the Committee recommends a decrease in
program element 0305206D of $3.0 million.
Senior year electro-optical system, +$5.0 million
The budget request included $136.7 million in aircraft
procurement, Air Force, line 73 for continued procurement of
spares and repair parts for the U-2 aircraft and sensors. The
Committee understands the request does not adequately fund
upgrades and spare parts for the Senior Year Electro-Optic
System (SYERS).
U-2 SYERS imagery satisfies a large percentage of theater
commanders' imagery requirements, and the Committee is
committed to ensuring the availability of this aircraft and the
viability of its sensors. Further, Congress initiated and
sustained for several years an upgrade to the SYERS imaging
sensor that, among other things, would allow the sensor to be
carried in the `Q-bay' of the aircraft such that a radar sensor
and the SYERS sensor could be flown simultaneously. In wartime,
this dual capability could free up an entire orbit's worth of
U-2 aircraft. This appeared to Congress to be well worth the
small investment in the SYERS system.
The Committee has now learned that the aircraft fuselage
may have to be modified in order to carry SYERS in the Q-bay.
Specifically, a ``canoe'' would have to be added to allow the
camera to image out beyond about 45 degrees. The Committee is
more than a little irritated to learn of this constraint at
this late juncture. Also, it has beensuggested to the Committee
that the Air Force is, at a minimum, reluctant to undertake any
modification to the U-2 airframe, no matter how small, aside from
issues relating to safety or flight, in anticipation of the replacement
of the U-2 by platforms such as Global Hawk. The Committee does not
believe the U-2 will be fully replaced or retired for many years and is
not willing to forego improvements to this workhorse aircraft.
Based on the above, the Committee recommends an
authorization of $141.7 million, an increase of $5.0 million
for the upgrade and procurement of additional spares for the
SYERS.
Further, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a report to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees by March 15, 1998, on the need and the
costs to design and procure the number of ``canoes'' necessary
to allow SYERS and ASARS to be flown simultaneously. The report
shall include a statement of DoD policy regarding modifications
of the U-2.
Airborne information transmission, +$3.0 million
The budget request included $10.8 million in program
element 0305206D to continue testing and evaluation of the
Airborne Information Transmission (ABIT) system.
The Committee believes that all major airborne
reconnaissance systems should have the ability to communicate
and cooperatively operate sensor systems using widebandwidth,
high data rate communications. Such a capability would allow
real-time database sharing, cooperative target location, a long
haul ``reach back'' capability to national processing
facilities, and use/control of collection systems from platform
to platform (i.e., control of UAVs from manned reconnaissance
aircraft, remote operation of collection systems, etc.). To
that end, the Committee is pleased with the Department's Common
Data Link (CDL) and ABIT efforts.
Accordingly, the Committee requests the Department to
conduct a study on the costs, requirements, and benefits of
adding wide-band data links (both for air-to-air and air-to-
ground applications, and point-to-point and broadcast modes) on
all major airborne reconnaissance/surveillance aircraft.
Specifically, this study should examine the benefits of:
providing a capability to route signals that cannot
be processed tactically directly from the collection
platforms to national processing sites in the CONUS:
allowing split basing of assets;
maximizing intelligence community collection and
analysis potential by providing a capability to route
excess raw data collection to other processing/analysis
platforms or ground sites;
providing the ability to complete high speed data
base transfers from aircraft departing station to
aircraft coming on to station;
allowing precision target location via cooperation
direction finding and correlation of multiple
intelligence disciplines; and
allowing cooperative remote system operation;
The study should also provide the costs for developing and
installing this capability on the various aircraft. The
Committee requests the results of this study be provided to the
defense and intelligence authorization committees by March
1998.
The Committee notes, and applauds, the ongoing USAF efforts
to integrate CDL/ABIT capabilities on the RC-135 reconnaissance
aircraft, and believes this effort should be basis for all
future manned reconnaissance interoperability efforts,
including an ABIT capability on the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. The Committee recommends
an increase of $3.0 million for the USAF to lead this effort.
Further, specifically with respect to JSTARS program,
elsewhere in this report the Committee raised the issue of
whether the Navy requires unprocessed data from JSTARS and
other platforms that collect moving target indicator (MTI) and
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), in addition to processed tracks
transmitted via the narrow band Link 16. If DoD decides that
there is such a requirement, and the Committee considers that
to be likely, the Navy and DoD generally will need to decide
whether the existing JSTARS wide bank link, the Secure Common
Data Link (SCDL), is a practical choice for the Navy and other
potential users. First, all other MTI and SAR platforms (the U-
2, the endurance UAVs, and the Army ARL) are or likely will be
equipped with a wide band common data link (CDL), and the CDL
is already the Navy's standard and will be widely fielded on
large ships. It may not be feasible or practical to outfit
these ships with the SCDL, which is unique to JSTARS. It might
make sense to add CDL to JSTARS, or even to replace SCDL with
CDL.
The Committee appreciates fully that SCDL provides
excellent anti-jam capabilities and has a very large ground
footprint, which is essential to support widespread Army ground
stations. However, DoD is developing a CDL broadcast
capability, which might be sufficient for the Army in light of
the changed threat situation and the increased emphasis on
commonality and interoperability. The Committee believes that
the Army needs to consider also that shifting from SCDL to CDL
would enable the Army common ground stations to receive MTI and
SAR data from the U-2, the Army's own ARL platform (assuming it
is equipped with a downlink at all), and any future UAVs.
In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report, in
connection with the proposed Joint Mobile Target Engagement
ACTD, centralized processing of MTI data from all possible
sources (U-2s, Airborne Reconnaissance Low, UAVs. etc.), and
merging thecorrelated results with target identification
information, might be extremely important to battlefield awareness and
targeting. These processes might be greatly facilitated by common use
of CDL. Adding CDL to JSTARS would enable any appropriately equipped
ground site to perform the MTI correlation and target identification
function, including Navy ships. A CDL capability on JSTARS that could
operate in an air-to-air mode as well would enable JSTARS aircraft to
transfer MTI track histories and other databases as they are relieved
from station, and conceivably also to act as a central MTI processing
and correlation site--for situations where there is no ground presence
established.
The Committee directs the USD(A&T) to submit the report
requested above to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees by January 15, 1998. The Committee believes that the
USD(A&T) study effort should be coordinated with all the
services, the JROC, DARPA, and the JMTE ACTD program office.
Endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $282.1 million for endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles (EUAV). The research and development
request for high altitude endurance (HAE) UAVs contained $96.0
million for Global Hawk and $54.6 million for DarkStar, while
$116.5 million was requested for procuring the medium altitude
endurance (MAE) UAV Predator.
The Committee notes that, in 1995, the Department initiated
two Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) to
develop and demonstrate HAE UAVs at a cost estimate of
approximately $900 million. The purpose of these ACTDs was to
permit the rapid and affordable evaluation of advanced
capabilities resulting in air vehicles that could provide
military utility. The HAE ACTDs also included the specific
requirement that the air vehicles have a unit fly away cost of
$10.0 million in fiscal year 1994 dollars.
The Committee supports the need for determining the
military utility of the two long-dwell HAE UAVs for broad area
coverage. The Committee notes that OSD has unilaterally
determined to, at this time, scale back the number of air
vehicles, the number of ground stations and the length of the
user demonstration period. The Committee understands this is
due to cost growth and the desire to fly successfully and to
prove design configurations before producing more flight
vehicles. The cost growth, due to developmental problems, is
troublesome and lends support to the DoD Inspector General
conclusion that the technologies were not, in fact, fully
mature and ready for demonstration. While the ACTD model may
not have been the best approach for these programs, the
Committee supports the development and evaluation of these
systems. However, the Committee does not see the need to rush
these programs to the point where their success is imperiled.
The Committee strongly recommends that the Department
complete the ACTDs, including the complete user evaluation with
the Air Force's Air Combat Command over the period first
proposed, before authorizing a follow-on HAE UAV acquisition
program.
Due to the Department's reduction in Global Hawk air
vehicles from eight to five, the Committee believes there
should be a corresponding reduction in funds required for long
lead item purchases, and recommends a $22.0 million reduction
in this line.
The MAE UAV, the Predator, was established as an ACTD in
response to an urgent requirement identified by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1993. The Committee notes that while
there have been some operational issues with this system, it is
the first ACTD to make the transition to a production program.
The success of the Predator in a number of continental United
States exercises and two operational deployments to Bosnia has
prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek additional funding
for Predator, including a number of pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) upgrades to be included with production
systems. The Committee has learned, however, that as result of
this vehicle's success, the amount of spare parts and attrition
vehicles available appears to be insufficient. Therefore, the
Committee recommends an increase of $25.0 million to purchase
spare parts and attrition air vehicles for the operators.
High altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, common ground segment,
-$9.0 million
The budget request included $51.1 million in program
element 0305205D, line 138, for the high altitude endurance
(HAE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) common ground segment
(CGS). Of this, $9.0 million was for testing purposes.
The Committee understands that $10.0 million of fiscal year
1997 funds were authorized and appropriated for this same
testing. The Committee also understands that such testing was
not completed due to the delay in both HAE advanced concept
technologies demonstrations.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$42.1 million, a reduction of $9.0 million.
Defense airborne reconnaissance office, -$14.0 million
The budget request included $21.5 million in program
element 0305209D, line 142, and 31 billets for operation of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). Section 608
directs abolishment of this defense organization office
chartered under the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology).
The Defense Authorization Act of 1994 directed the
development of an organization to oversee and coordinate the
activities of the military Services with respect to the
development of airborne reconnaissance systems. The intent of
this law was to ensure the most effective expenditure of
defense funds within this mission area by forcing the services
to work closely together in the development and upgrades of
airborne reconnaissance systems.
The Committee notes the positive influence the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP) has had on the various
service and agency airborne reconnaissance programs. However,
the Committee has not been comfortable with the management
structure the Department of Defense put in place to manage the
DARP, nor with the extent to which the DARO has assumed
authority over service reconnaissance system acquisition
equities.
The Committee totally agrees with the founding concept of
the DARP, including the need to have a coordinating entity for
ensuring the service acquisition authorities have insight into
each others developments in order to maximize sharing of
capabilities and to reduce redundancies. The Committee also
supports the need to coordinate these service efforts from a
programmatic perspective. However, the Committee believes such
a coordinating function is more appropriately accomplished by
an intelligence organization vice an acquisition organization.
Therefore, section 608 also transfers the responsibilities of
the DARP to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, under
his authorities as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI).
The Committee authorizes $7.8 million, and 15 billets for DIA,
for this purpose. Elsewhere in this report, the remaining
personnel billets are redistributed to other JMIP programs.
The Committee's intent is to protect service acquisition
equities while providing an intelligence community-based, and
intelligence mission-focused, coordination authority. The
Committee believes transferring the DARP management to DIA,
coupled with the technical and operational standards
authorities vested in the National Security Agency, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Central MASINT
Office, will ensure the proper levels of authority over
investments and ensure system interoperability. Further, the
Committee expects the DIA responsibilities to be limited to
establishing joint reconnaissance policies and standards,
coordinating service efforts, including DARP budget
developments, and ensuring theater CinC and joint service
reconnaissance needs are addressed through interoperable
systems. Therefore, the Committee believes the services should
retain all funding and execution responsibilities over their
reconnaissance platforms, subject to a ``seal of approval''
from the DMI. The Committee does not see the need for the DMI
to execute research and development programs.
To accomplish the above, the Committee directs the
Director, DIA, to provide a transition plan, with a draft DMI
DARP charter, to the defense and intelligence committees before
conference on the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization bill.
RC-135 Rivet Joint reengining, +$52.0 million
The budget request did not include funding in aircraft
procurement, Air Force, for reengining the RC-135
reconnaissance fleet.
The Committee remains convinced the RC-135 aircraft will
continue to be the workhorse of manned special reconnaissance
well beyond the year 2020. In previous years, the Committee has
fully supported and added funding for this important re-
engining effort to ensure the long term viability of this
fleet. This support has been unwavering, in part, due to Air
Force assurances that, once begun, the Department would fully
fund this re-engining effort. This promise remains unfulfilled.
The Committee believes the Air Force and DoD handling of this
program has been woefully negligent.
The Committee is swayed by the General Accounting Office's
report on re-engining that states the Department would realize
a cost savings over the expected life of these aircraft in
excess of $1.5 billion over the cost of maintaining the current
TF-33 engines. The Committee further is impressed by the
mission enhancements made possible by these new engines.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of $52
million for re-engining two RC-135 with the CFM-56 engines.
Further, the Committee expects the Department to request funds
for this program within the Air Force's Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Program in future years.
Joint mobile target engagement, advanced concept technology
demonstration, +$10.0 million
The budget request included no funding in P.E. 305206D for
the reconnaissance portion of the proposed joint mobile target
engagement (JMTE) advance concept technology demonstration
(ACTD). The Committee strongly supports the goals of this ACTD
to correlate moving target indicator (MTI) data streams from
varied systems such as the Joint Surveillance and Targeting
System (JSTARS), the U-2, the Airborne Reconnaissance Low
(ARL), unmanned aerial vehicles, and others. Also, the ACTD
would focus on the concept of automatically tracking targets of
interest based on disparate intelligence inputs.
The benefits from correlating muliple moving target
indicator (MTI) radar data streams appear to be enormous,
particularly when coupled to new auto-tracking algorithms and
when the resulting track files are stored and available for
replay. This ACTD will determine the feasibility of combining
current and historical target identification information, such
as imagery taken hours before the exploited product becomes
available, to make positive target identifications. Currently,
delays typically experienced in exploiting and disseminating
traditional imagery collection often preclude such data from
being used in engaging mobile targets. The Auto-tracking and
automated weapon-target pairing algorithms developed in this
ACTD should eliminate two large bottlenecks that currently
would prevent efficient use of wide-area sensors like JSTARS,
and the inherent attack capabilities of U.S. tactical-air and
ground-attack missiles. Also, correlating multiple MTI data
streams should enable precise target location even with radars
with poor azimuth resolution.
The Committee notes that DoD underestimated the cost of
this ACTD at the time the budget was formulated. The Committee
recommends authorizing $10 million above the request for this
program but directs that none of these funds be obligated until
the Air Force or other organizations provide the balance of
funding required in fiscal year 1998. The Committee expects
that, as part of the ACTD, DoD will examine the costs and
benefits of adding a moving target indicator (MTI) mode to all
the endurance UAVs; the need for correlation, auto-tracking,
and weapon-target pairing capabilities in airborne platforms
(such as JSTARS), on Navy ships, and, in a scaleable fashion,
in Army common ground stations; and the need for wideband
datalinks on the collection platforms. The Committee recommends
further that this ACTD be coordinated with the arsenal ship
demonstration, as appropriate, and the Navy's efforts to
integrate JSTARS into Navy deep-attack capabilities.
Electro-optic framing technologies, +15.0 million
The budget request included $7.0 million in program element
0303526D, line 139, for electro-optic (EO) framing
technologies.
The Committee has been very supportive of efforts to
further the EO framing with on-chip forward motion compensation
(FMC) technologies, and has been very pleased with the efforts
to develop high resolution and ultra-high resolution EO
backplanes. The Committee understands the fiscal year 1998
request does not reflect efforts to push this technology beyond
the visible spectra, nor does it sufficiently fund the ultra-
high resolution (UHR), 100 mega-pixel, focal plane array (FPA)
developments. The latter capability is necessary to increase
the instantaneous field of view to the equivalent of current
wet film cameras.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional $15
million in this program element for the following purposes:
$8.0 million for continued development of the UHR
FPA, including modular, miniaturized electronics, and
conformance with JPEG 2000 wavelet compression
standards. This development should result in a form/fit
operational insertion into currently deployed CA-260
framing cameras.
$3.5 million for operational insertion of tactical
infra-red EO framing technologies and image intensified
EO framing sensors with on-chip FMC. This should result
in form fit replacements for evaluation in the Richmond
Air National Guard reconnaissance pods.
$3.5 million for developing an infra-red module into
the existing EO framing sensor on the Darkstar unmanned
aerial vehicle.
Theater airborne warning system, +20.0 million
The budget request did not include funding for the Theater
Airborne Warning System (TAWS), a medium-wave infrared (MWIR)
sensor system capable of tracking and calculating the launch
points of tactical ballistic missiles.
In the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization, the
conferees encouraged the Department of Defense to move forward
with a near-term, cost effective program to transfer the mature
TAWS MWIR technology from the RC-135 Cobra Ball aircraft to the
RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft. The Department's response was to
determine whether the TAWS or the `Eagle' system installed on
the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, would
provide the most effective theater missile defense collection,
analysis and warning capability. A resulting decision selected
neither, and, instead, recommended such a capability be
installed on the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft.
The Committee understands that if the ABL goes into full
production, only a hand-full of aircraft will be built with an
initial operating capability in 2006. This does not appear to
be the near-term solution the conferees were hoping for.
Additionally, the committee questions where these limited
number of aircraft will be assigned and whether they can
provide the theater collection and warning missions that TAWS
or EAGLE would.
The Committee believes a near-term theater TBM analysis and
warning capability is needed. Further, the Committee believes
this mission is best satisfied by a reconnaissance aircraft.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $20.0 million in Aircraft
Procurement, Air Force, line 60, for migrating the TAWS MWIR
technology from the Cobra Ball to the Rivet Joint aircraft.
Digital terrain elevation data, +$2.0 million
The budget request included no funding in program element
0305206D for developing a digital terrain elevation data (DTED)
collection capability for aircraft.
The stated requirements for DTED are very stringent and may
cost the Department of Defense more than it can afford using
current and planning collection methods. There are also
indications that the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment for
intelligence and reconnaissance casts doubt on the need for
worldwide DTED at the currently required levels (levels 3, 4,
and 5). Instead, the Committee believes it may be sufficient to
have the surge capability to collect such data only when needed
with an airborne system. However, no such DTED collection
capability currently exists.
The Committee therefore recommends an authorization of $2
million in this program element for the Department to conduct
an analysis to determine design trades from which to choose a
airborne platform to perform such fine DTED data collection.
This analysis should determine whether an embedded system or a
``remove and replace''configuration that could be installed as
necessary on an airframe of opportunity makes the most sense. The
Committee requests the results of this analysis be provided to the
defense and intelligence committees no later than April 1, 1998.
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, no budgetary action
The Committee is concerned about the manning of the
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Specifically, the
Committee has informally inquired about the morale and
motivation of rated Air Force officer pilots flying the
Predator. The Committee has also questioned the costs of flight
qualifying a pilot in high performance jet aircraft, then to
send them to fly the Predator, a low performance aircraft. The
Committee has questioned whether enlisted personnel could be
flight qualified in low performance commercial aircraft,
certified and licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration
and given a specialty code of Predator pilot. The Committee
firmly believes the costs associated with such training would
be dramatically lower than that of rated officers. The
Committee also believes the morale and motivations of enlisted
pilots would be extremely high, possibly higher than that of
rated pilots taken from their cockpits. Finally, the Committee
believes the high quality of the Air Force's enlisted personnel
is, without question, a factor that would safely and
effectively allow such pilots.
Therefore, the Committee requests the Air Force to conduct
a study of creating an enlisted pilot specialty code for the
Predator UAV. The study should review the feasibility of
training, employing, and maintaining enlisted pilots. It should
compare the costs of training, the career salary costs, and the
retirement cost projections of enlist pilots versus rated
pilots. Finally, the study should carefully explore the morale
and motivational issues. The Committee requests the results of
this study be provided to the defense and intelligence
committees by February 1, 1998.
Darkstar, no budgetary action
The investigation of the crash last year of the first
Darkstar unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the experience of
trying to field the Predator after its successful demonstration
have revealed that reliability is an important issue for these
advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs). In
principle, an ACTD is to demonstrate technology and need not--
perhaps should not--expend many resources to ensure that the
demonstrated system is ready for serial production. However, in
practice, the Department of Defense has demonstrated a
proclivity to move directly into production with ACTD
configurations immediately after successful demonstrations.
Taking production issues into account in designing systems for
ACTDs, therefore, would appear to be prudent, especially in
cases (such as the endurance UAVs) where a unit price cap is a
determining factor in the success of the program. The Darkstar
program office is currently examining high-payoff reliability
improvement measures for the system. The Committee directs
Department to provide the results of this review and any
actions taken as a result by February 15, 1998.
The Committee also requests the Department to sponsor a
study of the operational benefits of adding a moving target
indicator (MTI) radar capability to the Darkstar, and the costs
of doing so. This study should be coordinated with the program
office of the Joint Mobile Target Engagement ACTD, assuming it
gets underway in fiscal year 1998. The study should be
submitted to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees by April 1, 1998.
Joint planning and program review, fence $2.0 million
The budget request included $6.6 million for Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) general support to the defense
community. Based on anti-terrorism and force protection
directives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this
request included funding for moving DIA elements within the
Pentagon and to leased spaces.
The Committee supports new DIA efforts, within this
project, to provide intelligence assessments, intelligence
inputs to Defense Planning Guidance, and other intelligence
support functions. The Committee hopes that these efforts are
indeed having an impact on defense planning and programming.
The Committee further notes that the budget justification
materials assert that these DIA assessments have ``determined
shortfalls in current high-cost reconnaissance and surveillance
programs and identified/prioritized specific near-term
solutions, which resulted in great savings across Future Year
Defense Plan (FYDP).'' Therefore, the Committee requests that
the Director of DIA provide the defense and intelligence
committees a report on these assessments before the fiscal year
1998 conference.
Further, the Committee does not believe there is inadequate
justification in the request for a 35 percent increase in
funding for moving personnel. Therefore, the Committee
recommends a limitation on the obligation of $2.0 million of
the request until the Department provides the Committee with a
detailed explanation and rationale for the increased costs
incurred by the DIA for these forced moves.
Tactical support, -$1.2 million
The budget request included $9.9 million for continued
support to the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
(TENCAP) programs, to provide management support to
intelligence processes, and for funding contingency operations
for Operation Southern Watch.
Elsewhere in this report, the Committee has recommended
reductions to the TENCAP programs, as it believes the
utilization of space has become more commonplace, and therefore
requires less specialized management support. Additionally, the
Committee does not believe a funding increase for Operation
Southern Watch is justified. Therefore, the Committee
recommends an authorization of $8.7 million for the OSD
Tactical Support effort, a reduction of $1.2 million.
Joint reserve intelligence program, +$2.1 million
The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP) is a new
initiative designed to improve a structure wherein military
reserve units can actively engage in direct, operational
support to CinCs and the services, thus, promoting the DoD
Total Force concept. The Committee fully supports the JRIP and
believes that utilizing military reservists in a virtual
analytic environment, particularly for analysis against lower
tier countries, is critical if the Intelligence Community is to
have flexible and global coverage. Therefore, the Committee
authorizes $2.1 million for use in purchasing/leasing
computers, facilities, programs and personnel (reserve man-
days) as deemed appropriate by the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Intelligence and Security).
Foreign instrumentation intelligence, no budgetary action
The budget request contained no funding or personnel
billets in the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) for
Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence (FISINT) analysis.
The Committee is concerned about the significant reduction
in the number of weapons-specific FISINT analysts. While some
decline in this capacity may have been justified following a
decline in certain missile test activities, it is not
consistent with the corresponding increase in other missile
developments and testing. Numerous countries that did not
retain such weapons capabilities during the bi-polar Cold War
era are now able to obtain or indigenously develop high
technology missiles and components. Many of these weapons could
be used to threaten U.S. and allied forces. The Committee is
convinced that weapons FISINT analyst levels have dropped too
far, postponing important analysis of weapons systems and
increasing gaps in U.S. understanding of new weapon systems.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that of the positions
realized as result of the abolishment of the Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Office directed elsewhere in this report, eight
personnel billets should be made available to the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, under his authorities as the
Defense General Intelligence Applications Program Coordinator,
to rebuild weapons FISINT analysis capabilities. The Director,
DIA will allocate these billets to the National Security
Agency, the National Aerospace Intelligence Center, the
Missiles and Space Intelligence Center, and the Office of Naval
Intelligence as required.
Special technology support, -$2.0 million
The budget request included $11.7 million in program
element 0603704D, line 36, for various Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security) quick reaction
intelligence support projects.
The Committee fully supports funding for the Department's
efforts to quickly respond to unforeseen theater and unified
command technical requirements. However, the Committee believes
the justifications provided for fiscal year 1998 indicate that
much of the activities in this program do not fall within this
category and ought to be pursued, if at all, by Services or
other DoD technology development agencies.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$9.8 million for this project, a decrease of $2.0 million.
Command and control, communications, computers and intelligence
integrated architecture plan, +$5.7 million
The budget request included $3.6 million for the Command
and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C41)
Integrated Architecture Plan (CIAP).
CIAP provides the Commanders in Chief (CINC) in-depth
analysis of regioncentric intelligence issues resulting in
regional intelligence support plan, resource programming and
operational architecture design. The Committee has been very
supportive of this effort, and is concerned that it is once
again underfunded jeopardizing the completion of CIAP plans for
several of the regional CINCs. The Committee believes these
plans provide a unique analytical basis for future intelligence
decisions, and that intelligence funding will be most
effectively programmed and expended with such analysis.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a total of $9.3 million
in this P.E. for the CIAP efforts, an increase of $5.7 million.
Optionally piloted aircraft, +$2.5 million
The budget request included no funding for the ``Owl''
Optionally Piloted Air Vehicle (OPV).
The Committee firmly believes development of this multi-
functional aircraft will produce a unique, low-profile,
airborne observation platform, providing an inexpensive, long-
dwell reconnaissance capability for counter-drug, law
enforcement and other agencies. The Committee understands that
U.S. Government funding for this aircraft would provide the
basis for a federal/private industry partnership, with the
majority of funding to be provided by the private industry
partners.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $2.5 million for this
project in program element 0305889D. These funds will remain
fenced pending the private industry funding.
NAASW report language
The Congress has repeatedly addressed the need to maintain
two separate, independent but coordinated non-acoustic anti-
submarine warfare (NAASW) programs within the Department of
Defense. The Congress has also addressed the need for adequate
and stable funding and for a stable management environment for
both programs.
Funding for NAASW has been reduced in recent years, and the
Department's efforts have been reduced to three continuing
efforts: the Navy's SSBN Security Program, the Office of Naval
Research's (ONR) long-term science and technology efforts, and
the OSD/C31 Advanced Sensor Applications Program (ASAP).
Because of the degraded acoustic environment and smaller
areas, the committee believes that today's emphasis on littoral
warfare substantiates the need for research and development in
NAASW technologies. The committee understands that the Navy
currently assesses that no NAASW technology available today or
in the foreseeable future threatens deep submarines in the open
ocean. However, some of these technologies might prove to be
effective ASW tools in the confined, shallow waters of the
littoral.
The committee expects that the SSBN Security Program will
remain the Navy focal point for evaluating technical concepts
to determine their possible threat to the SSBN force, and the
potential for ASW utility. The ONR should continue to support
advanced technology developments which have strong potential to
improve our NAASW posture. The ASAP is expected to continue
investigating advanced technology in NAASW. The committee
believes that a senior oversight group needs to be maintained
to provide technical and policy direction and to ensure the
coordination and integration of ASAP and the Navy program.
The Secretary of Defense is directed to address the
Department's NAASW program as an area of special interest to be
included in the Secretary's detailed ASW report when that
report is submitted to the Congress with the submission of the
fiscal year 1999 budget request.
Mapping, charting and geodesy, -$0.8 million
The budget request included $8.4 million in Operations and
Maintenance, Defense-wide, for continued National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) support to the Defense Intelligence
Counter-Drug's (DICP) mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G)
requirements.
The Committee has taken action elsewhere in this report to
modernize and streamline NIMA MC&G operations. This action
forces NIMA to move toward privatization and use of geospatial
data maintenance rather than developing products. The Committee
believes the DICP will benefit from these changes.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$7.6 million for this effort, a decrease of $0.8 million.
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Satellite communications radios, +$3.6 million
The budget request did not provide funds for fielding or
operating satellite communications (SATCOM) radios at remote
Army Counterintelligence (CI) units in Korea.
The Committee is aware that communications shortfalls exist
to fully support CI units deployed throughout Korea and that a
recent study identified a requirement to provide SATCOM
capabilities to these units to ensure reliable connectivity
with them.
The Committee recommends $2.8 million in Other Procurement,
Army, line 63 for purchasing SATCOM radios for CI units in
Korea to correct this shortfall. The Committee also recommends
$0.8 million in Operations and Maintenance, Army to operate
these radios.
Airborne reconnaissance low, no budgetary change
The Committee notes that the U.S. Army redirected fiscal
year 1996 funding, authorized and appropriated to convert
Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL)-I and ARL-C aircraft into the
multi-intelligence ARL-M configuration, into developments for a
Moving Target Indication (MTI) Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).
While this capability was required, Congress was not properly
notified and did not authorize this shift of funding. Report
language in the fiscal year 1997 bill stated congressional
concern for the Army's actions.
The Committee has now learned, again after the fact, that
the Army has redirected fiscal year 1997 funding from the ARL-M
conversions to acquire two additional ARLaircraft. Once again,
the congressional oversight Committees were not properly notified
before the Army completed its actions, nor did they formally agree to
this action. While the Committee now agrees with the rationale for the
decisions, the Army's process leading to these actions is not
acceptable. The Committee does not condone the Army's purchase of two
new aircraft without specific congressional authorization.
Because of the Army's actions, the Committee directs the
ARL program be identified as a Congressional interest item. The
Army should not redirect any funding exceeding $2 million that
has been specifically authorized and appropriated for projects
in this program without prior formal approval from the defense
and intelligence committees. This restriction applies to fiscal
year 1998 and future year funding.
Join tactical terminal, no budgetary change
The Committee is aware that the Department of Defense is
attempting to move to the Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) to
receive the intelligence data broadcasts such as the Integrated
Broadcast Service and its antecedent datalinks. However, an
ongoing protest has delayed contract award and subsequent start
of engineering and production of the JTT. This will negatively
impact operational users who have an immediate need to receive
the current data broadcasts.
Therefore, the Committee supports the Services and Agencies
procuring available transceivers to serve these immediate needs
with funding requested for the JTT. However, the committee
directs that only the two radios, determined by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command and Control, Communications and
Intelligence) as migration systems, the Commander's Tactical
Terminal and the Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal, be
procured for this purpose.
Tactical air reconnaissance pod system, +$5.0 million
The budget request included no funding for development of
the F-18 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS)
Completely Digital (CD) capability.
The Committee has followed the TARPS digital (DI) electro-
optical (EO) improvements and is very pleased with the results
of this interim, but limited, capability. However, the
Committee believes there is a need to move to a production EO
capability with a larger format back plane that provides a
larger target area field-of-view. The Committee understands the
TARPS CD development would provide such a capability at
significantly less cost than a Navy purchase of the Advanced
Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS). In the fiscal
year 1997 Defense Authorization Act, Congress provided 45.0
million for the TARPS CD effort. As of this writing, the
Committee understands this funding had not been released to the
program office. The Committee also understands a total of $10.0
million is necessary to complete all the non-recurring
engineering for TARPS CD.
Based on the successful results from the interim DI
efforts, the Committee is convinced that CD will provide a cost
effective EO tactical manned reconnaissance capability to
replace the current film-based F-18 pods. Further, the
Committee believes the Navy is not moving forward with this
capability aggressively enough. Therefore, the Committee
recommends $5.0 million in Research and Development, Navy, line
151 for modifying TARPS CD using off-the-shelf equipment. The
Committee directs the Navy to move to TARPS CD production as
expeditiously as possible.
Close range unmanned aerial vehicle, +$5.0 million
The budget request included no funding within the Marine
Corps Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities aggregation
for developing or modifying a close range tactical unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) that satisfies specific Corps needs.
The Committee elsewhere in this report directs termination
of the Outrider Joint Tactical UAV, and directs several actions
designed to provide the services with the flexibility to
satisfy their unique needs. One approach is to purchase ``off-
the-shelf'' tactical UAVs. While the committee firmly believes
such vehicles exist and can be procured, it is concerned that
available UAV systems do not provide a secure digital data link
capability required in a sophisticated battlefield environment.
Therefore, the committee recommends $5.0 million in
research and Development, Marine Corps, line 167, for this
purpose. The committee believes the Marine Corps is the logical
service to investigate and develop this capability, and expects
the Marine Corps to make available all resulting capabilities
to the other services.
Join STARS integration, +$10.0 million
The budget request included $5.1 million in program element
0604231N for continued development and integration of new
functionality for the Joint Maritime Communications Information
System (JMCIS)--Afloat. None of the funds were requested for
including a capability within JMCIS to exploit Joint
Surveillance and Target Radar System (JSTARS) moving target
indicator (MTI) data.
The Committee believes there are compelling reasons for the
Navy to acquire the ability to use the Joint STARS radar
surveillance system. The Navy currently has no means to detect,
track, and locate moving targets, on a large scale, so as to
contribute meaningfully to operations ashore. The Navy and
Marine Corps aviation forces, future variants of the Tomahawk
missile, shore fire-support systems, the arsenal ship, and
amphibious forces will all require highly capable moving target
indicator (MTI) radar support for situation assessment and
targeting.
The Committee therefore recommends an increase of $10
million over the requested amount in this program element for
the following purposes:
(1) to integrate Link 16/TADIL J into JMCIS/GCCS core
software;
(2) to develop an interface from Link 16 JTIDS to
JMCIS/GCCS;
(3) to enable the JMCIS/GCCS correlation function to
use or interpret JSTARS data; and
(4) to enable JSTARS SAR data to be put the proper
format for use within JMCIS/GCCS.
It is important to note that most of these items--and most
of the expense--are required regardless of whether the Navy
itself is going to use JSTARS. Clearly, at some point, DoD will
have to pay the bill to integrate Link 16/JTIDS into GCCS. This
initiative would enable the Navy to exploit JSTARS through the
Link 16/JTIDS system. The Committee is concerned that this
approach will not serve all of the Navy's needs for JSTARS
support. Therefore, elsewhere in this report, the Committee
address the issue of enabling the Navy to receive wide-band
data from JSTARS and other platforms.
Advanced deployable system, +$10.4 million
The budget request included $33.5 million in program
element 0604784N for continued development of the Advanced
Deployable System (ADS), an element of the Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System (IUSS) program. The request included funds
for the concept evaluation, program definition, and risk
reduction phase of an ADS prototype and engineering and
manufacturing development for the production of the ADS.
To meet the requirement for providing reliable detection of
quieter threat submarines operating in the nosy and shallow
water of the world's littoral regions, a significantly improved
information processing and data fusion capability is needed for
support of ADS operations. The budget request is insufficient
for development of these capabilities and does not support the
conduct of an at-sea test to validate ADS performance in the
challenging littoral environments. Accordingly, the Committee
recommends an increase of $10.4 million to the budget request
for continued development and integration of automated
detection and data fusion algorithms, rapid prototyping of
information processing capabilities, and at-sea testing to
validate the expected improvements in ADS performance.
Navy F/A-18F tactical reconnaissance, no budgetary change
The Committee understands the U.S. Navy desires to provide
a long-term replacement for the F-14 Tactical Air
Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS) with an electro-optic
podded system for the F/A-18F Super Hornet. The Committee has
closely monitored the technical issues and difficulties
experienced by the Marine Corps with its internally-mounted
Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F/A-
18D. These problems have led the Committee to believe that a
podded reconnaissance capability is the most cost-effective and
mission-flexible approach for Navy fighter aircraft. This
belief would appear to be bolstered by the expected costs and
extent of modifications necessary to the low-observable F/A-18F
airframe if an internal sensor were to be chosen.
Therefore, the Committee applauds the Navy's decision to
develop a nondedicated podded reconnaissance capability for the
Super Hornet. The Committee stresses that if this Navy position
changes, the Committee will not favorably review future
requests for an internally-mounted F/A-18 reconnaissance
capability. Further, the Committee believes the Navy should, to
extent possible, ensure the TARPS completely digital (CD)
development efforts be transferable to the F/A-18F pods.
Finally, to ensure that the latest technologies are provided to
the users, the Committee directs that the development/
procurement of an F/A-18F podded system be competitively
awarded.
Tactical information program, +$4.0 million
The budget request contained $5.2 million in Operations and
Maintenance, Air Force, partly for operation of the Integrated
Broadcast Service (IBS) executive agency by the Air
Intelligence Agency (AIA).
The Committee believes the budget request does not
adequately fund the increased operational demands levied on AIA
as a result of the decision by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I) to direct the Air Force to manage the development
of the IBS data broadcast program. Therefore, the Committee
recommends an increase of $4.0 million for this purpose.
Elsewhere in this report, the Committee recommends a reduction
of $3.0 million from PE 0304111F, R-169, and $1 million from
Other Procurement, Air Force, line 113, as an offset for this
increase.
Integrated broadcast service, +$5.0 million
The budget request included $4.1 million in other
procurement, Air Force, line 47, partially for beginning
development of the standards for the OSD-approved Integrated
Broadcast Service (IBS).
The Committee fully supports OSD's efforts to coordinate
intelligence data broadcasts to the warfighter. To that end,
the Committee believes the IBS data link Executive Agent (Air
Force's Air Intelligence Agency) must be properly resourced to
accomplish its assigned tasked. Therefore, the Committee
recommends an increase of $5.0 million to fully develop the
standards and to accelerate the IBS technical/operational
architecture development. However, the Committee directs that
this funding not be obligated or expended without the specific
concurrence of the overall IBS program Executive Agent (the
Deputy Director, Space & Electric Warfare Division, HQ USN).
Theater airborne reconnaissance system, fence $6.2 million
The budget request included $6.2 million in aircraft
procurement, Air Force, for procuring podded electro-optical
camera systems for Air National Guard F-16 Block 30 aircraft.
The Committee notes that the total cost for the Theater
Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) capability has been
capped by Congressional direction at $50 million. The Committee
understands there has been significant upheaval in getting
underway with this project. The original contract award was, as
the Committee has informed, inevitably, protested. This protest
was settled in a strained contracting arrangement between the
prime contractor and the, now, subcontractor. The Committee
finds the private sector actions leading to the current
situation regrettable as the government has ultimately paid the
costs both in terms of additional funding and time getting
needed warfighting capabilities to American airmen. Further,
the government has not been without fault in this case.
Apparently, the Department has successfully positioned itself
to sole-source a second TARS sensor using the Advanced Tactical
Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) Medium Altitude Electro-
optical (MAEO) sensor. This has been accomplished by providing
a structural environment that will make other competitor's
offers too difficult and expensive to achieve. This, the
Committee finds intolerable.
In discussions with the Air Force, the Committee has
learned the current program results in a total contract worth
$38.9 million. The Committee now understands the Air Force
plans to use the fiscal year 1998 funding to award a sole-
source contract for six or fewer MAEO sensors. The purchase of
these sensors will maximize the overall TARS costs under the
$50 million cap. While the Committee absolutely disagrees with
the history that brought the Department to this point, it
agrees that a sole-source contract is now the only cost-
effective means for inserting this second sensor. However, the
Committee does question the logic for purchasing this limited
number of sensors. The Committee does not see the operational
utility and the logistical supportability of a single MAEO
sensor at each of five operational squadrons with a single
spare for all.
Therefore, the Committee fences all requested fiscal year
1998 funds until the Secretary of Defense provides to the
congressional defense and intelligence Committees a report
that:
(1) specifically details the history and the
decisions that resulted in the position forcing the
Department to select the MAEO sensor as a sole-source
item;
(2) provides operational rationale and requirements
for a follow-on purchase of six or fewer MAEO sensors,
and the operational impact if none are purchased;
(3) certifies any follow-on actions do not commit
funds that would exceed the $50 million cost cap
(excluding the cost of a follow-on data link
installation).
Moving target indicator radar, no budgetary action
As a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
Department of Defense has decided to reduce the planned
procurement of Joint Surveillance Target Attack System (JSTARS)
aircraft from 19 to 13. According to Department officials and
the QDR report, the major rationale for the reduction is that
13 aircraft is slightly more than sufficient for one major
conflict. And, if a second conflict were to erupt, some of the
aircraft assigned to support the first war could be shifted
over to the second. The QDR report also indicated that the
Department will investigate the potential for supplementing the
remaining JSTARS force with moving target indicator (MTI)
radars on endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. The report does
make a vague reference to funding ``key upgrades'' to JSTARS,
including the radar system and communications capabilities.
The National Defense Panel, in its initial reaction to the
QDR, criticized the decision to reduce the JSTARS buy as
inconsistent with the Department's rhetorical commitment to
dominant battlefield awareness and improved surveillance and
intelligence capabilities.
The Committee is struck by the Department's adoption of a
``swing'' strategy for critical reconnaissance capabilities. If
a swing strategy is appropriate for JSTARS, why isn't it
appropriate for virtually all surveillance capabilities? What
is the rationale for sizing the force of U-2s, UAVs, Rivet
Joints, EP-3s, Guardrail, the Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), and so on for two major conflicts if the MTI
radar need can be sized for one? Certainly, the distinction
cannot be based on differences in importance between MTI radar
and other collection disciplines, such as SIGINT or
conventional imagery, since the QDR's own Command, Control,
Communications, Intelligence and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Mission
Assessment (CMA) study affirms that MTI radar is a key to
achieving dominant battlefield awareness, something the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has publicly stated is
the underpinning for all the elements of his Joint Vision 2010.
Indeed, the CMA study, as well as the Department's proposed
Joint Mobile Target Engagement Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), postulates the additional MTI radar
resources, now fewer, are required to meet the Department's
warfighting needs.
The Committee believes additional MTI capabilities are
needed to provide coverage deep against strategic-level SAMs,
mobile missiles, and other forces; to enable precise target
location by integrating multiple sensors; and to allow
continuous tracking of identified targets. Ground surveillance
radar is a linchpin for a capability to attack mobile targets
with any efficiency and on a reasonable scale, with aircraft
and missiles. It is precisely this capability that lies at the
heart of modern military strategy.
The CMA study claims that technology is at hand for a
moderate-risk, near-term program to place JSTARS-like
capabilities on a UAV such as Global Hawk at a fraction of the
cost, despite the enormous differences in aircraft power and
payload. The CMA study also claims that technology advances
would support a low-risk program to fully reproduce JSTARS
capabilities on a business jet, again at great savings. The
Committee is aware that there is skepticism within the
Department regarding these claims. Furthermore, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has
reported to Congress that enhancements to the JSTARS radar
would be required to support a cruise missile defense mission.
The CMA study did not take such requirementsinto account in
calculating required radar performance for potential UAV replacements
for JSTARS, nor did it, apparently, take into account a potential
future decision not to continue with the high altitude UAVs beyond
their ACTDs.
In conclusion, the Committee is disturbed by the
Department's actions thus far on moving target surveillance.
The JSTARS decision has the appearance of being based on narrow
budgetary grounds and not on requirements. The decision does
not reflect what appears to be a need for more MTI radar
capabilities rather than less. It also does not comport with
assurances provided Congress over the last year regarding
advanced air defense capabilities. The QDR report mentions a
possibility of augmenting the residual JSTARS force with a UAV-
based capability, but the Department has yet to come to grips
with the technical issues involved in this or related
initiatives.
The Committee therefore recommends that the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a comprehensive study to
determine DoD's needs for MTI radar capabilities. The Committee
further recommends the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology conduct an associated study to
determine the appropriate technical approach to meeting these
needs. The studies should specifically assess the technical
basis for the conclusions reached in the CMA study, as well as
the implications of incorporating new requirements such as
cruise missile defense. The studies should be conducted in
whatever manner is necessary to ensure that all relevant
programs and activities are considered, regardless of
classification. The Under Secretary should submit a report on
this study to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees by April 1, 1998.
Tactical exploitation of national capabilities, -$12.1 million
The budget request included $107.2 million for various
Tactical Exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) and
related research and development projects within the service
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). This breaks down to:
$1.7 million in program element 0305884L in the JMIP
Defense Intelligence Tactical Program,
$12.3 million in program element 0604766A within Army
TIARA,
$11.0 million in program element 0605867N within Navy
TIARA,
$15.2 million in program element 0207247F within Air
Force TIARA,
$3.3 million in program element 0206313M within USMC
TIARA,
$1.0 million in program element 1160405BB within
SOCOM TIARA, and
$34.9 million in program element 0305159I within the
JMIP Defense Space Reconnaissance Program.
The Congress directed the establishment of the modest and
very successful TENCAP program in 1977. Since then, numerous
TENCAP projects have demonstrated and fielded capabilities that
allow tactical consumers to exploit the capabilities of
national space programs. These projects have, without question,
provided needed warfighting capabilities to military customers
around the world. The associated costs, however, have steadily
increased, and some projects are questionably space-related.
The Committee believes that the tactical
``operationalization'' of space has become commonplace within
military doctrine, planning, and execution. Space, today, has
become simply another dimension of warfare, and is now less an
enigma; we should, as a result, require fewer specialized
projects to inform, educate, and provide improved capabilities.
Also, the Committee believes the TENCAP programs have, to a
small degree, become a funding source for projects that are not
directly focused on exploiting national systems. Finally, the
now-public National Reconnaissance Office has an explicit
mission to provide support to military operations, and takes
this mission seriously.
While the Committee is fully supportive of the TENCAP
program, it believes there is a need to begin a decline in the
specialized projects to exploit space and national
capabilities. Such exploitation should, and must, be the focus
of new programs from the outset of their development.
Therefore, the Committee recommends the following
authorizations:
$1.5 million in program element 0305884L (-.2
million),
$36.0 million in program element 0604766A (-1.2
million),
$10.0 million in program element 0605867N (-1.0
million),
$14.0 million in program element 0207247F (-1.2
million),
$3.0 million in program element 0206313M (-0.3
million),
$1.0 million in program element 1160405BB (no
change), and
$30.0 million in program element 0305159I (-3.5
million).
Special operations forces intelligence vehicle, +$5.0 million
The budget request included no funding for improvements to
the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Intelligence Vehicle (SOF
IV).
The Committee fully supports the Special Operations
community and its needs for the most up-to-date intelligence
support capabilities such as the SOF IV. The Committee is aware
that current funding profiles do not begin block upgrades
approved in the evolutionary acquisition strategy until fiscal
year 1999. To ensure critical intelligence support is
available, the Committee believes the SOF IV must be upgraded
as quickly as possible to ensure its world-wide communications
connectivity and interoperability based on Defense Intelligence
Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE)
standards.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $5.0 million in P.E.
116405BB forimplementing evolutionary enhancements to the SOF
IV in support of deployed Joint Special Operation Command Task Forces
Headquarters. These funds will be used to develop and install a DII/COE
compliant dual local area network providing separate special
compartmented intelligence and collateral communications circuits over
a single communications path.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported
intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1998
Title I: Intelligence activities
Section 101--authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists those elements of the United States
Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year
1998.
Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified
Schedule of Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the
specific amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for
fiscal year 1998 for those United States Government elements
listed in Section 101. The details of the Schedule are
explained in the classified annex to this report.
Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 1998, to exceed the
personnel ceilings otherwise applicable to the components of
the Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not
to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings otherwise
applicable under Section 102. The Director may exercise this
authority only if doing so is necessary to the performance of
important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this
authority must be reported to the two Intelligence committees
of the Congress.
The Committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by
Section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of
personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with
flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for
contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance between
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The
Committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence
to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed
levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations, except for the
satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are
consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in
this legislation. In no case is this authority to be used to
provide for positions otherwise denied by Congress.
Section 104--community management account
Section 104 details the amount and composition of the
Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$147,588,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the staffing and
administration of various components under the CMA. Within such
amounts authorized, funds identified for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence
and Applications Program remain available through September 30,
1999.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 313 full-time
personnel for elements within the CMA for fiscal year 1998 and
provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the
CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes additional personnel
and funds for the CMA as are specified in the Schedule of
Authorizations, which is incorporated into this Act through
Section 102.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis except for temporary situations.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 to be made available
to the Attorney General by the Director of Central Intelligence
for the operation and management of the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC), above in Johnstown, Pennsylvania,
from the funds authorized for the CMA in Subsection (a)
located. Furthermore, Subsection (e) comprehends the NDIC's
need for long-term moneys so funds authorized for research and
development, and procurement remain available until September
30, 1999, and September 30, 2000, respectively for such
purposes.
Title II: Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system
Section 201--authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$196,900,000 for fiscal year 1998 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III: General provisions
Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that authorized appropriations for
salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation
or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations within this Act does not constitute authority
for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not
otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
Section 303--administration of the Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence
Section 303 amends Section 102(e) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) by reinserting language that was
inadvertently deleted when Congress enacted amendments to the
National Security Act of 1947 through the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. See P.L.104-293. This
language places the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence within the CIA, and clarifies that the CIA has the
authority to provide administrative support to entities within
the Office of the Director.
Section 304--detail of intelligence community personnel--
intelligence community assignment program (ICAP)
Section 304 provides authorization for the inauguration of
the Intelligence Community Assignment Program (``ICAP''). The
ICAP plan was developed as part of an effort to broaden the
perspective of Intelligence Community (``IC'') employees and to
create an additional mechanism by which employees can secure
rotational assignments within the IC. The Committee anticipates
that the ICAP will develop IC leaders with broad knowledge of,
and appreciation for, the issues facing the various elements of
the IC. Without this provision, the implementation of ICAP as
envisioned will not be possible. Enactment of this provision
will bring the United States Government one step closer to
achieving the goal of creating a more efficient and
``corporate'' Intelligence Community. This development is
applauded by the Committee.
The Committee understands that ICAP assignments will be two
to three years in duration and involve only GS-13 to Senior
Executive Service/Senior Intelligence Service positions.
Section 304 will allow heads of IC entities, or their
designees, to authorize long-term reimbursable or
nonreimbursable details within the ICAP.
Nonreimbursable details would be capped at three years;
however, the heads of the parent and host agencies could extend
such details for a period not to exceed an additional one year
when they determine an extension is in the public interest. The
provision also would authorize IC elements to pay ICAP
participants those benefits, allowances, travel, and/or
incentives otherwise provided by their organizations to enhance
staffing.
Current law could impede the effective implementation of
ICAP in two respects. First, under title 31, United States
Code, nonreimbursable details are restricted and must either
involve a matter related to the loaning agency's appropriation
and aid it in accomplishing the purpose for which the
appropriations are provided; or have a negligible impact on the
loaning agency's appropriations (generally viewed as a detail
of one year or less). This restriction would impede the ability
to establish the longer-term nonreimbursable rotations
necessary to provide adequate exposure to a broader range of IC
activities.
Second, under existing law, it is questionable whether
unique benefits, allowances, travel and/or incentives normally
payable to employees may continue to be paid to those employees
upon their detail to another IC organization. Employees may
view loss of such benefits as a penalty for participating in
ICAP and may be less willing to participate in the program.
With the enactment of this section, IC elements will be able to
provide special relocation bonuses and cost-of-living
allowances to employees on detail under the ICAP if it is
determined that the particular incentive is necessary to fill
the position. This determination should be made on a case-by-
case basis. This provision supplies much needed flexibility to
enable the ICAP to succeed.
The Committee hopes the ICAP will help address concerns
shared by senior IC managers, the Intelligence committees of
the Congress, and the Brown Commission, all of which
highlighted the need for IC employees to develop an IC-wide, or
more ``corporate,'' perspective of intelligence activities. The
Committee estimates that not more than 100 IC employees will be
involved in the ICAP, in its initial stage. That number of
expected to grow to close to 900 employees by fiscal year 2001.
The Committee requires that an annual report be provided to the
Intelligence committees on March 1 of each year concerning each
preceding 12 month period. The report is to be submitted by the
Director, or his or her designee, and should include a summary
of the efficacy of the ICAP, and the costs and benefits
realized by the IC and to the national security resulting from
the operation of the program.
Section 305--application of sanctions laws to intelligence
activities
Section 305 further extends the deferral of sanctions
provision in current law until January 6, 1999. This provision
was first included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996. It was extended until January 6, 1998, as
part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997. The provision amended the National Security Act of 1947
to give the President statutory authority to delay imposing a
sanction, uponhis determination that proceeding with the
sanction could compromise an ongoing criminal investigation or an
intelligence source or method. The President would be required to lift
any stay of sanction as soon as possible. Also, the provision would
require the President to report to Congress immediately upon imposing
any stay and when any stay exceeds 120 days.
The Committee believes it is worthwhile to reiterate the
Joint Statement of Managers to the Conference Report for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 as it
discussed the original amendment to the National Security Act,
currently found at Sections 901-905 of that Act.
The underlying provision, which would be extended for one
additional year by the Fiscal Year 1998 Act, ``permit[s] the
President to stay the imposition of an economic, cultural,
diplomatic, or other sanction or related action when the
President determines and reports to Congress that to proceed
without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an
intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal
investigation.'' See Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference to the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996, 104th Congress 1st Session, Report No.
104-427 at page 23. The underlying provision:
grants the President the authority to stay the
imposition of a sanction or related action. . . . [and]
requires that when a sanction or related action is to
be deferred due to the risk of compromise of a source
or method or an ongoing criminal investigation, the
source or method or the law enforcement matter in
question must be related to the activities giving rise
to the sanction. The section allows the President to
stay the imposition of a sanction or related action for
a specified period not to exceed 120 days.
Id. As part of this finding by the President, there must
also be a certification by the President that the delay in the
imposition of a sanction or related action will not be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States'
nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase the
threat or risk to United States' military personnel. Id.
The Committee emphasizes that this is not a sanctions
waiver provision, but rather a sanctions deferral provision.
The President is not authorized to avoid sanctions under this
section, but rather can only delay imposition in order to
accommodate the protection of sources and methods or to protect
the integrity of an ongoing criminal investigation.
In any event, the underlying provision ``requires that
reports to Congress pursuant to [the sanctions deferral
provision] be submitted promptly upon the President's
determination to stay the imposition of a sanction or related
action.'' Id. Any delay of sanctions decision that relates to
intelligence sources and methods must be reported to the
Intelligence committees of the House and Senate.
The Committee reaffirms the need for dialogue between
Congress and the Executive Branch on such questions of
sanctions and deferral of same. It is expected that whatever
reports are submitted to Congress will ``indicate the nature of
the activities giving rise to the sanction or related action,
the applicable law concerned, the country or countries in which
the activity took place, and other pertinent details, to the
maximum extent practicable consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods.'' Id.
The Committee fully anticipates compliance by the President
with the sanctions laws of the United States. That said,
however, the Committee also strongly believes that there is a
continuing need for this provision in the event a need to
impose sanctions becomes apparent, but doing so immediately,
without some delay, would jeopardize a criminal investigation
or sources and methods of intelligence collection. The
Committee expects that when the President chooses to exercise
the deferral authority, the utmost will be done to resolve the
underlying issues that permit deferral as soon as possible so
that the necessary and mandated sanctions will be imposed. The
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, as appropriate, should
be fully informed of the efforts being made to address the
circumstances that underlie any delay in the imposition of
sanctions.
The Committee understands that instances where sanctions
will be deferred will be rare, and that the deferral authority
will be exercised only when an intelligence source or method or
a criminal investigation is seriously at risk. Deferral of
sanctions should never be grounded on a generic or speculative
intelligence or law enforcement concern, nor should the
legitimate concern for the integrity of our intelligence
sources and methods and our criminal investigations be used as
a pretext to avoid imposing sanctions because doing so would
present diplomatic difficulties. The President must lift the
stay as soon as a determination is made that the risk to
sources and methods or the integrity of the criminal
investigation is no longer present were sanctions imposed.
Finally, any determination to defer sanctions should be
preceded by the rigorous interagency review process
contemplated by the conferees to the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996. See id.
Title IV: Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401--multiyear leasing authority
Section 401. Subsection (a) modifies Section 5 of the CIA
Act of 1949 to provide clear legislative authority for the CIA
to enter into multiyear leases of not more than 15 years'
duration for the purpose of ensuring cost-efficient acquisition
of overt Agency facilities. This authority is, of course,
subject to appropriations provided for in advance for either
the full cost of the lease or the first 12 months' cost, plus
estimated termination liability. In the latter case, leases
shall include a clause that conditions the lease upon the
availability of funds in any fiscal year. Additionally, funds
made available for termination liability remain available until
the costs associated with lease termination are paid. This
provision is similar to, and modeled after, Section 1072 of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (``FASA'') of 1994. In the
event a lease is not terminated early, excess termination
liability funds may be used to satisfy rental obligations in a
subsequent fiscal year. Lastly, available funds in any fiscal
year may be used to make lease payments for a maximum of 12
months beginning any time during that fiscal year. This
provision is similar to Section 1073 of FASA.
With the end of the Cold War, the CIA has been reorganizing
to meet new intelligence requirements. As part of this effort,
the CIA has been consolidating its overt facilities in the
Washington, D.C. area, and other locations. This process, as
well as future consolidation efforts, calls for the acquisition
of new leases that permit the CIA to relocate from outdated
facilities with poor workspace, outmoded communications, and
increased personnel security and safety risks. The ability to
enter into multiyear leases during this consolidation process
will result in savings to the Government, in both time and
money. Multiyear leases, because of their stability, are highly
desirable to commercial landlords and lenders. Multiyear
leasing authority will allow the CIA to negotiate with a wider
array of landlords, thus resulting in the best lease terms
possible for the Government. Multiyear leasing authority will
permit the CIA to conduct these negotiations in a more timely
manner than is currently possible. For these reasons, multiyear
leasing authority makes sense to the Committee and is an
important part of the CIA's efforts to meet the intelligence
challenges of the next century in a financially responsible
manner.
Subsection (b) would allow the CIA to enter into multiyear
leases beginning October 1, 1997.
Section 402--CIA central services program
Section 402 establishes a ``Central Services Program'' and
its necessary working capital fund at the CIA. The Central
Services Program will include a comprehensive program of
services for the CIA, and potentially other federal agencies,
that the Director of Central Intelligence determines can be
performed more appropriately and advantageously than through
other vendors. The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (``OMB'') must approve the inclusion of an enterprise
within the Central Services Program prior to its participation.
Section 402 also authorizes funds, not to exceed $5,000,000, to
be appropriated for the working capital fund of the Central
Services Program in fiscal year 1998. Provision is made for
reimbursement from applicable appropriations and other
authorized sources to recover the expenses of the fund's
operations.
The fund's purpose is to provide a ready source of funds to
pay for equipment, salaries, maintenance, operation, and costs
associated with the management of the Central Services Program,
which the Committee is willing to support as a potential means
of reducing government costs while improving services.
The fund may impose a fee and retain a portion of net
receipts, not to exceed four percent for: (1) the acquisition
of capital equipment, and (2) the improvement, development, and
implementation of information management services to include
financial management and payroll/personnel systems. Use of
retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, may only
be made with OMB approval, and after notification to the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees.
At the end of each fiscal year, any working capital that is
excess to the efficient operation of the Fund (and to the
amount of income retained, subject to the four percent limit)
shall be transferred into the Treasury as miscellaneous
receipts, after making provisions for prior year losses and
expanded fund operations, if any.
The legislation requires that an audit be conducted
annually by the CIA Inspector General. The form and content of
the audit is to be determined by OMB. In any event, however,
the audit must include an itemized accounting of the central
services provided, the cost of each service, the total receipts
received, the agencies or departments serviced, and the amount
of money returned to the U.S. Treasury. A copy of the audit is
to be made available to the Intelligence Committees of the
House and the Senate, to the OMB, and to the DCI.
The Central Services Program is a pilot program and is thus
scheduled for termination on March 31, 2000, unless
reauthorized by an Act of Congress.
Section 403--Protection of CIA facilities
Section 403 expands the law enforcement jurisdiction of the
CIA special police 500 feet beyond the confines of Agency
facilities, and also onto the Federal Highway Administration
(``FHWA'') property immediately adjacent to the CIA
Headquarters Compound, subject to certain limits on the
exercise of that law enforcement authority.
This expanded authority is required to enable the CIA to
respond effectively to an increasing threat of terrorist attack
against Agency personnel and facilities. Under existing law,
CIA special police officers lack authority to investigate
suspicious activity near but outside the boundaries of CIA
facilities.
Currently, the CIA special police must call the local
police to respond to a suspicious vehicle near a CIA facility.
Local police response time varies, however. A delay could
result in Agency personnel having little or no warning of the
detonation of a bomb. This provision seeks to protect the CIA's
rank and file employees from potential harm.
With the authority provided under this section, the CIA
special police could immediately investigate a threatening
situation if presented with reasonable grounds to believe a
threat to the CIA's employees or property existed. Such
investigation would at least allow the CIA special police to
decide if a sufficient threat existed to justify evacuation of
CIA personnel. The CIA special police could also seek to
question and identify an individual in the 500-foot zone or on
the FHWA property they reasonably believed, based on specific
and articulable facts, was surveilling an Agency facility as a
precursor to a terrorist attack.
Although the main rationale for the broader authority is to
enable more effective response to terrorist threats, the
authority would not be limited solely to countering such
threats. The provision also would enable a special police
officer to investigate (and, if allowable by law, detain)
individuals or activities within the 500 foot zone, consistent
with the law enforcement authorities of other federal police
officers. The section does not change the special police
officers' authority under current law to approach and, on a
consensual basis, question and seek identification from
individuals in the 500-foot zone or on the FHWA property.
Section 403 does not, however, provide a statutory basis to
patrol within the 500 foot zone. The Committee understands that
CIA special police officers currently conduct such external
perimeter patrols of the CIA Headquarters property pursuant to
the authority granted the Director of Central Intelligence
under Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949. That statute does not
authorize follow-up by the officers should the need arise. The
Committee appreciates the need to continue such external
perimeter patrols, but also understands the need to follow-up
or investigate any potential criminal activity that likely
threatens the CIA, its employees, or property. The Committee,
however, in no way, envisions a general grant of police
authority in the 500 foot zone of protection created by this
legislation, but does intend that CIA special police officers
can function as federal police within that 500 foot zone, with
all attendant authorities, capabilities, immunities, and
liabilities, when the need arises, for the limited purpose of
protecting CIA employees and property. Any detentions or
arrests executed by the special police shall only be for a
limited duration (i.e., only long enough to turn the suspects
over to the appropriate state, local, or federal law
enforcement authorities).
There would be several limits on the new authority. First,
it is restricted to the open areas within 500 feet of a CIA
facility, and to the FHWA property immediately adjacent to the
CIA Headquarters Compound.
Second, the authority can be exercised only where the CIA
special police officer identifies specific and articulable
facts giving the officer reason to believe that the exercise of
such functions is necessary to protect the security of CIA
installations, property, or employees. Thus, special police
officers would not be authorized to issue traffic tickets in
the 500-foot zone, or on the FHWA property. Also, once the
special police officer does begin to investigate suspected
criminal activity, the special police officer's actions must
conform with the well-established legal standards in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), and its progeny, as to investigative
stops of private citizens.
Third, the new authority would not preclude or limit in any
way the authority of any federal, state, or local law
enforcement agency or of any other federal police orfederal
protective service. The CIA will seek agreements with such other
agencies and/or services as to the exercise of the new authority,
including the statutory violations the CIA special police would plan to
act on in the 500-foot zone or on the FHWA property. With regard to the
FHWA property, the Agency's intent is to execute a formal agreement
with the FHWA that addressed not only the statutory violations issue
but also the broader range of operational, administrative, and
transactional matters that would be presented by the new authority and
interagency relationship.
Finally, the Agency rules and regulations, including those
enforced by criminal penalties, that apply within the CIA
facilities are not extended into the 500-foot zone or to the
FHWA property. This means, for example, as with current law,
that individuals in the 500-foot zone outside CIA facilities
would not be barred from having cameras or taking pictures of
CIA facilities.
Title V: Department of Defense
Section 501--Authority to award academic degree of bachelor
of science in intelligence
Section 501 amends Section 2161 of title 10, U.S.C., to
show that the former Defense Intelligence School was renamed as
the Joint Military Intelligence College (``JMIC''), in order to
reflect the nature of the College as a joint institution of
higher learning. The amendment also authorizes the President of
the College to confer the undergraduate degree of Bachelor of
Science in Intelligence (BSI) on graduates of the College who
have fulfilled the requirements for that degree.
The increasing complexity in the field of intelligence has
created the need for a highly educated professional workforce.
Although the need to broaden the intelligence knowledge of
Intelligence Community professionals has been recognized in
degree programs such as the Masters of Science of Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI), the professional development of the
Intelligence Community should not be limited to senior-level
personnel. A substantial portion of the community is composed
of intelligence personnel in the E-5 through E-9, warrant
officer, and equivalent civilian grades. The Intelligence
Community would benefit greatly by the addition of an
undergraduate degree program designed to educate junior
intelligence professionals. The Committee encourages the JMIC
to admit to the BSI program those qualified individuals that
provide intelligence support through their roles as Reservists
within the various military departments.
The BSI is a degree completion program developed by the
Joint Military Intelligence College focusing on intelligence
collection and analysis, providing an intelligence major for
those who have completed the first three years of an
undergraduate program. This is a cost-effective means of
increasing the professional competence of a key segment of the
Community. It also serves to underpin a coherent career
development program which may include the MSSI.
In his March 1996 Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, the Secretary of Defense advised that the college was
taking the steps necessary to acquire this additional degree
granting authority. The BSI degree program enjoys wide support,
which includes the Joint Military Intelligence College Board of
Visitors, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
each of the Service intelligence organizations. As stated in
the Department of Education report on the college's
application, the program has already received informal support
from the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, the
accreditation authority for the Joint Military Intelligence
College. The program has been fully piloted, reviewed, and
approved by the U.S. Department of Education.
Section 502--Unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal of
National Reconnaissance Office
Section 502 prohibits private organizations from publicly
using the name and initials of the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) to convey the misleading impression that their
services were sponsored or endorsed by the NRO, except with the
specific written permission of the Secretary of Defense, or
Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The NRO became
``public'' in September 1992. The Central Intelligence Agency
and National Imagery and Mapping Agency currently have
identical provisions prohibiting unauthorized use of their
names, initials, and seals. See Section 13 of the CIA Act, 50
U.S.C. Sec. 403m (CIA); 10 U.S.C. Sec. 445 (NIMA).
Section 503--Extension of authority for enhancement of
capabilities of certain army facilities
Section 503 extends through the end of the fiscal year
1999, the authority granted the Army in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for the rectification of
infrastructure and quality of life problems at Bad Aibling and
Menwith Hill Stations. With respect to Bad Aibling Station,
this authority is requested as an interim measure for
contingency maintenance, pending any final decision on the
status of the Station.
The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station
in fiscal year 1995 and Menwith Hill Station in fiscal year
1996. Without Congressional action, the Army is prohibited by
31 U.S.C. Sec. 1301 from using appropriated funds to support
these field sites, notwithstanding that the Army is the
Executive Agent for them. Language in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 provided the necessary
flexibility to allow the Army to transfer or reprogram
relatively minor amounts of funds (up to $2 million in fiscal
year 1996 O&M and $2 million in fiscal year 1997 O&M funds) for
necessary maintenance at these stations. Sufficient funding,
however, has not been available to allow the Army to meet all
of the stations' needs, given financial constraints and
increasing operational tempo. Consequently, in order to
continue addressing infrastructure and quality of life needs at
Menwith Hill Station and to be able to meetcontingencies on an
interim basis at Bad Aibling Station, the Committee extends the Army's
flexible transfer and reprogramming authority through fiscal year 1999.
Title VI: Miscellaneous community program adjustments
Section 601--coordination of armed forces information
security programs
Section 601. At present, service and defense agency
Information System Security Program (ISSP) budgets appear to
differ considerably in amount, thrust, and implementation. In
the past, communication security focused on point to point
traffic, minimizing the need to coordinate actions. In an age
of networked communications, however, the weakest link can be
exploited to the potential detriment of all. Therefore,
coordination in planning and execution is critical. Currently,
the services are required under National Security Directive 42
to consult with the National Security Agency regarding their
budgets. The Committee believes, however, that in the future,
these programs and budgets must obtain the concurrence of the
NSA, so that coordination and overall security may be
maximized. Thus, the necessity for Section 601.
Additionally, the Committee expects greater detail in
Congressional Budget Justification Books regarding future
service ISSP budget submissions, and expects that each of the
services, and the head of any defense agency, will provide the
NSA, and the Committee, with an itemization of the expenditure
of funds authorized and appropriated for these purposes.
Section 602--authority of executive agent of integrated
broadcast service
Section 602 directs that no current or future fiscal year
funds for any intelligence or intelligence-related data
broadcast system may be obligated or expended without consent
of the Integrated Broadcast (IBS) Service Executive Agent.
Section 603--predator unmanned aerial vehicle
Section 603 directs that those functions with respect to
the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle currently performed by the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Joint Program Office are hereby
transferred to the Air Force. Concurrently, all Predator
funding within the Defense-wide Program Element 0305205D is
transferred to the Air Force Program Element 0305154F.
Section 604--U-2 sensor program
Section 604 directs the Department of Defense to ensure
that the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft's RAS-1 sensor suites are
maintained at a constant operational inventory of 11 systems.
This provision also requires the Department to maintain these
systems in a manner consistent with threat technologies until
the aircraft is retired or until a follow-on sensor suite is
developed and fielded.
Section 605--requirements relating to congressional budget
justification books
Section 605. The Congressional Budget Justifications Books
(CBJBs) for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)
and the Congressional Justification Books (CJBs) for the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) programs represent
the official documentation provided yearly by the Community
Management Staff (CMS) and the Defense Department to the
Congress on the President's intelligence budget request. These
documents provide the official budget numbers, by program, with
which the Congress evaluates the President's proposed
intelligence program and renders decisions on individual
programs and policy matters.
The Committee is concerned, however, that the current
budget documents lack several critical components necessary for
the Committee to ensure proper alignment of funding within the
funding appropriations categories. Clear identification of each
project; its specific budget request numbers; the appropriation
category (e.g., Other Procurement, Defense-wide; RDT&E, Navy;
etc.); the budget request line number, and if a research and
development project, the Program Element number essential to
this task. Further, the Committee requires a detail accounting
of all program reprogramming/reallocation actions including the
distribution of all Congressional adds and their status, where
unallocated cuts/taxes were taken, and identification of total
program costs (such as aircraft or spacecraft and associated
ground station costs including systems engineering/systems
integration costs and operations support). Therefore, the
Committee directs the CMS and the Defense Department to provide
this specific data in all future budget justification
documents.
Finally, the Committee is also concerned that past and
current request documents have not consistently shown all
direct and associated funds requests for intelligence programs.
Research and development costs in the Defense Cryptologic
Program, for example, are not identified specifically with the
programs that are the direct beneficiaries. Also, operations
and maintenance costs are often carried in a service's total
obligation authority and not specifically identified in the
CJBs. The Committee cannot fully understand the magnitude of
budgetary actions without fully and clearly understanding all
the costs of a program. Therefore, the Committee directs that
in future CBJBs and CJBs all direct and associated costs, in
each budgetary category (e.g., procurement, research and
development, operations and maintenance, military construction,
etc.) be clearly and completely provided in each program
request.
Section 606--joint SIGINT program office
Section 606 directs the Air Force Joint Airborne Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) Program Office to coordinate with the
affected military service headquarters prior to modifying any
ongoing Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) contract and/or
before contracting for new (JSAF) developments that may
directly affect the services' operational satisfaction of
intelligence requirements.
Section 607--discontinuation of the Defense Space
Reconnaissance Program
Section 607 mandates the discontinuation of the Defense
Space Reconnaissance Program, a program within the Joint
Military Intelligence Program, and the termination of the
Defense Space Program Office beginning with the fiscal year
1999.
Section 608--Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office
Section 608 directs that the Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Office, chartered as a Defense Organization
under the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) be abolished. The oversight functions of this
office are transferred to the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Committee Position
On June 5, 1997, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, a quorum being present, approved the bill, as
amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and, by
a recorded vote of 15 ayes to 0 noes, ordered the bill, as
amended, favorably reported. On that vote the Members present
recorded their votes as follows:
Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr. Lewis--aye; Mr.
Shuster--aye; Mr. McCollum--aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr.
Boehlert--aye; Mr. Bass--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr.
Dicks--aye; Mr. Dixon--aye; Mr. Skaggs--aye; Ms.
Pelosi--aye; Ms. Harmon--aye; Mr. Skelton--aye; Mr.
Bishop--aye.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House
of Representatives, the Committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject of this bill.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee held 9 hearings,
as well as a number of briefings, on the classified
legislative, personnel, programmatic, and budgetary issues
raised by H.R. 1775. Testimony was taken from the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National
Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, numerous program managers, and various other
knowledgeable witnesses on the activities and plans of the
Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. The bill,
as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions reached by
the Committee in light of that oversight activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The Committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 7(a) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 1998 and
the five years following if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI of
the Rules of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to
sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the Committee submits the following estimate prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 12, 1997.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1775, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn Sauter.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 1775--Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998
Summary.--H.R. 1775 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence activities of the United
States government, the Community Management Account, and the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 1775 would result in additional spending of $153 million
over the 1998-2002 period, assuming appropriation of the
authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill would
not affect direct spending or receipts in 1998; thus pay-as-
you-go procedures would not apply to it. The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the act
legislative provisions that are necessary for the national
security. CBO has determined that all of the provisions of this
bill either fit within that exclusion or do not contain
intergovernmental mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government.--The estimated
budgetary effect of H.R. 1775 is shown in the following table.
CBO was unable to obtain the necessary information to estimate
the costs for the entire bill because parts are classified at a
level above clearances held by CBO employees. The estimated
costs, therefore, reflect only the costs of the unclassified
portion of the bill.
The bill would authorize appropriations of $148 million for
the Community Management Account and $5 million to capitalize a
new revolving fund for equipment, salaries, maintenance,
operations, and other expenses. In addition, the bill would
authorize $197 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs
attributable to military service andvarious unfunded
liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in the CBO
baseline.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumed that H.R. 1775
will be enacted by October 1, 1997, and that the full amounts
authorized will be appropriated for fiscal year 1998. Outlays
are estimated according to historical spending patterns for
intelligence programs.
[By fiscal year in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending under current law:
Estimated authorization level <SUP>1....................... 102 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 95 46 22 5 0 0
Proposed changes:
Estimated authorization level......................... 0 153 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 0 85 38 22 7 0
Spending under H.R. 1775:
Estimated authorization level <SUP>1....................... 102 153 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays..................................... 95 131 60 27 7 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The costs of this legislation would fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
<SUP>1 The 1997 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
Pay-as-you-go consideration.--None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact.--The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the act
legislative provisions that are necessary for the national
security. CBO has determined that all of the provisions of this
bill either fit within that exclusion or do not contain
intergovernmental mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimated prepared by.--Federal Cost: Dawn Sauter. Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Pepper Santalucia.
Impact on the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
Estimate approved by.--Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Committee Cost Estimates
The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of this
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of
the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress
shall have power . . . to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; . . .
``; ``to raise and support Armies,. . . ``; ``to provide and
maintain a Navy; . . . `` and ``to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to
enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the
bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed
to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is
printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed
is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
* * * * * * *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 110. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations.
[Sec. 120. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
[Sec. 121. Collection tasking authority.]
Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations.
Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence
community assignment program .
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
office of the director of central intelligence
Sec. 102. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) * *
*
* * * * * * *
(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall,
for administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence
Agency.
* * * * * * *
national mission of national imagery and mapping agency
Sec. [120] 110. (a) In General.--In addition to the
Department of Defense missions set forth in section 442 of
title 10, United States Code, the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency shall support the imagery requirements of the Department
of State and other departments and agencies of the United
States outside the Department of Defense.
(b) Requirements and Priorities.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall establish requirements and priorities
governing the collection of national intelligence by the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency under subsection (a).
(c) Correction of Deficiencies.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall develop and implement such programs and
policies as the Director and the Secretary of Defense jointly
determine necessary to review and correct deficiencies
identified in the capabilities of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency to accomplish assigned national missions,
including support to the all-source analysis and production
process. The Director shall consult with the Secretary of
Defense on the development and implementation of such programs
and policies. The Secretary shall obtain the advice of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the matters on
which the Director and the Secretary are to consult under the
preceding sentence.
collection tasking authority
Sec. [121] 111. Unless otherwise directed by the President,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall have authority
(except as otherwise agreed by the Director and the Secretary
of Defense) to--
(1) approve collection requirements levied on
national imagery collection assets;
(2) determine priorities for such requirements; and
(3) resolve conflicts in such priorities.
restrictions on intelligence sharing with the united nations
Sec. [110] 112. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information
to the United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence
information may be provided to the United Nations or any
organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any
officials or employees thereof, unless the President certifies
to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and
implemented procedures, and has worked with the United Nations
to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from
unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and
methods connected to such information.
(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written certification by
the President to the appropriate committees of Congress that
providing such information to the United Nations or an
organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any
officials or employees thereof, is in the national security
interests of the United States.
(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
report semiannually to the appropriate committees of Congress
on the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United
Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the
period covered by the report. The President shall also report
to the appropriate committees of Congress within 15 days after
it has become known to the United States Government that there
has been an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided by
the United States to the United Nations.
(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first
sentence of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision of
intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of,
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the United Nations.
(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or
assign the duties of the President under this section.
(d) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(6) of this Act;
or
(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of
title V of this Act.
(e) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community
assignment program
Sec. 113. (a) Detail.--(1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the head of a department with an element in
the intelligence community or the head of an intelligence
community agency or element may detail any employee within that
department, agency, or element to serve in any position in the
Intelligence Community Assignment Program on a reimbursable or
a nonreimbursable basis.
(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as are
agreed to between the heads of the parent and host agencies, up
to a maximum of three years, except that such details may be
extended for a period not to exceed 1 year when the heads of
the parent and host agencies determine that such extension is
in the public interest.
(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An employee
detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit,
allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided to enhance
staffing by the organization from which they are being
detailed.
(c) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year,
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate a report describing the detail of intelligence community
personnel pursuant to subsection (a) for the previous 12-month
period, including the number of employees detailed, the
identity of parent and host agencies or elements, and an
analysis of the benefits of the program.
(2) The Director shall submit the first of such reports not
later than March 1, 1999.
(d) Termination.--The authority to make details under this
section terminates on September 30, 2002.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 905. This title shall cease to be effective on January
6, [1998] 1999.
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
general authorities
Sec. 5. (a) In the performance of its functions, the Central
Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
[(a)] (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government
agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, for the performance of any of the
functions or activities authorized under subparagraphs (B) and
(C) of section 102(a)(2), subsections (c)(5) and (d) of section
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), 403-3,
403-4, and 405), and any other Government agency is authorized
to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without
regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting
transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the
Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for
the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard
to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
[(b)] (2) Exchange funds without regard to section 3651
Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543);
[(c)] (3) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of
personnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government
agencies are hereby authorized, without regard to provisions of
law to the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or
employee for duty with the Agency;
[(d)] (4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to
carry firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of
the Agency's authorized functions, except that, within the
United States, such authority shall be limited to the purposes
of protection of classified materials and information, the
training of Agency personnel and other authorized persons in
the use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations and
property, and the protection of Agency personnel and of
defectors, their families, and other persons in the United
States under Agency auspices;
[(e)] (5) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on
premises rented by the Agency, and pay rent therefor without
regard to limitations on expenditures contained in the Act of
June 30, 1932, as amended: Provided, That in each case the
Director shall certify that exception from such limitations is
necessary to the successful performance of the Agency's
functions or to the security of its activities; [and]
[(f)] (6) Determine and fix the minimum and maximum limits of
age within which an original appointment may be made to an
operational position within the Agency, notwithstanding the
provision of any other law, in accordance with such criteria as
the Director, in his discretion, may prescribe[.]; and
(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United
States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years
that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this
Act.
(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under
subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided
in advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months
of the lease and the Government's estimated termination
liability.
(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause
(B) of paragraph (1)--
(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides
that the contract shall be terminated if budget
authority (as defined by section 3(2) of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not provided specifically
for that project in an appropriations Act in advance of
an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United
States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination
costs in respect of such lease shall remain available
until the costs associated with termination of such
lease are paid;
(C) funds available for termination liability shall
remain available to satisfy rental obligations in
respect of such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the
event such lease is not terminated early, but only to
the extent those funds are in excess of the amount of
termination liability in that subsequent year; and
(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year
may be used to make payments on such lease for a
maximum of 12 months beginning any time during the
fiscal year.
* * * * * * *
security personnel at agency installations
Sec. 15. (a)(1) The Director may authorize Agency personnel
within the United States to perform the same functions as
special policemen of the General Services Administration
perform under the first section of the Act entitled ``An Act to
authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the
Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special
policemen for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes'' (40
U.S.C. 318), with the powers set forth in that section, except
that such personnel shall perform such functions and exercise
such [powers only within Agency installations, and the rules
and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be rules and
regulations promulgated by the Director.] powers--
(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such
Compound and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open
areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary
of such Compound and property and extending outward 500
feet; and
(B) within any other Agency installation and in the
streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone
beginning at the outside boundary of any such
installation and extending outward 500 feet.
(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under
paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where
such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts
giving such personnel reason to believe that their performance
of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to
protect against physical attack or threats of attack upon the
Agency installations, property, or employees.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other Federal
police or Federal protective service.
(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel
shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director
and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in
paragraph (1).
(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the
Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that
describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by
this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the
exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year.
The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector
General of the Agency.
* * * * * * *
central services program
Sec. 21. (a) Establishment.--The Director may--
(1) establish a program to provide the central
services described in subsection (b)(2); and
(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the
working capital fund established under subsection
(b)(1).
(b) Establishment and Purposes of Central Services Working
Capital Fund.--(1) There is established a central services
working capital fund. The Fund shall be available until
expended for the purposes described in paragraph (2), subject
to subsection (j).
(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment,
salaries, maintenance, operation and other expenses for such
services as the Director, subject to paragraph (3), determines
to be central services that are appropriate and advantageous to
provide to the Agency or to other Federal agencies on a
reimbursable basis.
(3) The determination and provision of central services by
the Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2) shall
be subject to the prior approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget.
(c) Assets in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of money and
assets, as follows:
(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial
monetary capitalization.
(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law
for the purpose of supplementing the Fund.
(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets,
including inventories and equipment on order,
pertaining to the services to be carried on by the
central services program.
(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to
transfer to the Fund.
(d) Limitations.--(1) The total value of orders for services
described in subsection (b)(2) from the central services
program at any time shall not exceed an annual amount approved
in advance by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-Federal
entity by the central services program.
(e) Reimbursements to Fund.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Fund shall be--
(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments,
from applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency,
other Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal
agencies, for the central services performed by the
central services program, at rates that will recover
the full cost of operations paid for from the Fund,
including accrual of annual leave, workers'
compensation, depreciation of capitalized plant and
equipment, and amortization of automated data
processing software; and
(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from
sale or exchange of property, including any real
property, or in payment for loss or damage to property,
held by the central services program as assets of the
Fund.
(f) Retention of Portion of Fund Income.--(1) The Director
may impose a fee for central services provided from the Fund.
The fee for any item or service provided under the central
services program may not exceed four percent of the cost of
such item or service.
(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation of
the Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net
receipts of the Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year
thereafter may be retained, subject to subsection (j), for the
acquisition of capital equipment and for the improvement and
implementation of the Agency's information management systems
(including financial management, payroll, and personnel
information systems). Any proposed use of the retained income
in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall only be made with
the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget and after notification to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal
year, amounts in excess of the amount retained under paragraph
(2) shall be transferred to the United States Treasury.
(g) Audit.--(1) The Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of the
Fund within three months after the close of each fiscal year.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
determine the form and content of the audit, which shall
include at least an itemized accounting of the central services
provided, the cost of each service, the total receipts
received, the agencies or departments serviced, and the amount
returned to the United States Treasury.
(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit,
the Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``central services program'' means the
program established under subsection (a); and
(2) the term ``Fund'' means the central services
working capital fund established under subsection
(b)(1).
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to the Fund $5,000,000 for the purposes
specified in subsection (b)(2).
(j) Termination.--(1) The Fund shall terminate on March 31,
2000, unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress prior
to that date.
(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget--
(A) may terminate the central services program and
the Fund at any time; and
(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for
dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants,
contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances
of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and
other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or
to be made available in connection with such Fund, as
may be necessary.
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--General Military Law
* * * * * * *
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 8--DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIELD ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--MISCELLANEOUS DEFENSE AGENCY MATTERS
Sec.
201. Certain intelligence officials: consultation and concurrence
regarding appointments; evaluation of performance.
[202. Unauthorized use of Defense Intelligence Agency name, initials,
or seal.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 202. Unauthorized use of Defense Intelligence Agency name,
initials, or seal
[(a) No person may, except with the written permission of the
Secretary of Defense, knowingly use the words ``Defense
Intelligence Agency'', the initials ``DIA'', the seal of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, or any colorable imitation of such
words, initials or seal in connection with any merchandise,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner
reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Secretary of Defense.
[(b) Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any
person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice
which constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by
subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate a civil
proceeding in a district court of the United States to enjoin
such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to the hearing and determination of such act on and
may, at any time before final determination, enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action
is brought.]
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 21--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS
Sec.
421. Funds for foreign cryptologic support.
* * * * * * *
[424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: exemption
for Defense Intelligence Agency.
[425. Disclosure of personnel information: exemption for National
Reconnaissance Office.]
424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: exemption
for Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance
Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies
(a) Prohibition.--Except with the written permission of the
Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in
connection with any merchandise, retail product, impersonation,
solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner reasonably
calculated to convey the impression that such use is approved,
endorsed, or authorized by the Secretary of Defense, any of the
following (or any colorable imitation thereof):
(1) The words ``Defense Intelligence Agency'', the
initials ``DIA'', or the seal of the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
(2) The words ``National Reconnaissance Office'', the
initials ``NRO'', or the seal of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
(3) The words ``National Imagery and Mapping
Agency'', the initials ``NIMA'', or the seal of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(4) The words ``Defense Mapping Agency'', the
initials ``DMA'', or the seal of the Defense Mapping
Agency.
(b) Authority To Enjoin Violations.--Whenever it appears to
the Attorney General that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in an act or practice which constitutes or will
constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney
General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of
the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and
determination of such action and may, at any time before final
determination, enter such restraining orders or prohibitions,
or take such other actions as is warranted, to prevent injury
to the United States or to any person or class of persons for
whose protection the action is brought.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 22--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--MISSIONS AND AUTHORITY
Sec.
441. Establishment.
* * * * * * *
[445. Protection of agency identifications and organizational
information.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 445. Protection of agency identifications and organizational
information
[(a) Unauthorized Use of Agency Name, Initials, or Seal.--(1)
Except with the written permission of the Secretary of Defense,
no person may knowingly use, in connection with any
merchandise, retail product, impersonation, solicitation, or
commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey
the impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or
authorized by the Secretary of Defense, any of the following:
[(A) The words ``National Imagery and Mapping
Agency'', the initials ``NIMA'', or the seal of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
[(B) The words ``Defense Mapping Agency'', the
initials ``DMA'', or the seal of the Defense Mapping
Agency.
[(C) Any colorable imitation of such words, initials,
or seals.
[(2) Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any
person is engaged or about to engage in an act or practice
which constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by
paragraph (1), the Attorney General may initiate a civil
proceeding in a district court of the United States to enjoin
such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to a hearing and determination of such action and
may, at any time before such final determination, enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action
is brought.]
* * * * * * *
PART III--TRAINING AND EDUCATION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 108--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS
Sec.
[2161. Defense Intelligence School: master of science of strategic
intelligence.]
2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 2161. Defense Intelligence School: master of science of strategic
intelligence
[Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense,
the Commandant of the Defense Intelligence School may, upon
recommendation by the faculty of such school, confer the degree
of master of science of strategic intelligence upon graduates
of the school who have fulfilled the requirements for that
degree.]
Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the
president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may, upon
recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer upon a
graduate of the college who has fulfilled the requirements for
the degree the following:
(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI).
(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
(BSI).
* * * * * * *
----------
SEC 506 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
SEC. 506. ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.
(a) * * *
(b) Source of Funds.--Funds available for the Army for
operations and maintenance for fiscal years [1996 and 1997]
1998 and 1999 shall be available to carry out subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
For the most part, we are supportive of the bill as
reported. We do, however, have concerns about the effect
several actions taken in the bill would have on activities
within the National Reconnaissance Program. These concerns are
described fully in the classified annex to this report. We only
note here our hope that, with respect to the classified
matters, as well as the provision in the bill that affects the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office discussed below, the
time remaining before conference with the Senate can be used to
develop a solid record which will provide a clear justification
for whatever actions are ultimately to be recommended in the
conference report.
Section 608 of the bill directs the termination of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) within the
Department of Defense. Curtailed Defense Airborne
Reconnaissance Program (DARP) management responsibilities would
be transferred to the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency. Under this proposal, however, acquisition authorities
would revert to the services with the DARP manager playing only
a coordinating role.
DARO was created in 1993, at least in part in response to
urgings by the Congress, to coordinate the airborne
reconnaissance activities of the department. In its brief
history, DARO has experienced success in promoting
interoperability in the programs it oversees and in eliminating
costly duplication in research, development, test, and
evaluation activities. In 1996, when another congressional
committee recommended DARO's termination, then Secretary of
Defense Perry strongly and successfully opposed that
recommendation.
We acknowledge that, as part of the effort to streamline
the operation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it may
be necessary to disestablish some entities within the
Department of Defense. Secretary Cohen has appointed a Defense
Reform Task Force to review the functioning of his office,
departmental agencies and field activities. The report of the
task force is due by the end of November. We believe that any
action to terminate a departmental agency or office in advance
of the report by this task force should be based on extremely
compelling evidence. No such evidence with respect to DARO was
presented to us during the committee's hearings on the
intelligence budget for fiscal year 1998. In fact, not a single
witness advocated the termination of DARO and, when asked in a
question for the record, ``Under what conditions, if any, would
the Department decide that the DARO is no longer necessary?''
Defense Department officials replied ``The Department supports
the role of the DARO and has no plans to make such a
decision.'' Secretary Perry's 1996 opposition to the
termination of DARO remains unchallenged within the executive
branch and, in fact, was reinforced by a June 4, 1997 letter to
the committee's ranking Democrat by the Acting Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Noel Longuemare:
The Under Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 4, 1997.
Hon. Norman D. Dicks,
Ranking Minority Member,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Dicks: I want to convey my strongest support for
the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). We
absolutely need a single focal point to coordinate all the
diverse airborne reconnaissance activities underway within the
Department. As was mentioned in the May 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the modernization of our forces depends upon a
strong backbone of command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.
The integrating force of our airborne intelligence and
surveillance efforts is the DARO.
Just ten months ago, Secretary Perry also strongly opposed
a proposal to dissolve the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Program (DARP) and divide its programs among the Services.
Secretary Perry called last year's proposal ``a step backward
and a disservice to the warfighter.'' I could not agree more.
Over the past three years DARO has steadfastly addressed
Departmental problems, and compiled an impressive record of
performance in the critically sensitive area of airborne
reconnaissance. DARO continues to perform with credibility and
integrity.
Secretary Cohen has recently engaged a Defense Reform Task
Force to review OSD, Defense agencies, DoD field activities,
and the military departments to look for ways we can
consolidate functions, eliminate duplication of effort, and
improve efficiency. This Task Force will work closely with the
National Defense Panel, the independent, Congressionally
mandated board that is reviewing the QDR, and with the Vice
President's National Performance Review. The Task Force results
will be available to the Department in November 1997. At this
time and for the above reasons, I see no reason to preempt the
prerogatives of these reviews. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in
this statement and strongly support the continuation of DARO.
Sincerely,
R. Noel Longuemare,
Acting Under Secretary of Defense, (Acquisition and Technology).
We do not believe that a case for terminating DARO has been
made, and look forward to the committee's exploring this matter
more fully prior to conference, as promised by Chairman Goss.
Norman D. Dicks.
David E. Skaggs.
Jane Harman.
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.
Julian C. Dixon.
Nancy Pelosi.
Ike Skelton.