House Debate on the FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 56 (Thursday, May 7, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H2944-H2978]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 420 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 420

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule
XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. Points of
order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply
with clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI are waived. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be
considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall
be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose
of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill, modified
by striking section 401 (and redesignating succeeding
sections accordingly). That amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be considered by title rather than by
section. Each title shall be considered as read. Points of
order against that amendment in the nature of a substitute
for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI or clause
5(b) of rule XXI are waived. No amendment to that amendment
in the nature of a substitute shall be in order unless
printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated
for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. Printed
amendments shall be considered as read. The chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during
further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request
for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five
minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any
postponed question that follows another electronic vote
without intervening business, provided that the minimum time
for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions
shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of
the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report
the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been
adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House
on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the
bill or the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in
order as original text. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to
recommit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is
recognized for 1 hour.

[[Page H2945]]

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to my friend, the gentlewoman from New York (Ms.
Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 420 is a modified open rule providing for the
consideration of H.R. 3694, the Fiscal Year 1999 Intelligence
Authorization Act. What makes this rule modified open instead of fully
open is a preprinting requirement for amendments, whose purpose is to
ensure that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has an
opportunity to work with Members seeking to offer germane amendments to
ensure that important issues are addressed without threatening
disclosure of sensitive, classified information. This preprinting
requirement has become standard procedure for consideration of the
annual intelligence authorization and has not been controversial.
Because the leadership sought to have this bill on the floor today,
the rule also includes a waiver of points of order against the
consideration of the bill for failure to comply with the clause 2(1)(6)
of rule XI, which requires a three-day layover of a committee report.
The committee's report was properly filed on Tuesday of this week,
and Members have had notice of availability of classified portions of
the authorization measure since late last week when public
announcements were, indeed, made from the floor.
It is my understanding that there is no objection to this slight
speeding up of the schedule to accommodate changes stemming from the
unrelated scheduling matters and to accommodate Members' travel plans.
The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate on the bill, time
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
In addition, the rule makes in order as an original bill for the
purpose of an amendment the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute now printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 of
the bill.
That modification, a self-executing change accomplished through the
rule, is designed to addressed a Budget Act technicality relating to a
provision of the bill extending the early-out retirement program for
the CIA.
We were advised that, due to the fact that we still await this year's
budget resolution, the early-out provision found in title IV of the
bill causes a Budget Act problem, and so the provision is being removed
from the bill with the understanding that the substance of the issue
will be addressed at a later stage of legislative process of H.R. 3694.

{time} 1200

The rule further provides that the amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be considered by title and that each title shall be
considered as read.
The rule also waives points of order against the committee amendment
for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI prohibiting nongermane
amendments or clause 5(b) of rule XXI, prohibiting tax or tariff
provisions in a bill not reported by a committee with jurisdiction over
revenue measures. Both of these waivers apply to a section of H.R. 3694
regarding the application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities
in title III of the bill. That provision is nongermane to the
introduced version of H.R. 3694, and it deals with subject matter
falling within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Based on an exchange of letters between the two committees, there is
no controversy on this matter. However, these waivers are necessary
under the rules of the House. And during general debate, I will
introduce into the Record that correspondence between the two
committees.
I would also point out for the record the Committee on National
Security has, by letter, discharged itself from consideration of the
matters in this bill that fall within its purview.
Mr. Speaker, the rule permits the Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole to postpone the vote on any amendment and reduce voting time to 5
minutes on any series of questions provided that the first vote shall
not be less than 15 minutes.
Finally, the rule provides for the traditional motion to recommit
with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, that was a long explanation of a rule that is, in fact,
straightforward, simple, and traditional for this piece of legislation.
I know of no controversy about this rule. I urge Members to support
this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding to me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
(Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose this rule. It allows
amendments that are germane to be offered. However, H. Res. 420 does
include one waiver of a House rule that troubles me. The rule waives
clause 2(L)(6) of rule XI that provides for a 3-day layover of the
committee report accompanying the bill.
This House rule allows Members time to study the report and decide
whether they would like to offer or support amendments. The 3-day
opportunity to study the bill and report is particularly important in
this case because many provisions of the intelligence bills are
classified and, if a Member wishes to review those portions, a Member
must make arrangements with the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. To cut short the standard review time under these
circumstances is unfortunate.
And while I understand that the majority and the minority on the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had no objection to the
waiver, we should note that it is not the committee's rights but the
rights of Members not on the committee that the House rule is designed
to protect.
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee,
is to be commended for avoiding the need for waiver of the Budget Act
by self-executing in this rule an amendment striking the offending
section of the bill.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also worked with the
Committee on Ways and Means to gain its acquiescence to a violation of
a House rule designed to protect the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means.
While I often question the need for a requirement for preprinting in
the Congressional Record, the sensitivity and the complexity of the
intelligence authorization bill justifies the requirement in this case.
Mr. Speaker, this rule allows the full House to consider germane
amendments offered by any Member. Under the rule, the House will be
able to debate important questions, such as whether to reduce the
overall size of the intelligence budget.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr.
Sanders).
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
this time, and I rise in support of the rule.
I think it is a fair rule. Among other things, it, in fact, allows
this Congress to begin debating major priorities as to whether or not
we are going to increase spending for the intelligence budget, despite
the end of the Cold War and despite the fact that while we increase
funding for the intelligence budget, we have cut spending in Medicare
for our senior citizens, cut spending for veterans' programs, cut
spending in a dozen different areas that the middle-class and low-
income people of this country need.
So I applaud the chairman for bringing forth this rule. It is a fair
rule and it is going to allow us to have a serious debate on what we
want this Congress to be doing for the American people.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to
address the concerns of the gentlewoman from New York about the notice
given and accommodating Members' schedules today.
I am happy to report that several Members did take advantage of the
opportunity to come to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and participate in review of materials that were of interest to them.
So I think the

[[Page H2946]]

word has gotten out and I think we have done our job properly.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Duncan). Pursuant to House Resolution
420 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 3694.

{time} 1205

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration the bill
(H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with (Mr. Thornberry) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to bring the fiscal year 1999 intelligence
authorization to the floor today. As a strong believer in the
congressional oversight process, I hope Members have taken the
opportunity to examine this year's bill, including its classified annex
and, indeed, I know several Members have come upstairs to do just that.
The annual intelligence authorization, and its exhaustive review of
intelligence activities and capabilities that accompanies it, form the
cornerstone of our oversight process. This is truly a valuable exercise
for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for Congress as a
whole, and I think it is beneficial to the intelligence community as
well.
I want to take this opportunity to thank the members and staff of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from both sides of the aisle
whose hard work and long hours have enabled us to produce a
responsible, nonpartisan bill that was unanimously approved in
committee.
I would also like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Floyd Spence), chairman of the Committee on National Security, and the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bill Young), chairman of the Subcommittee
on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations, for their
input and able assistance with this legislation.
H.R. 3694 authorizes funds for the fiscal year 1999 intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. That
is a big order. The National Security Act requires Congress
specifically to authorize all intelligence spending. That is unique.
As Members are aware, many of the details of the intelligence budget
are classified, including the total fiscal year 1999 budget request, or
top line. I can say, however, that H.R. 3694's top line is
substantially in line with the President's request. The committee came
in a mere one-tenth of 1 percent above the President's level.
I would like to take a moment to explain the process by which the
committee arrived at this recommended spending level. What we did not
do was adopt an arbitrary number and fill in the blanks until we
reached our goal. Instead, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence looked at each line of every program, examined its
effectiveness and how it fit in with the overall U.S. intelligence
requirements and priorities in today's world. Then we made our
decisions based on the merit and value of each program.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the committee's review of U.S. intelligence
capabilities, whether we were looking at satellite reconnaissance or
human intelligence, one fact stood out. The threats that face our
Nation demand that the intelligence community maintain a worldwide
vigilance and the resources to deal with a multitude of challenges and
new challenges.
The Cold War is over and the threat of nuclear war has been reduced.
Or has it? Unfortunately, the world still is a dangerous place for the
United States and its citizens, as we read in papers almost daily about
concerns about political stability in places like Russia, the chain of
command in Russia over the nuclear weapons, or perhaps even the Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missiles which we read in the newspapers are
targeted against U.S. cities, what they call city-buster bombs and an
ICBM capability.
To demonstrate this, we need look no further than our continuing
struggles with Iraq. Earlier this year the United States came to the
brink of military confrontation with Saddam Hussein; yet we did so
without all of the information necessary to support a serious campaign.
There were serious shortfalls in our ability to support policymakers
and military commanders at this critical time. Such gaps endanger U.S.
lives and interests and are not acceptable, tolerable, or necessary in
today's world.
We should not ignore Iraq or Iran or Libya or North Korea or other
rogue nations that are striving for and, in many cases achieving, the
means to threaten the United States. The risk that a terrorist group or
a rogue country will use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon
against the U.S. or an American citizen or American interests here or
abroad is increasing. Despite this fact, U.S. intelligence capabilities
have dwindled since the end of the Cold War. In effect, we are asking
the intelligence community for more and we are giving them less to do
it. And we are counting on them more.
The intelligence community needs to change the way it does business
to address these new threats. This year's authorization identifies five
areas that deserve particular attention.
One, our signals intelligence capabilities are in serious need of
modernization to keep up with the fast pace of communications and
technology improvement. I think it is fair to say that the golden days
of SIGINT may, in fact, be behind us, and we have been enjoying the
benefits of a very good SIGINT activity for many years. That may be
over because of technology. We need to deal with that.
Two, our clandestine espionage, or human intelligence as it is
called, that infrastructure needs to be rebuilt and refocused on
current priorities. It is fair to say, I think, that the cupboard is
nearly bare in the area of HUMINT. We are badly outnumbered by hostiles
in a lot of dangerous places in the world. That is intolerable,
unacceptable, and unnecessary.
The intelligence community needs to increase its analytical
capability in order to absorb and accurately gauge the immediate and
long-term implications of an ever-increasing volume of information. We
have stuff on hand we have not reviewed. We have not exploited it. And
it is stuff that would be useful to our decision-makers. We do not have
as much analytical capacity as we need. That can be fixed.
Covert action capabilities need to be restructured. I said
capabilities. Nobody is calling for covert action. We are calling for
more arrows in the quiver in case we do need it to suit the needs of
today's world and how to deal with problems we come against.
Fifth, and last, we need to ensure we maintain an active research and
development program in all intelligence areas.
H.R. 3694 addresses each of these priorities, in some cases by
providing additional funding; in others by redirecting existing
programs, resources, or restructuring ongoing programs.
In addition, the committee's review raised some fundamental questions
that the committee will review over the coming year. These include,
what are the proper priorities for our future overheads systems? How
can we manage the cost of a national reconnaissance program and yet
meet other critical requirements? Is the intelligence community
striking the right balance between our capacity to collect intelligence
and our capacity to analyze what is collected? Is the intelligence
community prepared to face the challenges of information and
operations, or cyber-warfare?

[[Page H2947]]

The future of our intelligence programs depends on finding the
answers to these and other questions. But for today, today we
understand very well our needs. We have provided for them in this
legislation. I think we have achieved an excellent balance. Mr.
Chairman, I urge all members to support H.R. 3694 today.
Mr. Chairman, I submit the following:

House of Representatives,

Committee on Ways and Means,

Washington, DC, May 4, 1998.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Porter: I am writing in response to your letter of
April 29, 1998, which addresses H.R. 3694, as reported by the
House Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) on April
29, 1998. H.R. 3694 would amend Section 905 of the National
Security Act of 1947 by striking out ``January 6, 1998'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 1999''. The bill
contains an extension of application of sanctions laws to
intelligence activities.
As your letter notes, this provision falls within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Accordingly,
the Committee would ordinarily meet to consider the bill.
However, because the bill, as reported, extends for one year
an already existing application of sanctions laws to
intelligence activities, I do not believe that a markup of
the bill is necessary.
I appreciate your consultation with the Committee in
advance. I request your full support in joining me to prevent
any other expansion or changes to the application of
sanctions laws for intelligence activities other than the one
year extension agreed to here. I would further appreciate
your consultation with respect to this provision on any
future Intelligence Authorization bills, including a mere
reauthorization for additional periods of time. Of course, if
an agreement cannot be reached, the provision would be
subject to a point of order pursuant to Clause 5(b) of House
Rule XXI.
I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this
matter be included in the record during floor consideration.
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance on this
matter. With best personal regards,
Sincerely,
Bill Archer,
Chairman.
____

House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.
Hon. Bill Archer,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
Longworth House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Bill: I am writing to you concerning the planned
inclusion of a provision in the ``Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal year 1999'' (H.R. 3694), which we expect to
mark up on Wednesday, April 29, 1998, and report to the House
early next week. I have included a copy of the proposed
section for your consideration.
As you know, this provision relates to the application of
sanctions laws to intelligence activities and simply extends
the life of the provision for one additional year. As you
will recall during last year's consideration of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and
based upon our mutual understanding and agreement as to your
Committee's jurisdiction over matters relating to taxes and
tariffs, this provision was included in the Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 as section 304 of that Act. A copy of
that provision, as enacted (P.L. 105-107), is also included
for your review.
I hope that we can, consistent with the agreement reached
last year, once again agree that this provision may be
included in H.R. 3694, and any resulting Conference Report,
without objection from the Committee on Ways and Means.
There is no doubt that this provision falls squarely within
the scope of Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI, which provides
that no tax or tariff provision may be considered by the
House that has not been considered by the Committee on Ways
and Means.
This provision is of critical importance to the protection
of intelligence sources and methods whenever a proliferation
violation has been identified and sanctions are deemed to be
the appropriate method of discipline. This provision supplies
the President with the necessary flexibility to address the
competing interests of punishing the violators and protecting
our national security interests at the same time. I
appreciate your recognition of this important aspect of this
section of our bill.
I would also offer that any modification of this provision
in future Intelligence Authorization bills, beyond a mere
reauthorization for additional periods of time, will be
subject to consultation between our Committees, and, if
agreement cannot be reached, subject to points of order
pursaunt to Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI.
Thank you for your cooperation in this regard and I look
forward to your support for H.R. 3694.
With all best wishes, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
____

``(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An
employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any
benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided
to enhance staffing by the organization from which the
employee is detailed.
``(c) Annual Report.--Not later than March 1, 1999, and
annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report describing
the detail of intelligence community personnel pursuant to
subsection (a) during the 12-month period ending on the date
of the report. The report shall set forth the number of
personnel detailed, the identity of parent and host agencies
or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the
details.''.
(b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the
National Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as
sections 110, 111, and 112, respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act is amended by striking out the items
relating to sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:

``Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
``Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United
Nations.
``Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence
community assignment program.''.

(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1,
1997.

SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1998'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 1999''.

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.

It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national
security interests of the United States and consistent with
operational and security concerns related to the conduct of
intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should
competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the
procurement of products properly designated as having been
made in the United States.

SEC. 306. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECEIPT OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.

It is the sense of Congress that Members of Congress have
equal standing with officials of the Executive Branch to
receive classified information so that Congress may carry out
its oversight responsibilities under the Constitution.

SEC. 307. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON CERTAIN VIOLENT CRIMES
ABROAD TO VICTIMS AND VICTIMS' FAMILIES.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national interests of the United States to
provide information regarding the killing, abduction,
torture,
____

(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking out the following item:
``Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).''.
(b) Expansion of Duties of Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management.--Subsection 102(d)(2)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(2)) is
amended by striking out subparagraph (B) through (D) and
inserting in lieu thereof the following new subparagraphs:
``(B) Carrying out the responsibilities of the Director
under paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(c).
``(C) Carrying out such other responsibilities as the
Director may direct.''.

SEC. 304. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.

Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000.''.

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.

It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
intelligence community, whenever compatible

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence strives
to report an authorization bill each year which is free of partisan
division. While we have been generally successful in that effort, from
time to time we have been divided on significant issues of substance.
This year, I am pleased to report that we have produced legislation
which is not only bipartisan but without major substantive disagreement
as well.

{time} 1215

Credit for that result goes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
who has worked tirelessly to ensure that the views of all Members are
reflected

[[Page H2948]]

in the work of the committee. I commend him for the leadership he has
exhibited as chairman and for his willingness to work with committee
Democrats on matters of importance to us.
For two of the Democratic Members, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr.
Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this will be
the final intelligence authorization bill they will bring to the floor.
Although I look forward to working with them to get a conference report
enacted, I want to thank them for their many contributions to the work
of the committee.
The willingness of the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) to tackle
issues like declassification and the need to make greater use of
intelligence in nontraditional ways has been invaluable. And the
efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) to encourage
development of the complex systems through which intelligence will be
collected in the future were also of great assistance.
This will be my last authorization bill, as well. I have enjoyed my 8
years of service on the committee and look forward to keeping up with
intelligence issues when they come before the Committee on
Appropriations. I have been impressed tremendously by not only the
importance of intelligence to our Nation's security, but by the
dedication, often under circumstances of great hardship and danger, of
the men and women who work in our intelligence agencies.
The authorization bill for fiscal year 1999 will make improvements in
intelligence capabilities that need to be modernized either because of
technological advances or because they require greater emphasis to
respond to changing threats. The bill is only marginally more, in the
aggregate 0.1 percent, than the amount requested by the President.
Although the committee chose to place a different spending priority on
certain items than did the administration, I do not believe that we
have done harm to any initiative or activity which the Director of
Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense consider crucial.
Generating public support for spending on intelligence programs,
given their classified nature, is never going to be easy. Although it
should be common sense that the possession of information in advance
about the military plans of an enemy, the bottom-line position of
another government in a diplomatic negotiation, the location of a
terrorist cell, or the scientific and technical capability of someone
trying to develop a weapon of mass destruction should be invaluable, we
sometimes forget that the acquisition of access to that kind of
information is time consuming and expensive. I do not believe we need
to justify intelligence spending on the basis of some esoteric
calculation about whether our national security is more or less at risk
than when the Soviet Union was in place.
We will always have threats to our security. Some will be
predictable, some will not. Dealing with them requires accurate and
timely information, some of which can be provided only by intelligence
agencies. There is a cost to maintaining the capability to provide that
information when required, and that cost is significant. The cost if
the information is not available, however, is potentially far greater.
Our job on the committee is to ensure that the means necessary to
provide intelligence on matters which demonstrably affect national
security are available at a cost which is not excessive relative to
their importance. I believe the 21-year record of the committee in this
effort, including the bill now before the House, has been exceptional.

Besides recommending spending levels, an authorization bill and
accompanying report also make judgments about the manner in which
programs are being managed. I believe that one of the chief
responsibilities of an oversight committee is to monitor the activities
of the agencies under its jurisdiction in a manner which is both
aggressive and thorough. I also believe that oversight should be
constructive and fair. I am concerned about the tone of some of the
recent criticism of the work of two agencies, the National
Reconnaissance Office, (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA).
The United States has an intelligence capability second to none in
the world. Much of that preeminence is due to the performance of the
systems acquired and operated by the NRO. These systems are
extraordinarily complex and expensive. We are now in the midst of an
effort to modernize these systems. When the need for modernization was
made clear several years ago by then-Director of Central Intelligence
Jim Woolsey, and Congress agreed to embark on a plan to accomplish it,
it was with the understanding that substantial amounts of money would
have to be expended in the short term to produce savings in the future.
We have spent much of the intervening years altering in sometimes
significant ways the components of the plan, which has added to the
costs that have to be met in the near term and delayed the realization
of the expected long-term savings as well. It is disingenuous to have
been a part of this practice and then to complain about the effects it
has produced on the NRO's budget.
NIMA is a new agency created less than 2 years ago through the merger
of the Defense Mapping Agency and the imagery analysis elements of the
CIA and DIA. Like most mergers, this one, which I strongly supported
was not without problems, but I believe that NIMA personnel are
committed to having the agency fulfill its important mission
successfully.
Earlier this year I wrote to NIMA's customers to ask for an
evaluation of their performance. Secretary of Commerce Daley responded
that ``After working through some initial confusion regarding authority
and responsibility for certain products and services, support to
civilian agencies is now better than before the individual components
were combined into NIMA.''
James L. Witt, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, wrote, ``The support and service provided by NIMA to support
disaster response activities have been and continue to be
outstanding.'' Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor,
complimented NIMA on making a strong effort to provide high-quality
analysis and pronounced himself ``generally satisfied'' with the
results.
I do not believe that these comments reflect an agency that is
failing to do its job or one that is ignoring the needs of nonmilitary
consumers to concentrate on those of the military, as some had feared.
Any enterprise involving human beings can be made better, but I think
it is not helpful to make final judgments, pro or con, about an agency
in its infancy. I offer these thoughts in the hope that they will
provide perspective in evaluating the performance of the NRO and NIMA
in the days ahead.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3694 is a good bill which will advance the
interest of military and civilian consumers of intelligence. I urge
that it be approved by the House.
I would also like to compliment both the majority staff and the
Democratic minority staff. I think this committee has been blessed over
the years with an outstanding staff. And I want to particularly thank
Mike Sheehy and the Democratic staff members whom I have had the
privilege of working with for the last 4 years.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I simply want to say that I am very proud to have worked with and
learned from the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) as the ranking
member. He has been an extraordinary asset of the United States of
America in his capacity as a manager of the portfolio. He brings
wisdom, judgment and knowledge about military intelligence and
equipment to the table in our committee to the extent that I think no
other member has or can at this time. I hope he is not going to leave.
But if it turns out that way, we will miss him.
I also hope we are not going to lose anybody else. And for the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman), I share that view with all the other members.
I happen to feel that we have got an extraordinary committee and staff,
we are doing our job timely and well.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Boehlert) to allow him to demonstrate what I have just said.

[[Page H2949]]

(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in both a fiscal and
political environment in which we simply cannot fund every system and
program we would like. This applies whether intelligence or not
intelligence.
However, it is important for the American people to understand just
how critical intelligence is to the very survival of our Nation and our
way of life. On the way over to the Capitol this morning, I heard a
radio announcer refer to this bill as ``the bill to authorize America's
cloak-and-dagger operation.'' That sort of a label is correct in a way,
but unfortuantely, I believe it unintentionally misrepresents what this
bill is all about.
What this bill is about is the wise and prudent funding and oversight
of those intelligence collection analysis and dissemination function
necessary to provide for the security of our Nation, its interests, and
its citizens around the world. We are talking about what I refer to as
``counterprograms.'' We are not engaged in a world war, but we have
some very important counterprograms, counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, counterproliferation. These are all very important
activities, and this bill funds them.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out a couple of funcational
intelligence areas of particular interest in this bill. The first is
the emphasis this bill places on rebuilding leading-edge technology,
research and development. It is the basic research and development of
new technologies that are the easiest to cut in lean fiscal times. But
it is precisely these efforts that our future depends on and that we
must pay particular attention to and fund properly.
This bill puts great emphasis on future capabilities, albeit
sometimes imprudently at the expense of older so-called legacy systems.
Also, this bill emphasizes the need for a strong, well-trained and
funded reserve intelligence component.
Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of things I could say about this bill,
and I do not have the time to say them. Just let me say that as someone
who tried to be very attentive to my important responsibilities on this
committee, I admire the way the chairman and ranking member have worked
cooperatively. I admire the seriousness of purpose of all of the
members. I admire the product that we are producing, and I commend it
to the attention of all my colleagues and the American people.
We are doing the people's business in a wise and prudent manner.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member, for yielding this time to
me and for his leadership on this important committee.
I rise, Mr. Chairman, to engage the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss), the distinguished chair of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, in a colloquy concerning section 303 of the bill.
Before doing so, I want to commend our chairman for his leadership
also and to thank him for including full funding for the environmental
program in this legislation before us today, the recognition that new
issues need to be addressed, not that the environment is a new issue,
but new compared to its being a priority on the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and in the intelligence authorization bill.
In any event, I rise to engage the gentleman in a colloquy.
As the chairman knows, this section of the bill extends for 1 year
the authority of the President to delay the imposition of a sanction
upon a determination that to proceed with the sanction would risk the
compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence
source or method.
My first question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the legislative history
of this provision, enacted in 1995, would be applicable to the
extension of the authority for 1 more year?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that is the
intent of the committee, that the legislative history of this
provision, as it was developed in the debate in 1995, is applicable to
the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R.
3694 reaffirms the joint explanatory statement of the committee of
conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996 to
make completely clear that the original legislative history of this
provision continues to govern its implementation.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, is it then the case that the committee
intends that the provision will be narrowly construed and used only in
the most serious of circumstances when a specific sensitive
intelligence source or method or criminal investigation is at risk?
Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman would further yield, that is certainly
the intent of the committee.
Ms. PELOSI. Is it also the case that the law requires the
intelligence source or method or law enforcement matter in question
must be related to the activities giving rise to the sanction and the
provision is not to be used to protect generic or speculative
intelligence or law enforcement concerns?
Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.
Ms. PELOSI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, does the committee expect that
reports concerning a decision to stay the imposition of a sanction
shall include a determination that the delay in the imposition of a
sanction will not be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the
United States' nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase
the threat or risk to U.S. military forces?
Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of our
committee for engaging in this colloquy and for his confirmation of the
understanding that we had when this provision was first enacted.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. I wanted just to say that I concur in all the statements
made by the chairman. This is also the understanding that I have of
this provision.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the ranking member for his cooperation and
concurrence in the view of the chairman.
Mr. DICKS. And I want to compliment the gentlewoman for her diligence
on this important matter.

{time} 1230

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Young), chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on
National Security.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Young).
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
intelligence authorization bill. I want to compliment the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Goss). He has done an outstanding job. I have had the
privilege of working on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
for 14 years now, two different terms. I have to say that the gentleman
from Florida has been outstanding in the leadership that he provides
for the committee and also to the gentleman from Washington (Mr.
Dicks), we have worked together for so many years, he is a member of
our subcommittee. We have the unusual relationship of being members of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as members of
the appropriations subcommittee that provides the funding for the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from
Washington does a really good job. He is very dedicated to a good
intelligence bill.
That is what this is. This is a good intelligence bill. It provides
not as much as we would like to have provided for our intelligence
activities, but it provides the best that we can with the budget
constraints that we are faced with today.
There are those of us who believe that we are not making a strong
enough investment in our national security, at any part of our national
defense structure, whether it be the operational military forces or the
intelligence community. But the intelligence community is the eyes and
ears of our national capabilities. We have to have information, we have
to know what is happening in the world, we have to know what threats
there might be out there.

[[Page H2950]]

The intelligence community does an outstanding job, I might say. I
might be criticized for that statement because all you ever hear is the
bad news. If an intelligence agent happens to go bad, which does happen
on occasion, or if a mistake is made, you hear about that but you do
not hear about the good things that the intelligence community brings
to our overall national security effort. I wish we could talk about
some of those on the floor in open session today, but obviously we
cannot because it is essential that the sources that we use for
developing our own intelligence information and the methods that we use
and the people who are involved in this have to be protected. Their
mission is extremely important and their lives could very well be at
risk if we went into a lot of detail.
I know that there will probably be some amendments offered to reduce
the authorized level of funding in this bill. I would urge the Members
not to support this. This bill does not provide enough authorization
for funding to do the things that we ought to be doing in our national
security effort, but it is the best we could do with the budget
constraints.
I suggest that we defeat any amendments that would tend to reduce the
investment in our intelligence capability and let us pass this good
bill and get it on to the Senate so we can get it to the President.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment the gentleman for
his statement and I want to concur in it. Sometimes I think there is a
question out there about whether intelligence is really that important.
I think it is our ace in the hole. I think it is what gives America an
extraordinary advantage over any potential foe. Our human intelligence,
our national technical means, are remarkable assets to this country. In
every conflict we have been in in recent years, they have given us a
tremendous advantage. I think the work of the defense subcommittee and
the authorization committee to come up with a good bill that keeps that
going is essential to the future of the country.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's
comments. He is right on track.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the Committee on National
Security.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3694. I have a
rather unique position and opportunity. As ranking member of the
Committee on National Security and as a member of this Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, I can personally testify to the importance
of intelligence to our military commanders in the field, to our troops
who are daily supporting our peacekeeping efforts in places like Iraq,
in Macedonia and to our pilots in the Iraqi no-fly-zone.
Cicero once said that gratitude is the greatest of all virtues. I am
not sure we say thank you enough to the members of the intelligence
community. What they do so often is not known. Yet it pays off in
knowledge to the commanders in chief in the field, to the President, to
the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of State, and, of course, to
this body.
Intelligence is critical to successful operations and to the safety
of our men and women in uniform. Intelligence also plays a crucial role
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plan for the 21st century, Dominant
Battlespace Awareness, which hinges on our intelligence investment.
Critical to the Joint Chiefs' plan, as well as to daily air, sea, and
ground operations, are the mapping products created by the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency. Although I support this bill, I am frankly
concerned with the reductions in the operations and maintenance funds
for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. I think the cuts are
unjustified and excessive. I fear that they will have an unacceptable
impact on the production of products for the unified commands and for
the State Department peacekeeping negotiations. I am also concerned
that these cuts will result in the unwarranted elimination of jobs from
an agency that does not have sufficient staffing to meet military
requirements today.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass).
Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, I welcome the opportunity to speak in support of H.R.
3694, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I would
also like to associate myself with the very good comments of the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Dicks) concerning the strategic importance of intelligence. I
would only add to that by saying that intelligence is also more than
military and tactical in nature. There are civilian aspects to
intelligence that are very important to the national security of this
country that go beyond support to our military and provide the kind of
protection for the citizens of the United States, not only domestically
but abroad, that we all need and cherish.
This is one of the safest countries in the world in which to live.
Part of the reason for that is the fact that we know what our enemies
are doing and we know what their plans and intentions are better
perhaps than anybody else in the world.
I would like to address if I could for a second the budget itself.
The legislation before us today refocuses the President's request upon
four major priorities for intelligence in the next century. Firstly, it
accelerates the recapitalization of a signals intelligence program that
has produced invaluable information against the new transnational
targets of the post-Cold War world.
Secondly, our bill begins the process, after years of drawdowns and
reductions, of rebuilding a clandestine human intelligence program that
has provided much of our intelligence on the plans and intentions of
terrorists, traffickers and other adversaries.
Thirdly, our bill continues the strengthening of the analysis part of
intelligence collection that provides both assessment to our
policymakers and guidance to the collectors.
Finally, our bill enhances the capability of the President to direct
and accomplish covert actions when he deems such actions necessary to
U.S. foreign policy and our national security. The purpose of our mark
in each of these areas is to strengthen the capabilities that will
provide policymakers with the intelligence that they will need in the
next century.
Mr. Chairman, there were also strategic cuts in the budget, made
after much investigation and on a line-by-line basis, on programs that
will mostly be effective in the 21st century. The intelligence
community has for the most part moved forward effectively against new
and difficult issues. There are some areas where we can make some
reductions and do so in a prudent fashion.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to rise in support of this
bipartisan authorization bill. I want to commend both the gentleman
from Florida and the gentleman from Washington for having done an
excellent job working together to produce this important bill.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cardin), a good solid member of the Committee on Ways and
Means.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time and congratulate both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman
from Washington for bringing forward a product that deserves the
support of this House. I have said before that whenever an intelligence
authorization or appropriations is before us, the proponents are at a
disadvantage because people can attack the intelligence community. A
lot of this is confidential. They do not have the opportunity sometimes
to defend themselves.
The United States has the most sophisticated intelligence apparatus
in the world. We have the best trained professionals in the world. Yet
we have the most difficult challenges of any nation in this world. We
work in a bipartisan manner in order to provide authorization and
appropriations for our intelligence agencies. I really do applaud the
leadership of this House for

[[Page H2951]]

doing that. For the security of our country and for the manner in which
this has been handled in the House, it deserves our support.
I must tell my colleagues, though, that I was somewhat disappointed
by some of the tone in the language as it related to some of our
intelligence agencies. But I am very pleased to see that the report
acknowledges that we must invest in the recapitalization and
modernization of our SIGINT capacities. I think that is very important
for this country.
I have visited NSA on numerous occasions and know the dedication of
the men and women in public service for our country. They represent
some of our brightest minds in our Nation. But if we are going to be
able to attract the best from our universities and colleges so that we
can maintain that capacity in the future, it is important that we
authorize adequate funds and appropriate adequate funds for our
intelligence operation.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we were able to bring this product
forward in a bipartisan manner. I hope that this body will support the
work of the committee, support the authorization and later support the
appropriation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished gentleman from
Maryland's remarks. We have worked together on many things. His support
is very important.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Hastert), the chairman of the task force to counter the
drug problem.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fine work of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I am pleased to join my
colleagues from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in
support of H.R. 3694, the fiscal year 1999 intelligence authorization
bill. As chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Subcommittee on National Security, and the Task Force for a Drug-Free
America, I have had an opportunity to visit a wide range of
counternarcotic programs in this country and overseas during the past
few years. I have seen the effectiveness of the information produced by
our intelligence community in identifying and tracking major narcotics
trafficking activities. This intelligence information is essential to
facilitating the law enforcement community's effort to slow the flood
of cocaine and heroin that is pouring into our country. I have been
particularly impressed by the growing coordination between the
intelligence community and the law enforcement agencies to jointly
target major narcotrafficking groups.
Despite this good news, I regret to report that we are stopping no
more than 15 to 20 percent of the drugs flowing from the source
countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. We have the best intelligence
organization in the world, but we lack the capability to act
effectively on the information that we collect against
narcotraffickers. It is clear that the administration's current source
zone strategy is having only a very limited impact on cocaine and opium
production in the source countries. We need to provide sufficient
political will, sufficient resources and sufficient personnel to this
effort.
Equally, the transit zone strategy is undermined by an unwillingness
to seek sufficient air, ground and maritime resources to track, pursue
and stop narcotrafficking moving through Central America, the Caribbean
and Mexico. Based on numerous meetings with foreign narcotics officials
and U.S. Government personnel serving in the field, I am quite
persuaded that much more could be achieved if we would be willing to
come forward and seek the necessary resources to step up the
eradication and interdiction of cocaine and heroin.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important piece of legislation. Intelligence
is the key to stopping narcotics traffic in this country and this
hemisphere. I support this legislation.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Bishop).
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3694, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Let me first
congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman
from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for their tireless efforts in producing a
bipartisan bill that addresses the needs of the intelligence community.
There is arguably no greater consumer of intelligence than our Nation's
Armed Forces. Despite the end of the Cold War, the requirements of our
military for better and more timely intelligence has actually increased
rather than decreased.
This is the result of a number of factors, including transitional
issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Perhaps no incident better illustrates the threat that
terrorism poses to the men and women of our armed services than the
cowardly and callous terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia.

{time} 1245

Our forces in Bosnia remain exposed to the threat of terrorism, and
it is the intelligence that is collected, processed, analyzed and
disseminated that continues to aid in shielding our sons and daughters
against this deadly threat.
Additionally, our military has drawn down significantly in the
aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, the military has experienced more
cutbacks than any other Federal agency, and quite frankly in my view
the reductions have gone too far.
Despite these reductions, the missions have increased as has the
tempo of operations associated with those missions. Today we have
members of our services in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia
conducting missions ranging from peacekeeping to enforcement of United
Nations sanctions to defense of nations.
Intelligence is a force multiplier, and if we are to continue on a
downward path of funding our Nation's armed services, then we
definitely need to take every step we can to ensure that our
intelligence capabilities are sufficient to provide the policymakers
with the information needed to make key decisions affecting national
security. This bill provides the necessary resources to ensure that our
intelligence capabilities are sufficient to meet the contingencies of
the next generation.
Mr. Chairman, last January I traveled to Southeast Asia to review our
intelligence activities and our operations in that region of the world,
and I focused my attention specifically on efforts aimed at achieving a
full accounting of Americans that are still unaccounted for as a result
of the Vietnam war. I want to ensure our Nation's veterans and the
families of those soldiers, airmen, and sailors that are still
unaccounted for that the bill that is being considered today contains
the necessary resources to permit the intelligence community to
continue its efforts to determine the fate of those who have yet to
come home.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community historically has had a poor
record in maintaining a diverse work force. In fact, the intelligence
community as a whole lags far behind the Federal labor sector in its
representation of minorities and women. This committee recognizes the
difficulty faced by intelligence agencies, that of competing with the
private sector for minority applicants possessing high technical skills
that are critical to intelligence missions. The fact of the matter is
that these agencies cannot match the financial incentives and rewards
offered by the private sector firms that attract individuals with
skills of importance to the intelligence community.
This committee has been a supporter of a number of recruitment and
training programs aimed at ensuring equal employment opportunity within
the intelligence community agencies and developing and retaining
personnel that are trained in the skills essential to the effective
performance of intelligence missions. I am pleased to report that this
bill continues this committee's commitment to those programs,
specifically including the Stokes program.
I also want to note that I intend to review these programs in the
succeeding years to ensure that the desired goals are being achieved
and that the programs are being administered in an effective manner.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act for this year, for
1999, provides critical support to all facets of our intelligence
community. Resources are authorized that permit the

[[Page H2952]]

sustainment of the intelligence community's efforts to assist in
providing force protection intelligence to our troops and to assist in
the collection and analysis of critical intelligence bearing on such
challenging issues as counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and
counterterrorism.
I am proud to support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), Chairman
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and a valued
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, when General Schwarzkopf came back from
the Gulf War, he told us that he had better intelligence than any
battlefield commander in the history of the world. He also was asked by
the media if there were any improvements that could be made, and he
said yes, there were, and he went on to outline what further
improvements could be made. The headlines then became ``Schwarzkopf
Criticizes Intelligence,'' rather than the emphasis on his tremendous
complimentary comments about the extraordinarily good intelligence
which he had during that war.
Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a pervasive feeling across this
country somehow, at least in some quarters, that criticizing
intelligence is the thing to do. Indeed there has been a drum beat of
criticism of intelligence rather than the kind of support which I
believe it deserves. And it is largely as a result of that, I believe,
that there has developed, particularly in the clandestine service, what
might be called a culture of timidity, and I do not fault the
clandestine service for that at all. I think it is a rational response,
if each time someone raises their head they get a shot taken at it,
they learn to keep their head down. Unfortunately, by its very nature,
the clandestine service must be a careful but bold risk-taking service,
and I think we are losing that in this country, and I think it is a
very, very serious matter, and it is going to take years to rebuild it.
And so I would urge all of us to be aware of that and to be
supportive where we can.
And finally with regard to the so-called drug war, this is something
which deserves much, much more attention, much more funding, and I
would urge support for the blueprint of the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
McCollum) to wage war on drugs. We need to focus and spend more funds
on this important issue.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) who has served as chairman of this
committee and in many important assignments in this House, and he is
going to be one of the Members that next year we are going to miss the
most. He has done an outstanding job for his district and an
outstanding job for this country.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member
for yielding this time to me and also for his very kind remarks. I also
want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) for the work that he does with this committee.
I want to address the House on an area of this legislation which is
of particular concern to me. That area is the undergraduate training
program. I rise as a former member and chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. When I served on the committee, I was
struck by the lack of minorities employed in ranking and policymaking
positions throughout the intelligence community. In questioning area
agency directors about this, I was told that they were unable to find
qualified minorities who were interested in employment in the
intelligence community.
The solution to this problem took the form of legislation which is
included in the intelligence authorization bill of 1987, creating the
undergraduate training program. We were able to secure the cooperation
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, to
become the first intelligence agencies to include in their budgets the
funds to provide full scholarships for minority and disadvantaged
students.
Mr. Chairman, through the UTP program, students have their
undergraduate education fully funded and, following completion of
college, are placed in mid-level positions at the agencies. To date,
more than 150 individuals have participated in the undergraduate
training program at the National Security Agency. The Central
Intelligence Agency has graduated 135 students from the program. Many
of these students have 4.0 averages at top universities around the
nation. Some of them have 4.1 averages.
I am proud that the undergraduate training program is changing the
face of America's work force, particularly in the intelligence field.
Mr. Chairman, when I met with these graduates, they have expressed how
this program has provided them with challenging career choices, helped
them to realize their full potential. The success of this initiative
has resulted in its adoption now in other agencies, including the DIA,
the FBI, the National Institutes for Health and other agencies.
It is my strong belief that the undergraduate training program
represents our commitment to diversity in the workplace and equal
employment opportunity. It has proven successful, and I want to thank
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Dicks) and all the members of the committee on both sides of the
aisle for their efforts in maintaining this initiative, which I think
is a credit to both the Congress and to our Nation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) about the gentleman from Ohio
(Chairman Stokes). He has always been Chairman Stokes to me. He was
chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct when I
started out, and the vision and contribution he has made to this
institution are immeasurable. That is all I can say, and I thank the
gentleman for his words.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr.
Gibbons) a distinguished veteran of the Gulf War, an Air Force officer
and a member of our committee.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman and
chairman of the committee for an opportunity to speak today.
Mr. Chairman I rise to join my colleagues today in strong support of
H.R. 3694,the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
Mr. Chairman, I have the distinct pleasure of being able to serve on
both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Committee on National Security. This allows me the opportunity to look
across both operation military and defense issues as well as the
intelligence functions that not only support but in fact participate in
those various defense operations.
I can tell my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, this is a very prudent bill.
It is a bill that not only sustains currently required capabilities
but, importantly, begins to rebuild critical intelligence capabilities
lost as a result of security changes brought about by the end of the
bipolar cold war. It is a bill that provides our military forces with
the information resources necessary to build our fighter confidence and
perhaps even to keep them out of harm's way. It also seeks to provide
them with the indications and warnings intelligence to allow them the
advantage in a conflict.
Let there be no mistake Mr. Chairman. Contrary to arguments that will
be made today, this is not a more secure world since the end of the
cold war. While it is true that we do not face the imminent threat of
nuclear annihilation today from the former Soviet Union, the threats
posed by international terrorism, transnational threats such as
narcotics trafficking, organized international crime, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, any use of chemical and biological
weapons by rogue nation states are more pressing and considerably more
dangerous than they ever have been before. The problems associated with
collecting and understanding information about today's risks are in
many ways more difficult because formal government boundaries are not
limiting the threats to our peace and security.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs

[[Page H2953]]

of Staff has stated that information dominance is one of the most
important characteristics of his Joint Vision 2010 strategy.
Intelligence, intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is the bedrock for that
information dominance. This bill provides our intelligence community
with military forces, the infrastructure necessary to give United
States that information dominance.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I need to point out that this bill
provides a fiscally sound increase of less than one-tenth of 1 percent
to the President's request for intelligence. This increase reflects the
proper emphasis on the information gathering, exploitation and
dissemination activities necessary to ensure the security of the United
States. And that is the bottom line: the security of the United States.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Traficant), my good friend, who every year has offered a Buy
America amendment. This year we just put it in the bill because we
thought it was the right thing to do, and the gentleman has made a very
important contribution, and we appreciate his interest in the
intelligence bill.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman of the
committee and the ranking member for this bill, and I will vote for it.
And I am for the first time going to vote against any cuts in their
bill because I believe they deserve the chance, as stated by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes), the chairman and one of the great
Members in the body, that there is some hope here.
But I would like to give one observation specifically on this
business about the war on drugs. See, I am one that believes that the
CIA is not as bad as the critics proclaim, but I also believe the CIA
is certainly not as good as its proponents proclaim, and I think there
must be some improvement. Certainly the war on drugs is a good example.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community should know the source of
drugs. They should know the land that grows them, the farmers that tend
to those crops and harvest those crops. They should know the cartels
that take those rough products and manufacture them into a finished
product. They should further know the networking system that arranges
for the export of those narcotics to our borders where 100 percent of
all heroin and cocaine comes into this country across our borders, and
Congress keeps philosophically debating the war on drugs.

{time} 1300

I also believe the CIA should know who arranges for the importation
of these drugs, what groups in America are also a part of the
distribution, marketing and networking of making these drugs available;
and finally, which international politicians not only turn their backs,
but help to make these narcotics available.
Now, here is what I am saying: If the intelligence community does not
know that, we should save the money and throw it all out. Now, I am
offering an amendment today that is a very little, safe amendment. It
calls for a report from the CIA as to their networking and coordination
of efforts with law enforcement agencies in this country relative to
the dynamics of this war on drugs.
But let me say this. I believe the time will come where Congress
should mandate that the CIA should network and cooperate with domestic
law enforcement and international law enforcement specifically on this
war on drugs. I believe we have failed in the war on drugs.
Networking and coordination are very important. Oftentimes, agencies
compete against one another for funds, and Congress at times takes
stands and plays and takes sides on the floor for appropriations. We
must have better coordination, better networking, and the intelligence
community must be the heart of this success. Quite frankly, I do not
think they are.
I am willing to give it a chance; I think that focus needs to be
taken.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), former Governor of the State of
Delaware and a member of our committee.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I also rise in strong support of H.R. 3694,
the intelligence authorization bill, and I offer my congratulations to
the ranking member and to the chairman of this committee, both of whom
are extraordinarily dedicated to this and, I think, do a wonderful job
in performing this function.
Mr. Chairman, I do share the chairman's concerns about the current
state of the intelligence community, and I do fully support his
recommendations within this legislation for finding its deficiencies.
Like my chairman, I believe that we must invest sufficient resources
toward the development of the intelligence community's all-source
analytical infrastructure. United States policymakers must have the
most comprehensive, responsive and timely strategic perspective on
major global changes.
During the Cold War, the wide-ranging nature of the Soviet threat
simplified the analytical tasks faced by the intelligence community.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unpredictability of
emerging global challenges such as those of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and
Iraq, requires the development of a national analytical capability that
can provide policymakers with sufficient warning and with a range of
policy options.
The failure of the Clinton administration's efforts to contain Saddam
Hussein may, in part, reflect the inadequacy of our government's
analysis of Iraqi internal dynamics, as well as gaps in our
understanding of Iraq's policies and economy. Like other rogue states,
Iraq demands a rigorous and aggressive analytical posture on the part
of our intelligence community. We must do a better job of analyzing
trends within such hard targets.
As a member of both the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, I am quite aware
of the intelligence community's role and performance in analyzing
significant global economic trends for policymakers, as well as its
efforts to respond to the emerging threat of global organized crime.
I must confess that I have heard that the intelligence community may
not be as capable of assessing global economic trends as a number of
private sector firms. Economic and banking specialists and such
government entities as the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department and
the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, have not been shy in
criticizing the value of the community's economic intelligence
reporting. While some of this criticism may not be justified, I believe
that a prudent approach would be to initiate some sort of interagency
review process to evaluate the quality and relevance of the community's
economic intelligence reporting.
In response to emerging national security threats, such as money
laundering by global criminal organizations, efforts should be made to
clarify the respective roles of the intelligence community and law
enforcement agencies. The nature and scope of the threat posed to our
national security by money laundering groups is apparently large, but
not well defined.
Numerous U.S. agencies have some responsibility for monitoring and
responding to the global money-laundering threat, but no single agency
takes the lead in tracking illicit financial flows and tracking down
major launderers. I believe we can do it here. I urge members to
support H.R. 3964.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Vermont (Mr. Sanders), who has been very diligent over the years in
reviewing the intelligence budget. We do not always agree on this, but
I certainly want to yield to him to present his perspective.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
do not know that I will take the 2 minutes.
Let me just say this: We have heard a lot of discussion about the
bipartisan nature of support for the intelligence budget, and that may
well be on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; I do not
think it is in the general House.
Last year, when we offered an amendment to lower the intelligence
budget by 5 percent, we had 142 Members who said, no, those do not
reflect our priorities. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that when we go out
on Main Street and we go to rural America and we go to urban America
and we say to the folks there, many of whom, I should add, no longer

[[Page H2954]]

vote, by and large have given up on the political process because they
do not believe that this Congress represents their interests, and we
say to them, should we increase funding for the intelligence budget and
cut funding for Medicare, should we allow a situation to continue where
millions of elderly people in this country cannot afford their
prescription drugs or should we build more spy satellites, I say to my
colleagues, those people will tell us, in my view, and tell us
overwhelmingly, they will say, Congress, get your priorities right.
This is an intelligence budget, so let us talk about how we can improve
intelligence in America.
Let us make sure that the little kids are able to get into the Head
Start program. Let us make sure that millions of kids in this country
who would like to go to college, but today cannot afford to go to
college, have that opportunity by significantly increasing the
appropriations for Pell grants. That is what we are talking about.
Now, nobody here is saying this is a peaceful world, that there are
no problems. Nobody here is saying, let us cut the intelligence budget
to zero. Nobody here is saying that the intelligence agencies do not
serve a useful purpose. What we are saying is, get your priorities
right.
The Cold War is over. The middle class, the working families of this
country are hurting. Do not cut programs for them in the name of
deficit reduction and increase funding for the intelligence budget.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute and 55 seconds.
I would just like to remind my colleague that if we subtract 142 from
435, we come up with 293, or a better than 2-to-1 ratio of the members
of the House who voted in favor of the intelligence bill as reported by
the committee.
I would just say this. We have to look at this in perspective. The
intelligence bill is part of the defense bill. We have cut defense over
the last 14 years every single year. The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense decide how much of the
defense budget, which has been cut for 14 straight years, will be
allocated to intelligence. We are not going to take money out here and
put it over in Health and Human Services. That is just not what we are
talking about.
If we cut the money out of intelligence, it is going to go to some
other aspect of the defense bill, because it is part of the 050
function. I support all of these programs that the gentleman from
Vermont is talking about.
We were here last night in support of education, and I agree with him
that we need to protect Medicare and Social Security and the safety
net. But we also have to protect our national security, and that is the
foremost responsibility of the Federal Government.
I think the bill this year provides a prudent amount. There were 16
members of this committee, and from the most liberal to the most
conservative, every single one of them present in the committee voted
to approve this bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill. We have done a
responsible, balanced job, and I think this bill deserves the support
of the House.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to gather an understanding of
where we are on the time left on the floor on either side.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 5 minutes
remaining; the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, does the distinguished gentleman from
Washington have any other speakers?
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back at this time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would just yield myself such time as I may
consume to present a closing thought.
I would like to point out that the United States is a pioneer in
legislative oversight in intelligence. I think the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks) and I can both attest to the fact that we have
met with parliamentarians from around the world whose countries are
just beginning to take the first tentative steps toward independent
oversight of intelligence activities. They are very interested to learn
how our system works. I think we have the best system, the safest
system, and a system where we can absolutely assure the citizens of the
United States of America that things are under control.
I thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for assisting in
that, and if the gentleman is willing to yield back at this time, I am
as well.
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the
Sanders Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1999.
In the name of reducing deficit spending, Congress has slashed
hundreds of billions of dollars from programs for education, health
care, the elderly, and veterans. These cuts have left millions of the
neediest Americans in even greater need. Yet when it comes to the
intelligence budget, we are willing to spend tens of billions of
dollars every year without meaningful reductions.
H.R. 3694 provides $28 billion dollars for national intelligence
programs. This enormous amount represents $3 billion more than what we
spend on food stamps, over 50% more than what we spend on medical care
for veterans, and more than the total amount spent on child nutrition,
special education, and Pell Grants combined.
We need to keep our budget priorities straight. The welfare of the
American taxpayer should be more important than funding secret
operations overseas. This amendment would reduce the intelligence
budget by 5%; although a modest cut, it would at least ensure that the
intelligence budget does not escape the same budget-cutting axe that
has cut so many other government programs. I urge my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Ms. MILLENDER-McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my support
for H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization for FY 1999. However, my
support is not without serious reservations, for I remain deeply
concerned about allegations that have been raised regarding CIA
involvement in drug trafficking in South Central Los Angeles and
elsewhere. While I applaud Chairman Porter Goss, Ranking Member Norm
Dicks, and the rest of the House Permanent Select Committee for
convening a public hearing following release of Volume One of the
Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General's report in response to
the San Jose Mercury News' series ``Dark Alliance'', I have made my
views about the shortcomings in this report known to the Committee and
to the Agency. I am aware that Volume Two of the Inspector General's
report, which deals with the more substantive issues regarding the
extent of the relationship between the intelligence community and the
Nicaraguan Contra resistance, has been provided to the Select Committee
in classified form. I understand that it is being reviewed by the
Central Intelligence Agency to determine whether any or all of it may
be declassified. And, we are still awaiting release of Inspector
General Michael Bromwich's report on the allegations of wrongdoing that
may have occurred within branches of the U.S. Department of Justice.
However, I would like to take this opportunity to strongly urge CIA
Director John Tenet and Chairman Goss to do everything possible to
declassify as much information in the report as possible as its subject
matter goes to the heart of the issues raised by my constituents in the
public meetings I convened following publication of the San Jose
Mercury News series. I also urge Attorney General Janet Reno to release
the I.G.'s report at the earliest possible opportunity. Failure to make
this information public feeds the skepticism of the hundreds of
constituents in my District who still want answers and who are
encouraged by the Committee's expressed commitment to make public as
much information as possible.
Furthermore, to fully appreciate our government's efforts to fight
the scourge of narcotics, the public must understand its intricacies,
including the role of interdiction and intelligence. Public release of
the reports, followed by public hearings, and ultimately the conduct by
the Committee of its own inquiry, will assist my constituents to
evaluate the role of the Central Intelligence Agency played in
balancing competing national priorities. Such a process will also give
Members of Congress, as policy makers, the information necessary to
make informed decisions about handling such issues in the future.
Consequently, I and my constituents continue to eagerly await the
public release of the reports by the Inspectors General of Justice and
CIA. I reiterate my hope that the Select Committee will give their
content, methodologies and findings the scrutiny they deserve and in a
similar spirit of openness, make themselves available to my
constituents to respond to any questions these reports generate. I
believe such openness is critical to restoration of the credibility and
public trust necessary to allow intelligence gathering activities,
which by their nature are secretive, to coexist with democracy.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take a few minutes to talk about
some of the things that aren't being talked about enough. The war on
drugs has come up several times

[[Page H2955]]

today. I think there's some compelling evidence to show how the culture
of obsessive secrecy that is part of covert action cultivates an actual
and implied climate of impunity.
The CIA's Inspector General, Fred Hitz, undertook a massive study
into the CIA ties to drug traffickers. Upon completion of the first
volume of the 600 page report, Hitz declared that they found ``no
evidence . . . of any conspiracy by the CIA or its employees to bring
drugs into the United States.'' Then he announced that hardly any of
his findings would be publicly available, casting a long shadow of
doubt as to the scope and conclusions of the investigation. A second
volume is still in the works.
The CIA's credibility when it comes to investigating itself was
further brought into question when Hitz disclosed during recent
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that in 1982, the CIA
and Attorney General William French Smith had an agreement that the CIA
was not required to report allegations of drug smuggling by non-
employees. Non-employees was explicitly interpreted to include unpaid
and paid assets of the CIA, such as pilots and informants. The
memorandum, dated February 11, 1982, states ``no formal requirement
regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in
these procedures'', referring to the procedures relating to non-
employee crimes. I want to compliment the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Waters, for her hard work on this topic and for obtaining this and
other relevant memoranda. I ask you, though, is this the war on drugs
that President Reagan launched?
Nobody here who advocates cuts to the intelligence budget or
reforming this intelligence system gone haywire doubts for one second
that the U.S. needs reliable information about exports of Russian
missile technology or the trade in bacteriological warfare technology.
I am a veteran and I know how important intelligence is. But doesn't
the above information illustrate why the integrity of our intelligence
system is in doubt?
The historical record shows that this culture of secrecy too often
undermines our foreign and domestic interests.
In 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Communications, headed by Senator John Kerry, found that
``there was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zone
on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots,
mercenaries who worked with the Contra supporters throughout the
region.'' Moreover, U.S. officials ``failed to address the drug issue
for fear of jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua.''
In other words, the drug war was subordinated to the cold war. This
is right in line with what we've learned about the memorandum of
understanding described above. I am inserting into the Record a list,
compiled by the Institute for Policy Studies, which goes through other
examples of the troubling history of our intelligence agencies.

A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International
Trafficking

WORLD WAR II

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI), the CIA's parent and sister
organizations, cultivate relations with the leaders of the
Italian Mafia, recruiting heavily from the New York and
Chicago underworlds, whose members, including Charles
``Lucky'' Luciano, Meyer Lansky, Joe Adonis, and Frank
Costello, help the agencies keep in touch with Sicilian Mafia
leaders exiled by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.
Domestically, the aim is to prevent sabotage on East Coast
ports, while in Italy the goal is to gain intelligence on
Sicily prior to the allied invasions and to suppress the
burgeoning Italian Communist Party. Imprisoned in New York,
Luciano earns a pardon for his wartime service and is
deported to Italy, where he proceeds to build his heroin
empire, first by diverting supplies from the legal market,
before developing connections in Lebanon and Turkey that
supply morphine base to labs in Sicily. The OSS and ONI also
work closely with Chinese gangsters who control vast supplies
of opium, morphine and heroin, helping to establish the third
pillar of the post-world War II heroin trade in the Golden
Triangle, the border region of Thailand, Burma, Laos and
China's Yunnan Province.

1947

In its first year of existence, the CIA continues U.S.
intelligence community's anti-communist drive. Agency
operatives help the Mafia seize total power in Sicily and it
sends money to heroin-smuggling Corsican mobsters in
Marseille to assist in their battle with Communist unions for
control of the city's docks. By 1951, Luciano and the
Corsicans have pooled their resources, giving rise to the
notorious ``French Connection'' which would dominate the
world heroin trade until the early 1970s. The CIA also
recruits members of organized crime gangs in Japan to help
ensure that the country stays in the non-communist world.
Several years later, the Japanese Yakuza emerges as a major
source of methamphetamine in Hawaii.

1949

Chinese Communist revolution causes collapse of drug empire
allied with U.S. intelligence community, but a new one
quickly emerges under the command of Nationalist (KMT)
General Li Mi, who flees Yunnan into eastern Burma. Seeking
to rekindle anticommunist resistance in China, the CIA
provides arms, ammunition and other supplies to the KMT.
After being repelled from China with heavy losses, the KMT
settles down with local population and organizes and expands
the opium trade from Burma and Northern Thailand. By 1972,
the KMT controls 80 percent of the Golden Triangle's opium
trade.

1950

The CIA launches Project Bluebird to determine whether
certain drugs might improve its interrogation methods. This
eventually leads CIA head Allen Dulles, in April 1953, to
institute a program for ``covert use of biological and
chemical materials'' as part of the agency's continuing
efforts to control behavior. With benign names such as
Project Artichoke and Project Chatter, these projects
continue through the 1960s, with hundreds of unwitting test
subjects given various drugs, including LSD.

1960

In support of the U.S. war in Vietnam, the CIA renews old
and cultivates new relations with Laotian, Burmese and Thai
drug merchants, as well as corrupt military and political
leaders in Southeast Asia. Despite the dramatic rise of
heroin production, the agency's relations with these figures
attracts little attention until the early 1970s.

1967

Manuel Antonio Noriega goes on the CIA payroll. First
recruited by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1959,
Noriega becomes an invaluable asset for the CIA when he takes
charge of Panama's intelligence service after the 1968
military coup, providing services for U.S. covert operations
and facilitating the use of Panama as the center of U.S.
intelligence gathering in Latin America. In 1976, CIA
Director George Bush pays Noriega $110,000 for his services,
even though as early as 1971 U.S. officials agents had
evidence that he was deeply involved in drug trafficking.
Although the Carter administration suspends payments to
Noriega, he returns to the U.S. payroll when President Reagan
takes office in 1981. The general is rewarded handsomely for
his services in support of Contras forces in Nicaragua during
the 1980s, collecting $200,000 from the CIA in 1986 alone.

May 1970

A Christian Science Monitor correspondent reports that the
CIA ``is cognizant of, if not party to, the extensive
movement of opium out of Laos,'' quoting one charter pilot
who claims that ``opium shipments get special CIA clearance
and monitoring on their flights southward out of the
country.'' At the time, some 30,000 U.S. service men in
Vietnam are addicted to heroin.

1972

The full story of how Cold War politics and U.S. covert
operations fueled a heroin boom in the Golden Triangle breaks
when Yale University doctoral student Alfred McCoy publishes
his ground-breaking study, The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia. The CIA attempts to quash the book.

1973

Thai national Puttapron Khramkhruan is arrested in
connection with the seizure of 59 pounds of opium in Chicago.
A CIA informant on narcotics trafficking in northern
Thailand, he claims that agency had full knowledge of his
actions. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the CIA
quashed the case because it may ``prove embarrassing
because of Mr. Khramkhruans's involvement with CIA
activities in Thailand, Burma, and elsewhere.''

June 1975

Mexican police, assisted by U.S. drug agents, arrest
Alberto Sicilia Falcon, whose Tijuana-based operation was
reportedly generating $3.6 million a week from the sale of
cocaine and marijuana in the United States. The Cuban exile
claims he was a CIA protege, trained as part of the agency's
anti-Castro efforts, and in exchange for his help in moving
weapons to certain groups in Central America, the CIA
facilitated his movement of drugs. In 1974, Sicilia's top
aide, Jose Egozi, a CIA-trained intelligence officer and Bay
of Pigs veteran, reportedly lined up agency support for a
right-wing plot to overthrow the Portuguese government. Among
the top Mexican politicians, law enforcement and intelligence
officials from whom Sicilia enjoyed support was Miguel Nazar
Haro, head of the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), who
the CIA admits was its ``most important source in Mexico and
Central America.'' When Nazar was linked to a multi-million-
dollar stolen car ring several years later, the CIA
intervenes to prevent his indictment in the United States.

April 1978

Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan sets stage for explosive
growth in Southwest Asian heroin trade. New Marxist regime
undertakes vigorous anti-narcotics campaign aimed at
suppressing poppy production, triggering a revolt by semi-
autonomous tribal groups that traditionally raised opium for
export. The CIA-supported rebel Mujahedeen begins expanding
production to finance their insurgency. Between 1982 and
1989, during which time the CIA ships billions of dollars

[[Page H2956]]

in weapons and other aid to guerrilla forces, annual opium
production in Afghanistan increases to about 800 tons from
250 tons. By 1986, the State Department admits that
Afghanistan is ``probably the world's largest producer of
opium for export'' and ``the poppy source for a majority of
the Southwest Asian heroin found in the United States.'' U.S.
officials, however, fail to take action to curb production.
Their silence not only serves to maintain public support for
the Mujahedeen, it also smooths relations with Pakistan,
whose leaders, deeply implicated in the heroin trade, help
channel CIA support to the Afghan rebels.

June 1980

Despite advance knowledge, the CIA fails to halt members of
the Bolivian militaries, aide by the Argentine counterparts,
from staging the so-called ``Cocaine Coup,'' according to
former DEA agent Michael Levine. In fact, the 25-year DEA
veteran maintains the agency actively abetted cocaine
trafficking in Bolivia, where government official who sought
to combat traffickers faced ``torture and death at the hands
of CIA-sponsored paramilitary terrorists under the command of
fugitive Nazi war criminal (also protected by the CIA) Klaus
Barbie.

february 1985

DEA agent Enrique ``Kiki'' Camerena is kidnapped and murder
in Mexico. DEA, FBI and U.S. Customs Service investigators
accuse the CIA of stonewalling during their investigation.
U.S. authorities claim the CIA is more interested in
protecting its assets, including top drug trafficker and
kidnapping principal Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. (In 1982,
the DEA learned that Felix Gallardo was moving $20 million a
month through a single Bank of America account, but it could
not get the CIA to cooperate with its investigation.) Felix
Gallardo's main partner is Honduran drug lord Juan Ramon
Matta Ballesteros, who began amassing his $2-billion fortune
as a cocaine supplier to Alberto Sicilia Falcon. (see June
1985) Matta's air transport firm, SETCO, receives $186,000
from the U.S. State Department to fly ``humanitarian
supplies'' to the Nicaraguan Contras from 1983 to 1985.
Accusations that the CIA protected some of Mexico's leading
drug traffickers in exchange for their financial support of
the Contras are leveled by government witnesses at the trials
of Camarena's accused killers.

january 1988

Deciding that he has outlived his usefulness to the Contra
cause, the Reagan Administration approves an indictment of
Noriega on drug charges. By this time, U.S. Senate
investigators had found that ``the United States had received
substantial information about criminal involvement of top
Panamanian officials for nearly twenty years and done little
to respond.''

april 1989

The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Communications, headed by Sen. John Kerry of
Massachusetts, issues its 1,166-page report on drug
corruption in Central America and the Caribbean. The
subcommittee found that ``there was substantial evidence of
drug smuggling through the war zone on the part of
individuals Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots,
mercenaries who worked with the Contras supporters throughout
the region.'' U.S. officials, the subcommittee said, ``failed
to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war
efforts against Nicaragua.'' The investigation also reveals
that some ``senior policy makers'' believed that the use of
drug money was ``a perfect solution to the Contras' funding
problems.''

january 1993

Honduran businessman Eugenio Molina Osorio is arrested in
Lubbock Texas for supplying $90,000 worth of cocaine to DEA
agents. Molina told judge he is working for CIA to whom he
provides political intelligence. Shortly after, a letter from
CIA headquarters is sent to the judge, and the case is
dismissed. ``I guess we're all aware that they [the CIA] do
business in a different way than everybody else,'' the judge
notes. Molina later admits his drug involvement was not a CIA
operation, explaining that the agency protected him because
of his value as a source for political intelligence in
Honduras.

november 1996

Former head of the Venezuelan National Guard and CIA
operative Gen. Ramon Gullien Davila is indicted in Miami on
charges of smuggling as much as 22 tons of cocaine into the
United States. More than a ton of cocaine was shipped into
the country with the CIA's approval as part of an undercover
program aimed at catching drug smugglers, an operation kept
secret from other U.S. agencies.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 and redesignating
the succeeding sections, shall be considered as an original bill for
the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule. Consideration shall
proceed by title, and each title shall be considered read.
No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in
the Congressional Record. Those amendments shall be considered read.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request
for a recorded vote on any amendment, and may reduce to not less than 5
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device,
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting
by electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not
be less than 15 minutes.

The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.

TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and family
members.
Sec. 403. Technical amendments.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1?
If there are no amendments to section 1, the Clerk will designate
title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall

[[Page H2957]]

promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises
the authority granted by this section.

SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the
sum of $139,123,000. Within such amount, funds identified in
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development
Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence is authorized 283 full-time personnel as of
September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or
personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there is also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there
is authorized such additional personnel for such elements as
of that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947, during fiscal year 1999,
any officer or employee of the United States or a member of
the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the
Community Management Account from another element of the
United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may
be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less
than one year for the performance of temporary functions as
required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000
shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.
Within such amount, funds provided for research, development,
test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the
United States funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General
shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements
at Overseas Locations.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central
Intelligence may transfer funds to departments or other
agencies for the sole purpose of supporting certain
intelligence community security requirements at overseas
locations, as specified by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Amounts made available for departments or
agencies under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) transferred to the specific appropriation;
(B) allocated to the specific account in the specific
amount, as determined by the Director;
(C) merged with funds in such account that are available
for architectural and engineering support expenses at
overseas locations; and
(D) available only for the same purposes, and subject to
the same terms and conditions, as the funds described in
subparagraph (C).

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Sanders

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Sanders:
At the end of title I, add the following new section:

SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE
APPROPRIATED.

(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
notwithstanding the total amount of the individual
authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act
(including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations referred to in section 102), there is
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 to carry
out this Act not more than 95 percent of the total amount
authorized to be appropriated by this Act (determined without
regard to this section).
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is also being offered by
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio); the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Owens); and the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark).
Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts the intelligence budget by 5
percent from the level authorized for fiscal year 1999, while still
protecting the CIA retirement and disability fund. Although this year's
amount authorized by the bill is classified, we do know that last
year's budget was $26.7 billion, which means that this amendment would
cut approximately $1.3 billion from the intelligence agencies.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment truly speaks to what we are as a Nation
and who we are as a people. It speaks to whether the Congress of the
United States is here to represent the ordinary people of America, the
middle class, the working families, the children, the veterans, the
seniors, or whether we are here to continue representing very powerful
special interests within the military-industrial complex, the force
that President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned us about 40 years ago.
Mr. Chairman, it is no secret that the United States today is
becoming two very separate nations. On the top we have people who are
enjoying incredible wealth. In fact, the wealthiest 1 percent is today
better off than at any time in the modern history of this country. We
have people like Bill Gates, himself, alone, who owns more wealth than
the bottom 40 percent of households in America. One man owns more
wealth than the bottom 40 percent of our households.
In recent years, we have seen a proliferation of millionaires and
billionaires, but Mr. Chairman, there is another reality in America
today, and that is that the middle class continues to shrink, that the
wages of the average American worker are 15 percent less than they were
25 years ago, that 40 million Americans have no health insurance, that
millions of senior citizens cannot afford the prescription drugs they
desperately need.

{time} 1315

That millions of our families cannot afford to send their kids to
college. That food shelters and emergency shelters are seeing a large
increase in the hungry and the homeless who come to them for help. That
is the issue that we are talking about today.
We are not just talking about the intelligence budgets. We have to
put that into the context of the needs of all the people in this
country.
Mr. Chairman, how can we increase funding for an already bloated
intelligence budget at exactly the same time as some propose major cuts
for millions of low- and moderate-income citizens? How is it okay to
say more for the intelligence budget at the same time as this Congress
cut $115 billion from Medicare? Tell the senior citizens of this
country whose benefits we have cut back on.
How can we look our veterans in the face when in last year's balanced
budget agreement we cut funding for veterans programs by 19 percent;
when we cut the administration of Social Security by 23 percent; when
just last week we cut $2.3 billion in affordable housing, despite the
housing crisis experienced by so many Americans.
Mr. Chairman, even in Washington the $1.3 billion that we cut from
the intelligence budget is a lot of money, and let me tell my
colleagues what we can purchase with that $1.3 billion if we get our
priorities straight.
In Vermont and throughout this country, seniors are finding it
difficult to pay for their prescription drugs. Legislation has been
offered which would provide up to $500 each in prescription drug
assistance for seniors. This $1.3 billion that we cut from a bloated
intelligence budget could provide 2,600,000 seniors up to $500 each in
their prescription drug assistance.
Are my colleagues going to go back to their districts and tell their
senior citizens who are struggling to ease their pain that we cannot
cut $1.3 billion from the intelligence budget when we can provide 2.6
million of them help for their prescription drugs?
Mr. Chairman, there are 808,000 homebound seniors who receive the
excellent Meals on Wheels program supported widely in this Congress.
This

[[Page H2958]]

$1.3 billion could double the number of seniors who receive this help.
These are elderly people at home, long waiting list for the Meals on
Wheels program. We could double the number.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders)
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, nearly 1 million college students could
receive Pell Grants to assist them going to college. Just yesterday we
passed the education bill. I voted for it, but remember the
authorization is nowhere near equal to the appropriation.
We have millions of middle-class families in this country who cannot
afford to send their kids to college. And are my colleagues so sure
that it makes sense for the security of this country, for the
intelligence of this country, that it is more important to vote another
$1.3 billion than it is to provide nearly a million kids in this
country with Pell Grants?
Nine hundred sixty-nine thousand families could benefit from Section
8 housing programs if we cut that $1.3 billion. In the State of
Vermont, we have a long waiting list for Section 8. That is true all
over this country. Two hundred forty thousand more children could
attend the Head Start program if we cut this $1.3 billion.
So, Mr. Chairman, what I would just like to say at this point is that
the Cold War is over. We do need an intelligence budget, but there is
very ample evidence that the budget that we are being asked to support
today is bloated.
I would say to my friends who are the deficit hawks who get up here
every day and who say cut, cut, cut, if they are going to cut Medicare,
if they are going to cut Medicaid, if they are going to cut veterans
programs, if they are going to cut housing, take a look at the
intelligence budget.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Vermont made reference
to getting our priorities straight. What is a higher priority than
defending the lives of all the people of this great country? We are
talking about cutting today. I would like to remind the gentleman that
the defense budget, which includes the intelligence budget, has taken
all the cuts in recent years. Spending has gone up for everything else
except defense.
Let me dwell on that for a minute. I do not think people realize the
extent to which we have cut back on our military and our intelligence-
gathering agencies, the impact these cuts have had on our national
defense. And yes, in a world where the Cold War is over, but in many
ways a more dangerous world today than it was during the Cold War. And
I will tell my colleagues why. Because people do not realize what we
have done to ourselves. We have done to our military and to our
intelligence agencies what no foreign power has been able to do. We
have been decimating our own defenses.
That is unforgivable, Mr. Chairman. In this dangerous world in which
we are living, when not tomorrow but tonight, today, at any minute,
this whole world could explode for us. It is just that serious. And
here we are fat, dumb, and happy going about our merry ways, not
concerned about what could happen to us. Let me tell my colleagues what
could happen to us.
In this day and time you do not have to be a superpower to raise the
horrors of mass destruction warfare on people. It could be a Third
World country, a rogue nation, or a terrorist group for that matter.
They can put together weapons of mass destruction in laboratories in
inexpensive low-tech ways. They can marry these weapons of mass
destruction with cruise missiles, which can be bought across borders.
They can launch them from various platforms, airplanes, submarines,
ships, tugboats, extending the range to the extent that it brings
everyone under the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
These weapons of mass destruction are chemical, biological,
bacteriological. Can my colleagues imagine having to defend against
these kinds of weapons, hideous weapons? Anthrax could be released in
the air over Washington, D.C. in a simple way, killing hundreds of
thousands of people, and we could not inoculate people fast enough to
prevent anything happening to them. That could happen at any time and
people are talking about cutting back on our ability to defend against
these things or to prevent them from happening. It is unconscionable to
even think about it. It borders on leaving our country defenseless when
confronting the enemy and all the dangers that we are facing as a
country.
Aside from those weapons of mass destruction, we face all kinds of
threats from various sources. This is a very dangerous world. We have
to do more instead of less in defending our country and our people.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to let reason come to this
debate. Think it through. Vote down overwhelmingly this senseless
amendment.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. The gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spence) made some excellent points. The whole
world, it is a dangerous world. It could explode at any moment. The
question, given the past performance of our intelligence agencies is
whether they could tell us about the world exploding before or after
the fact or even recognize it after the fact. The disintegration of the
Soviet Union, they could not predict that. The invasion of Kuwait with
the Iraqis massed on the border, they could not predict that. Even the
horrible tragedy which was mentioned earlier of the killing by
terrorists of our troops, that was not prevented and it certainly was
not predicted.
These are horrible things that have happened and the intelligence
agencies have not exactly been ahead of the curve. They are engaged in
acquiring ever greater technology at ever greater expense and more and
more money, as opposed to becoming more efficient and more effective,
finely honed, leaner and meaner, getting the intelligence we really
need and our Armed Services really need to defend our people.
The gentleman talked about defending our people against chemical-
biological attack. We just had an assessment about that. There is no
preparation in this country. We are not investing in the civilian law
enforcement agencies, the emergency response, the vaccines, and the
other things we should be stockpiling to respond. But we are spending
money on incredible satellite systems and the satellite systems are
gathering so much data that 60 percent of it is never analyzed.
Mr. Chairman, we wonder if they have got up to the point yet of
analyzing the data that shows whether or not there is still a Berlin
Wall. Just a couple of years ago, the National Security Agency, in
doing a cursory review of its books, found that it had an extra $4
billion in accounts which it had secreted around, more than the annual
budget perhaps, but that is a classified number so we do not know. But
probably more than its annual budget, they had secreted it in various
accounts and no one knew anything about it.
So that speaks to me, and I think to other Members of Congress, that
perhaps there is a little bit too much money washing around over there
if they can misplace $4 billion. We are investigating misappropriations
of hundreds of dollars or thousands of dollars regularly, and rising to
those issues.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has always been accurate. He
said the NSA. He meant the NRO, and I ask him to correct that.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, excuse me. I thank the
gentleman for correcting me. I meant the NRO, not the NSA. That is part
of the problem with this debate. This is not a debate which really
takes place very often on the floor of the House, and does not take
place in full light with full accountability to the public. We know
last year's number. We know how much money we spent last year. But we
cannot talk about how much money we are going to spend this year. We
cannot talk about the number which we are debating here on the floor
today. We cannot talk about

[[Page H2959]]

whether it is an increase or decrease from last year's number because
we have last year's number.
It used to be at least we could talk about the percentage increase of
the secret number, but now since we know what the number was, we cannot
even talk about what percentage increase or decrease it might be in
this year's budget. But we are debating it here on the floor and we do
have some confusing acronyms, NRO, NSA, DIA, CIA, and others which we
cannot even mention which are involved.
The point that I am trying to make, and I think others here are, no,
we do want to have a robust intelligence service, but we want to have
one that is reorganized, that is not territorial, oriented towards
preserving their own separate bureaucracies, but one which is better
integrated, one which is more efficient, more effective, and provides
realtime data that is of use both to our military services, our
civilian law enforcement agencies, and in the defense of the people of
the United States of America.
I believe we could do that with more scrutiny instead of having this
absurd debate every year where we do not know what we are debating. Let
us talk about the individual components of this budget and what they
are spending it on. There is no one in the world who can benefit from
knowing that. In fact, our potential enemies already know it, but the
American people cannot know it and the elected officials cannot know it
and they cannot speak about it and debate it on the floor.
Mr. Chairman, that is an absurdity and that is what the debate is
about today. If they could defend their numbers and defend them
category by category as we do every other department of the United
States of America, including the Pentagon and the Defense Department,
then there would be a fair debate and the numbers that the gentleman
cited in support of that budget would be fair numbers. But those are
numbers where the Members did not even know what they were voting on.
That happens fairly often around here, but this is one for sure that
they did not know what they were voting on.
So I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment to cut the
amount of money, whatever it is, by 5 percent and make these agencies
more efficient, more effective, and better protect the people of the
United States.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, the previous speaker talked about a lot of complaints
that he had about our intelligence community and I think we would all
admit they are not perfect. As he was speaking, it reminded me of a
trip that I made driving home to Florida one time. I came upon a group
of young kids that were on a hay ride. And the hay ride wagon had red,
white, and blue bunting and American flags and the kids were having a
good time packed up on the bales of hay.

{time} 1330

It had this big banner across the back of the wagon, and it said
``America, we ain't perfect, but we ain't through yet.'' I would apply
that to the argument that the gentleman just made.
Our intelligence community is not perfect. There are problems. This
bill directs itself to many of those problems, to solve many of those
solutions. That is what we intend to do with this bill.
What I really wanted to mention is that I listened to the comment of
my friend, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) about senior
citizens. He listed a lot of things that we could do if we did not do
something else. You could make that argument about anything that we do
in here.
Let me tell you this. I represent one of the largest groups of senior
citizens of anybody in this body. And those senior citizens are old
enough to remember a time in our history that was devastating to us,
that was devastating to our morale, and that killed an awful lot of
young Americans.
I am talking about a lack of intelligence, poor preparation for
intelligence, lack of information that we needed when Pearl Harbor was
attacked in 1941. That was a long time ago, and a lot of people do not
remember that, but those senior citizens that the gentleman from
Vermont (Mr. Sanders) talks about, they remember that.
I hear it on a regular basis when I am home in my district talking
about defense issues and veterans issues; and that is, let us do not
ever get ourselves in a position where we are not prepared to either
know about an attack of that type or be prepared to do something about
it.
The world is different today in 1998 than it was in 1941. In 1941, we
did not have intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at each other
across the oceans. We did not have submarines carrying nuclear warheads
within range of the United States of America, any city in the United
States of America. We did not have satellites, and we did not have
space shuttles and things of this nature.
In 1941, we had a little time to put it back together. Although we
lost thousands and thousands of young Americans, we lost in the beaches
of the Pacific and the frozen battle grounds of Europe; and, finally,
we turned the tide, and we came back to life, and we defeated the
enemy, and we prevailed, and freedom prevailed.
Just think, had our intelligence been adequate then, we might not
have had to suffer the terrible tragedy of Pearl Harbor. Let us not let
that happen again. Let us keep our eyes and ears as sharp as they can
possibly be. Let us be prepared in the event someone is determined to
do something that would be adverse to us and our national interest and,
more importantly, the people of our great Nation.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Yes, I am happy to yield to my friend, the
gentleman from Washington.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) has
expired.
(On request of Mr. Dicks, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Young of
Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, the
gentleman makes an important point in that we have to be prepared with
what we have today. We are not going to have time to go out and build
all the things that we may need in our next conflict.
My colleague, the gentleman from Oregon said that in the Gulf War, we
had an intelligence failure. That simply is not true. The President
said after the invasion of Kuwait was that he had 2 days of actionable
warning from the intelligence community; and that is a fact.
The problem was, and this is what happens sometimes in these crises,
we did not act on that intelligence, because we were told by other
people who were allies in that region that Saddam would not invade. But
there was, in fact, warning there; and I want to make that point. Part
of the reason why we had the warning is because we had our intelligence
apparatus in place.
I would also say, in very general terms, we had a tremendous military
victory because we had an intelligence advantage in the Gulf War that
allowed that victory to occur quickly, decisively, saving American
lives, saving the lives of the allies, and saving money, actually, for
the taxpayers.
By having intelligence superiority, as Colin Powell said, you can
provide overwhelming military force and end the conflict rapidly. That
is why I have always believed that having a strong defense is the right
thing to do; because, as you go back and look in our history, look at
Korea, another example where we were unprepared, did not have the right
training, did not have the people ready to go, and we almost got run
off the peninsula. That was another problem where we were both
militarily weak and did not have good intelligence. It would be a
mistake of vast proportions to undermine the intelligence community, to
undermine the defense of this country.
We have already cut defense and national security by $115 billion.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) has
again expired.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Young) have an additional minute.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Washington?
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

[[Page H2960]]

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
My view of this is that we have already cut defense by $115 billion
from the high point back in 1985. That means that we have reduced that
overall budget from about $365 billion a year to $250 billion a year.
We are not even keeping up with inflation.
There has been a judgment made by the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence about how much of that roughly $250
billion is going to go into intelligence.
This committee, 16 Members; 9 Republicans, 7 Democrats, have held
exhaustive hearings into every aspect of that budget. We have a highly
professional staff that looks into it all. We have come to a unanimous
conclusion that the amount that has been requested by the chairman in
his markup is the right amount.
Let us fight in other venues to take money and use it for what the
gentleman from Vermont talked about. I am for all those programs. But I
do not think we should try to cut it out here. If it was taken out of
the authorization for intelligence, all it would do is wind up being
spent for other defense items. That is the reality of this. It is a
nice idea, but it simply will not work.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a brief statement just on
that. You are aware that just last week when we voted for disaster
relief, which virtually everybody supported, suddenly out of nowhere
came an offset from disaster relief to cut $2.2 billion in housing.
It seems to me that if this Congress has the capability of cutting
affordable housing for disaster relief, we also have the capability of
working together and making sure that when we cut intelligence
spending, it goes to people in need, middle-class and working families.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, what I say to my good friend is this, we
have cut defense over the last 15 years by $115 billion. That is how we
balanced this budget. Defense has already been cut. I think there are a
lot of other parts of this budget that ought to be looked at.
Mr. SANDERS. I suggest to my friend, the gentleman from Washington,
we are spending $267 billion this year on defense in addition to our
NATO allies and all their expenditures in addition to the intelligence.
That is a lot of money.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DICKS. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. He pointed out that there has been a reduction from what
seemed to me a greatly swollen budget under Secretary Weinberger, but
it is down about 30 percent. At the same time, we have had the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The defense is to deal with our enemies. I wonder if he believes that
we are, in fact, facing less of a military threat today than we were in
1985? I wonder if he would quantify that.
Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would give me a chance, I would respond
to that. I say yes, we are facing less of a ground-based military
threat from the Soviet Union.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Only ground-based? Does the gentleman
think the Soviet air and sea power is the same?
Mr. DICKS. Sea power and air power, yes, basically the threat from
conventional forces has been reduced.
That is one reason why we have cut the defense budget, because we
think we can go to a lower level. But I would say to my friend, the
gentleman from Massachusetts, that there are other problems out there.
We have got Iran. We have got Iraq. We have got North Korea. We have
got the problems of China. We have got instability in Russia today that
I worry about. They still possess thousands of nuclear weapons. We are
taking some risk here in cutting back on our defenses.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I only have a little bit of time here, but I
yield again to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, let me say to the
gentleman, the basic point I want to make is it seems to me very much a
partial picture to talk about the reduction in the defense spending
without talking about the concomitant reduction in the need for defense
spending.
I have to say that if you look at the Soviet Union today, not just in
conventional, but you have got the defection of the nuclear parts that
were in Ukraine and Belarus, the Soviet Union today is far less than
two-thirds as threatening to us as it was in 1985. There has been, I
believe, a diminution in the external threat we faced greater than the
diminution in the defense budget.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from
Massachusetts I think there are still areas in the defense budget that
can be cut; that is why I have supported BRAC.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will
yield, let us get out a news flash.
Mr. DICKS. I know.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I think we may get an extra here.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, there are some areas in base closure where
we can do some other cuts. I would like to take that money, frankly,
and put it into modernization where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
and all the service chiefs have written a letter to the Secretary of
Defense saying we should be, instead of being at $43 billion a year, be
at $60 billion. We are not there.
We went through this before, after the Vietnam War, when we created a
hollow force, and then it opened the door for Mr. Reagan to come in and
say we have to vastly increase defense spending because we did not
handle this properly. We did not develop an adequate force.
Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask for any additional time because I
know my colleagues will not appreciate it.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. We wish you would not ask for additional
money.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to be redundant. It has been
well said by many Members here in defense of the budget and in
opposition to the well-intentioned but I think unwise amendment of the
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
I think the thing to remember is that we have a Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in the House and in the Senate. It is peopled
by sensitive, patriotic, intelligent, budget-minded people. They have
done their job. They have looked at the budget, program by program by
program.
We are not dealing with the CIA. We are dealing with the intelligence
community, including the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, et cetera, et cetera,
et cetera. There are a myriad of programs, all requiring some study to
understand if they are cost-effective or not.
They have done their job. The Senators will do their job. The
conferees will do their job. But to come in and try to perform brain
surgery with a croquet mallet, with an across-the-board 5 percent cut,
makes a political statement but it does real damage to the defense of
our country.
Yes, a lot of seniors, a lot of children can benefit by increased
domestic spending, but we all benefit, including children, including
seniors, from a secure and peaceful world.
Yes, the Cold War is over, but let me suggest to you the bear is only
sleeping. The forest is full of snakes and other dangerous animals.
There are 13 ICBMs trained on us from the People's Republic of China. I
have not heard that all of the intercontinental nuclear missiles are
disabled in the former Soviet Union. Narco-terrorism, terrorism,
technological developments have made this a much more complicated world
in terms of staying ahead of the curve.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
his disquisition of what the bear is doing in the forest, but I do have
a question.
Mr. HYDE. Was the gentleman not interested in the snakes either?

[[Page H2961]]

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. No, that is not under our committee's
jurisdiction as I last looked, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HYDE. I thought you were an expert on the subject.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. My question was this: You said that
because we have a committee composed of intelligent, patriotic
Americans, we should not be for an across-the-board cut. My
recollection is that in the past, the gentleman from Illinois has voted
for across-the-board cuts. Did that reflect his lack of respect for the
members of those committees?
Mr. HYDE. Not at all. I think sometimes it is important to make a
statement and sometimes it is not. This is not the time to make a
statement. This is a time to recognize the sensitivity, the importance,
the significance, and the intention which the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of both bodies give to this issue and to
prefer that looking at these things in depth, understanding the
consequences of emasculating them by across-the-board cuts, I think
that is so important and I think it is the right way to do it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield, again, to my friend from Massachusetts for
whatever illumination he chooses to give us.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
gentleman's point, and I think it is important to remember he
apparently dismisses the notion of across-the-board cuts as simply
making statements. I think we ought to have that down on the record,
that his view is that an across-the-board cut is simply for the purpose
of making a political statement and is apparently never a serious
legislative answer.

{time} 1345

Mr. HYDE. No, sir, not at all. My position is sometimes it is
appropriate and sometimes it is not. This is inappropriate.
So I simply suggest that we trust our committee. And, by the way,
when we talk about cutting defense, I heard the other day there are
soldiers and their families on food stamps. We ought to be ashamed of
ourselves if that is true.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont. Beautiful Vermont.
Not that Massachusetts is so bad.
Mr. SANDERS. I would, by the way, agree with the gentleman about the
shame of having our soldiers on food stamps, and maybe we should put
more money into their needs and less into B-2 bombers. But that is
another story.
The point I want to make is the gentleman raised China as a potential
threat. I am not here to be on an anti-China kick. But I would point
out to the gentleman that this Congress voted MFN status for China;
that corporate America is putting tens of billions of dollars into
bolstering the China economy rather than reinvesting in America.
Mr. HYDE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would say to the
gentleman that some of us did and some of us did not. I stand with
those who did not.
I thank the gentleman for his kind attention.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment, and I want
to thank my colleague from Vermont (Mr. Bernard Sanders) for leading
this annual dialogue with the American voters. Unless we raised these
questions, one would never know that the CIA budget is about $30
billion, and there are no questions raised outside of the very closed
circle of the people on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence represents one of
those command and control operations of the type which brought down the
Soviet Union. There is a close circle of people who have a vested
interest in keeping something going. They have no outside criticism.
Nobody even knows what they are doing.
Other intelligence communities have opened up, even the Soviet Union
has opened up information about its intelligence operations, but we
still have a secret operation which perpetuates itself.
I want to thank the gentleman from Vermont for offering the American
people 130 schools. We can build a state-of-the-art school for $10
million. $1.3 billion would give us 130 schools. Why not take the $1.3
billion out of the budget of this organization, which clearly has far
more money than it needs at this time? The budget is about the same
level it was at the time of the evil empire of the Soviet Union.
They clearly do not know what to do with all the money because, and
nobody ever explains this to us from the committee, they had a petty
cash problem. They lost $2 billion in their bookkeeping. Found they had
$2 billion more than they knew they had a few years ago. A couple of
years ago. Actually, it was $4 billion. After the first announcements
were made, nobody noticed that later on they came and said, well,
actually we found $4 billion. Four billion dollars, and nobody on the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has ever bothered to explain
that to us or to the American voters. What happened to $4 billion? How
can you lose $4 billion? That is a lot of schools.
So we have an agency that probably is very much needed. Nobody says
we want to get rid of it. All we are talking is a 5 percent cut, a 5
percent cut to say discipline yourself, take care of your petty cash
better and build 130 schools.
We can break this circle of closed decision-making, the command and
control operation, that whole spirit of cloak-and-dagger operation
where they will not let us see the whole budget. If a Member of
Congress goes to look at this budget, he is duty bound never to speak
about it again. What kind of cloak-and-dagger operation is that, that
we need at this time in the life of the globe?
There are some people who know the secrets of the CIA because they
get it from the members of the CIA. All the people that Aldridge Ames,
remember Aldridge Ames? They do not talk about him very much, but he
was a top-ranking CIA person in charge of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, and he turned out to be a guy who was a hustler. For a few
dollars, a few million dollars, he was telling the enemy everything
they needed to know. We cannot find out here, but Aldridge Ames was
telling them.
Now they have a mentally unstable ex-policeman. An ex-policeman who
his colleagues, in the former police department where he came from,
said this guy was a nut. How did he ever get in the CIA? He is
divulging our code secrets. He has divulged. He is now arrested, and
there is a lot being said about him and a lot not being said about him.
So we do not know what damage he has done. But he has divulged the
codes and the whole cryptology and a whole bunch of very secret things
the enemy knows, because the CIA is so incompetent it allows these
kinds of things to get out.

So we are dealing with wasteful spending and a closed circle of
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members who are determined
to perpetuate wasteful spending. It is part of their religion. It is a
dogma. They go on and on and not looking closely at what they are
spending the money for.
There is big spending and there is wasteful spending. Democrats often
get accused of being big spenders. Big spenders are the people who want
to keep the Social Security system going. Big spenders are the people
who want to spend money for Medicare, Medicaid, Title I. Big spenders
are people who want to use the American resources for the greatest
number of people.
Blind spenders, wasteful spenders, are the kind of people on the
Republican majority that say we should spend $10 billion for an
investigation that is going nowhere in the case of campaign finance
reform. They do not want to talk about campaign finance reform, they
just want to dig up dirt, play around and release tapes.
Ten billion dollars. That is one whole school that will be taken away
as a result of wasteful spending for an investigation. The CIA and its
continued big budget represents the same kind of wasteful spending.
Republican wasteful spending is one thing that the voters need to
take a hard look at. Do not listen to people who talk about big
spending. If we ask them what they are spending the

[[Page H2962]]

money for, we will find out whether it is big spending, blind spending,
or wasteful spending.
We are, Democrats as well as Republicans, very much conscious of the
label of being big spenders. A lot of Democrats who are labeled as big
spenders, if they do not want to stay with the label, here is an
opportunity for my fellow colleagues, Democrats and Republicans. Here
is an opportunity to send a message to our constituents. We can send a
message to the voters that we will not be a wasteful spender. We will
not go on and perpetuate the budget of the CIA, the secret budget that
nobody can really know. We will not go on. We will at least cut it 5
percent and give America 130 schools. One hundred thirty schools to
America.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of interesting rhetoric here, and I
think that, in a charitable mood, generous mood, maybe, that this kind
of debate each year is salutary, because it is an opportunity for
members who do not serve on the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to ask questions of those who do.
I think, despite what the gentleman said, perhaps in a little bit of
overblown rhetoric, the gentleman from New York, this is not a command
and control operation of the Soviet Union. The kind of oversight that
the House and Senate give to the intelligence operations of the United
States is the best among all the parliamentary bodies in the world.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. OWENS. Would the gentleman take time to tell us about the $4
billion in petty cash funds that were lost? Could the gentleman tell us
about the unstable ex-policeman who has now been arrested? Can the
gentleman expound on these subjects?
Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming the balance of my time, the gentleman had
his 5 minutes.
Mr. OWENS. Well, the gentleman should not waste his on rhetoric. Give
us some information.
Mr. BEREUTER. I am not a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. I do not expect to respond to the gentleman's questions.
My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is the money has been recovered. It
is not lost.
In any case, what I want to say is that countries from around the
world send their parliamentary bodies to try to understand how we
conduct oversight of the intelligence functions of our government, and
they do that because of the quality of what is done by the people
appointed by the minority leader and the Speaker of this House.
Now, they choose people who they think will give the interest, the
competence, the time, and have the intense focus necessary to give
oversight to these important functions of the Federal Government.
We have a limitation. First 6 years, now 8 years, like the other
body, on the length of time that Members can serve on the intelligence
committees, and that is so that these Members do not become co-opted by
the agencies over which they conduct oversight. That is a protection
for all of us.
Now, I have been a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. I do not serve there any longer because of that term
limitation. I spend a lot of my time on foreign policy and trade
issues, and I want to speak to my colleagues from that perspective
today.
Mr. Chairman, our policymakers, from the President on down, depend
upon accurate and timely intelligence when making their most critical
decisions. The Secretary of State relies on the information to assist
her in crafting foreign policy, to judge the performance of that policy
and, as added ammunition, during crucial international negotiations. It
is true of the STR, it is true of the Treasury Secretary, it is true of
the Department of Defense.
In fact, the Secretary of Defense needs political and military
intelligence in order to deploy troops and plan for future military
needs. And the list goes on. For all these leaders, intelligence is a
vital tool that enables them to respond to crises and to anticipate
future needs. A broad cut to our intelligence capabilities would hamper
our government's abilities in these areas.
The sponsors of this amendment argue that the intelligence budget
should come down. After all, the Cold War is over. Well, intelligence
spending has declined, along with other defense spending. But the world
is still a very dangerous place, as many of my colleagues have pointed
out, and new threats to our Nation's security and the safety of its
citizens have emerged. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
international organized crime, and drug trafficking all pose increased
risk to the United States. We need to collect information about these
new threats if we are going to combat them and combat them
successfully.
The gentleman from Oregon raised some interesting points a few
minutes ago. He talked about some areas he felt that we had not had
adequate intelligence. First of all, policymakers have to make use of
the intelligence that is provided. I sat in that Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Nothing
could have been better than the intelligence given to our policy
leaders during that period of time. But European nations and our
leadership, from President Bush to President Clinton, had to act upon
that intelligence to have its effect. That was not done adequately.
Secondly, I would say when it comes to the terrorist activities that
took place in Saudi Arabia, we were not blind in intelligence, but
action has to be taken.
Finally, I want to say as a person who follows trade, we have
disarmed ourselves in certain parts of this world. We disarmed
ourselves on economic intelligence in southeast and east Asia, and it
is no wonder we had no intelligence adequate to take steps to avoid the
kind of monetary fiscal crises that took place in Thailand, the
Republic of Korea and Indonesia. That is because, in part, I suggest,
we disarmed ourselves.
The same is true in parts of Latin America, where we have devastated
our human intelligence by disarmament, not conducted by this body, but
conducted by the executive branch over a period of time.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I oppose this cut on the basis that it is not
good government. As a former member of this committee, I believe it is
fair to say that I know firsthand the process that is required to
develop an annual intelligence authorization. And I can attest to the
scrutiny and to the rigorous oversight that the members of this
committee, chosen by the leadership of the House, give to this budget.
They have done a particularly good job this year. And I would say that
the staff that assists them is always among the best in the House. I
have great confidence in their recommendation.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not what I would like, I
say to the floor managers and chairman and ranking member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, because in this 5 minutes
back and forth, usually we do not get answered.
Let us understand that the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship
with drug pushers has not even been mentioned here. It is as if we are
in a universe where nobody knows about this except we read it in the
paper or we get a GAO study every now and then, or somebody writes
about Los Angeles and the introduction of cocaine, which creates a
momentary flak. And then we come here to the annual ritual and what do
we have? We have people saying the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence is one of the most respected bodies in the world system,
not the Congress. It is studied all over the world because these are
sensitive people, understand. They are very sensitive about this
subject. It is all secret. We do not know what is going on.
We do know that there was $26.7 billion appropriated. And then
somebody snuck into the emergency supplemental appropriation, fiscal
year 1998, an unknown amount of money.

{time} 1400

Rumored, ``Oh, never heard of that before.'' Okay. Rumored, $260
million.

[[Page H2963]]

Suspected a lot more. But nobody knows. And then this discussion my
colleagues have passed off as an open, fair debate on this subject.
Now, if I hear that the CIA is not perfect one more time, I am going to
excuse myself from these proceedings. Of course it is not perfect. It
is awful.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I will not yield to the gentleman from California. I
will excuse myself from the proceedings after the debate on this
measure is concluded.
But look, we know the CIA is not perfect. But that is not the
question. The question is, how bad are they? ``Oh, wow, that is an
insult. We cannot talk like that.'' They are not perfect. Why, any
amateur historian knows that we had perfect knowledge that the Japanese
were coming to Pearl Harbor. And a respected Member of this body gets
up and says, well, it was military intelligence, if it had been
stronger. Pearl Harbor is a perfect example of our intelligence system
at work.
Now, the intelligence community failed in Iraq. I mean, for anyone to
suggest that we won the war on intelligence, really they have not even
been listening to the military much less to anybody else.
This committee has done us a great disservice, and then to fight hard
to keep a 5 percent reduction from occurring. Let us really show them
by a two-to-one margin that the American people want to keep this
secret budget going full blast, whatever it is, and that the American
people are approving of this.
Well, I think this does the body a disservice. I do not think that we
should do it. I refer my colleagues to the GAO news release. ``CIA kept
ties with alleged traffickers.'' And then we come here and debate about
how they have got to do some more about drugs and we hear, ``Let's give
them another chance.'' Did I hear that last year, the last year, the
year before the year before, the year before, the year before? Of
course. ``Let us give them one more chance.''
Well, I think this is not the way to debate. There is a tangled web
of the CIA's complicity in drug international trafficking that not one
member of the Select Committee on Intelligence has even alluded to in
debate, even referenced. It does not exist. We are here to get this
secret budget through and that is it.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the
actions of the committee and to praise the Members on both sides of the
aisle for the very deliberate effort they have made in, I think,
crafting the best budget we could in a very difficult budget
environment. I am not a member of the committee, never have been,
although one day that is something perhaps I would like to serve on
behalf of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, and that is a role
on the committee itself.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, over the past several years I have been very
critical of the agencies, both the CIA and DIA. I have reviewed their
NIEs. From time to time I have disagreed. I asked for backup and I have
challenged them publicly and privately.
But I will say this to my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, in response to
those who say that the CIA and the committee operates in a closed
environment, I have been in this Congress for 12 years, I have
interacted with the intelligence agencies on a regular, ongoing basis
in my office. From time to time I have gone over to meet with them in
this building. They have been fully accessible to answer questions that
I have asked them about emerging threats around the world. So I would
say to my colleagues that any Member of this body that wants to get
access to what the intelligence community is doing only has to ask and
they will find that they are more than happy to respond. In fact, I am
very pleased with the current leadership of the Director of the CIA. I
think he is putting a new era of management and control in terms of the
way the agency is being operated.
But why am I so interested in the intelligence budget and the
intelligence agency? My job in this body, Mr. Chairman, is to oversee
approximately $36 billion a year of defense spending that is being put
forth to protect our people and our allies against emerging threats. I
would like to be able to know that we are spending that money on
threats that are real, on threats that we understand from our best
intelligence sources may be those threats that our young people have to
face in the future. And only through good, solid intelligence can we
get that data.
We heard debate on the floor; in one case I heard someone say that
Russia is two-thirds less than what it was. Well, I do not know where
people base their opinions, but let me give my colleagues my
perception.
I guess I am one of the few Members of Congress who speaks the
language. I have been there 15 times. In fact, next week I will be
hosting all the major members of the state Duma. I work with Russia on
a regular, ongoing, weekly basis.
I would make the case publicly that Russia is more destabilized today
than at any point in time under Communism. I do not just make that
statement radically. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I had General Lebed testify
before my committee. If my colleagues do not know who General Lebed is,
he is a Russian general, two star, who ran against Boris Yeltsin and
then became Boris Yeltsin's chief defense advisor.
Along with members on both sides of the aisle last May, in one of my
visits to Moscow last year, we sat in General Lebed's office and he
told us the story about one of his responsibilities to account to Boris
Yeltsin for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices that Russia built and he
was able to account for only 48 of them. And we said to him, ``General,
where are the rest?'' He said, ``I have no idea.'' He said, ``They
could be under control or they could be in terrorists' hands.'' He
said, ``They could be in somebody's basement. We just do not know where
they are.''
I came back and interacted with our intelligence community and got an
update on what they are doing to try to ascertain whether or not Russia
does have control of these devices. Now, Russia, the government, denied
they even built them for the following 4 months after General Lebed
made the statement.
Finally, when I met with the defense minister, General Sergeyev, in
December, he admitted to me that, yes, they built them and they hoped
to have them all destroyed by the year 2000.
Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about some pie-in-the-sky Steven
Spielberg movie plot. We are talking about real-life situations. What
about the situation in January 1995, when because of Russia's
deterioration and their intelligence assets, they responded to a
Norwegian weather rocket by activating their all-out nuclear
capabilities, which meant that Russia, which they publicly
acknowledged, was within 15 minutes of an all-out nuclear response
against the U.S. to a weather rocket that Norway had forewarned them of
a month earlier?
That is reality, Mr. Chairman. These are the kinds of threats that we
have to have assets to help us understand. If we talk to the
intelligence community because of the shift in focus in this country to
the Far East, what are we doing in the case of Russia? To meet the
declining budgets, the limitations, we are taking away assets that we
used to have to understand the former Soviet Union. So at a time when
Russia becomes more of a risk, where we do not understand what is
happening there, we are decreasing our ability to understand the
situation.

Let me tell my colleagues what else General Lebed said in a public
hearing here in this country. And by the way, he just is in the process
of winning the governorship of one of the largest regions in Russia,
Krasnoyarsk. This is what he said. He said, ``You know, Congressman,
one of our biggest problems? All of those most competent admirals and
generals in the Soviet military have been forced out of service because
of our economic problems.'' And we have heard members talk about that.
But he said, ``Here is the problem. These most competent generals and
admirals have not been given housing, they have not been given
pensions. So what are they doing?''
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for
an additional 2 minutes.

[[Page H2964]]

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania?
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment that is being offered
for a meager 5 percent cut from the intelligence budget. I rise to
support it because it makes eminently good sense.
First of all, no matter what my colleagues say, those who are opposed
to this amendment, those who can appear and rant and rave about why we
should not only support the budget but be for more money for that
budget, first of all, it has been said over and over again, the Cold
War is over; the Soviet Union is no more.
Where is this great threat to our country? Who can identify anybody
in the world who is prepared to take on the United States of America?
Someone alluded to Iran and alluded to China. Well, I can talk a lot
about China. And if we feel they are such a great threat, why are we
chasing them down, embracing them, running after them to do business
with them, to be involved in trade activities with them?
Let me tell my colleagues where the threat is. The real war that is
being waged on America today is the drug war. Where is our great
intelligence to tell us who the drug lords are and how they manage to
continue day in and day out, week in and week out, to dump tons of
drugs into this Nation that finds its way into our cities and our rural
communities, addicting our children, creating more crimes, with people
who get addicted and are looking for ways to support those habits.
Why cannot this intelligence community tell us who these drug lords
are? Why is it these cartels can continue to operate without any
interference? It is so embarrassing to have our own Drug Czar go down
to Mexico and wrap his arms around General Gutierrez Rebollo. And just
a few days after he is down there talking about how great he is, this
is our own drug czar, the drug czar was busted because he is connected
to the Juarez cartel.
Now, our Drug Czar was in the service. He is a general. He knows
about the DIA, the CIA, and everybody else. But he goes down there,
wraps his arms around him, talks about how great he is, he has known
him for years; and he is the dope dealer. He is the one that is
connected to the drug cartel. This is outrageous. It is embarrassing.
And do not tell me how good the intelligence community is. It does
not matter whether we are talking about Mexico or Peru or Colombia. Why
cannot our intelligence community tell us about the heads of government
and the leadership of those countries who are involved in trafficking
drugs, at the same time we are giving support to them, we are showing
up with them in every kind of cockamamie scheme, talking about we are
helping to eliminate drugs, when the fact of the matter is, it is
getting worse.
If this intelligence community was about the business of dealing with
any war, it would be the war on drugs. That is the war that is being
waged on America. I am sick and tired of hearing that we cannot
streamline, we cannot cut, we cannot do anything about the intelligence
community. And there are those who just romanticize the intelligence
community, those who think we cannot ask any questions, we cannot cut
them, we cannot dare challenge them.
It is outdated, long overdue for cuts and being streamlined. And yet
we come to the floor, person after person, talking about how great it
is, how we should continue to support it.
Well, my colleagues know that I have been involved in this drug war
for a long time, and they understand that the number one priority of
the Congressional Black Caucus is to get rid of drugs in our society.
We do not have any help from the CIA. As a matter of fact, we are still
investigating the CIA and their involvement in drug trafficking.
As my colleagues know, we just had a hearing, and I would like to
thank our ranking member for embracing some of the ideas that I have,
and in that hearing we are investigating what was the CIA doing when
all the drugs were being trafficked in South Central Los Angeles and
profits were going to fund the contras? Where were they?
Well, I will tell my colleagues where they were. They were at the
same place they were when they were in Southeast Asia, turning their
backs on drug trafficking, even being involved in it, to have
additional money. They like slush funds. It is not enough that we give
them over $30 billion in this intelligence community.
If we want an intelligence operation that is dealing with the real
war, turn their attention to the drug war and maybe we will want to
support them in the future.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, on one area I agree with the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Waters). Mexico has a problem with drugs, and it is a
problem in America.
But I tell my colleagues, the White House cutting all the drug
responses, from interdiction right down the line, that we Republicans
had to restore, is the answer, not cutting them. Telling our children
that it is okay to inhale or that he would if he could is not the
proper message to send to our children in antidrug programs.

{time} 1415

Liberal trial lawyers that get the drug dealers and kingpins off and
yet we cannot get through in this body stiff penalties for those
druggers, that is wrong as well.
Let me speak to the issue at hand on intelligence. First of all, it
is amazing. I would almost let the other side of the aisle speak up
here for 2 days on this issue. People that have never set foot in a
military uniform, people that have never had to direct intelligence
units, people who have never had to go in and plan the defense of major
countries but yet they are, quote, the experts. ``There is no Cold War.
The Cold War is over.'' But yet what they do not tell you is the threat
that is out there. I tell my colleagues, you state your own opinion as
fact and you are factually challenged.
First of all, there are over 14,000 nuclear warheads in Russia alone.
Because the Russian head said that they are not pointed at the United
States, do you know how long it takes to change those targeting data?
About 2 minutes. Fourteen thousand of them. Russia in the last 2 years
built six nuclear class red October submarines and deployed them. Built
them. But there is no threat. Russia this week, a nuclear ship, the
largest missile cruiser in the world, launched a missile cruiser out of
Russia. But the Cold War is over. Russia is building today the size of
the Beltway here in Washington, D.C. under the Ural Mountains a first
strike nuclear site. Why? ``Oh, the Cold War is over. There is no
threat.'' There is one to the northeast half its size. But there is no
threat. We are dealing with 1970s technology in our military, with the
F-14 and the F-15 and the F-16, but yet they deploy the SU-35 and the
SU-37 that uses vectored thrusts that outclass our fighters and they
have an AA-10 and an AA-12 missile that outclasses our AMRAAM. But
there is no threat. You are the experts. You would send our troops 300
percent increase in deployments over Vietnam and kill them and not
provide for the services that they need and cut the defense budget and
cut procurement by 67 percent for your great social programs because
there is no threat.
Give me a break, Mr. Chairman. We talk about intelligence and
military and foreign policy all to protect this country. Poor foreign
military policy does not help, either. Haiti. Haiti could sit there for
another 200 years and not be a threat to this country. But yet a
political move. And guess what? Aristide is still there. There is still
poverty and it costs us billions of dollars. Somalia, the extension of
Somalia in which the majority then under the Democrats extended
Somalia. Guess what? Aideed died but Aideed's son is there and we got
22 rangers killed because the White House would not give armor to
protect them. Twenty-two of our people, billions of dollars.
The gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) talks about hurting
veterans. Sixteen billion dollars for Haiti and Bosnia. And we have a
bill that we cannot get a billion dollars for for FEHP for veterans,
which I think he would probably support. But $16 billion and guess
what? That comes out of our

[[Page H2965]]

military and kills us, and kills any chance of helping the veterans.
Yet you are the experts and you say there is no Cold War. I have got a
tape here of 16 SAMs fired in pairs. Mr. Chairman, I lost three good
friends because we did not have the intelligence to know they were
there. I am sick and tired of self-proclaimed experts on intelligence
and defense standing up and saying, ``Oh, look. Look at those that
support defense. Look at those that support intelligence.''

Announcement by the Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will remind all persons in the gallery that
they are here as guests of the House and that any manifestation of
approval or disapproval of the proceedings or other audible
conversation is in violation of the rules of the House.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, after the previous speaker, I
think I should rise to the defense of some Republicans. He said people
who had not been in uniform should not be involved in this debate. I do
not think that the Speaker of the House, the majority leader of the
House or any of the rest of us who were not able to serve for one
reason or another ought to be disqualified. I have never found that the
Speaker, because he had never served in the military, was somehow
incompetent to discuss military affairs.
I also thought it was rather unkind to Ronald Reagan. We dedicated a
building to him yesterday. I had previously thought that people,
including former President Reagan, considered ending the Cold War in
the way that it ended to be one of his accomplishments. But we learned
today that apparently that was a mistake. Indeed, the previous speaker
denigrated the notion that the Cold War ended, so I guess that is a
claimed accomplishment of President Reagan that is not really real. I
am rather more sympathetic to President Reagan in that regard.
Some people suggested, one of the previous speakers, that we are even
worse off, that Russia is more dangerous today. Maybe we ought to ask
the Communists to come back. Maybe we should see if we can get at least
Mr. Gorbachev back in power, Mr. Zyuganov. In fact, what we have heard
today is some of the worst history I have ever heard.
I want to, by the way, differ with some of my colleagues who support
this amendment. I think the intelligence community does an excellent
job on the whole. They have a very difficult job. The reason they
sometimes do not know the answer is we cannot know the answer. We
cannot know the unknowable. People who are planning to do bad things do
not always cooperate by tipping their hand. I do not criticize them for
not having known everything that was going to happen. I think they
have, in fact, done a pretty good job.
What we are experts in here, by the way, is not military expertise.
We are the experts so empowered by the American people at dividing up
the resources of this country. We made a decision a couple of years ago
about how much we were going to spend. We are not, I think, spending to
the fullest, to the extent that we need to in any one area. We then
have the job of allocating scarce resources. That is what we have the
democratic mandate to do.
The suggestion that somehow this impinges unfairly on the expertise
of the committee, no one really seriously believes that. In fact, when
people get up and defend the committee on one day, they are the people
who would criticize a different committee on a different day.
Let me say, in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I also have respect for the committee. Indeed I have
respect for, I was about to say all the committees of the House but let
me say today I have respect for all the committees but one and I hope
we can soon resume respect for that one.
The question is how do we allocate our resources. There are a couple
of erroneous historical arguments. People have made the analogy to
1941. That is about the worst history I have ever heard. In the 1930s,
America was one of the weaker powers in the world. We are not remotely
comparable to 1941. We are not, as the United States, anywhere near
where we were 55 and 60 years ago vis-a-vis Germany and Japan. Today
the United States is by far the strongest Nation in the world. We are
stronger than all of our potential opponents, and everyone agrees we
should stay that way.
One of my friends said we were emasculating the Defense Department.
We are not emasculating. We are saying that maybe in this world, we can
taper off on the Viagra dose that they have been on for many years, but
nobody is talking about America being anything less than overwhelmingly
the strongest Nation in the world. Fifteen years ago, when we peaked in
defense spending, we had not just the Soviet Union but its satellite
nations. Remember what we all believe, you do not look at the enemy's
intentions, you look at the enemy's capability. The defense budget we
had 15 years ago assumed that East Germany and Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and Poland could be part of a Soviet assault. There has
been a very substantial diminution in the capacity of the Soviet bloc
to damage us.
Yes, it is still a dangerous world. That is why we are still going to
be, if this amendment passed three times over, by far the strongest
Nation in the world. The question is, let us look at where we are in
America. Many of us believe that there has been a greater diminution in
the external threat, which is still there. People posturing about
saying, ``Well, there is no threat,'' no one has said there is no
threat. There is a threat. The question is, is it now with the collapse
and dismantlement of the Soviet Union, the denuclearization of Belarus,
the denuclearization of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, the freeing of the
satellite nations so they are now in NATO as opposed to opposing NATO,
has there been a diminution? I think the argument is overwhelmingly
that there has been.
Many of us believe that while we should still be the strongest Nation
in the world militarily, the time has come to shift some resources into
domestic crime fighting, into fighting cancer, into dealing with some
of our domestic problems. We believe that in the current world, the
average American faces more domestic threats than international ones.
No one is suggesting that we should have anything less than by far the
strongest military and intelligence in the world. We are saying that
too much is no longer defensible.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 120,
noes 291, not voting 21, as follows:

[Roll No. 137]

AYES--120

Abercrombie
Allen
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Blumenauer
Bonior
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Camp
Capps
Carson
Chabot
Clay
Clayton
Coble
Conyers
Costello
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Doggett
Duncan
Ensign
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fox
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gephardt
Green
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hill
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hooley
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (WI)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kingston
Kleczka
Kucinich
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Markey
Mascara
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Metcalf
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Porter
Poshard
Ramstad
Rangel
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rohrabacher
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Sanchez
Sanders
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Shays
Slaughter
Stabenow
Stark
Stearns
Strickland
Thompson
Tierney
Torres
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Woolsey
Yates

NOES--291

Ackerman
Aderholt
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bentsen

[[Page H2966]]

Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boyd
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Cardin
Castle
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clement
Clyburn
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hilleary
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King (NY)
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Manzullo
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
Meek (FL)
Menendez
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Pascrell
Paxon
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Ryun
Sabo
Salmon
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stenholm
Stokes
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--21

Bateman
Christensen
Dingell
Dixon
Doyle
Gonzalez
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
LaFalce
Martinez
McHugh
McNulty
Murtha
Nethercutt
Neumann
Parker
Radanovich
Skaggs
Solomon
Stupak
Taylor (NC)

{time} 1445

Messrs. PALLONE, SMITH of New Jersey, and PICKERING changed their
vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. SCHUMER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title I?
If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
The text of title II is as follows:
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title II?
If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
The text of title III is as follows:
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.

Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
441d) is amended by striking out ``January 6, 1999'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``January 6, 2000''.

SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:

SEC. 305. PROLIFERATION REPORT.

(a) Annual Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit an annual report to the Members of Congress
specified in subsection (d) containing the information
described in subsection (b). The first such report shall be
submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and subsequent reports shall be
submitted annually thereafter. Each such report shall be
submitted in classified form and shall be in the detail
necessary to serve as a basis for determining appropriate
corrective action with respect to any transfer within the
meaning of subsection (b).
(b) Identification of Foreign Entities Transferring Items
or Technologies.--Each report shall identify each covered
entity which during the preceding 2 years transferred a
controlled item to another entity for use in any of the
following:
(1) A missile project of concern (as determined by the
Director of Central Intelligence).
(2) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver
chemical or biological weapons.
(3) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain
full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or
equivalent full scope safeguards.
(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
(1) Controlled item.--(A) The term ``controlled item''
means any of the following items (including technology):
(i) Any item on the MTCR Annex.
(ii) An item listed for control by the Australia Group.
(iii) Any item listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.
(B) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means
the multilateral regime in which the United States
participates that seeks to prevent the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons.
(C) MTCR annex.--The term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning
given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(D) Nuclear suppliers' group.--The term ``Nuclear
Suppliers' Group'' means the multilateral arrangement in
which the United States participates whose purpose is to
restrict the transfers of items with relevance to the nuclear
fuel cycle or nuclear explosive applications.
(2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means a
foreign person, corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, or other nongovernmental
organization or group or any government entity operating as a
business. Such term includes any successor to any such
entity.
(3) Missile project.--(A) The term ``missile project''
means a project or facility for the design, development, or
manufacture of a missile.
(B) The term ``missile'' has the meaning given that term in
section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(d) Specified Members of Congress.--The Members of Congress
referred to in this subsection are the following:
(1) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(2) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on
behalf of myself and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
This is a bipartisan initiative and one that I think gets at the heart
of our

[[Page H2967]]

concerns involving proliferation around the world.
This amendment is a very simple amendment, Mr. Chairman. It requires
the Director of Central Intelligence each year to give a report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence in the House and the Senate involving
any proliferating activity from any entity around the world that this
Congress needs to know about.
Now, we have heard a lot of debate over intelligence and a lot of
debate over how we should stop proliferation, but let us get to the
heart of the matter.
Mr. Chairman, the fact is that we have good intelligence assets that
tell us when proliferation is occurring. After all, 2 years ago,
working with the Jordanians and Israelis, we caught the Russians
transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq to improve their
Scud missiles. In fact, we have 120 sets of those right now with
Russian markings on them.
Last year, last summer, we caught the Iranians being assisted again
by a Russian entity to develop a medium-range missile that we think
within 12 months will threaten all of Israel, all of our Arab friends,
and 25,000 of our troops in that theater. We caught the Chinese
transferring ring magnets to Pakistan, and M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, the problem is not our ability to detect when
technology is being transferred. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would at this
time insert into the Record detailed examples of 21 specific cases of
China transferring technology in violation of every major arms control
agreement that we are a signatory to, including the MTCR, the Chemical
Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, the Arms Control Export Act, and every other arms control
agreement that is the basis of this administration's security
arrangements.
Mr. Chairman, I also would like to insert in the record detailed
examples of 16 instances of Russia transferring technology. In each of
these cases, Mr. Chairman, the problem was not the intelligence
community, it was not having the assets upon which to make an
intelligent decision.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Possibly applicable
Date of transfer or report Reported Russian transfers that may treaties, regimes, Administration's
have violated a regime or law and/or U.S. laws reponse
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early 1990's................... Russians sold drawings of a sarin AECA sec. 81; EAA No publicly known
plant, manufacturing procedures, sec. 11C. sanction.
and toxic agents to a Japanese
terrorist group.
1991........................... Transferred to China three RD-120 MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known
rocket engines and electronic EAA sec. 11B. sanction.
equipment to improve accuracy of
ballistic missiles.
1991-1995...................... Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/ MTCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions against
hydrogen rocket engines and EAA sec. 11B. Russia and India
technology to India. under AECA and EAA
imposed on May 6,
1992; expired after
2 years.
1992-1995...................... Russian transfers to Brazil of MTCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions reportedly
carbon fiber technology for rocket EAA sec. 11B. secretly imposed
motor cases for space launch and waived.
programs.
1992-1996...................... Russian armed forces delivered 24 MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known
Scud B missiles and 8 launchers to EAA sec. 11B. sanction.
Armenia.
June 1993...................... Additional Russian enterprises MRCR; AECA sec. 73; Sanctions imposed on
involved in missile technology EAA sec. 11B. June 16, 1993 and
transfers to India. waived until July
15, 1993; no
publicly known
follow-up sanction.
1995-present................... Construction of 1,000 megawatt IIANPA sec. 1604 and Refused to renew
nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. 1605; FOAA; NPPA some civilian
sec. 821; FAA sec. nuclear cooperation
620G. agreements; waived
sanctions on aid.
Aug. 1995...................... Russian assistance to Iran to BWC; AECA sec. 81; No publicly known
develop biological weapons. EAA sec. 11C; sanctions.
IIANPA sec. 1604
and 1605; FAA sec.
620G and 620H.
Nov. 1995...................... Russian citizen transferred to AECA sec. 81; EAA Sanctions imposed on
unnamed country technology for sec. 11C. Nov. 17, 1995.
making chemical weapons.
Dec. 1995...................... Russian gyroscopes from submarine United Nations No publicly known
launched ballistic missiles Sanctions; MTCR; sanction.
smuggled to Iraq through middlemen. AECA sec. 73; EAA
sec. 11B; IIANPA
sec. 1604 and 1605;
FAA sec. 620G and
620H.
July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported Russia transferred to MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known
Iran ``a variety'' of items EAA sec. 11B; FAA sanctions.
related to ballistic missiles. sec. 620G and 620H;
IIANPA sec. 1604
and 1605; FOAA.
Nov. 1996...................... Israel reported Russian assistance AECA sec. 81; EAA No publicly known
to Syria to build a chemical sec. 11C; FAA sec. sanction.
weapon plant. 620G and 620H.
1996-1997...................... Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known
submarines to Iran. 1605; FAA sec. 620G sanction.
and 620H.
Jan.-Feb. 1997................. Russia transferred detailed MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known
instructions to Iran on production EAA sec. 11B; FAA sanction.
of the SS-4 medium-range missile sec. 620G and 620H;
and related parts. IIANPA sec. 1604
and 1605; FOAA.
April 1997..................... Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti- IIANPA sec. 1604 and No publicly known
missile missile system to Iran to 1605; FAA sec. 620G sanction.
protect nuclear reactors at and 620H.
Bushehr and other strategic sites.
Oct. 1997...................... Israeli intelligence reported MTCR; AECA sec. 73; No publicly known
Russian technology transfers for EAA sec. 11B; sanction.
Iranian missiles developed with IIANPA sec. 1604
ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 and 1605; FAA sec.
km. Transfers include engines and 620G and 620H; FOAA.
guidance systems.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regimes:

BWC--Biological Weapons Convention.
MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime.

U.S. Laws:

AECA--Arms Export Control Act.
EAA--Export Administration Act.
FAA--Foreign Assistance Act.
FOAA--Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.
IIANPA--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act.
NPPA--Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration's
Date of transfer or report Reported transfer by China Possible violation response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nov. 1992...................... M-11 missiles or related equipment MTCR; Arms Export Sanctions imposed on
to Pakistan (The Administration Control Act; Export Aug. 24, 1993, for
did not officially confirm reports Administration Act. transfer of M-11
that M-11 missiles are in related equipment
Pakistan.). (not missiles);
waived on Nov. 1,
1994.
Mid-1994 to mid-1995........... Dozens or hundreds of missile MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
guidance systems and computerized Nonproliferation
machine tools to Iran. Act; Arms Export
Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
2d quarter of 1995............. Parts for the M-11 missile to MTCR; Arms Export No Sanctions.
Pakistan. Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995.......... 5,000 ring magnets for an NPT; Export-Import Considered sanctions
unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment Bank Act; Nuclear under the Export-
program in Pakistan. Proliferation Import Bank Act;
Prevention Act; but announced on
Arms Export Control May 10, 1996, that
Act. no sanctions would
be imposed.
July 1995...................... More than 30 M-11 missiles stored MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions.
in crates at Sargodha Air Force Control Act; Export
Base in Pakistan. Administration Act.
Sept. 1995..................... Calutron (electromagnetic isotope NPT; Nuclear No sanctions.
separation system) for uranium Proliferation
enrichment to Iran. Prevention Act;
Export-Import Bank
Act; Arms Export
Control Act.
1995-1997...................... C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
C-801 air-launched cruise missiles Nonproliferation
to Iran. Act.
Before Feb. 1996............... Dual-use chemical precursors and Arms Export Control Sanctions imposed on
equipment to Iran's chemical Act; Export May 21, 1997.
weapon program. Administration Act.
Summer 1996.................... 400 tons of chemicals to Iran...... Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
Nonproliferation
Act \1\; Arms
Export Control Act;
Export
Administration Act.
Aug. 1996...................... Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions.
or missile components in Pakistan. Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Aug. 1996...................... Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
test equipment for missile Nonproliferation
guidance to Iran. Act; Arms Export
Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Sept. 1996..................... Special industrial furnace and high- NPT; Nuclear No sanctions.
tech diagnostic equipment to Proliferation
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities Prevention Act;
in Pakistan. Export-Import Bank
Act; Arms Export
Control Act.
July-Dec. 1996................. Director of Central Intelligence MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions.
(DCI) reported ``tremendous Control Act; Export
variety'' of technology and Administration Act.
assistance for Pakistan's
ballistic missile program.

[[Page H2968]]

July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported ``tremendous variety'' MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
of assistance for Iran's ballistic Nonproliferation
missile program. Act; Arms Export
Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported principal supplies of NPT; Nuclear No sanctions.
nuclear equipment, material, and Proliferation
technology for Pakistan's nuclear Prevention Act;
weapon program. Export-Import Bank
Act; Arms Export
Administration Act.
July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported key supplies of NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
technology for large nuclear Nonproliferation
projects in Iran. Act; Nuclear
Proliferation
Prevention Act;
Export-Import Bank
Act; Arms Export
Administration Act.
July-Dec. 1996................. DCI reported ``considerable'' Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
chemical weapon-related transfers Nonproliferation
of production equipment and Act; Arms Export
technology to Iran. Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Jan. 1997...................... Dual-use biological items to Iran.. BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
Nonproliferation
Act; Arms Export
Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
1997........................... Chemical precursors, production Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
equipment, and production Nonproliferation
technology for Iran's chemical Act; Arms Export
weapon program, including a plant Control Act; Export
for making glass-lined equipment. Administration Act.
Sept. to Dec. 1997............. China Great Wall Industry Corp. MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms No sanctions.
provided telemetry equipment used Nonproliferation
in flight-tests to Iran for its Act; Arms Export
development of the Shahab-3 and Control Act; Export
Shabab-4 medium range ballistic Administration Act.
missiles.
Nov. 1997/April 1998........... May have transferred technology for MTCR; Arms Export No sanctions.
Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range Control Act; Export
ballistic missile that was flight- Administration Act.
tested on April 6, 1998.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996.

BWC--Biological Weapons Convention.
MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime.
NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, the problem was, we did not have the will to impose
sanctions. In fact, in only two of those 37 instances were sanctions
imposed.
The problem is a simple one. The Congress is not brought into the
process until after the State Department has made a ruling that they
are not going to impose sanctions. The Congress is not brought into the
process until after the proliferating action has taken place.
My amendment is simple. My amendment asks the Director of Central
Intelligence, and I know they collect this data anecdotally, to each
year submit to the chairmen of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence an
unsanitized listing of all of those occasions that we should know
about, unsanitized by the State Department, involving proliferation of
technology, involving weapons of mass destruction. In that way, we can
play our rightful role in saying that we want arms control agreements
enforced.
Mr. Chairman, we know what happened last November. This Congress
voted overwhelmingly in favor of a bipartisan bill to force the
administration to impose sanctions on Russia because of transferring of
technology to Iran. This Congress has spoken unequivocally, in fact, in
that case, with 400 Members voting in the affirmative that we want arms
control agreements enforced. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. It is
not the intelligence collection, it is not the analysis of the data,
although I disagree from time to time with NIE, it is the use of that
data by the State Department and by the administration where they have
not imposed sanctions.
Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to incite a conflict with Russia. I
happen to believe in the Ronald Reagan philosophy: Trust, but verify.
I am engaged with Russia. Next week I will host a group of senior
Russian leaders in this city. I want to help Russia stabilize itself. I
want to help them have a middle class.
However, I understand one very important fundamental thing about
Russia and China: We must be consistent, we must be candid, and we must
be strong, and when we fail to follow through on any one of those three
areas, we send the wrong signal to entities that cannot be controlled
in those countries.
That is why, after Russia transferred the accelerometers and
gyroscopes 2 years ago, I was not surprised this past summer when we
found they were transferring technology to Iran; because we have been
sending the wrong signal.
I ask my colleagues to support this very simple amendment.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, for 40 years our country, this planet operated under a
doctrine of mutually assured destruction, meaning that both the United
States and the Soviet Union stockpiled nuclear weapons in vertical
proliferation, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 nuclear weapons apiece, when only
200 apiece would be necessary in order to destroy totally the
populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was
important for the Cold War to come to an end, because there was a very
slight likelihood that either country would ever use these weapons,
because the other country would have guaranteed their sure and certain
total destruction.
The greater threat has always been horizontal proliferation. The
spread of weapons from country to country to country, to subgroups, to
terrorist groups, to other parties around the globe who do not live
under this threat of mutually assured destruction.
The problem is that we in the United States do not on a consistent
basis get enough information about this threat so that we can formulate
policies, sanctions, that will guarantee that those around the world
who are intent on gathering these technologies to themselves and then
using them against their enemies or against the American people, know
that we have a strong policy of deterrence against their use.
The Weldon-Markey amendment, as it was originally formulated, ensured
that we would desubsidize any country, any company in the world that
was identified as one which was trafficking in materials which could be
used for proliferation purposes. That is putting real teeth, financial
teeth into the American policy towards these issues.
Unfortunately, in negotiating with the intelligence community and
others who are not yet ready to embrace that policy, we are unable to
bring that full amendment with all of the power of the American purse
string to this floor here today. But what we do is we ensure that there
will be a report made to the Intelligence Committees.
I believe it should go to other committees as well so that there is a
broader understanding of the importance of this issue. In the post-Cold
War period, there are only two great agendas for our country. One is
ensuring that the American people finally get the full benefits of the
prosperity which is being created in this world and that our people
benefit from it, and secondly, that we deal with the aftermath of the
Cold War in terms of these national rivalries that manifest themselves
both in human rights violations, religious violations, and in
proliferation threats spreading across this planet.
This is a good first step. I hope that the House adopts this
amendment. It will at least begin the process of giving us the
information which we need, and hopefully, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I, and the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Harman) and others can come back here next year and we can ensure
that there are teeth which are built into this system so that the
Congress votes to deny any financial assistance to any country or any
company which sells these technologies into the hands of those who are
not abiding by the nonproliferation safeguards which this world has to
have in the 21st century.
So I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), for his
leadership. I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and
all of those who have worked on this issue, and I hope that the House,
in its wisdom, adopts this very important first step here today.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

[[Page H2969]]

Mr. Chairman, first let me say that as a member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, I have learned an enormous amount
from its leaders, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), chairman of
the committee, and its ranking member, the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Dicks); and I want to thank them for their nice words about me
because, as my colleagues know, I will be leaving the Congress after
this term.
I intend to support this bill in full. It is a good bill that was
developed with broad, bipartisan support, and as I have said for many
years, intelligence spending is intelligent spending.
I rise in support now of this excellent amendment by the gentleman
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from Massachusetts
(Mr. Markey), because it deals with part of a subject that has
concerned many of us for some time, and that is technology transfer
from Russia and China to rogue regimes.

{time} 1500

We know from published reports that that transfer is continuing. It
is continuing in spite of laws on the books in the United States that
could cause our government to invoke sanctions against those firms
which we have identified as aiding Iran's missile program, and which
are doing business with the United States.
I authored a concurrent resolution last fall and the same resolution
was offered in the other body, both passed by overwhelming margins, to
direct the administration to impose sanctions on firms we have
identified as transferring technology to Iran to build its indigenous
missile industry. Sanctions have not been imposed.
From what we know, some list of firms is circulating and people are
being encouraged not to do business with those firms, but sanctions on
the proliferators have not been imposed.
Mr. Chairman, I am a cosponsor and strong supporter of the measure
authored by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), which has passed
this body. An identical measure authored by Senator Lott is likely to
pass the other body very soon. Hopefully then a strong majority of the
United States Congress will have expressed its will to make certain
that strong sanctions are imposed on firms that are proliferating.
Meanwhile, we do what we can. And in this case, this amendment makes
clear that we want to develop the most complete list of proliferators,
and we want our intelligence agencies to share that list with our
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, I want that list. I think it will be very helpful. But
more than the list, I want the technology transfers stopped. The United
States can do this if it has the will. I call on the administration,
despite its multiple agendas with Russia, to act now against
proliferation that has been publicly identified by Russia to Iran. It
is dangerous. It threatens our national security. We cannot wait any
longer.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Weldon) for his comments, as well as the comments of the gentleman from
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman).
I understand with regard to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that it
is his decision to withdraw this amendment at this time. But I also
want to quickly say, I want to make sure that he knows and the others
that we will work closely with him. In fact, we have already started
that process to make sure that we do have the necessary information so
that Congress does have the unfettered truth about the proliferation
issue. Certainly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence wants
to have it on both sides. The goal is great and we will get the goal
done.
The gentleman is very well respected for his commitment to our
Nation's security. I have heard him speak many times. He speaks with
knowledge and conviction, a great deal of information, and he certainly
has an extraordinary list of contacts. His concern regarding whether
our intelligence community is free to deliver the bad news that it
sometimes must is very relevant.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's efforts on the Committee on National
Security are obviously very much appreciated by our committee and by
myself personally. We share the same jurisdiction on many programs, and
I think we work together very well and I want to continue that and in
fact enhance it.
The gentleman's views and concerns on the most difficult and
important problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are
indeed respected and have been a great trigger in this effort.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), my friend and colleague, for yielding and I am not
here to disrupt the proceedings of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, as both Members know, the ranking member and the
chairman. I have the highest respect for their leadership and for their
commitment.
Mr. Chairman, my concern is with our State Department and with our
ability in this institution to get access to relevant data when it
occurs in a timely manner.
Mr. Chairman, because of the commitment of the gentleman from Florida
(Chairman Goss) and the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr.
Dicks), the ranking member, to work with me and with the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Harman) and others on this issue, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw
my amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Traficant

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Traficant:
In title III of the bill, add at the end the following new
section:

SEC. 305. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COOPERATION
WITH DOMESTIC FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year
ending after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a report to the
Congress that describes the level of cooperation and
assistance provided to domestic Federal law enforcement
agencies by the intelligence community during such fiscal
year relating to the effort to stop the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States through the United States-Mexico
border and the United States-Canada border.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, the threat of nuclear proliferation is
real and it must be curtailed. But while we keep worrying about
missiles from without, narcotics are destroying America from within. I
believe that we are losing the war on drugs and it is not because of
the money that we are not spending. It is not because of the effort
that Congress makes. I believe there is one simple major reason for it.
There is not a concentrated, cooperative network effort by our entire
intelligence and law enforcement community.
Mr. Chairman, that is the weakness. I do not know if we can solve
that in this legislation. I guess I have turned around and voted for
this measure and voted against the cut, which is the first time since I
have been here. I do have faith in the leaders of this committee and I
did say earlier that we deserve in the Congress the chance to see how
we can pool efforts to network because I believe our intelligence
community should know where these narcotics are grown, who is growing
them, who is processing them, who is arranging for their export to
America, who here in America is arranging to accept and receive these
imports, who is distributing them and what political figures around the
world are aiding and abetting the narcotraffickers. I think we must do
something about it.
So, Mr. Chairman, my modest effort is very simple. I want to read the
salient points of this amendment.
It would require the CIA and the Director of the CIA, through a
report to the Congress, to describe the level of cooperation and
assistance provided to

[[Page H2970]]

domestic Federal law enforcement by our intelligence community. These
agencies cannot be separate and apart. This jurisdictional haggling
must be resolved. And our intelligence network, if we are going to do
anything on 100 percent import of heroin and cocaine, is going to have
to work with our domestic people.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for a report at this point. I think it makes good
sense, and I would hope that it would be adopted.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Traficant) for yielding to me. Let me assure the gentleman that I take
very seriously the necessity of intelligence support for fighting and
winning the war on drugs.
There is no question that global narcotics trafficking does require
intelligence and it requires a close and good working handoff to law
enforcement. I am aware of that. Progress has been made. I think that
the gentleman's contribution to this, requiring this report, is very
beneficial and I am prepared to accept his amendment.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I compliment my friend, the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Traficant) again for another amendment that I find completely
acceptable. This cooperation must exist and we must do better in this
effort. I concur with my chairman that this is a national priority and
one that will be aided by this report. I urge that the Committee accept
the amendment.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I urge an ``aye''
vote.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?
If not, the Clerk will designate title IV.
The text of title IV is as follows:
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. ENHANCED PROTECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR CIA PERSONNEL AND
FAMILY MEMBERS.

Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended by striking out ``and
the protection of Agency personnel and of defectors, their
families'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``and the protection
of current and former Agency personnel and their immediate
families, and defectors and their immediate families''.

SEC. 402. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

(a) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section
5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) by striking out ``subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section
102(a)(2)'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``paragraphs (2)
and (3) of section 102(a)'';
(B) by striking out ``(c)(5)'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``(c)(6)'';
(C) by inserting ``(3),'' after ``403(a)(2),'';
(D) by inserting ``(c)(6), (d)'' after ``403-3''; and
(E) by inserting ``(a), (g)'' after ``403-4''.
(2) Section 6 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by
striking out ``(c)(5)'' each place it appears and inserting
in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section
201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50
U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended by striking out ``(c)(5)'' each
place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ``(c)(6)''.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title IV?

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Ms. Waters

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 4 offered by Ms. Waters:
At the end of title IV, add the following new section:

SEC. 404. REVIEW OF 1995 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REQUIRING THE CIA TO REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING DRUG TRAFFICKING
INVOLVING ITS FORMER OR CURRENT OFFICERS, STAFF
EMPLOYEES, CONTRACT EMPLOYEES, ASSETS, OR OTHER
PERSON OR ENTITY PROVIDING SERVICE TO OR ACTING
ON BEHALF OF ANY AGENCY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.

(a) Review of 1995 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes.--The
Attorney General shall review the 1995 ``Memorandum of
Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal
Crimes'' between the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense,
Director of Central Intelligence, Director of National
Security Agency, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency,
Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research, and
Director of the Non-Proliferation and National Security,
Department of Energy. This review shall determine whether the
1995 Memorandum of Understanding requires:
(i) Report to the Attorney General.--Whenever the Director
of Central Intelligence has knowledge of facts or
circumstances that reasonably indicate any former or current
officers, staff employees, contract employees, assets, or
other person or entity providing service to, or acting on
behalf of any agency within the intelligence community has
been involved with, is involved with or will be involved with
drug trafficking or any violations of U.S. drug laws, the
Director shall report such information to the Attorney
General of the United States.
(ii) Duty of Intelligence Employees to Report.--Each
employee of any agency within the intelligence community who
has knowledge of facts or circumstances that reasonably
indicate any former or current officers, staff employees,
contract employees, assets, or other person or entity
providing service to, or acting on behalf of, any agency
within the intelligence community has been involved with, is
involved with, or will be involved with drug trafficking or
any violations of U.S. drug laws, shall report such
information to the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) Public Report.--Upon completion of review, the Attorney
General shall publicly report its findings.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) reserves a point
of order.
The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would call for a review of
the 1995 memorandum of understanding that currently exists between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community and the
Department of Justice regarding reporting of information concerning
Federal crimes.
This amendment is very simple and noncontroversial. It calls for a
review of the current memorandum of understanding to ensure that drug
trafficking and drug law violations by anybody in the intelligence
community is reported to the Department of Justice. Specifically, the
review would examine any requirements for intelligence employees to
report to the Director of Central Intelligence and any requirements for
the Director to report this information to agencies.
This information would be reported to the Attorney General. The
review would be published publicly. This simple amendment fits well
with the recent calls for a reinvigorated war on drugs. The need for
this amendment, however, cannot be understated.
One of the most important things that came out of the hearing of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was an understanding
about why we did not know about who was trafficking in drugs as we
began to investigate and take a look at the allegations that were being
made about the CIA's involvement in drug trafficking in south central
Los Angeles and the allegations that profits from that drug trafficking
was going to support the Contras.
We discovered that for 13 years the CIA and the Department of Justice
followed a memorandum of understanding that explicitly exempted the
requirement to report drug law violations by CIA non-employees to the
Department of Justice. This allowed some of the biggest drug lords in
the world to operate without fear that the CIA would be required to
report the activity to the DEA and other law enforcement agencies.
In 1982, the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence entered into an agreement that excluded the reporting of
narcotics and drug crimes by the CIA to the Justice Department. Under
this agreement, there was no requirement to report information of drug
trafficking and drug law violations with respect to CIA agents, assets,
non-staff employees and contractors. This remarkable and secret
agreement was enforced from February 1982 to August of 1995. This
covers nearly the entire period of U.S. involvement in the Contra war
in Nicaragua and the deep U.S. involvement in the

[[Page H2971]]

counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador and Central America.
Senator Kerry and his Senate investigation found drug traffickers had
used the Contra war and tie to the Contra leadership to help this
deadly trade. Among their devastating findings, the Kerry committee
investigators found that major drug lords used the Contra supply
networks and the traffickers provided support for Contras in return.
The CIA of course, created, trained, supported, and directed the
Contras and were involved in every level of their war.
The 1982 memorandum of understanding that exempted the reporting
requirement for drug trafficking was no oversight or misstatement.
Previously unreleased memos between the Attorney General and Director
of Central Intelligence show how conscious and deliberate this
exemption was.
On February 11, 1982, Attorney General French Smith wrote to DCI
William Casey that, and I quote, this is what he said:

I have been advised that a question arose regarding the
need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable
non-employee crimes . . . no formal requirement regarding the
reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these
procedures.

On March 2, 1982 William Casey responded:

I am pleased these procedures which I believe strike the
proper balance between enforcement of the law and protection
of intelligence sources and methods will now be forwarded to
other agencies covered by them for signing by the heads of
those agencies.

My colleagues heard me correctly.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Waters) has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, the fact that President Reagan's Attorney
General and Director of Central Intelligence thought that drug
trafficking by their assets agents and contractors needed to be
protected has been long known. These damning memorandums and the
resulting memorandum of understanding are further evidence of a
shocking official policy that allowed the drug cartels to operate
through the CIA-led Contra covert operations in Central America.
This 1982 agreement clearly violated the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949. It also raises the possibility that certain individuals
who testified in front of congressional investigating committees
perjured themselves.
Mr. Chairman, every American should be shocked by these revelations.
Given the shameful history of turning a blind eye to CIA involvement
with drug traffickers, this amendment seeks to determine whether the
current memorandum of understanding closes all of these loopholes to
the drug cartels and narcotics trade.
At this time I know that there is a point of order against my
amendment. The chairman of the committee is going to oppose this
amendment, and so I am going to withdraw the amendment. But I wanted
the opportunity to put it before this body so that they could
understand that we had an official policy and a memorandum of
understanding that people could fall back on and say I did not have to
report it. Yes, I knew about it.
We have a subsequent memorandum of understanding of 1995 that is
supposed to take care of it. I am not sure that it does.
Mr. Chairman, I submit for the Record the following correspondence
between William French Smith and William J. Casey:

Office of the Attorney General,

Washington, DC, February 11, 1982.
Hon. William J. Casey,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.
Dear Bill: Thank you for your letter regarding the
procedures governing the reporting and use of information
concerning federal crimes. I have reviewed the draft of the
procedures that accompanied your letter and, in particular,
the minor changes made in the draft that I had previously
sent to you. These proposed changes are acceptable and,
therefore, I have signed the procedures.
I have been advised that a question arose regarding the
need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable
non-employee crimes (Section IV). 21 U.S.C. Sec. 874(h)
provides that ``[w]hen requested by the Attorney General, it
shall be the duty of any agency or instrumentality of the
Federal Government to furnish assistance to him for carrying
out his functions under [the Controlled Substances Act] . .
.'' Section 1.8(b) of Executive Order 12333 tasks the Central
Intelligence Agency to ``collect, produce and disseminate
intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and
trafficking.'' Moreover, authorization for the dissemination
of information concerning narcotics violations to law
enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice, is
provided by sections 2.3(c) and (i) and 2.6(b) of the Order.
In light of these provisions, and in view of the fine
cooperation the Drug Enforcement Administration has received
from CIA, no formal requirement regarding the reporting of
narcotics violations has been included in these procedures.
We look forward to the CIA's continuing cooperation with the
Department of Justice in this area.
In view of our agreement regarding the procedure, I have
instructed my Counsel for Intelligence Policy to circulate a
copy which I have executed to each of the other agencies
covered by the procedures in order that they may be signed by
the head of each such agency.
Sincerely,
William French Smith,
Attorney General.
____

The Director of

Central Intelligence,

Washington, DC, March 2, 1982.
Hon. William French Smith,
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Dear Bill: Thank you for your letter of 11 February
regarding the procedures on reporting of crimes to the
Department of Justice, which are being adopted under Section
1-7(a) of Executive Order 12333. I have signed the
procedures, and am returning the original to you for
retention at the Department.
I am pleased that these procedures, which I believe strike
the proper balance between enforcement of the law and
protection of intelligence sources and methods, will now be
forwarded to other agencies covered by them for signing by
the heads of those agencies.
With best regards,
Yours,
William J. Casey.
Enclosure.

Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Federal Crimes

i. scope

Section 1-7(a) of Executive Order 12333 requires senior
officials of the Intelligence Community to:
Report to the Attorney General possible violations of
federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal
criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures
agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the
department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as
specified in those procedures.
These procedures govern the reporting of information
concerning possible federal crimes to the Attorney General
and to federal investigative agencies acquired by agencies
within the Intelligence Community in the course of their
functions. They also govern the handling and use of such
information by the Department of Justice and federal
investigative agencies in any subsequent investigations or
litigation. These procedures are promulgated under the
authority of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 535 and Executive Order 12333,
Sec. 1-7(a).

ii. definitions

A. ``Agency'' means those agencies within the Intelligence
Community, as defined in Executive Order 12333, Sec. 3-4(f)
except for the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of the Treasury.
B. ``Department'' means the Department of Justice.
C. ``Employee'' means:
1. A staff employee or contract employee of an Agency;
2. Former officers or employees of an Agency, for purposes
of offenses committed during their employment; and
3. Former officers or employees of an Agency, for offenses
involving a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207.
D. Except as specifically provided otherwise, ``General
Counsel'' means the general counsel of the Agency or the
department of which it is a component or a person designated
by him to act on his behalf.

III. General Considerations

A. These procedures govern the reporting of information
which the Agency or its current employees become aware of in
the course of performing their functions. They do not
authorize the Agency to conduct any investigation or to
collect any information not otherwise authorized by law.
B. These procedures require a current employee of the
Agency to report to the General Counsel facts or
circumstances that appear to the employee to indicate that a
criminal offense may have been committed. Reports to the
Department of Justice or to a federal investigative agency
will be made by the Agency as set forth below.
C. When an Agency has received allegations, complaints or
information [hereinafter ``allegations''] tending to show
that an employee of that agency may have violated any federal
criminal statute, or another person may have violated a
federal criminal statute contained within one of the
categories listed in Section IV below, the Agency shall
within a reasonable period of time determine through a
preliminary inquiry whether or not there is any basis to the
allegations (that is, are clearly not frivolous or

[[Page H2972]]

false). If the allegations can be established as without
basis, the General Counsel will make an appropriate record of
his findings and no reporting under these procedures is
required. If the allegations cannot be established as without
basis, the reporting procedures set forth below will be
followed. A preliminary inquiry shall not include interviews
with persons other than current employees of the Agency or
examination of premises not occupied by the Agency without
the prior notification and approval of the Department of
Justice, except that the Agency may interview a non-employee
for the sole purpose of determining the truth of a report
that such non-employee has made an allegation or complaint
against an Agency employee. The foregoing provisions shall
neither limit the techniques which the Agency may otherwise
be authorized to use, nor limit the responsibility of the
Agency to provide for its security functions pursuant to
Executive Order 12333.
D. Allegations shall be reported pursuant to the procedures
in effect at the time the allegations came to the attention
of the Agency.
E. Allegations that appear to involve crimes against
property and involve less than $500 need not be reported
pursuant to the procedures set forth below. The General
Counsel will, however, make an appropriate record of his
findings.
F. In lieu of following the procedures set forth below, the
General Counsel may orally report periodically, but at least
quarterly, to the Department concerning those offenses which,
while subject to these reporting requirements, are in the
opinion of the General Counsel of such a minor nature that no
further investigation or prosecution of the matter is
necessary. If an oral report is made, the General Counsel
will meet with the Assistant Attorney General or a designated
Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice to obtain his concurrence or
nonconcurrence with the General Counsel's opinion. If such
concurrence is obtained, no further reporting under these
procedures is required. If concurrence is not obtained, the
reporting procedures set forth below will be followed.

iv. non-employee reportable offenses

A. Allegations concerning offenses in the following
categories are reportable, if they pertain to a person other
than an employee.
1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of
death or serious physical harm. Such crimes may include:
Assault--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 111-113(A).
Homicide--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1111-14, 1116, 2113(e).
Kidnapping--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201.
Presidential assassination, assault or kidnapping--18
U.S.C. Sec. 1751.
Threats against the President and successors to the
President--18 U.S.C. Sec. 871.
2. Crimes likely to impact upon the national security,
defense or foreign relations of the United States. Such
crimes may include:
Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C.
Sec. 783(b).
Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-98.
Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
Arms Export Control Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 2778.
Atomic Energy Act--* * * U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2077, 2092, 2111,
2122.
Export Administration Act--50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2410.
Neutrality offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 956-60.
Trading with the Enemy Act--50 U.S.C. App. Sec. Sec. 5(b),
16.
Agents of foreign government--18 U.S.C. Sec. 951.
Government employee acting for a foreign principal--18
U.S.C. Sec. 219.
Communication, receipt or disclosure of restricted data--42
U.S.C. Sec. 2274-77.
Registration of certain persons trained in foreign
espionage systems--50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 851.
Foreign Agents Registration Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 618(a).
Unlawfully entering the United States--8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325.
Any other offense not heretofore listed which is contained
within Chapter 45 of Title 18 U.S.C.
3. Crimes involving foreign interference with the integrity
of United States governmental institutions or processes. Such
crimes may include, when committed by foreign persons:
Bribery of public officials and witnesses--18 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 201-208.
Conspiracy to injury or impede an officer--18 U.S.C.
Sec. 372.
Election contributions and expenditures--2 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 441a-j, 599-600.
4. Crimes which appear to have been committed by or on
behalf of a foreign power or in connection with international
terrorist activity. Such crimes may include:
Aircraft piracy--49 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(i).
Distribution, possession, and use of explosives--18 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 842(a)-(i).
Unlawful electronic surveillance--18 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 2511(l), 2512(l), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1809.
Passport and visa offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1541-44,
1546.
Distribution, possession, transfer, and use of firearms--18
U.S.C. Sec. 922, 924; 26 U.S.C. 5861.
Transporting explosives on board aircraft--49 U.S.C.
Sec. 1472(h).
Conspiracy to injure or impede an officer--18 U.S.C.
Sec. 372.
Counterfeiting U.S. obligations--18 U.S.C. Sec. 471-74.
False statements and false official papers--18 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 1001-02, 1017-18.
Obstruction of justice--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503-06, 1508-
10.
Perjury--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621-23.
B. Any conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable
under this section shall be reported if the conspiracy or
attempt itself meets the applicable reporting criteria.
C. The General Counsel will make an appropriate record of
any matter brought to his attention which he determines is
not reportable under this section.
D. Notwithstanding any of the provisions above, the General
Counsel may report any other possible offense when he
believes it should be reported.

v. reporting procedures--format

The fact that a referral has been made pursuant to these
procedures shall be reflected in a letter or memorandum sent
by the Agency to the entity designated to receive the
referral under these procedures. In each instance that a
referral is required, information sufficiently detailed to
allow the Department of Justice to make informed judgments
concerning the appropriate course of subsequent
investigations or litigation shall be transmitted, either
orally or in writing, to the Attorney General, the Assistant
or a designated Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, or the Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigative or Intelligence Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The Agency shall supplement its
referral when any additional information relating to the
original referral comes to its attention.

vi. reporting procedures--no security considerations involved

A. Where the Agency determines in accordance with these
procedures that a matter must be reported, and where the
Agency further determines that no public disclosure of
classified information or intelligence sources and methods
would result from further investigation or prosecution, and
the security of ongoing intelligence operations would not be
jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the
appropriate federal investigative agency, or to the
appropriate United States Attorney for an investigative or
prosecutive determination. In each such instance, the Agency
shall also notify the Department of Justice, Criminal
Division of the referral.
B. The Agency will inform the entity receiving such report
that, unless notified otherwise by the Agency or by the
Department, the security and consulting requirements set
forth in Section VII of these procedures need not be
followed.
C. A federal investigative agency or United States Attorney
receiving information from the Agency pursuant to Section VI
of these procedures is required promptly to advise the Agency
of the initiation and conclusion of any investigation or
prosecution involving such information.

vii. reporting procedures--security considerations involved

A. Where the Agency determines in accordance with these
procedures that a matter must be reported, and where the
Agency also determines that further investigation or
prosecution of the matter would or might result in a public
disclosure of classified information or intelligence sources
or methods or would jeopardize the security of ongoing
intelligence operations, the Agency will report the matter to
the Assistant Attorney General or a designated Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice or Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative or
Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in
the manner described in section V, above. In any instance in
which a matter is reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Agency shall also notify the Department of
Justice, Criminal Division of the referral. Upon request, the
Agency will explain the security or operational problems that
would or might arise from a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
B. Persons who are the subject of reports made pursuant to
this section may be identified as John Doe ______ in any
written document associated therewith. The true identities of
such persons will be made available when the Department of
Justice determines that they are essential to any subsequent
investigation or prosecution of the matter reported.
C. Information contained in Agency reports will be
disseminated to persons other than the Assistant or Deputy
Assistant Attorney General or the Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigative or Intelligence Division, FBI, only as
follows:
1. No Department or Federal investigative employee will be
given access to classified information unless that person has
been granted appropriate clearances, including any special
access approvals. The Assistant or Deputy Assistant Attorney
General or the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative or
Intelligence Division, FBI, will ensure that access by an
employee is necessary for the performance of an official
function and that access is limited to the minimum number of
cleared persons necessary for investigative or prosecutorial
purposes. The Department will provide the head of the Agency
with a detailed report regarding any disclosure not
authorized by these procedures and will take appropriate
disciplinary action against any employee who participates in
such a disclosure.
2. With regard to information reported to the Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, which the general counsel of
an Agency designates in writing as particularly sensitive and
for which special dissemination controls are requested
pursuant to this provision, dissemination will only occur
after

[[Page H2973]]

consultation with the General Counsel of the Agency. The
designation of information as particularly sensitive may be
made only by the general counsel or acting general counsel of
an Agency.
3. Except as permitted by these procedures, classified
information which has been received by the Department, the
FBI, or other federal investigative agency pursuant to these
procedures may not be disseminated outside of that entity
without the advance written consent of the General Counsel or
the head of the Agency.
D. When it becomes apparent to the Department or federal
investigative agency that any investigative or legal action
may result in the disclosure of classified information or
intelligence sources or methods, the Department or federal
investigative agency will, at the earliest possible time,
fully advise and consult with the Agency to determine the
appropriate course of action and the potential harm to
intelligence sources and methods by the contemplated use or
disclosure of the classified information. Except in exigent
circumstances no investigative or legal action will be taken
without such advance notice and consultation.
1. ``Exigent circumstances'' means situations in which a
person's life or physical safety is reasonably believed to be
in imminent danger, or information relating to the national
security is reasonably believed to be in imminent danger of
compromise, or expiration of a statute of limitations is
imminent, or loss of essential evidence in any of these cases
is imminent, or a crime is about to be committed, or the
opportunity to arrest a person is about to be lost where
there is probable cause to believe that the person has
committed a crime.
2. If, due to exigent circumstances, any investigation or
significant contemplated action in any legal proceeding is
taken without advance notice or consultation, the Department
or federal investigative agency, within twenty-four hours of
taking such action, will provide the reporting agency an
explanation of the circumstances requiring that action.
Thereafter, there will be full adherence to the notification
and consultation requirements of these procedures.
3. For purposes of this provision, consultation will
include the specific investigative and legal actions the
Department or federal investigative agency purposes to take
and a specification of legal and investigative issues
involved. The purpose of the consultation is to assure an
opportunity for the Agency to provide its judgment to the
Department or federal investigative agency regarding the
potential damage, if any, to the national security of the
disclosure or use of the information at issue. During this
process, the Agency will promptly provide as detailed an
identification and analysis as is possible at the time of the
potential consequences for the intelligence sources or
methods and for the national security from the contemplated
disclosure or use of the classified information. The Agency
will also provide any changes to or elaborations of this
analysis as soon as they become evident.
4. If the Agency and the Department or federal
investigative agency agree that the risk of the use or
disclosure and any resulting consequences are acceptable, the
contemplated investigative or legal action may commence or
proceed.
5. If the Agency and the Department of Justice or federal
investigative agency are unable to agree as to the
appropriate use of classified information provided pursuant
to these procedures by the Agency, each entity will be
responsible for pursuing timely resolution of such issues as
may exist through appropriate channels within their
respective organizations. Each entity will provide notice to
the other entity if it intends to seek a resolution of the
issues by a higher authority in the other entity's department
or agency. Where issues remain, they shall be referred to the
Attorney General for final determination after appropriate
consultation with the head of the Agency, and, where
appropriate, the Director of Central Intelligence. The
decision of the Attorney General may be appealed to the
President with prior notice to the Attorney General and the
Director of Central Intelligence. While such an appeal is
pending, no action will be taken that would render moot the
President's decision.
E. When security considerations warrant such action, any
matter may be reported directly by the head of the Agency to
the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney General, in the
manner described in section V above. In considering such
reports, the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney General
may consult with any person whose advice he considers
necessary and who has the required security clearance,
provided that the Attorney General or the Acting Attorney
General will consult with the head of the reporting agency or
the General Counsel thereof concerning dissemination of
material designated ``Eyes Only.''
F. If requested by the Agency, classified information
provided by the Agency to the Department or a federal
investigative agency will, to the maximum extent possible and
consistent with investigative and prosecutive requirements,
be stored by the Agency.

viii. relation to other procedures and agreements

A. If the Agency for administrative or security reasons
desires to conduct a more extensive investigation into the
activities of its employees relating to any matter reported
pursuant to these procedures, it will inform the Department
or federal investigative agency, as is appropriate. The
Agency may take appropriate administrative, disciplinary, or
other adverse action at any time against any employee whose
activities are reported under these procedures. However, such
investigations and disciplinary action will be coordinated
with the appropriate investigative or prosecuting officials
to avoid prejudice to any criminal investigation or
prosecution.
B. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to
restrict the exchange of information among the Agencies in
the Intelligence Community or between those Agencies and law
enforcement entities other than the Department of Justice.
C. If the subject of a referral is an employee of another
agency other than a person subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the Criminal Division may refer the matter
to that agency for preliminary investigation and possible
administrative action. The employing agency will report the
results of any such preliminary investigation under the
procedures for reporting possible crimes by agency employees.
D. Notwithstanding the November 23, 1955, Memorandum of
Understanding between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Justice, notice of crimes which violate both
federal criminal statutes and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice shall be given to the Department of Justice as
provided. Thereafter, the handling of matters relating to
individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
shall be coordinated by the Criminal Division with the
appropriate military service in accordance with existing
agreements between the Departments of Justice and Defense.
William French Smith,
Attorney General.
William J. Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence.
____

Reporting of Federal Crimes Committed by Officers or Employees of
Agencies in the Intelligence Community

Executive Order 12036, Sec. 1-706, requires senior
officials of the intelligence community to:
Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible
violations of federal criminal law by an employee of their
department or agency . . .
These procedures govern the reporting of possible federal
crimes committed by officers or employees of the intelligence
agencies. They are promulgated under the authority of 28
U.S.C. Sec. 535 and E.O. 12036, Sec. Sec. 1-706, 3-305.
Except to the extent indicated in paragraph G, infra, they
supersede all previous agreements or guidelines.

a. definitions

1. ``Officer or employee'' shall mean:
a. All persons defined as employees in E.O. 12036, Sec. 4-
204;
b. former officers or employees when the offense was
committed during their employment; and
c. former officers or employees when a basis for referral
exists with respect to violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207.
3. ``Basis for referral'' shall mean allegations,
complaints, or information tending to show that any officer
or employee may have violated a federal criminal statute that
the agency cannot establish as unfounded within a reasonable
time through a preliminary inquiry.

b. determining basis for referral

1. When an agency has received allegations, complaints, or
information tending to show that any officer or employee may
have violated a Federal criminal statute, it shall determine
whether a basis for referral exists.
2. In determining a basis for referral, an agency will not
attempt to establish that all elements of the possible
violation have occurred or that a particular employee is
responsible before referring the matter to the Department of
Justice.
3. When the allegations, complaints, or information
received are not sufficient to determine whether a basis for
referral exists, an agency shall conduct a preliminary
inquiry, limited to the following methods:
a. Interviews with current employees;
b. Examination of the records of the agency;
c. Examination of the records of other agencies;
d. Examination of premises occupied by the agency not
constituting a physical search, physical surveillance, or
electronic surveillance; or
e. Under procedures approved by the Attorney General and in
conformity with other legal requirements, physical search,
electronic surveillance, or physical surveillance of officers
and employees of the agency on premises occupied by the
agency.
A preliminary inquiry shall not include interviews with
persons who are not current employees of the agency or
examination of premises not occupied by the agency, except
that the agency may interview a non-employee for the sole
purpose of determining the truth of a report that such non-
employee has made an allegation or complaint against an
agency employee.

c. referral to the department of justice

Referrals shall be made in the following manner:
1. (a) In cases where no public disclosure of classified
information or intelligence source and methods would result
from further investigation or prosecution, and the security

[[Page H2974]]

of ongoing intelligence operations would not be jeopardized
thereby, the agency will report the matter to the cognizant
office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other
appropriate United States Attorney or his designee for an
investigative or prosecutive determination. Cases involving
bribery or conflict of interest will be reported to the
Criminal Division.
(b) A record of such referrals and any subsequent agency
action to dispose of the matter shall be maintained by the
agency, and on a quarterly basis, a summary memorandum
indicating the type of crime, place and date of referral and
ultimate disposition will be forwarded to the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, or his designee.
Referrals made by covert facilities to the United States
Attorney, the FBI or other Federal investigative agencies
will also be included in the quarterly report with due regard
for protection of the security of said installations.
2. In cases where preliminary investigation has failed to
develop an identifiable suspect and the agency believes that
investigation or prosecution would result in public
disclosure of classified information or intelligence sources
or methods or would jeopardize the security of ongoing
intelligence operations, the Criminal Division will be so
informed in writing, following which a determination will be
made as to the proper course of action to be pursued in
consultation with the agency and the FBI.
3. (a) In cases where preliminary investigation has
determined that there is a basis for referral of a matter
involving an identifiable agency officer or employee to the
Department of Justice, the future investigation or
prosecution of which would result in the public disclosure of
classified information or intelligence sources or methods or
would jeopardize the security of ongoing intelligence
operations, a letter explaining the facts of the matter in
detail will be forwarded to the Criminal Division. The
agency will also forward to the Criminal Division a
separate classified memorandum explaining the security or
operational problems which would arise from a criminal
investigation or prosecution, including, but not limited
to:
(1) Public disclosure of information needed to prove the
offense or to obtain a search warrant or an electronic
surveillance order under chapter 119 of Title 18, United
States Code;
(2) Disclosure required by a defense request for discovery
of information under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 3500, or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963); and
(3) Interference with the voluntary provision of cover or
other services necessary for intelligence operations by
persons other than employees.
(b) In reporting such matter, the agency shall inform the
Criminal Division of the steps it has taken to prevent a
recurrence of similar offenses, if such action is feasible,
as well as those administrative sanctions which may be
contemplated with respect to the prospective criminal
defendant.
(c) The Criminal Division, after any necessary consultation
with the agency and the FBI, will make a prosecutive
determination, informing the agency in writing of such
determination.
4. Officers or employees who are the subject of such
referrals to any component of the Department of Justice may
be identified as John Doe ______ in any written document
associated with the initial referral. The true identities of
such persons will be made available when the Department
determines that they are essential to any subsequent
investigation or prosecution of the matter referred.

D. Further Action by Agencies

If, as a result of the preliminary inquiry, the agency
desires to conduct a more extensive investigation for
administrative or security reasons, it will inform the
Department of Justice component to which the matter is
referred. The agency may take appropriate administrative,
disciplinary, or other adverse action at any time against any
officer or employee whose activities are reported under these
procedures. However, internal agency investigations and
disciplinary action in referred matters will be coordinated
with the appropriate investigative or prosecuting officials
to avoid prejudice to any criminal investigation or
prosecution.

E. Format of Referrals

All referrals required by these procedures shall be in
writing and in such detail as the Department of Justice
component receiving the referral shall determine.

F. Direct Reports to the Attorney General

When the head of an agency within the intelligence
community believes that circumstances of security warrant it,
he may directly report to the Attorney General in writing any
matter required to be referred by these procedures, in lieu
of following the reporting procedures of paragraphs C-E,
supra.

G. Relation to Other Procedures and Agreements

1. Notwithstanding the November 25, 1955 Memorandum of
Understanding between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Justice, notice of crimes committed by an
officer or employee which violate both federal criminal
statutes and the Uniform Code of Military Justice shall be
given to the Department of Justice as provided herein.
Thereafter, the investigation and prosecution of individuals
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice shall be
conducted as provided by the 1955 Memorandum of
Understanding.
2. These procedures do not affect the reporting of possible
offenses by regular, permanent FBI employees to the Office of
Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice.
3. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to
restrict the exchange of information between agencies in the
intelligence community required by other procedures or
agreements made under E.O. 12036.
Griffin B. Bell,
Attorney General.
____

Procedures for Reporting Federal Crimes by Non-Employees Under E.O.
12036 Sec. 1-706

Section 1-706 of Executive Order 12036 requires senior
officials of the intelligence community to:
Report to the Attorney General evidence of possible
violations of federal criminal law by an employee of their
department or agency, and report to the Attorney General
evidence of possible violations by other persons of those
federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the
Attorney General.
These guidelines specify the violations of federal criminal
statutes by non-employees which must be reported and provide
reporting procedures.

a. definitions

1. ``Agency'' shall mean:
a. The Central Intelligence Agency;
b. the National Security Agency;
c. the Defense Intelligence Agency;
d. offices within DoD for the Collection of specialized
national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance
programs;

b. policy and interpretation

1. These procedures govern the reporting of information of
which the agency or its employees become aware in the course
of performing their lawful functions. They do not authorize
an agency to conduct any investigation or to collect any
information not otherwise authorized by law.
2. These procedures require an employee of an agency in the
intelligence community to report to the general counsel of
his department or agency facts or circumstances that appear
to the employee to indicate that a criminal offense has been
committed. Reports to the Department of Justice will be made
by the general counsel of the department or agency or his
delegate only as set forth below.

c. reportable offenses

Information or allegations showing that the following
federal offenses may have been committed shall be reported:
1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of
death or serious physical harm. Pertinent federal offenses
include:
Assault--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 111-113(a).
Homicide--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1111-14, 1116, 2113(e).
Kidnapping--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201.
Congressional assassination, assault or kidnapping--18
U.S.C. Sec. 1751.
Threatening the President--18 U.S.C. Sec. 871.
2. Crimes that impact on the national security, defense or
foreign relations of the United States. Pertinent federal
offenses include:
Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C.
Sec. 783(b).
Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-9.
Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
Arms Export Control Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 1778.
Export Control Act--50 U.S.C. Sec. 2405.
Neutrality offenses--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 956-60.
Trading with the Enemy Act--50 App. U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5(b),
16.
Acting as an unregistered foreign agent--18 U.S.C.
Sec. 951.
Communicating classified information--50 U.S.C.
Sec. 783(b).
Government employee acting for a foreign principal--18
U.S.C. Sec. 219.
Communicating restricted data--42 U.S.C. Sec. 2274-77.
Espionage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 793-98.
Failure to register as foreign espionage trainee--50 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 851-55.
Foreign Agents Registration Act--22 U.S.C. Sec. 618(a).
Sabotage--18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2151-57.
Unlawful entering the United States--8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325.
The general counsel of the agency, by agreement with the
Criminal Division, may develop categories of specific crimes
which need not be reported because that Particular category
could have no significant impact on national security,
defense or foreign relations.
3. Any crime meeting any of the following criteria:
a. The crime is committed in circumstances likely to have a
substantial impact on the national obstruction of justice--18
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503-06, 1508-10.
Perjury--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621-23.
4. The general counsel may report any other possible
offense when he believes it should be reported to the
Attorney General.
5. Any conspiracy to commit a reportable offense shall be
reported.
6. The general counsel shall keep records of any matters
referred to him which contain information or allegations of a
felony in violation of federal law which the general counsel
determines is not reportable under these provisions.

d. reporting procedures

When information or allegations are received by an agency
that a subject has committed or is committing a reportable
offense, the agency shall transmit the information or

[[Page H2975]]

allegations to the Department of Justice in the following
manner:
1. In a case where no public disclosure of classified
information or intelligence sources and methods would result
from further investigation or prosecution, and the security
of ongoing intelligence investigations would not be
jeopardized thereby, the agency will report the matter to the
cognizant office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
other appropriate Federal investigative agency, or to the
appropriate United States Attorney or his designee for an
investigative or prosecutive determination.
2. In a case where further investigation or prosecution
would result in the public disclosure of classified
information or intelligence sources and methods or would
jeopardize the conduct of ongoing intelligence operations, a
letter explaining the facts of the matter in detail will be
forwarded to the Criminal Division. The agency will also
forward to the Criminal Division a separate classified
memorandum explaining the security or operational problems
which would arise from a criminal investigation or
prosecution, including, but not limited to:
a. Public disclosure of information needed to prove the
offense or to obtain a search warrant or an electronic
surveillance order under chapter 119 of Title 18, United
States Code;
b. disclosure required by a defense request for discovery
of information under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, or Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963); and
c. interference with the voluntary provision by the subject
or persons associated with the subject of cover or other
services necessary for intelligence operations.
The Criminal Division, after necessary consultation with
the agency, will determine whether to further investigate or
prosecute. The agency will be informed of such determination
in writing.
E. If the subject of a referral is an employee of another
agency other than a person subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the Criminal Division may refer the matter
to that agency for preliminary investigation and possible
administrative action. The employing agency will report the
results of any such preliminary investigation under the
procedures for reporting possible crimes by agency employees.
F. If the subject of the referral is a person subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Criminal Division
will coordinate the handling of the matter with the
appropriate military service in accordance with existing
agreements between the Departments of Justice and Defense.
G. All referrals required by these proceedings shall be in
writing and in such detail as the Department of Justice
component receiving the referral shall determine.
H. When the head of an agency believes that circumstances
of security warrant it, he may directly report to the
Attorney General in writing any matter required to be
reported by these procedures in lieu of following the
procedures of paragraphs D-G.
I. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to
restrict the exchange of information among agencies in the
intelligence community required by other procedures or
agreements made under E.O. 12036.
Griffin B. Bell,
Attorney General.
____

Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning
Federal Crimes

i. introduction

Section 1.7(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 requires
senior officials of the Intelligence Community to--
Report to the Attorney General possible violations of
federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal
criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures
agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the
department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as
specified in those procedures.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 535(b) requires
that--
[a]ny information, allegation, or complaint received in a
department or agency of the executive branch of the
Government relating to violations of title 18 involving
Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously
reported to the Attorney General by the head of the
department or agency, unless--
(1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with
respect thereto is specifically assigned otherwise by another
provision of law; or
(2) as to any department or agency of the Government, the
Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a
specified class of information, allegation, or complaint.
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets forth the
procedures by which each agency and organization within the
Intelligence Community shall report to the Attorney General
and to federal investigative agencies information concerning
possible federal crimes by employees of an intelligence
agency or organization, or violations of specified federal
criminal laws by any other person, which information was
collected by it during the performance of its designated
intelligence activities, as those activities are defined in
E.O. 12333, Sec. Sec. 1.8-1.13.

ii. definitions.

A. ``Agency,'' as that term is used herein, refers to those
agencies and organizations within the Intelligence Community
as defined in E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.4(f), but excluding the
intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of the Treasury.
B. ``Employee,'' as that term is used herein, means:
1. a staff employee, contract employee, asset, or other
person or entity providing service to or acting on behalf of
any agency within the intelligence community;
2. a former officer or employee of any agency within the
intelligence community for purposes of an offense committed
during such person's employment, and for purposes of an
offense involving a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 (Conflict
of interest); and
3. any other Government employee on detail to the Agency.
C. ``General Counsel'' means the general counsel of the
Agency or of the Department of which it is a component or an
oversight person designated by such person to act on his/her
behalf, and for purposes of these procedures may include an
Inspector General or equivalent official if agency or
departmental procedures so require or if designated by the
agency or department head.
D. ``Inspector General'' or ``IG'' means the inspector
general of the Agency or of the department of which the
Agency is a component.
E. ``Reasonable basis'' exists when there are facts and
circumstances, either personally known or of which knowledge
is acquired from a source believed to be reasonably
trustworthy, that would cause a person of reasonable caution
to believe that a crime has been, is being, or will be
committed. The question of which federal law enforcement or
judicial entity has jurisdiction over the alleged criminal
acts shall have no bearing upon the issue of whether a
reasonable basis exists.

iii. scope

A. This MOU shall not be construed to authorize or require
the Agency, or any person or entity acting on behalf of the
Agency, to conduct any intelligence not otherwise authorized
by law, or to collect any information in a manner not
authorized by law.
B. This MOU ordinarily does not require an intelligence
agency or organization to report crimes information that was
collected and disseminated to it by another department,
agency, or organization. Where, however, the receiving agency
is the primary or sole recipient of that information, of if
analysis by the receiving agency reveals additional crimes
information, the receiving agency shall be responsible for
reporting all such crimes information in accordance with the
provisions of this MOU.
C. This MOU does not in any way alter or supersede the
obligation of an employee of an intelligence agency to report
potential criminal behavior by other employees of that agency
to an IG, as required either by statute or by agency
regulations, nor affect any protections afforded any persons
reporting such behavior to an IG. Nor does this MOU affect
any crimes reporting procedures between the IG Offices and
the Department of Justice.
D. This MOU does not in any way alter or supersede any
obligation of a department or agency to report to the
Attorney General criminal behavior by Government employees
not employed by the intelligence community, as required by 28
USC Sec. 535.
E. This MOU does not affect the obligation to report to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation alleged or suspected
espionage activities as required under Section 811(c) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995.
F. The following crimes information is exempted from the
application of this memorandum if the specified conditions
are met:
1. Crimes information that has been reported to an IG;\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Footnotes appear at end of Memorandum of Understanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Crimes information received by a Department of Defense
intelligence component concerning a Defense intelligence
component employee who either is subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice or is a civilian and has been accused of
criminal behavior related to his/her assigned duties or
position, if (a) the information is submitted to and
investigated by the appropriate Defense Criminal
Investigative Organization, and (b) in cases involving crimes
committed during the performance of intelligence activities,
the General Counsel provides to the Department of Justice a
report reflecting the nature of the charges and the
disposition thereof;
3. Information regarding non-employee crimes listed in
Section VII that is collected by the intelligence component
of a Department also having within it a law enforcement
organization where (a) the crime is of the type that the
Department's law enforcement organization has jurisdiction to
investigate; and (b) the Department's intelligence
organization submits that crimes information to the
Department's law enforcement organization for investigation
and further handling in accordance with Department policies
and procedures;\2\
4. Crimes information regarding persons who are not
employees of the Agency, as those terms are defined in
Section II, that involve crimes against property in an amount
of $1,000 or less, an amount of $500 or less. As to other
relatively minor offenses to which this MOU would ordinarily
apply, but which, in the General Counsel's opinion, do not
warrant reporting pursuant to this MOU, the General Counsel
may orally contact the

[[Page H2976]]

Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, or his/her
designee. If the Department of Justice concurs with that
opinion, no further reporting under these procedures is
required. The General Counsel shall maintain an appropriate
record of such contacts with the Department. If deemed
appropriate by the General Counsel, he/she may take necessary
steps to pass such information to the appropriate law
enforcement authorities; or
5. Information, other than that relating to homicide or
espionage, regarding crimes that were completed more than ten
years prior to the date such allegations became known to the
Agency. If, however, the Agency has a reasonable basis to
believe that the alleged criminal activities occurring ten or
more years previously relate to, or are a part of, a pattern
of criminal activities that continued within that ten year
interval, the reporting procedures herein will apply to those
activities.
F. The procedures set forth herein are not intended to
affect whether an intelligence agency reports to state or
local authorities activity that appears to constitute a crime
under state law. In the event that an intelligence agency
considers it appropriate to report to state or local
authorities possible criminal activity that may implicate
classified information or intelligence sources or methods, it
should inform the AAG, or the designated Deputy AAG, Criminal
Division, in accordance with paragraph VIII.C, below; the
Criminal Division will consult with the intelligence agency
regarding appropriate methods for conveying the information
to state or local authorities. In the event that an
intelligence agency considers it appropriate to report to
state or local authorities possible criminal activity that is
not expected to implicate classified information or
intelligence sources or methods, it should nevertheless
provide a copy of such report to the AAG, or to the
designated Deputy AAG, Criminal Division.

iv. general considerations: allegations of criminal acts committed by
agency employees

A. This Agreement requires each employee of the Agency to
report to the General Counsel or IG facts or circumstances
that reasonably indicate to the employee that an employee of
an intelligence agency has committed, is committing, or will
commit a violation of federal criminal law.\3\
B. Except as exempted in Section III, when the General
Counsel has received allegations, complaints or information
(hereinafter allegations) that an employee of the Agency may
have violated, may be violating, or may violate a federal
criminal statute, that General Counsel should within a
reasonable period of time determine whether there is a
reasonable basis to believe that a federal crime has been, is
being, or will be committed and that it is a crime which,
under this memorandum, must be reported. The General Counsel
may, as set forth in Section V, below, conduct a preliminary
inquiry for this purpose. If a preliminary inquiry reveals
that there is a reasonable basis for the allegations, the
General Counsel will follow the reporting procedures set
forth in Section VIII, below. If a preliminary inquiry
reveals that the allegations are without a reasonable basis,
the General Counsel will make a record, as appropriate, of
that finding and no reporting under these procedures is
required.

v. preliminary inquiry into allegations against an agency employee

A. The General Counsel's preliminary inquiry regarding
allegations against an Agency employee will ordinarily be
limited to the following:
1. Review of materials submitted in support of the
allegations;
2. review of Agency indices, records, documents, and files;
3. examination of premises occupied by the Agency;
4. examination of publicly available federal, state, and
local government records and other publicly available records
and information;
5. interview of the complainant; and
6. interview of any Agency employee, other than the
accused, who, in the opinion of the General Counsel, may be
able to corroborate or refute the allegations.
B. Where criminal allegations against an Agency employee
are subject to this MOU, an interview of that employee may
only be undertaken in compliance with the following
conditions:
1. Where the crime alleged against an Agency employee does
not pertain to a serious felony offense,\4\ a responsible
Agency official may interview the accused employee; however,
such interview shall only be conducted with the approval of
the General Counsel, the IG, or, as to Defense and military
employees, the responsible military Judge Advocate General or
the responsible Defense Criminal Investigative Organization.
2. Where the crime alleged against an Agency employee is a
serious felony offense, the Agency shall ordinarily not
interview the accused employee, except where, in the opinion
of the General Counsel, there are exigent circumstances \5\
which require that the employee be interviewed. If such
exigent circumstances exist, the General Counsel or other
attorney in the General Counsel's office may interview the
accused employee to the extent reasonably necessary to
eliminate or substantially reduce the exigency.
3. In all other cases of alleged serious felonies, the
General Counsel, or the General Counsel's designee, may
interview the accused employee only after consultation with
the Agency's IG, a Defense Criminal Investigative
Organization (for Defense and military employees), or with
the Department of Justice regarding the procedures to be used
during an interview with the accused employee.
Any interview of an accused employee that is undertaken
shall be conducted in a manner that does not cause the loss,
concealment, destruction, damage or alteration of evidence of
the alleged crime, nor result in the immunization of any
statements made by the accused employee during that
interview. The Agency shall not otherwise be limited by this
MOU either as to the techniques it is otherwise authorized to
use, or as to its responsibility to provide for its security
functions pursuant to E.O. 12333.

vi. general considerations: allegations of criminal acts committed by
non-employees

A. This MOU requires each employee of the Agency to report,
to the General Counsel or as otherwise directed by the
Department or Agency head, facts or circumstances that
reasonably indicate to the employee that a non-employee has
committed, is committing, or will commit one or more of the
specified crimes in Section VII, below.
B. When an Agency has received information concerning
alleged violations of federal law by a person other than an
employee of an intelligence agency, and has determined that
the reported information provides a reasonable basis to
conclude that a violation of one of the specified crimes in
Section VII has occurred, is occurring, or may occur, the
Agency shall report that information to the Department of
Justice in accordance with Sections VIII or IX, below.

VII. REPORTABLE OFFENSES BY NON-EMPLOYEES

A. Unless exempted under Section III, above, allegations
concerning criminal activities by non-employees are
reportable if they pertain to one or more of the following
specified violations of federal criminal law:
1. Crimes involving intentional infliction or threat of
death or serious physical harm. These include but are not
limited to homicide, kidnapping, hostage taking, assault
(including sexual assault), or threats or attempts to commit
such offenses, against any person in the United States or a
U.S. national or internationally protected person (as defined
in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1116 (b)(4)), whether in the United States
or abroad.
2. Crimes, including acts of terrorism, that are likely to
affect the national security, defense or foreign relations of
the United States. These may include but are not limited to:
a. Espionage; sabotage; unauthorized disclosure of
classified information; seditious conspiracies to overthrow
the government of the United States; fund transfers violating
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; providing
material or financial support to terrorists; unauthorized
traffic in controlled munitions or technology; or
unauthorized traffic in, use of, or contamination by nuclear
materials, chemical or biological weapons, or chemical or
biological agents; whether in the United States or abroad;
b. Fraudulent entry of persons into the United States, the
violation of immigration restrictions or the failure to
register as a foreign agent or an intelligence trained agent;
c. Offenses involving interference with foreign governments
or interference with the foreign policy of the United States
whether occurring in the United States or abroad;
d. Acts of terrorism anywhere in the world which target the
U.S. government or its property, U.S. persons, or any
property in the United States, or in which the perpetrator is
a U.S. person; aircraft hijacking; attacks on aircraft or
international aviation facilities; or maritime piracy;
e. The unauthorized transportation or use of firearms or
explosives in interstate or foreign commerce.
3. Crimes involving foreign interference with the integrity
of U.S. governmental institutions or processes. Such crimes
may include:
a. Activities to defraud the U.S. government or any
federally protected financial institution, whether occurring
in the United States or abroad;
b. Obstruction of justice or bribery of U.S. officials or
witnesses in U.S. proceedings, whether occurring in the
United States or abroad;
c. Interference with U.S. election proceedings or illegal
contributions by foreign persons to U.S. candidates or
election committees;
d. Perjury in connection with U.S. proceedings, or false
statements made in connection with formal reports or
applications to the U.S. government, or in connection with a
formal criminal or administrative investigation, whether
committed in the United States or abroad;
e. Counterfeiting U.S. obligations or any other
governmental currency, security or identification documents
used in the United States, whether committed in the United
States or abroad; transactions involving stolen governmental
securities or identification documents or stolen or
counterfeit non-governmental securities.
4. Crimes related to unauthorized electronic surveillance
in the United States or to tampering with, or unauthorized
access to, computer systems.
5. Violations of U.S. drug laws including: the cultivation,
production, transportation, importation, sale, or possession
(other than possession of user quantities) of controlled
substances; the production, transportation,

[[Page H2977]]

importation, and sale of precursor or essential chemicals.
6. The transmittal, investment and/or laundering of the
proceeds of any of the unlawful activities listed in this
Section, whether committed in the United States or abroad.
B. Any conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable
under this section shall be reported if the conspiracy or
attempt itself meets the applicable reporting criteria.
C. The Attorney General also encourages the Agency to
notify the Department of Justice when the Agency's other
routine collection of intelligence in accordance with its
authorities results in its acquisition of information about
the commission of other serious felony offenses by non-
employees, e.g., violations of U.S. environmental laws
relating to ocean and inland water discharging or dumping,
drinking water contamination, or hazardous waste disposal,
and crimes involving interference with the integrity of U.S.
governmental institutions or processes that would not
otherwise be reportable under Section VII.A.3.

viii. procedures for submitting special crimes reports

A. Where the Agency determines that a matter must be the
subject of a special report to the Department of Justice, it
may, consistent with paragraphs VIII.B and VIII.C, below,
make such a report (1) by letter or other, similar
communication from the General Counsel, or (2) by electronic
or courier dissemination of information from operational or
analytic units, provided that in all cases, the subject line
and the text of such communication or dissemination clearly
reflects that it is a report of possible criminal activity.
The Department of Justice shall maintain a record of all
special crimes reports received from the Agency.
B. Where the Agency determines that a matter must be the
subject of a special report to the Department of Justice; and
where the Agency further determines that no public disclosure
of classified information or intelligence sources and methods
would result from further investigation or prosecution, and
the security of ongoing intelligence operations would not be
jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the
federal investigative agency having jurisdiction over the
criminal matter. A copy of that report must also be provided
to the AAG, or designated Deputy AAG, Criminal Division.
C. Where the Agency determines that further investigation
or prosecution of a matter that must be specially reported
may result in a public disclosure of classified information
or intelligence sources or methods or would jeopardize the
security of ongoing intelligence operations, the Agency shall
report the matter to the AAG or designated Deputy AAG,
Criminal Division. A copy of that report must also be
provided to the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigations
or National Security Divisions, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or in the event that the principal
investigative responsibility resides with a different federal
investigative agency, to an appropriately cleared person of
equivalent position in such agency. The Agency's report
should explain the security or operational problems that
would or might arise from a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
D. Written documents associated with the reports submitted
pursuant to this section may refer to persons who are the
subjects of the reports by non-identifying terms (such as
``John Doe ______''). The Agency shall advise the Department
of Justice or relevant federal investigative agency of the
true identities of such persons if so requested.
E. It is agreed that, in acting upon information reported
in accordance with these procedures, the Agency, the
Department of Justice and the relevant federal investigative
agencies will deal with classified information, including
sources and methods, in a manner consistent with the
provisions of relevant statutes and Executive Orders,
including the Classified Information Procedures Act.

ix. when routine dissemination may be used in lieu of a special crimes
report

A. Except as set forth in IX.B, below, the Agency may
report crimes information regarding non-employees to the
Department of Justice by routine dissemination, provided
that:
1. the crimes information is of the type that is routinely
disseminated by the Agency to headquarters elements of
cognizant federal investigative agencies;
2. the criminal activity is of a kind that is normally
collected and disseminated to law enforcement by the Agency
(e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, or
sanctions violations); and
3. the persons or entities involved are members of a class
that are routinely the targets or objects of such collection
and dissemination.
If all three of these conditions are met, the Agency may
satisfy its crimes reporting obligation through routine
dissemination to the Department of Justice, Criminal
Division, and to all cognizant federal law enforcement
agencies, which shall retain primary responsibility for
review of disseminated information for evidence of criminal
activity. In all other cases, the special reporting
procedures in Section VIII shall apply. As requested by the
Department of Justice, the Agency will coordinate with the
Department to facilitate the Department's analytical
capabilities as to the Agency's routine dissemination of
crimes information in compliance with this MOU.
B. Routine dissemination, as discussed in IX.A, above, may
not be used in lieu of the special reporting requirements set
forth herein as to the following categories of criminal
activities:
1. Certain crimes involving the intentional infliction or
threat of death or serious physical harm (VII.A.1, above);
2. Espionage; sabotage; unauthorized disclosure of
classified information; and seditious conspiracies to
overthrow the government of the United States (VII.A.2.a,
above); and
3. Certain crimes involving foreign interference with the
integrity of U.S. governmental institutions or processes
(VII.A.3.b and c, above).

x. other agency responsibilities

A. The Agency shall develop internal procedures in
accordance with the provisions of Sections VIII and IX for
the reporting of criminal information by its employees as
required under Sections IV.A and VI.A.
B. The Agency shall also establish initial and continuing
training to ensure that its employees engaged in the review
and analysis of collected intelligence are knowledgeable
of and in compliance with the provisions of this MOU.

xi. relation to other procedures and agreements

A. If the Agency desires, for administrative or security
reasons, to conduct a more extensive investigation into the
activities of an employee relating to any matter reported
pursuant to this MOU, it will inform the Department of
Justice and the federal investigative agency to which the
matter was reported. The Agency may also take appropriate
administrative, disciplinary, or other adverse action at any
time against any employee whose activities are reported under
these procedures. However, such investigations or adverse
actions shall be coordinated with the proper investigative or
prosecuting officials to avoid prejudice to any criminal
investigation or prosecution.
B. Nothing in these procedures shall be construed to
restrict the exchange of information among the Agencies in
the Intelligence Community or between those Agencies and law
enforcement entities other than the Department of Justice.
C. This MOU supersedes all prior crimes reporting memoranda
of understanding executed pursuant to the requirements of
E.O. 12333. To the extent that there exist any conflicts
between other Agency policies or directives and the
provisions herein, such conflicts shall be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of this MOU. However, this MOU
shall not be construed to modify in any way the August 1984
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense
and the Department of Justice relating to the investigation
and prosecution of certain crimes.
D. The parties understand and agree that nothing herein
shall be construed to alter in any way the current routine
dissemination by the Agency of intelligence information,
including information regarding alleged criminal activities
by any person, to the Department of Justice or to federal law
enforcement agencies.

xii. miscellaneous

A. This MOU shall become effective as to each agency below
as of the date signed by the listed representative of that
agency.
B. The Intelligence-Law Enforcement Policy Board, within
one year of the date of the effective date hereof, and as it
deems appropriate thereafter, will appoint a working group
consisting of an equal number of representatives from the
intelligence and law enforcement communities, including the
Criminal Division. That working group shall do the following:
1. review the Agency's implementation of Sections III.F and
IV.B, hereof;
2. consider whether the crimes reporting requirements of
E.O. 12333 and other authorities are being met through the
operation of this MOU;
3. review each of the provisions of this MOU and determine
what, if any, modifications thereof should be recommended to
the Policy Board, or its successor; and
4. issue a report to the Policy Board of its findings and
recommendations in each of the foregoing categories.
C. The Policy Board in turn shall make recommendations to
the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the heads of the affected agencies concerning any
modifications to the MOU that it considers necessary.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
John Deutsch,
Director of Central Intelligence.
Michael F. Munson,
(For Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).
Kenneth E. Baker,
Director, Office of Non-Proliferation and National
Security, Department of Energy.
William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense.
J.M. McConnell,
Director, National Security Agency.
Toby T. Gati,
Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research.

[[Page H2978]]

footnotes

\1\ If, however, the IG determines that the reported
information is not properly subject to that office's
jurisdiction, but that such information may be reportable
pursuant to this MOU, the IG may forward the information to
the DOJ in compliance with these procedures. Alternatively,
the IG may transmit the information to the Agency's General
Counsel for a determination of what response, if any, is
required by this MOU.
\2\ This MOU does not affect the crimes reporting obligations
of any law enforcement and other non-intelligence components
of a department, agency, or organization.
\3\ When a General Counsel or IG has received information
concerning alleged violations of federal law by an employee
of another intelligence community agency, and those
violations are not exempted under section III.E.4, hereof,
the General Counsel shall notify in writing the General
Counsel of the accused employee's agency. The latter General
Counsel must then determine whether this MOU requires the
allegations to be reported to the Department of Justice.
\4\ A ``serious felony offense'' includes any offense listed
in Section VII, hereof, violent crimes, and other offenses
which, if committed in the presence of a reasonably prudent
and law-abiding person, would cause that person immediately
to report that conduct directly to the police. For purposes
of this MOU, crimes against government property that do not
exceed $5,000 and are not part of a pattern of continuing
behavior or of a criminal conspiracy shall not be considered
serious felony offenses.
\5\ ``Exigent circumstances'' are circumstances requiring
prompt action by the Agency in order to protect life or
substantial property interests; to apprehend or identify a
fleeing offender; or to prevent the compromise, loss,
concealment, destruction, or alteration of evidence of a
crime.

{time} 1530

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Waters) has expired.
(On request of Mr. Dicks, and by unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman would yield to me, I
appreciate very much the hard work that the gentlewoman from California
has put into this, an enormous effort on her part.
I regret that, because of a technicality, the amendment will not be
accepted. I guarantee the gentlewoman we will work with her to make
certain that we do everything we can to come up with a strategy to be
certain that the understanding that is now in place with the Attorney
General is strengthened, so that, in cases where there has been illegal
activity or problems, that they must be reported to the Attorney
General.
I know that is the thrust of your amendment. As you know, our
committee is still involved in our investigation. It may well be one of
the conclusions of our investigation that we need to strengthen this
area.
I pledge to the gentlewoman from California that I will work with her
to get a satisfactory solution. Again, I appreciate the gentlewoman's
endeavors and hard work here.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman from California yield?
Ms. WATERS. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I echo what the ranking member has said. I
think the gentlewoman from California is right on in an area of
critical importance; there is no doubt about that.
We are in the middle of the investigation, as the gentlewoman knows.
We are going to have recommendations. Certainly this is an area of
concern. I do not know what those recommendations will be, but I assure
the gentlewoman that her thoughts and her input on this are being
accepted, listened to, and we will be considering them as we go forward
with the other information we get in our investigation.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the chairman and our
ranking member and say to our ranking member that I really appreciate
the fact that he has at least been able to listen to some of the ideas
that I have brought to that committee.
I know that the gentleman is, by far, one of the most knowledgeable
in this area and that some of the things that I am raising are things
that challenge conventional wisdom. But the gentleman has been very
cooperative, and I appreciate it.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman's kind remarks.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from California?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is withdrawn.
Are there further amendments to title IV?
The Clerk will designate title V.
The text of title V is as follows:
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
by striking out ``December 31, 1998'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``December 31, 2001''.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title V?
Are there further amendments to the bill?
If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as modified, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified,
as amended, was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Ney) having assumed the chair, Mr. Thornberry, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3694) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 420, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature
of a substitute.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.

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