Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5866-H5870


 
 PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION H.R. 2417, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 295, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

                              H. Res. 295

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points 
     of order against consideration of the bill are waived. 
     General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not 
     exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill 
     shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. 
     It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the 
     purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No 
     amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be in order except those printed in the 
     report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
     resolution. Each amendment may be offered only in the order 
     printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member 
     designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and 
     shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question 
     in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of 
     order against such amendments are waived. At the conclusion 
     of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee 
     shall rise and report the bill to the House with such 
     amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a 
     separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the 
     Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
     amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings), my colleague and friend, who I am happy to report sits on 
both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence with me, pending which I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is 
for the purposes of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules has granted a modified open rule 
for H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. 
This is the standard rule that we have used for many years for the 
consideration of the intelligence authorization. The rule is fair. It 
will allow ample time for consideration of all matters.
  The rule provides for one hour of general debate equally divided 
between the chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. Pro forma amendments listed in the report 
will be debatable under the 5-minute rule.
  As in past rules for this legislation, amendments were required to be 
preprinted. This allowed for the vetting of amendments regarding 
classified matters, a procedure we have found to be a very good 
practice, helpful to both the committee and Members.
  Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit with or without 
instructions, as was announced.
  Mr. Speaker, as in past years, we thought it best to allow Members a 
good opportunity to review the bill and debate the issues that they 
feel are important, those particularly to our Nation's security at this 
time when national security is on our minds. Our classified annex and 
staff has been made available to any Member of Congress that was 
interested previously or is interested now in reviewing the underlying 
bill and reports.

                              {time}  1600

  H.R. 2417 is, in fact, must-do legislation because of the rules of 
the House. It authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2004 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. In effect, what 
that is is the 15 agencies of the intelligence community.
  In the nearly 2 years since the tragic terrorist attacks on September 
11, the intelligence community continues to build its capabilities to 
combat new threats that are threats to our Nation's safety, the well-
being of Americans at home and abroad. The bill authorizes resources to 
improve the analytical depth and capacity in all areas of intelligence, 
an area that has been in crying need. This will allow us to process and 
disseminate the information collected in a more efficient, hopefully 
wiser and more timely fashion, and make sure all interested parties 
have access.
  In addition, this legislation continues the sustained effort and 
long-term strategy to enhance human intelligence, an area that is vital 
to our current war on terrorism and is essentially the core business of 
intelligence, plans, and intentions of the enemy. H.R. 2417 helps to 
improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local 
governments. This is an area and a desire where we have overlapping 
interests with other committees in the House. This bill also provides 
including increased training for State and local officials on how the 
intelligence community can support their counterterrorism efforts, 
again, a matter of some overlapping interest.
  Mr. Speaker, these are only a few highlights from the bill that 
passed the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously, in 
the true bipartisan fashion we like to operate our House Permanent 
Select Committee on. I am sure a whole breadth of topics will be 
discussed during our general debate; and I think that we have, in this 
modified open rule, provided ample opportunity for all matters to come 
to the floor.
  I noted today in earlier debate that there was focus on one issue 
that was not necessarily the subject that was under debate, and that 
was the intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. 
Obviously, this is a topic currently under review by the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I would like all 
Members and all interested listeners to understand that we have been 
conducting a review on the House Permanent Select Committee to 
discharge properly our oversight responsibilities. We have been using 
the tools of oversight that are available to us. I think they are 
adequate, and I think they are being well used. I think we are using 
them in a thorough and in a nonpartisan manner. And, in fact, the 
ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and I 
have taken extra steps to detail how this review will be conducted and 
have actually issued a public statement on that.

[[Page H5867]]

  I think it is worth rehashing what that statement says: committee 
hearings, closed and open, as appropriate, that will permit Members to 
question senior administration officials about the prewar intelligence 
on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction holdings and programs, and its 
links to terrorism, to include questions relating to the sufficiency of 
intelligence collection and analytical coverage on these targets.
  Granting accesses to any Member of the House who wishes, under 
appropriate security provisions and House rules, to review the 
documentation provided to the Committee by the Director of Central 
Intelligence in response to a May 22 letter from the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) and myself to provide information. And I am 
happy to report we are getting full cooperation from the Director of 
Central Intelligence on that.
  Staff interviews of intelligence community personnel involved in 
drafting intelligence community analyses of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction holdings and programs and Iraqi links to terrorism.
  Regular committee updates and status reports on current efforts to 
locate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, which, after all, is a 
priority, including actions of the Iraq Survey Group and other 
government agencies employed in that task.
  And a written report suitable to the results of the committee's 
review, including an unclassified summary as promptly as is possible.
  In fact, I would say, Mr. Speaker, the committee has taken a very 
important additional step in its review. We have voted to allow access 
to the 19 volumes that we now have on hand of information provided by 
the Director of Central Intelligence outlining American intelligence 
analysis on Iraq and the sources that supported it. I do not believe we 
have ever done anything that specific before.
  To those who believe that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence is not doing its job or that we are incapable of doing our 
job, they can come and literally read over our shoulder. I think that 
the committee is doing its job, and I am very proud of its members and 
its staff and the way it works; and I am very thankful that I have a 
ranking member who is anxious to preserve the nonpartisan approach that 
we take to the Nation's important security business.
  Those who have questions about the competence of myself, my ranking 
member, or any of the other members on the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence are welcome to express that today in a vote of no 
confidence; but I would urge that they not do that. We are doing our 
very best, and if you would like to come upstairs and help us try to do 
it better, we would welcome your presence.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I first want to thank my good 
friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished 
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for 
yielding me the time, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to first point to the extraordinary 
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the 
bipartisan spirit of the unanimous consent of the entire Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence in support of H.R. 2417. I rise in 
support of the rule providing for the consideration of that measure. It 
is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. This is a 
modified open rule, and I believe that it is adequate for a bill that 
is relatively noncontroversial and was reported from the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence by unanimous vote, as I just said.
  I would like to reiterate a part of what the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss) has said and state to Members who wish to do so that they 
can go to the committee's office to examine the classified schedule of 
authorizations for the National Intelligence Program. This schedule 
includes the CIA, as well as the Foreign Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence programs within the Department of Defense, the 
National Security Agency, the FBI, and the Departments of State, 
Treasury, and Imaging.
  Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for 
the Tactical Intelligence and related activities and the Joint Military 
Intelligence program of the Department of Defense.
  Mr. Speaker, the Intelligence Authorization Act we consider today 
will provide authorizations for some of the most important national 
security programs in this country. This bill is the result of the 
committee's ongoing oversight of the intelligence community and 
oversight responsibilities, which include hundreds of hearings, 
briefings, and site visits annually.
  We are well aware that the global war on terrorism has focused even 
greater attention on the intelligence community and its mission. The 
men and women who serve in this community have faced many challenges in 
the past 21 months and, in my judgment, have responded admirably. This 
bill assists them in these many challenges. It fully supports the 
intelligence community's efforts in the war on terrorism by providing 
funds for analysis, analytic tools, and a unified overhead imagery 
architecture.
  Overall, the committee found the intelligence community is making 
progress in many areas, but noted that there is currently no one office 
in the executive branch that is charged with coordinating all elements 
of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to ensure they 
cooperate and coordinate their efforts.
  The committee also called on the Director of Central Intelligence to 
improve diversity in the workplace and special attention on recruitment 
initiatives for women and minorities. I would be terribly remiss right 
here if I did not mention two former members, one still alive and one 
who is deceased: former member Louis Stokes from Ohio, and our dear 
departed friend Julian Dixon, from California, both of whom spearheaded 
efforts to ensure greater diversity in the intelligence community.
  I hasten to urge that the chairman of this committee, and the now 
leader of the Democratic Caucus, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Pelosi), and certainly the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Reyes), and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who served on 
the committee previously, have all been vigorous in their assertions 
that the intelligence community must do more in the area of diversity. 
So I will be introducing an amendment that I believe will assist the 
director in attaining the goals in this critical area.
  I do urge my colleagues to support this rule and the bill; and before 
reserving the balance of my time, I take a point of personal privilege 
to thank the fine staff of the majority and the minority for the rather 
extraordinary work that it takes in putting this measure together, and 
the many measures that come across their desks on a given day, 
including putting up with some of us as Members and our requests. I 
urge my colleagues to support the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and 
I wish to thank the gentleman for his kind remarks. I also associate 
myself with his remarks about Lou Stokes and Julian Dixon, as well as 
the efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), when she 
was ranking member in the committee, to deal with the diversity issue. 
It is critically important. And as the gentleman from Florida knows, I 
am prepared to accept his amendment at the appropriate time and pleased 
to have his leadership.
  I would also point out that I believe the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Reyes) has shown another element that has improved our bill that we 
approved and were able to bring to the floor in our mark. So that is an 
area that has received attention because it needed attention, and I am 
entirely satisfied that we are taking good steps.
  I would also point out for other Members that we had a number of 
amendments requested. I do not think any were particularly 
controversial as to the bill itself. We have this year, because we are 
dealing with standing up the Department of Homeland Security, some 
questions about where we plug in the intelligence piece from our 
foreign

[[Page H5868]]

intelligence community, which is a very big piece, into the homeland 
security apparatus. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 
been a leader on that and done excellent work and is working with the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Turner), the chairman and ranking member of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security.
  We also, obviously, are working closely in some other areas that are 
a little new for us with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the 
chairman of the Committee on Commerce, because of some questions about 
how we deal with some of the Treasury aspects, and, additionally, how 
we deal with some of the judicial aspects as we respond to the 
challenge in this country of preventive enforcement for people who 
would take advantage of our hospitality here and do mischief. And 
regrettably, we do get the reports regularly that there are still some 
of those folks in our midst. So we are going to be working in that 
area.
  Not all of that is going to come to a final conclusion today. We are 
going to go from here, from our authorization bill, to a conference 
process. I expect there will be progress made in some of these areas 
where there is some apparent overlap between now and conference time, 
and certainly everybody is going to be assured that this committee is 
interested only in the portfolio of intelligence. That is what we do, 
the Foreign Intelligence Program. The other committees of standing that 
have jurisdictional areas that are associated we will work with closely 
and on a friendly and nonterritorial basis. I wish to assure them all 
of that.
  We had, I understand, some amendments that came in late and we had 
one amendment that was not germane; but otherwise, I understand that 
the Committee on Rules made six amendments in order. Five were 
Democratic amendments, one was a Republican amendment; and I believe 
that the Committee on Rules responded very fairly. I see no reason to 
oppose this rule and every reason to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I would state that I do not intend to use all the time. I 
will spend the first part of the debate on H.R. 2417 sharing my views 
about our bill and several other issues of enormous interest to the 
public.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and of the underlying 
bill, H.R. 2417. It is interesting and wonderful that both managers of 
this rule also ably serve on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is our bipartisan 
and collaborative chairman, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) is a senior member on the Democratic side. Both have 
contributed enormously to this rule and, obviously, enormously to the 
product we will soon debate.

                              {time}  1615

  Under this rule, as has been explained, amendments will be considered 
under the 5-minute rule and thus debate on all amendments that were 
filed with the Rules Committee, germane and did not require waivers 
will be in order. I am certain we will have a spirited debate on 
several of those amendments, and I think that is exactly what we should 
be doing in the people's House. In that vein, I will conclude, and I 
look forward to a spirited debate in a few minutes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I, too, wish to comment and 
respond that all of us know that individuals who accept the 
responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence go to 
it with nothing but good intentions and a desire to provide the 
greatest service to this Nation, so I appreciate very much the 
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and our ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). They have been 
unique in the shadow of the controversy of the Iraqi war to have come 
together on the question of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward 
to their work. They have come to this floor to indicate the opportunity 
for Members to review thousands of documents.
  Mr. Speaker, I will continue to pursue my position, and that is that 
there should be an independent commission designed to investigate the 
issues dealing with the weapons of mass destruction. But in light of 
their bipartisan effort, I wrote an amendment that indicated subsequent 
to the completion of their work, 6 months subsequent to that, that we 
would have the opportunity to design a commission that would then be 
able to address the questions again, and that is an independent 
commission separate and apart from this body and as well, of course, 
the executive and legislative bodies.
  I believe the intent was respectful of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence. I am disappointed that the amendment was not allowed 
to be admitted on the basis of waiving the points of order, but I will 
continue to insist that this is the appropriate process to proceed 
under.
  It is not a question of whether or not we find weapons of mass 
destruction or not. It is not a question of whether we are in a battle 
over the truth. All we need is the truth, the finding of weapons of 
mass destruction or not. Many made the decision to vote for the war 
because we were told that we were about to be under imminent attack. I 
think the American people are owed the ultimate determination how that 
decision was made.
  My other amendment had to do with providing local law enforcement 
assess to intelligence as needed and to get security clearances faster 
than they have been able to do so in the past. I hope we will be able 
to work together to ensure that happens so all of us who have local 
officials who need the information to perform their duties 
appropriately can assess this important intelligence to serve our 
communities. I look forward to this bill moving through the House, and 
working on these important issues.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Rule governing floor debate 
on H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 
I oppose this modified open Rule because it fails to make in order 
several amendments that improve this legislation and benefit the 
public.
  I proposed two amendments to H.R. 2417 that were not made in order. 
The first amendment called for the establishment of a "National 
Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq." This Commission 
was to be responsible for reviewing and assessing the administration's 
knowledge of the status of and threats posed by Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction program before America went to war. The need for and the 
benefits of this Commission are obvious. The administration declared 
war, without a declaration of war by the Congress, based upon the claim 
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that the 
United States was in immediate danger of being attacked by the Iraqi 
regime. Over the several weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, dozens of 
American and British soldiers lost their lives and many more suffered 
grave injuries. I had the honor of personally meeting many of our 
valiant, injured troops on visits to Bethesda Medical Facility and 
Walter Reed Army Hospital. Their courage and sacrifice was 
overwhelming.
  For many Americans, myself included, questions remain whether the 
deaths and injuries suffered by young Americans in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom were justified. To date, we have discovered no evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Many Americans are left wondering 
if the justifications for waging war proffered by the administration 
were legitimate. That is why I proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417 
calling for the establishment of a National Commission on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction in Iraq. We must study the intelligence available to 
the administration when war with Iraq was commenced. Was Saddam Hussein 
producing weapons of mass destruction? Was the Iraqi regime capable of 
producing weapons of mass destruction? Did the Iraqi regime conceal 
their weapons of mass destruction after Operation Iraqi Freedom began? 
These questions, and many more, need answers. The Commission 
established under my amendment would have provided those answers.
  I support the amendment offered by my colleague from California, the 
Honorable Barbara Lee. Her amendment calls for a General

[[Page H5869]]

Accounting Office report on the degree to which U.S. intelligence 
services shared information about weapons of mass destruction sites 
with the United Nations inspections teams searching for those weapons 
in Iraq. Ms. Lee's timely and important Amendment will provide many of 
the answers the American public seeks.
  I also proposed an amendment to H.R. 2417 to expand the security 
clearance for law enforcement agents, specified by State executives, so 
that classified and vital information related to homeland security can 
be shared. This amendment was also not made in order, but is vital to 
preparing or local communities to wage the war on terrorism. Protecting 
our homeland will be conducted by local law enforcement agencies and 
small communities across the country. It is vital for valuable, often 
classified information related to homeland security to be accessible to 
local law enforcement agents. My amendment would have expanded the 
security clearance for designated State and local officials and given 
them the ability to receive vital information.
  Mr. Speaker, I reiterate my opposition to this Rule. The Rule is too 
narrowly drafted and fails to make in order several valuable amendments 
offered by myself and my colleagues. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
opposing the narrowly-tailored Rule and in support of the amendment to 
H.R. 2417 offered by my colleague Ms. Barbara Lee.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just wish to respond to my colleague by inviting the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) to come upstairs, as all 
Members are permitted, and see the material being worked on by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and to read the mission of 
the committee in that regard. I think all Members would find that 
substantial work is being done, and I believe all Members of this body 
would be very proud of the efforts put forward by Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence in investigating the continuing concern that 
all of us in this body have, and I dare say the members of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are probably more directly 
concerned in light of the fact that we are there on a day-to-day basis.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule for the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. I commend the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), who are doing valuable work 
by looking into the intelligence surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  By necessity and design, their work is classified. I feel strongly 
that their work must continue, but that this issue is beyond the scope 
of a single committee and is of such importance to our democracy that 
responsible public hearings by a select committee of users of 
intelligence are necessary. Members of relevant committees such as the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International 
Relations, who use intelligence to make policy decisions every day, 
provide valuable perspective that should be part of a broader review.
  As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I am a user of 
intelligence, and the information I receive shapes the decisions I make 
for many men and women in uniform every day. Members of Congress and 
military planners need to have confidence that intelligence is 
objective and provides a sound basis for policy decisions.
  No decision is more grave than sending American fighting men and 
women into harm's way. We have a duty to be certain that public policy 
that we base these decisions on is credible and real. With American and 
British soldiers continuing to be killed at an alarming rate in Iraq, 
we have to be sure that our intelligence is providing a realistic view 
of the threats they have.
  Having open hearings by a select committee of policymakers who are 
customers of intelligence would not only allow Congress to reclaim its 
vital oversight role, but help convince the American people that their 
elected officials and President have the right tools to make the right 
decisions to protect them.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not about the purview of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I deeply respect the work that the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence does, but with all due respect, as a 
customer of that intelligence, the classified work that the committee 
does needs to remain classified, but after that work is declassified 
and moves to the National Security Agency, to the Pentagon, to the 
military planners, to the differing alphabet soups of agencies, who 
then take that classified work and begin to shape public policy with 
it, once that work becomes declassified and is starting to be moved 
into the public policy realm, I and others in relevant committees, like 
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International 
Relations, need to understand what exactly is being done to that 
intelligence to either promote it or shape it to perhaps fit a 
preconceived decision by people in the administration or in other parts 
of the policy-making chain.
  I want to know if the intelligence work that is being done so ably by 
our intelligence people and the analysis done by them has been shaped 
in any way that would change my mind when I make these decisions. That 
is why I think we need a select committee. I urge my colleagues to vote 
no on the rule, but I support the work of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would just point out to the gentlewoman 
from California (Mrs. Tauscher) that our committee is one of the users 
of intelligence. We are part of this community that uses intelligence 
information; and so it seems to me her point is right, and we are, 
therefore, the right committee to be assessing these questions and 
issues..
  Second, we have already agreed on a bipartisan basis to hold public 
hearings as appropriate, and the subject and timing of our first 
hearing is under active discussion right now. I am hopeful it will be 
held in July. I certainly agree that the public needs to know about 
some of these questions. We will discuss them in more detail in a 
moment. I do commend her for raising this issue. We are trying to 
address it responsibly in the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. If we should fail, then it would be timely to set up a 
different committee, or a commission, or use another mechanism.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Colorado (Ms. DeGette).
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Speaker, we are in a very curious position in 
Congress today. We standing here debating a critical bill to provide 
funding for our intelligence services while we ask whether those 
intelligence services might have suffered a massive failure in 
assessing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.
  I use the word "might" very deliberately because we do not know 
whether there was an intelligence failure. That is why we need an 
investigation, and I commend my colleague from California for pushing 
for an investigation within the committee because not only the public 
deserves to know, but we deserve to know equally.
  I am puzzled by many of my colleagues' lack of curiosity on this 
issue. The question of where Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons now may be is critical to the security of our Nation, and yet 
more than 90 days after the fall of Saddam Hussein, we have still not 
located one chemical weapon, biological weapon, or even their 
precursors production facilities or delivery systems.
  We went to war because of the imminent threat those weapons posed. We 
need to find those weapons if they are there; and if they are not 
there, we need to ask the question what caused this massive 
intelligence failure that was presented to Congress as an imminent 
threat to our national security? Our soldiers in Iraq are still engaged 
in combat operations. Saddam Hussein may still be out there, Osama bin 
Laden and al Qaeda are still on the loose, and we need to ensure 
through our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that we have 
solid information as we move forward.
  Congress has to exercise its powers of oversight openly and honestly 
and look into these in a thorough way. That is what our constituents 
deserve. That is what the American people deserve. I

[[Page H5870]]

look forward to working with the committee to make sure this happens in 
a timely fashion.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a distinguished member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, although I think this should be a totally open rule, as 
has been the tradition for dealing with this bill each year, I do think 
that the House should understand that the bill that is being brought to 
the House today is not controversial in the sense that it was agreed to 
unanimously within the committee. I would add to the remarks of my 
friend from Florida that this is, once again, a truly nonpartisan and 
bipartisan effort. It is appropriate that the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence should operate that way, both as the 
committee that provides oversight for intelligence activities and a 
committee that is, as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) 
points out, a consumer of intelligence product.
  No doubt there will be a great deal of controversy to follow, a great 
deal of political discussion to follow in coming weeks and months about 
the intelligence that led up to the fighting and into the fighting in 
Iraq. In fact, I think this will be very good for the committee because 
it is an excellent case study of what intelligence should be, what 
intelligence should not be, how it can be used, and how it can be 
misused. I applaud the decision of the chairman and the ranking member 
to investigate the disturbing matter thoroughly, and I have no doubt 
that we will be able to investigate it thoroughly.

                              {time}  1630

  I applaud their decision to allow Members of the House to read the 
large volume of material that the Director of Central Intelligence has 
provided to the Congress. And our committee intends to issue a written 
report on its findings as promptly as possible.
  We have only begun to examine in detail the testimony, the 
statements, the published intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons 
programs and terrorist associations. It is early in our investigation, 
too early in the military's search within Iraq itself to come to any 
definitive conclusions or explanations of our failure so far to 
substantiate the prewar claims and expectations of what we would find 
there. But I have no doubt that the House will be satisfied with the 
thorough and critical look that the committee will take in this issue.
  There is no question that there is a lot of ambiguous information to 
search through. There is no doubt that there have been some exaggerated 
claims at least, and lives and deaths have hung on these things. We 
must take a thorough look at it. We will and I think the Members of the 
House will be satisfied with that look.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for 
time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I just wanted to add one bit of remark with regard to some of the 
comment we have just heard which I thought was very helpful. We 
understand very clearly and the Intelligence Community understands very 
clearly that finding the weapons of mass destruction or what happened 
to them or whether there was faulty intelligence is a critical issue 
and that is indeed ongoing. As the gentleman from New Jersey just said, 
we are early in the game and we have literally thousands of pages for 
our staff and Members to work through.
  There is one thing that has not been said very clearly yet that does 
need to be said. I think we all share the desire to make as much of 
this known as possible to the public. We want the public to understand 
how good intelligence is and how good it is not. Frankly, I want to do 
everything I can to make the American people aware as well as people 
overseas who might be watching what we have to say here, whether they 
are our friends or our enemies, that our intelligence is indeed 
formidable and when in fact we find a place where there is a gap in it, 
it will be repaired and fixed and that gap will no longer be there. I 
think that will be a comfort to everybody. That process is partially 
what this bill is about. But we are doing this as regard to the debate 
with the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq at a time when we desire 
transparency but we understand that transparency might include some 
people who are our enemies in the Iraq area where there is still a very 
dangerous and difficult operational climate as we are tragically 
reminded every day.
  I would ask that we understand that this is not just a question of 
going back and reviewing material at our leisure trying to come to some 
Solomon decision about whether it was good or bad or where we can fix 
it. This is matching information that we had which was the best we had 
at the time as far as we know with what we are beginning to find as we 
are able to talk to people who are captured in Iraq and other areas who 
are terrorists or are associated with them, document exploitation, 
those types of things and match that up. This process is a process that 
the committee has taken on. We are not just doing the prewar analysis. 
We are doing the what is going on now and where is it going on a daily 
basis.
  I hope Members can be assured, we will be in a continuous position to 
assess, both give a score card to the community and perhaps to come 
back to our colleagues here and say there are some other areas where we 
need to invest in the Intelligence Community because a small investment 
will yield a greater national security return before we are through. 
That is an ongoing process and charge of this committee and one we take 
seriously.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________
						  


						  
Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5870-H5881



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2417.
  The Chair designates the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Isakson) as 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ose) to assume the chair temporarily.

                              {time}  1635


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Ose (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is 
considered as having been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I am very pleased to bring the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 to the floor today. As always, this authorization is 
the culmination of both an intensive review of the intelligence budget 
request and the rigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community that 
the committee conducts on

[[Page H5871]]

an ongoing basis. And I mean ongoing basis. That involves Members and 
staff here in Washington and elsewhere around the globe.
  In putting together this legislation and schedule of authorizations, 
the committee must first answer the question, what is the state of 
America's Intelligence Community? Overall there have been some 
significant improvements since the low point we hit in the last decade, 
and I am pleased about that. I applaud the President for making needed 
investments in intelligence capabilities and his appreciation for 
intelligence as a vital element of the national security of our Nation.
  I am pleased to say that our intelligence authorization comes very 
close to the number that the President has asked for. In dollar terms, 
we have basically come in at exactly the level of the President's 
request. Within that framework and building on the progress made to 
date, the committee has been able to accomplish quite a bit. Among 
other things, the bill before us provides full support for the 
Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism, job one. It 
postures the United States for the future with a unified overhead 
imagery intelligence architecture.
  I just can put it this way. We have been well served by technology 
for a number of years. Technology gets old, just like the rest of us, 
and gets fragile. We need to be in a position to keep a robust 
architecture of the best technology available and this bill goes a long 
way to doing that.
  This bill also makes needed investments in analysis and analytic 
tools. Anybody who has followed the progress of the 9/11 joint review 
done with our colleagues in the Senate and our committees have come to 
the conclusion that a big part of the problem lies in the coordination 
and making the whole analytical piece work better. We have focused 
rather extensively on that this year. It is not a new subject for us.
  We also address counterintelligence concerns stemming from such 
celebrated cases tragically as the Hanssen case and the Montes 
espionage cases. These cases did do us damage and there are others that 
can as well. Counterintelligence becomes even more important because we 
understand counterintelligence may stop people from doing damaging 
things to Americans here at home.
  In addition, the bill continues the committee's push for improved and 
aggressive human intelligence tools and capabilities. Human 
intelligence, spying, espionage, getting enemies' plans and intentions 
is the core business of intelligence.
  On the homeland front, homeland security is very much part of our 
mission in the sense that we must authorize the establishment of some 
connection between our foreign intelligence and our domestic 
authorities who are dealing with the problems on the homeland. So we 
authorize the establishment of a pilot program to enable State and 
local authorities to gather terrorist threat related information and 
push it upward to the Federal level.
  The Intelligence Community must be forward leaning on this. As we 
have discovered consistently through our oversight and through the 
joint inquiry into the events of September 11, the United States does 
not have the luxury to be complacent about its national security 
requirements. Risk aversion, inattention to detail, lack of investment 
in capabilities, these are not options that the American people are 
willing to accept and certainly the committee is not willing to accept.
  Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased that H.R. 2417 continues the 
nonpartisan tradition of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of reaching consensus. This is entirely appropriate 
because partisanship has no place in a debate over America's security. 
None at all. This measure was reported out of the committee by a 
unanimous vote of 16-0. And I daresay, we did not start with a piece of 
paper that we all agreed on. We got to 16-0 by dealing with some things 
that we did not necessarily all agree on but we did it in a responsible 
and, I would say, adult way, understanding that the flag we work for is 
the flag of this country, not the flag for any other agenda.
  I urge the House to support H.R. 2417. I will look forward to making 
comments on individual amendments as they come along.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
and rise in support of H.R. 2417.
  First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he 
runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and 
cooperative and shows a real willingness to work with every member of 
the committee. I have had the privilege of serving on the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence for 6 years. Chairman Goss has 
gracefully and competently chaired the committee since 1997 and my 
predecessors as ranking member during my service include the late and 
great Julian Dixon and our able leader the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Pelosi). The membership of our committee is truly talented, 
diverse and hardworking, and deeply committed to fulfilling its 
oversight duties and responsibilities to the House. By the way, Mr. 
Chairman, so is our staff. Committee members and staff worked closely 
together to craft a bill that provides new and better capabilities to 
fight the war on terrorism as well as address a range of global 
challenges. As we have just heard from our chairman, it is a good bill 
and it received the unanimous vote of our committee.
  An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been 
presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made 
thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest 
priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on 
certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill 
also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening 
the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all-
source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better 
information sharing and collaboration across the agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization 
bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern 
about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the 
decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both 
sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our 
committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other 
mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our 
committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend 
a few minutes discussing our effort.
  As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military 
force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was 
compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, 
was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how 
brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in 
Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime 
speak for themselves.
  To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected 
Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition 
forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further 
evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and 
biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee, 
these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization 
bill. It has been anything but business as usual.
  On May 22, Chairman Goss and I sent a letter to the Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, expressing the committee's interest 
in learning in detail how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD 
and ties to terrorism was developed. The chairman and I have also met 
twice with the Director on this subject. In response to our request, 
the Intelligence Community has provided 19 volumes of information on 
Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorism. On June 12, the chairman and 
I announced the bipartisan and unanimous commitment of our committee to 
a serious, focused, comprehensive review of the quality and objectivity 
of prewar intelligence. We announced that we would hold hearings, 
closed and open--open means public--to question senior administration 
and intelligence officials about the prewar intelligence on Iraq's WMD 
and its links to terrorism.

[[Page H5872]]

                              {time}  1645

  I think it is very important that the committee hold public hearings, 
and I have the gentleman from Florida's (Chairman Goss) personal 
commitment that we will. I hope our first hearing will occur in July. 
Our committee also decided to produce a written, unclassified report as 
promptly as possible, and in addition we agreed to give all House 
Members access to the materials provided by the intelligence community 
in response to the committee's request, under appropriate security 
conditions and House rules.
  Last week our committee held two hearings in connection with our 
investigation, one examining the October, 2002, National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the other 
on the current search for Iraq's weapons. While we are still at an 
early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have 
reviewed so far.
  First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and 
biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used 
chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted 
to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of 
anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both 
direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the 
intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning 
documents, and equipment to support WMD production.
  Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass 
destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the 
administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear 
before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical 
agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be 
hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to 
hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or 
munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found 
is cause for real concern.
  Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD, 
administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers 
attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State 
Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that "we know that 
Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction . 
. . " On the eve of war, President Bush said, "Intelligence gathered 
by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime 
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever 
devised." And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus 
information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even 
included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many 
Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that 
there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and 
intention to use WMD.
  Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now 
investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on 
circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the 
intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress 
that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial 
photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an 
issue that we have to explore.
  And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties 
to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the 
intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the 
administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to 
what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated 
in this area.
  Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of 
our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is 
counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not 
report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam 
destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he 
recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of 
keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely 
scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction 
and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of 
Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. 
and British troops.
  But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found 
tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that 
there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where 
the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were 
not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that 
their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate 
military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or 
Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would 
not support such action until these matters are cleared up.
  As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also 
be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not 
only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the 
world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence 
community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The 
committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to 
follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead.
  Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this 
authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's 
immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers 
dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am 
committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this 
authorization bill deserves our strong support.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are going to have a 
lot of Member participation in the general debate today.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. 
Gibbons), the chairman of the Human Intelligence, Analysis and 
Counterintelligence Subcommittee.
  (Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence 
authorization bill, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
for yielding me this time.
  This bill addresses vital intelligence needs, and may I say there is 
no greater need nor more important need, in my view, than the need for 
more and better human intelligence, also known as HUMINT. For America's 
intelligence community, fighting terrorism, as the chairman has said, 
is job one and rightly so. In order to learn the plans and intentions 
of America's terrorist enemies, which we must do to defend against 
another terrorist attack, we must improve the quality and quantity of 
intelligence from human sources. Technology certainly can help, but it 
has limited application. For instance, the overhead collection systems 
of the Cold War era continue to be a wonderful resource. However, they 
are not much good for tracking individual terrorists, and they 
certainly cannot get inside the heads of those individuals who are 
plotting to kill Americans. For that we must have HUMINT. HUMINT is the 
force multiplier.
  As good as the information is that the National Security Agency 
collects, it is that much more powerful when HUMINT officers down on 
the ground locate individuals who can tell them just what those 
electronic signals mean while talking to them in their native language. 
This authorization bill recognizes this fact, and I am very proud of 
the significant bipartisan support given to our HUMINT capabilities by 
the community.
  As I have said previously, throughout much of the 1990s there was a 
debate about whether America really needed to spend so much money on 
defense; and as for intelligence, some people even said there was no 
longer any need for the CIA. Mr. Chairman, that debate is long over. 
The task before us now is to continue to provide the necessary

[[Page H5873]]

resources for HUMINT programs so that our policymakers can have a 
better, more detailed understanding of what the intelligence analysis 
means.
  Unfortunately, the HUMINT programs of the CIA, America's premier 
HUMINT agency, were nearly starved to death during the mid-1990s; and 
with the help from the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Congress, and now a supportive administration, those 
programs are being resuscitated and brought back to new life. But 
despite this renewed commitment, the CIA still has to surge to cover 
the world's hot spots. This needs to change, and this bill helps us get 
there.
  The men and women of the CIA wherever they are found are doing a 
wonderful job; but they need encouragement, they need support from 
Congress, and they need the support of the American people. Our 
committee has again this year, under the leadership of the chairman and 
with the support of the ranking member, made the commitment to provide 
the resources to properly support these fine people to add to their 
numbers, to improve their foreign language skills, and to get them 
overseas where they are needed and needed badly. The support for the 
effort of these people must be sustained and a vote on H.R. 2417 is a 
perfect expression of that support. I urge my colleagues to support 
this bill.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member of our committee.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman, ranking member, for 
yielding me this time.
  I want to thank the chairman for his leadership, along with our 
ranking member, in presenting a bill that I think addresses many of the 
concerns that many Members of Congress have expressed to a number of us 
on the committee.
  H.R. 2417 expresses, among other things, the committee's deep and 
longstanding concern about the lack of progress made by the 
intelligence community in diversifying its workforce, especially in the 
senior ranks and the core mission areas. In fiscal year 2002, the 
intelligence community had a smaller proportion of women and minorities 
than the Federal Government workforce and the civilian workforce at 
large. Women and minorities continue to be especially underrepresented 
in senior grades GS-13 through 15 and in Senior Intelligence and 
Executive Services positions.
  This bill requires that the Director of Central Intelligence submit a 
report outlining the current diversity action plan including short- and 
long-term goals. This report should also include the DCI's plan for 
implementing diversity initiatives across the intelligence community 
and plans for measuring the progress made by the individual agencies in 
the intelligence community. The bill limits the use of a portion of the 
money authorized to be appropriated to the Community Management Account 
until such time as the Director of Central Intelligence reports to this 
committee on his plan for implementing an effective and a meaningful 
diversity plan.
  Diversity in the workforce is a corporate imperative. It is critical 
to defeating global threats and simply makes good business sense. 
Therefore, the committee will look to the Director of Central 
Intelligence and each intelligence community agency director to ensure 
that more is done to diversify the intelligence workforce. The DCI and 
agency heads are also urged to take diversity into account when 
selecting officers to fill the many senior management vacancies in the 
agencies across the intelligence community. It makes good business 
sense. Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2417.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), who is the chairman of the 
Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee who has done an 
extraordinary job on a very difficult subject.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.

                              {time}  1700

  I want to pay my respects and admiration to both the chairman and the 
ranking member who I think are extraordinary public servants and do a 
great job for our committee.
  As chair of the HPSCI's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland 
Security, I am continuously impressed by the men and women of the 
Intelligence Community. Over the past year, we have witnessed 
significant success in the war on terrorism, to include the capture of 
a number of significant terrorist operatives around the world. The men 
and women of the Intelligence Community have worked tirelessly to 
deter, disrupt, and destroy terrorist capabilities wherever they 
threaten our interests, and they have performed remarkably in support 
of our successful military action in Iraq. Their ability to carry out 
their mission is due, at least in part, to the support provided by the 
Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) 
and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this House has 
consistently supported providing more resources and better tools to the 
Intelligence Community. This support has only now begun to reverse the 
underinvestment suffered by the Intelligence Community in the last 
decade.
  As we continue to face threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad, 
we must remain vigilant. We must ensure that the Intelligence Community 
has the personnel, the skill, the languages, and the resources 
necessary to work against such threats. The Intelligence Community must 
be prepared to confront the asymmetrical threat to the future.
  Mr. Chairman, to this end, H.R. 2417 provides authorization funding 
for the counterterrorism activities of the Intelligence Community. It 
provides money and other resources to deepen all-source analytical 
capabilities. This is most important when confronting the terrorist 
target. It is through our analytical efforts that all the dots that get 
collected ultimately get connected.
  This bill also provides funding for the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center proposed by the President of the United States in his State of 
the Union address. The TTIC is a primary example of how well the 
Intelligence Community is marshalling its resources, encouraging 
efficiencies, and disseminating timely intelligence across government 
in defense of the American homeland.
  The President deserves a great deal of credit for his vision. The 
Intelligence Community deserves credit for putting that vision into 
action.
  H.R. 2417 also authorizes additional funding to specifically improve 
the sharing of terrorist threat-related information across all levels 
of government, Federal, State and local, and it is through the 
aggressive collection, analysis, and dissemination of threat 
information that the agencies and organizations of the Federal, State, 
and local governments, as well as the private sector, can best protect 
the homeland, prosecute the war on terrorism, and work together to keep 
America safe.
  The counterterrorism elements of the Intelligence Community are at 
the forefront of this effort, and this bill is an investment in that 
effort, and I urge support of H.R. 2417.
  I want to say a word about two other issues. Some of us have been 
briefed on the House floor by Secretary Rumsfeld. He stood in the well 
of this House and briefed many Members. On one occasion, when asked the 
question, how do we know when we have won the war, he said three 
things: regime change, which we have accomplished; a new regime, which 
is now being put in place; and finding the weapons of mass destruction. 
I have great faith that with two of those goals accomplished, the third 
goal will be accomplished. I have great faith, after a number of 
briefings from folks in the Intelligence Community, that the weapons of 
mass destruction will be found. And I think all Members should have 
that kind of reassurance from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
based on reports that we have received, based on information we have 
been given by the Secretary of Defense that that will take place.
  If I could say one other thing. I want to say this, Mr. Chairman: I 
think our committee probably has stepped over the bounds a little bit 
by saying to every Member of the House they can have all of this 
information. I think sharing this information is going to

[[Page H5874]]

turn out to be a mistake. This is the greatest talking body in the 
whole world. People love to talk. Very few listen. And I am afraid that 
when 435 Members have access to the information we do, a select 
committee, an important committee, I am afraid of what is going to 
happen, particularly after what the New York Times had to say about a 
very important meeting that we had in the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, which is now out in the public. Nobody knows how it got 
out there, but I guarantee my colleagues, if we give 435 access, we got 
big problems.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, I have great 
faith that the WMD will be found too, and in the seriousness and 
responsibleness of the Members of the House.
  Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), who is ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence.
  (Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
this time, and I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his 
hard work. He is truly a leader, and he treats us with fairness, and he 
has the best interests of our Nation in his heart, as well as the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman). I appreciate that very much.
  I would associate myself with some of the remarks that the previous 
speaker just made concerning having some faith. We are two-thirds of 
the way there, and I think we have reason to believe we will get there.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417. As the ranking member 
of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis and 
Counterintelligence, working with the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. 
Gibbons), who I appreciate very much his hard work and efforts, we have 
observed firsthand the dedication and the professionalism of the men 
and women on the frontline collecting intelligence around the globe. 
Through their sacrifices and their heroic efforts, they have helped 
make our Nation more secure and have contributed greatly to our 
military success in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am pleased that this bill 
provides the tools essential to intelligence collectors to meet 
operational goals; in particular, those related to military operations, 
combating terrorism, and countering the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  My colleagues will also appreciate that in H.R. 2417, it also 
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to report back to the 
committee on lessons learned from the war in Iraq. Careful analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of our technical systems and processes 
will allow both the executive branch and Congress to make better 
resource allocation decisions in the future.
  H.R. 2417 also stresses the need for improved strategic and all-
source intelligence analysis, both key to U.S. policymaker 
understanding of the capabilities and the intentions of rogue nations 
and individuals posing threats to U.S. interests. The bill further 
authorizes additional billets for analysts, as we all know we have to 
have people to do jobs, and additional funds for information technology 
upgrades to help analysts more efficiently do their job.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill. I trust my colleagues will support 
it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), who is a new and 
valued member of our committee, and we welcome him.
  Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I too rise in strong support of H.R. 2417, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. It is a good 
bill with bipartisan support and, hopefully, it will be adopted, and I 
feel sure it will.
  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on our Nation, the 
Select Committee on Intelligence has noted the urgent need for better 
information-sharing between and among our various Intelligence 
Community's agencies, and Federal, State, and even local law 
enforcement are enjoying better shared intelligence. Since joining the 
committee earlier this year, I have observed the chairman, ranking 
member, and committee members, how they have advocated the 
implementation of new policies and technologies which are designed to 
facilitate the timely sharing of important information among our 
intelligence agencies and our local law enforcement.
  Technical shortfalls in communications and collaboration systems, 
however, have undermined efforts to fully share information across the 
Intelligence Community. This bill makes an effort to correct those 
issues. These technical limitations can be overcome with proper 
management and capital investments. This bill provides significant 
funding to assist the Intelligence Community's leadership in developing 
and sharing useful information, management tools, capabilities, and 
operating systems throughout the Intelligence Community.
  As important as technological solutions to information-sharing are 
the needs for updated policies to direct the flow of information. The 
community's leadership has not been sufficiently clear about its 
information-sharing policies with its various component agencies. As a 
result, information becomes irrelevant due to outdated directives or 
conflicting opinions about what information can or cannot be shared, 
and with whom. One of the key lessons learned by the committee's 9/11 
inquiry last year was that a failure to communicate sensitive data on 
an urgent basis among intelligence law enforcement agencies can cost 
our Nation dearly.
  The committee has taken steps to improve this situation with this 
important bill. It is a good piece of legislation, a strong piece of 
legislation. I encourage its passage and support it fully.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), a valued member of our committee.
  Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me this time.
  Today I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization 
Bill for Fiscal Year 2004. I want to commend the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), our 
ranking member, for their leadership and the professional, bipartisan 
manner in which they conduct the business of the Committee on 
Intelligence.
  H.R. 2417 includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as Foreign 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs within the Departments of 
Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, Energy and the FBI. The bill 
addresses critical threats to our national security, but it also calls 
attention to particular areas of concern. Among those concerns is the 
connection between drug trafficking and terrorist activities.
  The committee is concerned about the level of personnel and funding 
resources dedicated to combat transnational crimes such as drug 
trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. As seen in both 
Colombia and Afghanistan, the activities of terrorist organizations are 
closely linked to the drug trade. These illicit activities feed upon 
and sustain each other. To defeat terrorist organizations, the 
Intelligence Community must understand the transnational organized 
crime that supports them. Therefore, the committee calls upon the 
administration to reinvigorate the strategy in this area.
  In addition, the bill extends the authority granted last year to 
allow foreign intelligence funds dedicated for Colombia to be used in a 
unified campaign against drug trafficking and activities by groups 
designated as terrorist organizations.
  Finally, the bill establishes an Assistant Secretary of Intelligence 
and Enforcement within the Department of Treasury to enhance the 
identification and targeting of illicit financial transactions. This 
office will also seek to improve the coordination and dissemination of 
intelligence products concerning drug trafficking, international crime, 
and terrorist activities.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman 
of the committee.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me

[[Page H5875]]

this time. I rise in strong support of the legislation.
  This Member would like to commend the exemplary bipartisan efforts of 
the chairman and the distinguished ranking member, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman). Often when people in Washington talk about the 
need for bipartisanship, what they really mean is that the other side 
should agree with them. In the case of the Committee on Intelligence, 
however, there has been true bipartisanship and genuine cooperation 
towards the goal of serving the Nation's interest. Although this 
bipartisanship is a tradition on the Committee on Intelligence, it is 
commendably reinforced by the leadership style and the efforts of the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman).
  Under the chairman's leadership, and in this bill, the legislative 
branch will be moving rapidly to address a number of long-standing 
concerns in our collection and analysis of intelligence. This Member 
would mention just a few.
  First, it should be recognized that in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attack of September 11, President Bush declared war on terrorist 
financing. There is, however, no single office in the Federal 
government that is responsible for ensuring that all elements of law 
enforcement and intelligence share terrorist information in a timely 
fashion. As a result, our counterterrorist financing efforts to date 
have not been as effective as they could be. The committee concluded 
that the Department of the Treasury needs to be more effective in 
implementing its counterterrorist financing mission from an 
intelligence sharing perspective. By elevating the intelligence 
function within the Treasury Department, this bill ensures that the 
coordination and information sharing between the Treasury and the rest 
of the Intelligence Community can be more effective.
  This Member recognizes that the assistance and the cooperation of the 
chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), will be required to achieve this 
important policy change. The Select Committee on Intelligence will 
continue to work with him and his committee, on which this Member also 
serves, to ensure that we get this correct.
  Mr. Chairman, secondly, it should be noted that Americans have become 
painfully aware of the threats to the homeland and the risk that 
terrorist cells and their support networks may be operating in the 
United States. Several suspected cells already have been cracked. 
Indeed, an individual has just been convicted last week of conducting 
surveillance operations for possible al Qaeda attacks. The presence of 
this new and very real threat has compelled the FBI to transform the 
way it conducts investigations.

                              {time}  1715

  No longer does the FBI solely pursue investigations in order to build 
criminal cases. Now they are also actively at work to disrupt and 
destroy terrorist cells before they launch attacks. This is nothing 
less than revolutionary in the way that the FBI does its business. It 
is a very necessary transformation that the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence is following closely through careful oversight. We in 
the legislative branch are attempting to ensure that the information 
flow between the FBI and the intelligence community is done 
effectively, but also within the confines of the law.
  The committee intends to continue aggressive oversight. I want to 
assure our colleagues of this evolving relationship between this 
intelligence and law enforcement.
  Third, and finally, this Member would remind his colleagues of the 
enormity of the challenge now faced by the intelligence community. The 
war on terrorism has required an unprecedented commitment requiring 
timely, actionable intelligence on a truly global scale.
  In addition, our intelligence services are devoting significant 
resources to the effort to Iraq, not only to identify and to apprehend 
the remaining elements of Saddam Hussein's regime but also to locate 
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. More on that subject later.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), the distinguished ranking member of our 
subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, TNT, who became a 
grandfather for the second time yesterday.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my new granddaughter, Patricia 
Lanier, I would say it is my pleasure today to speak about a very 
important piece of legislation that our colleagues in this House will 
pass judgment on.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2417, the fiscal year 2004 
intelligence authorization act. I am a fairly new member of this House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is a unique opportunity 
for Members of the House to serve on this select committee.
  I came on to the committee at the time that the joint 9-11 hearings 
were taking place. And as I look around the room today and I observe my 
colleagues that participated in those joint sessions with the Senate, I 
want my other colleagues that are not on this committee to know how 
impressed I was with the leadership of this committee and our 
participation with the Senate as well.
  I also want to take this opportunity to thank the staff who have been 
most kind and generous on both sides of the aisle to participate with 
us as we have gone through these very tough issues.
  This is a good bill. It is a complicated bill. It is hard for some 
Members to understand. For example, traditionally, the executive 
branch, the Congress, the industry, we focus on expanding the 
capability of sensors. Sensors are used to take pictures, to intercept 
communications or to measure some special signature whether they are 
from satellites, whether they are from aircraft, or whether they are 
from ships. But the government has underinvested in abilities to task 
the collection systems properly and to exploit and disseminate the 
collection data once received.
  For a number of years this subcommittee that I am on on this 
committee has worked to improve and rectify that imbalance. This year's 
bill accomplishes that and expands the concept as well. In years past, 
the committee has stressed the need for more investment and better 
management at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National 
Security Agency to improve processing, exploitation and dissemination 
capabilities for imagery and signals intelligence. The committee 
sustained these initiatives in the current bill.
  We also lay a foundation for applying information technology to solve 
problems revealed by the congressional investigation into the September 
11 tragedy as well.
  This is an important bill. I urge its support. I also want to point 
out that the missile in space intelligence command in my district is 
adequately covered by funding under this important piece of 
legislation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Boehlert), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee 
on Science.
  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
intelligence authorization bill, and I want to start by commending the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), for their leadership, their 
bipartisanship and their commitment. We are all in this together. And 
while I am at it, I want to compliment the most professional staff that 
I have seen of any committees in the Congress in my years in this 
institution.
  As a member of the committee, I know well the threats facing our 
country. They are many. They are varied and they are serious. The job 
of intelligence is challenging and never ending. All of us, not just in 
the Congress but across the country, have become painfully aware that 
while many countries of the world are working with us to promote peace 
and stability, there are those who are committed to undermining our 
efforts. The Nation has been exposed to this ugly reality. The memory 
of September 11 will forevermore be seared on our souls.
  Our collective awareness has increased as has our understanding of 
the

[[Page H5876]]

absolute need for a very capable intelligence community. This bill 
accelerates investment in enhanced capabilities and people to move the 
intelligence community from being postured from the threats of the past 
to being positioned to address the increasingly asymmetric threats 
facing us in the future.
  It will not happen overnight, but the changes needed must and will 
come about at a rapid pace. Rebuilding the infrastructure and retooling 
for the future is under way even as we debate this issue. Every area of 
intelligence operations needs support and attention. But I want to 
focus on what I believe is the most critical need we face, and that is 
in the area of human intelligence.
  Mr. Chairman, the sad fact is that we, of necessity, need to reverse 
course from the years of decline in investments in the people that make 
up our cadre of human intelligence officials. This does not mean we 
should not continue to invest in important technical systems, but we 
must not become solely dependent on them. Satellites in the heavens and 
all the sophisticated and complex technologies here on Earth must be 
complemented by our eyes and ears around the globe. There must be a 
proper balance between people and machines.
  We are proud of our intelligence professionals because of the 
outstanding work they perform day in and day out, so often putting 
their lives at risk. What they do and how they do it is not easy. And 
they have earned our gratitude for their dedication and 
professionalism.
  One of the basic tools that these professionals need in order to do 
their job is the ability to speak foreign languages. Quite frankly, and 
this is sad to say, this is a deficient area. I am not at all happy, 
and I will confess it up front, about the response we have received 
from the intelligence community leadership on this issue, despite our 
continuing efforts to improve language skills. We set a clear priority 
to ensure that we have people with native language capabilities 
regardless of where we might find ourselves. Yet year after year we 
have provided an increase in the amount of funds requested for language 
training, and year after year something happens that is not our intent.
  The response to our concerns has been unsatisfactory. Year after year 
the intelligence community finds ways to avoid implementing these 
initiatives which are essential to its success.
  Mr. Chairman, this year we insist that the community leadership 
resolve to fix the language inadequacy. No more finessing, no more 
fudging. Just do it or else.
  Our country's intelligence community is still recovering from years 
of decline. There are fundamental shortcomings that must be addressed, 
and we will fail in this challenge if we do not adequately restore the 
resources to a sufficient level to get the job done.
  While this budget represents a significant increase over the past 
years, we support it with the full knowledge and understanding there is 
a great deal more work to be done. Language being only one of the 
issues, but this is an issue that we have to pay attention to. It does 
not do us any good to have some sophisticated satellite costing a 
jillion dollars up in the heavens taking pictures of Afghanistan, if in 
the caves there are all these people bent on doing us harm and there is 
nobody in there who can understand them, communicate with them, or 
provide us with necessary intelligence. And that is what we intend to 
correct, and I am proud to say the committee stands strong behind this 
commitment and we will follow through on it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. The 15 seconds 
is to tell the prior speaker, our wonderful colleague, that I totally 
agree with him. As the representative from the district in America that 
probably makes most of our intelligence satellites and has fabulous 
technology, that is great; but we need more investment in human 
intelligence. And he is right.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), a classmate and good friend, one of the rookies 
on our committee, but already the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Policy, and National Security.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished ranking member, 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), and the chairman of our 
committee for their joint leadership and the standards that they set 
for us every day.
  I respect and have high regard for the men and women of the 
intelligence community, and I really consider it a high privilege to 
have been appointed to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence in the House. As a new member, I have valued meeting and 
learning from the many talented and patriotic individuals in our 
intelligence community; and I believe it is important for the foreign 
policy and the national security of the United States that our 
intelligence community be given the tools and the support they need and 
that their efforts be focused on important priorities. That is why we 
are on the floor today in support of this authorization act for fiscal 
year 2004.
  I do have some concerns today that I would like to voice. I serve as 
the ranking member of the Subcommittee of the Intelligence Policy and 
National Security, as the ranking member just said. The role of the 
subcommittee is to examine how intelligence supports national security 
policy, ensuring that intelligence is focused on the right priorities 
and is as reliable as it can be and that it is used appropriately by 
senior policymakers in furthering U.S. foreign policy. Issues such as 
potentially politicized intelligence, potential exaggeration of 
intelligence and imprecise characterizations of intelligence are of 
significant concern to me in my role on this committee. So I am very 
concerned about the role intelligence played in the foreign policy 
debates about going to war in Iraq.
  The answers must await a thorough accounting, and we cannot 
predetermine what those outcomes are. But I am concerned that the 
administration and the American people and the Members of this House 
relied too heavily on their interpretation of the threat facing this 
country, a threat that was described as imminent, as grave and growing 
without sufficient transparency into the intelligence picture 
underpinning the argument for war.
  I think we are learning that a foreign policy based on preemption 
puts far too much pressure on the intelligence community to deliver 
certainty when it simply cannot. So the intelligence community must be 
given all that they need to protect our magnificent Nation.
  Every administration deserves the best intelligence that they 
possibly can get. But we must assure the credibility of this for the 
American people and for the world community.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this 
authorization act. It is important for our country and the protection 
of our people.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham), the distinguished gentleman who is a very 
valued member of our committees and has helped us on a number of 
fronts.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to first thank not only 
the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), but he ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  Our committee is a bipartisan committee. The defense committee that I 
sit on is also, with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) and 
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and people like that; and it 
is really a pleasure to work on.

                              {time}  1730

  When there is a pressure put on the ranking member to force political 
gain on weapons of mass destruction, it is a sign of true leadership 
and bipartisanship to not do that and to work with the chairman to come 
about and perform a bill like this, and we should all be proud of that, 
the Members, and I want to personally thank the gentlewoman from 
California.
  The weapons of mass destruction, we cannot say too much about them, 
but the chairman and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) also 
made something in order that has not been done before, and that is for 
every single Member to be able to look at the information. I am 
convinced that if anyone on this floor looks at that information, they 
only have one conclusion. There are weapons of mass destruction still 
there. If we take a vial

[[Page H5877]]

this big, the size of an eye dropper and have two seeds in it and in 2 
days a person can whip up a batch to kill every man, woman and child in 
New York City and then try and find that with deceit, a system that was 
designed to hide it on deceit or destroy it if people get close, and 
the one thing I can say is we were told there would be absolutely no 
way possible for Hans Blix and the U.N. to find such things, especially 
with Saddam Hussein still there trying to hide it. So that was a bogus 
issue.
  I would also tell them that the committee does not just deal with 
terrorism, the war on drugs, local crime and the one thing that I could 
say before we ever did a pre-9/11 look was that we did not fund the 
folks enough. We need to change some laws.
  The Phoenix report, we knew there were terrorists in Arizona, but our 
intelligence agencies were afraid to act because they would be sued 
because it would be racial profiling, and these guys put out papers 
supporting Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and we could not touch them 
under the first amendment and that is wrong. There is the same type of 
people there in Arizona today. One guy was so stupid he went to 
navigator school. He failed that. Do my colleagues know what he is in 
today? Airport security, and we cannot touch him.
  So I think we need to go further and change some of our laws to 
protect American citizens, and I know there is a fine line in 
protecting rights and the other, but by golly, I know where I stand and 
I know where the committee stands, and I am proud of them.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. We 
are all proud to serve on this committee. It is now my pleasure to 
yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), the 
rookie on the committee and a rookie in Congress, but he is no rookie 
to these issues.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I too want to acknowledge the 
leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member. I 
have been in local politics for 18 years, and we have tremendous 
leadership on this committee, and I think all members of this committee 
put the Nation first.
  I rise in support of H.R. 2417. The bill reflects the committee's 
support for the Intelligence Community and the men and women who serve 
in the intelligence agencies. Often unrecognized, these individuals 
have made great sacrifices to secure our homeland and to support the 
war in Iraq, the global war on terrorism and other important national 
priorities. I am proud to represent many of the men and women who work 
for the National Security Agency, NSA, in Fort Meade, Maryland, my 
Second Congressional District.
  This bill addresses concerns for the health and well-being of NSA 
employees by providing additional funds to ensure a cleaner, healthier 
and better maintained workforce. It provides tort liability protection 
to NSA security officers so that they have legal protections similar to 
those provided other law enforcement officers.
  The bill gives NSA the authority to provide living quarters to the 
bright and talented students participating in NASA's summer and 
cooperative educational programs.
  It also encourages NASA to continue its acquisition reform 
initiatives and bring its processes in line with standard commercial 
and government practices. It increases funds available for the 
recapitalization and modernization of NASA's technical systems which 
will allow the Nation's Signals Intelligence Systems to keep pace with 
changing technology.
  H.R. 2417 emphasizes the need for the Federal Government to improve 
information sharing with State and local governments. As the Baltimore 
County Executive, I was the county executive during 9/11, this is very 
important, and where appropriate, private companies.
  To make this possible, the bill allows the Director of Central 
Intelligence to establish pilot projects to train State and local 
officials to increase the flow of information between them and Federal 
agencies. Advisory councils on privacy and civil liberties and State 
and local issues will help ensure the protection of individual rights, 
and the needs of State and local governments need to be properly 
addressed.
  I am also pleased that this bill provides additional funding to the 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center to enhance the analysis of 
health risks to our deployed forces.
  Together, the enhancements provided for in H.R. 2417 will contribute 
to our Nation's efforts to prevent terrorism and to curb the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the globe. I urge 
my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), also a valuable member of our 
committee.
  (Mr. BURR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BURR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2417.
  After terrorists struck on September 11, 2001, our government has 
been engaged in an aggressive prosecution of the global war on 
terrorism, a war that will be fought for years to come, I fear. Our 
efforts I have no doubt will be successful. To ensure success, however, 
we must prepare for the long road ahead of us. That is exactly what 
this bill does.
  The men and women of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities 
have been instrumental in the numerous successes thus far. I thank them 
for their sacrifices, for their dedication. We are indebted to them for 
their tireless service.
  In my view, the key to success in this war on terrorism is 
communication. We have to improve our communication across the Federal 
Government. We must improve and make seamless the flow of information 
within our Intelligence Community. It is essential to have good 
communication with our liaison partners, and better communication 
between Federal, State and local authorities and with the private 
sector must be ensured.
  Without doubt, intelligence and law enforcement officers are our 
front line defenders in our daily battle against this evil. State and 
local authorities also stand at the forefront of this war. Success in 
safeguarding the homeland lies firmly in the ability to communicate 
effectively and share sensitive, timely and actionable information 
among Federal, State and local officials.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2417 is an important bill because it also 
specifically authorizes greater training and support to local and State 
authorities as it relates to preventing the possible use of weapons of 
mass destruction in the United States.
  Additionally, H.R. 2417 authorizes funding to ensure greater 
participation of city, county and State law enforcement officials in 
joint terrorism task forces that are spread across this country.
  Mr. Chairman, only with better communication and sharing necessary, 
relevant and actionable information with State and local authorities, 
can we best wage the best effort on the war on terrorism in our 
homeland.
  I urge its passage.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers except for me 
and I have some brief closing remarks. So I would yield if there are 
speakers over there and perhaps speak just before our chairman closes 
this debate.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to advise the Chair to advise 
the gentlewoman that we have no further speakers except myself to make 
a few household and closing remarks.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  This debate has been friendly, collaborative, supportive, not just of 
each other but our staffs. It is clear that committee members are 
putting the country first in our service on the committee. I believe 
that our authorization bill is putting the country first in terms of 
the priorities it chooses, and I believe further, Mr. Chairman, that 
our investigation of the quality of intelligence supporting the war in 
Iraq is also putting the country first.
  Our investigation has a long way to go but it is serious, 
collaborative, and bipartisan. We will do as much as possible in 
public, and we will report to the public on our findings.
  Should we hit the wall and fail in our endeavor, then it may be time 
for a commission or an alternative committee or set of committees of 
Congress to take over. But meanwhile, I

[[Page H5878]]

want to commend the Members of this committee who serve with great 
distinction, and I urge the passage of this authorization bill, H.R. 
2417.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
  I would like to also announce that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Hoekstra), who is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and 
Tactical Intelligence, and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly) are other members of the 
committee who will probably join us later on and we are equally proud 
of them.
  We obviously have an extraordinarily high level of group of members, 
as my colleagues have seen, on both sides of the aisle who take this 
business quite seriously, and we are very pleased about that.
  I would like to include for the Record the administration policy and 
exchange of correspondence with the chairmen of the appropriate 
committees. That would be the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Oxley), the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter).

                   Statement of Administration Policy


         H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004

       (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the 
     concerned agencies.)
       The Administration appreciates the support of the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence for the work and efforts of 
     the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as the Committee's 
     inclusion in its bill of a significant number of requested 
     provisions. The Administration would support H.R. 2417 if the 
     concerns outlined below are addressed.
       The Administration has not had the opportunity to review 
     the classified schedule of authorizations, and reserves 
     comment on those authorizations. The Administration would 
     strenously object if certain high priority transformational 
     development programs affecting the IC's future collection and 
     research and development strategies, are not authorized as 
     requested.
       The Administration appreciates the Committee's support for 
     our initiatives to improve our nation's intelligence 
     capabilities, and believes that section 336, regarding 
     improved information sharing among federal, State, and local 
     government officials, addresses significant and important 
     issues. However, the Administration has concerns with this 
     and other sections of the bill (such as section 321) which 
     seek to direct specific roles and responsibilities to be 
     carried out by particular components of the Executive Branch. 
     They could impinge on the President's constitutional 
     authority to determine how Executive Branch agencies should 
     be organized to carry out national defense and anti-terrorism 
     activities.
       Section 505, concerning the measurement and signatures 
     intelligence (MASINT) research program, would provide the 
     Defense Department the authority to review CIA and other 
     intelligence agencies' MASINT programs. The Administration 
     would oppose this expanded authority for DoD, as we believe 
     the existing authorities and responsibilities are properly 
     vested.
       The Administration looks forward to working with the 
     Congress on these and a number of other policy and technical 
     concerns as H.R. 2417 moves through the legislative process.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 
           Rayburn House Office Building,
                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
     Hon. Porter Goss,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Goss: In recognition of the desire to 
     expedite floor consideration of H.R. 2417, the intelligence 
     authorization bill for fiscal year 2004, the Committee on the 
     Judiciary hereby waives consideration of the bill with the 
     understanding that you will continue to work with me on 
     sections within the Committee on the Judiciary's jurisdiction 
     and that for any of those sections on which we cannot reach a 
     mutually agreeable resolution, you will remove them before 
     enactment. I further understand that you will support the 
     Committee on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these 
     sections.
       The sections in the bill as reported that contain matters 
     within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction 
     are:

       104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's 
     National Drug Intelligence Center);
       321 (relating to procedures for using classified 
     information);
       332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified 
     aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the 
     CIA or the United States military);
       333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons);
       334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from 
     which law enforcement can obtain financial records for 
     criminal investigation purposes);
       335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source 
     rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to 
     procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency);
       336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of 
     intelligence information between state and local officials 
     and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on 
     the one hand and federal officials on the other)
       401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort 
     Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime)
       504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National 
     Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims 
     Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime)

       (These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.) 
     Based on this understanding, I will not request a sequential 
     referral based on their inclusion in the bill as reported.
       The Committee on the Judiciary takes this action with the 
     understanding that the Committee's jurisdiction over these 
     provisions is in no way diminished or altered. I would 
     appreciate your including this letter in your Committee's 
     report on H.R. 2417 and the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of the legislation on the House floor.
           Sincerely,
                                      F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                    Washington, DC, June 16, 2003.
     Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner: Thank you for your letter 
     regarding H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for 
     fiscal year 2004. As you noted, several provisions of the 
     bill as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary. I will continue to work with you 
     on these sections. For any of these sections on which we 
     cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution, I will remove 
     them before enactment. Further I will support the Committee 
     on the Judiciary's request for conferees on these sections.
       The sections of the bill as reported that contain matters 
     within the Committee on the Judiciary's Rule X jurisdiction 
     are:

       104(e) (relating to funding for the Department of Justice's 
     National Drug Intelligence Center);
       321 (relating to procedures for using classified 
     information);
       332 (relating to the use of explosives by certain qualified 
     aliens if they are in the United States to cooperate with the 
     CIA or the United States military);
       333 (relating to the naturalization of certain persons);
       334 (relating to the types of financial institutions from 
     which law enforcement can obtain financial records for 
     criminal investigation purposes);
       335 (relating to certain aspects of the mandatory source 
     rules for Federal Prison Industries as they relate to 
     procurements by the Central Intelligence Agency);
       336 (relating to pilot projects to encourage the sharing of 
     intelligence information between state and local officials 
     and representatives of critical infrastructure industries on 
     the one hand and federal officials on the other);
       401 (relating to giving certain employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency the protections of the Federal Tort 
     Claims Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime);
       504 (relating to giving certain employees of the National 
     Security Agency the protections of the Federal Tort Claims 
     Act when they take certain actions to prevent crime).

       (These section numbers refer to the bill as reported.) I 
     appreciate you willingness to forgo consideration of the bill 
     and not request a sequential referral based on this 
     understanding.
       I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration 
     of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive 
     its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under 
     your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and 
     this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation 
     on the House floor.
       Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Financial 
           Services, Rayburn House Office Building,
                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
     Hon. Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Goss: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, The Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. As you are

[[Page H5879]]

     aware, the bill as reported contained several provisions 
     which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Financial Services pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction 
     under Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
       As you know, we continue to have strong concerns about some 
     of these provisions, particularly those relating to the 
     creation of a Bureau of Enforcement and Intelligence within 
     the Department of the Treasury. However, because of your 
     commitment to support my position regarding all of these 
     provisions as the bill moves through the process and the need 
     to move this legislation expeditiously, I will waive 
     consideration of the bill by the Financial Services 
     Committee. By agreeing to waive its consideration of the 
     bill, the Financial Services Committee does not waive its 
     jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. In addition, the Committee on 
     Financial Services reserves its authority to seek conferees 
     on any provisions of the bill that are within the Financial 
     Services Committee's jurisdiction during any House-Senate 
     conference that may be convened on this legislation. I ask 
     your commitment to support any request by the Committee on 
     Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or related 
     legislation.
       Finally, I request that you include a copy of this letter 
     and your response in the Select Committee's report on the 
     bill, and that they be printed in the Congressional Record 
     during the consideration of this legislation on the floor.
       I appreciate your commitment to address my concerns as the 
     process moves forward and willingness to work constructively 
     toward common goals.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Michael G. Oxley,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 2003.
     Hon. Michael G. Oxley,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Oxley: On June 12, 2003, the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence ordered reported H.R. 2417, the 
     "Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004." The 
     bill as reported contained several provisions which fall 
     within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial 
     Services, pursuant to the Committee's jurisdiction under Rule 
     X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
       I am quite aware of, and sensitive to the specific concerns 
     you raise about the inclusion of section 105 in H.R. 2417 
     concerning the establishment of a Bureau of Intelligence and 
     Enforcement within the Department of the Treasury. Once 
     again, I want to convey my personal commitment to work with 
     you to resolve this issue to our common satisfaction and 
     support your position in a conference with the Senate on the 
     Intelligence Authorization bill.
       I very much appreciate your willingness to waive 
     consideration of H.R. 2417 by the Financial Services 
     Committee. I acknowledge that, by agreeing to waive its 
     consideration of the bill, the Financial Services Committee 
     does not waive its jurisdiction over H.R. 2417. I further 
     recognize that the Committee on Financial Services reserves 
     its authority to seek conferees on any provisions of the bill 
     that are within the Financial Services Committee's 
     jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference that may be 
     convened on this legislation. I will support a request by the 
     Committee on Financial Services for conferees on H.R. 2417 or 
     related legislation.
       Finally, I am pleased to accommodate your request to 
     include a copy of your letter and my response in the Select 
     Committee's report on the bill, and that they be printed in 
     the Congressional Record during the consideration of this 
     legislation on the floor.
       I appreciate your commitment to work together so as to 
     achieve an appropriate and mutually satisfactory resolution 
     of this important national security matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                      Committee on Armed Services,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 2003.
     Hon. Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to you concerning the 
     jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Armed Services in 
     matters being considered in H.R. 2417, the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
       I recognize the importance of H.R. 2417 and the need for 
     this legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, while the 
     committee is entitled to a jurisdictional claim on this 
     legislation, I do not intend to request a sequential 
     referral.
       The Committee on Armed Services asks that you support our 
     request to be conferees on the provisions over which we have 
     jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference. 
     Additionally, I request that you include this letter as part 
     of your committee's report on H.R. 2417.
       Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Duncan Hunter,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                    Washington, DC, June 18, 2003.
     Hon. Duncan Hunter,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Rayburn House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Hunter: Thank you for your letter regarding 
     H.R. 2417, the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal 
     year 2004. As you noted, elements of the bill as reported 
     fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed 
     Services. I will continue to work with you on these sections. 
     I will support the Committee on Armed Services' request for 
     conferees on these sections.
       I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the 
     bill and not request a sequential referral based on this 
     understanding.
       I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive its consideration 
     of the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive 
     its jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under 
     your jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and 
     this response in our Committee's report on H.R. 2417 and the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation 
     on the House floor.
       Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
                                                         Chairman.

  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our staff. We have a perfect 
balance, I believe, between professional management staff and expertise 
on the various facets of the Intelligence Community which is what we 
need to do our job properly in terms of providing oversight on the one 
hand, to make sure the Intelligence Community plays in bounds and to 
make sure they have the necessary wherewithal, the advocacy piece that 
is our other side, the other hat we wear.
  I am very much convinced that intelligence is the best investment. We 
are involved globally. There is no question the United States of 
America is no secret any place around the world, and in order for us to 
do the best we can in terms of our security, we have to have good 
information. It is a good investment.
  Nobody would pretend that we are fully sufficient in all that we 
have. We can always do better, and I think we will probably be talking 
about sufficiency and insufficiency as we go along in our review.
  Nobody would say that we are inherent. There is no document I know 
that is written that is inherent with the possible exception of the 
Bible, and some would say the New York Times, but I think they 
forfeited their right to that recently, nor is there anyone infallible. 
We are all human beings. What I can say to the American people is that 
I am satisfied that the men and women of the Intelligence Community of 
our Nation, and there are thousands of them, are doing their best for 
our national security, and I think we need to be behind them, and 
supporting this bill would be a good way to do that.
  Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2417, a 
bill to reauthorize appropriations for FY 2004 for the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government.
  It has been my honor to serve this Nation with the Central 
Intelligence Agency for 10 years, five of which were spend as an 
operations officer in Southeast Asia. For over 30 years I served on 
active and reserve duty as a Military Intelligence Officer and have 
also had the unique privilege of serving as Staff Director for the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Chairmen Barry Goldwater 
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. All this service took place at a time when 
our Nation was seeking to win the Cold War.
  The collapse of the Soviet Union changed our world for the better, 
but did not eliminate the need for accurate and timely intelligence. We 
now face a new uncertainty and risk. Rather than focusing on one or two 
superpowers, we have to defend against numerous lethal covert terrorist 
groups.
  H.R. 2417 responds to these changing threats by boosting the role of 
human intelligence or HUMINT gathered from human sources around the 
world; increases our ability to analyze material from a broad spectrum 
of sources; increases our capability to conduct counter terrorism; and 
authorizes protections and benefits for our intelligence officers at 
home and abroad.
  Mr. Chairman, it is incumbent on this body to improve the 
intelligence capabilities of the Nation, to better serve as the "eyes 
and ears" of America in a difficult and dangerous world. This bill 
responds to this urgent requirement, and I support it completely.

[[Page H5880]]

H.R. 2417--Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004, Updated June 24, 
                                  2003


                            floor situation

       The House is scheduled to consider H.R. 2417, pursuant to a 
     rule, on Wednesday, June 25, 2003. On Tuesday, June 24, 2003, 
     the Rules Committee granted, by voice vote, a modified open 
     rule providing one hour of general debate equally divided and 
     controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The rule provides 
     that the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 
     five-minute rule. The rule provides that it shall be in order 
     to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment 
     under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute now printed in the bill, which shall be considered 
     as read. The rule waives all points of order against 
     consideration of the bill, and against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The rule provides 
     that no amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of 
     a substitute shall be in order except those printed in the 
     Rules Committee report accompanying the resolution, and all 
     points of order against said amendments are waived. The rule 
     provides that each amendment may be offered only in the order 
     printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member 
     designated in the report, shall be considered as read, and 
     shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question 
     in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Finally, the 
     rule provides one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.


                                summary

       H.R. 2417 authorizes appropriations for FY 2004 for (a) the 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. 
     Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. 
     The authorization level is classified. The funding levels and 
     personnel ceilings for most programs are outlined in a 
     classified annex to the committee report, which Members only 
     may review in the offices of the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence in H-405 in the Capitol.


                               highlights

       H.R. 2417 will:
       Provide full support for the Intelligence Community's 
     efforts in the war on terrorism;
       Focus attention on the need to enhance Human Intelligence 
     capabilities and tools;
       Authorize additional resources to improve analytical depth 
     in all areas of intelligence, and increase our analytical 
     capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate all of the 
     intelligence that is collected;
       Posture the Intelligence Community to develop a framework 
     for a unified overhead imagery architecture;
       Include provisions that are intended to improve the 
     government's ability to identify any spies that might be 
     working against the United States and to provide the 
     government additional leverage as it moves to prosecute such 
     traitors, such as Hanssen, Ames, and Montes;
       Establish a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement within 
     the Department of the Treasury, to be headed by an Assistant 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, that will enhance 
     the government's ability to gather and process information 
     about the financial support of terrorism and other illegal 
     activity;
       Require the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to 
     report on lessons learned as a result of military operations 
     in Iraq;
       Improve information sharing among Federal, State, and local 
     government officials; including increased training for state 
     and local officials on how the intelligence community can 
     support their counterterrorism efforts;
       Require the Intelligence Community's senior leadership to 
     comprehensively examine (and report to Congress on) policy 
     and technical issues related to digital information sharing, 
     electronic collaboration, and "horizontal integration" 
     across the Intelligence Community;
       Extend the authority for the use of funds designated for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related purposes for assistance 
     to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities to 
     be used also to fund counterterrorism activities in Colombia 
     for each of FYs 2004 through 2005;
       Provide limited immunity from tort liability to those 
     Special Police Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     and the National Security Agency;
       Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2004 for 
     the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central 
     Intelligence to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 
     2003 for any intelligence element up to two percent above the 
     authorized levels, with the approval of the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget; and
       Authorize $226.4 million for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund (CIARDS) in order to 
     fully fund the accruing cost of retirement benefits for 
     individuals in the Civil Service Retirement System, CIARDS, 
     and other Federal retirement systems.


                               background

       Agencies' activities affected by the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act of 2003, include fourteen agencies of the 
     U.S. government, such as: Central Intelligence Agency; 
     National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance 
     Organization; FBI (Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence); 
     DOE; Homeland Security; and U.S. Coast Guard.


                          Legislative History

       H.R. 2417 was introduced by Chairman Goss on June 11, 2003. 
     It was reported from the Select Intelligence Committee by a 
     vote of 16-0 on June 12, 2003 (H. Rpt. 108-163).


                             Cost Estimate

       CBO estimates that the unclassified portions of this 
     measure will cost $320 million over the 2004-2008 period, 
     assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated 
     amounts. CBO also estimates the bill will affect direct 
     spending and receipts by an insignificant amount.
       H.R. 2417 contains intergovernmental and private-sector 
     mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
     (UMRA), but CBO estimates that the costs of complying with 
     these mandates will not exceed the thresholds established by 
     that act ($59 million for intergovernmental mandates and $117 
     million for private-sector mandates in 2003, adjusted 
     annually for inflation).


         Amendments Made in Order Under the Rule (6 amendments)

       Rep. Cox will offer an amendment (#10) on Wednesday, June 
     25, 2003. The amendment strikes Section 336 (Improvement of 
     Information Sharing Among Federal, State, and Local 
     Government Officials) of the bill. Contact: 6-8417.
       Rep. Farr will offer an amendment (#9) on Wednesday, June 
     25, 2003. The amendment seeks to improve the foreign language 
     training of the intelligence community by providing: (1) 
     training in the application of standardized foreign language 
     skill assessment mechanisms; (2) development of curriculum 
     for advanced proficiency intelligence community foreign 
     language speakers and interpreters; (3) non-degree training 
     for translators and interpreters; (4) training intelligence 
     community foreign language teachers in the use of technology 
     geared for teaching advanced "critical languages;" (5) 
     intensive on-site foreign language training. Contact: 5-
     2861.
       Rep. Harman will offer an amendment (#2) on Wednesday, June 
     25, 2003. It amends section (g)(1) of Section 343 of the bill 
     by requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to report 
     on whether further consolidation or elimination of watch list 
     databases in Federal departments and agencies would 
     contribute to the efficacy and effectiveness of the Terrorist 
     Identification Classification System in identifying known or 
     suspected terrorists. If passed, it would also require the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to report on steps required 
     to consolidate or eliminate such watch lists. Contact: 5-
     8220.
       Rep. Hastings (FL) will offer an amendment (#1) on 
     Wednesday, June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Director 
     of Central Intelligence to establish a pilot project to 
     improve recruitment of ethnic and cultural minorities and 
     women to meet the diversity of skills, language, and 
     expertise required by the current mission. Contact: 5-1313.
       Rep. Kucinich will offer an amendment (#8) on Wednesday, 
     June 25, 2003. The amendment directs the Inspector General of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct an audit of all 
     telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and 
     the Office of the Vice President that relate to weapons of 
     mass destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom. Not later than one year after the 
     date of enactment, the Inspector General shall submit a 
     report to Congress on the audit conducted. Contact: 5-5871.
       Rep. Lee will offer an amendment (#7) on Wednesday, June 
     25, 2003. The amendment requires the Comptroller General of 
     the United States to conduct a study to determine the extent 
     of intelligence sharing by the Department of Defense and 
     intelligence community with United Nations inspectors 
     searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom. Contact: 5-2661.

  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to commend the 
collaborative efforts of my colleagues who serve on the Permanent 
Select Committee in crafting the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization, 
H.R. 2417.
  This measure encourages information sharing among agencies, which is 
critical to our Nation's ability to respond to threats to our homeland 
security.
  There are still important intelligence questions unresolved from our 
war in Iraq--questions that will, and should, face greater scrutiny in 
the coming months. This Intelligence Authorization provides added 
resources that will be used in securing the answers to those questions 
and we should support it.
  Mr Chairman, in closing, I want to commend the committee for giving 
us a bill that strengthens the Intelligence Community and provides new 
and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism, and I urge my 
colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the debate is concluded.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.

[[Page H5881]]

Hefley) having assumed the chair, Mr. Isakson, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2417) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and 
intellience-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________






Congressional Record: June 25, 2003 (House)
Page H5883-H5903                       



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 2417.

                              {time}  1824


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Simpson (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose 
earlier today, all time for general debate had expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill 
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be 
considered read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                               H.R. 2417

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004".
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

                        Subtitle B--Intelligence

Sec. 311. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to 
              construct or improve intelligence community facilities.

                    Subtitle C--Counterintelligence

Sec. 321. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence 
              community.

                       Subtitle D--Other Matters

Sec. 331. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic 
              Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 332. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials.
Sec. 333. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of certain 
              persons.
Sec. 334. Modification to definition of financial institution in the 
              Right to Financial Privacy Act.
Sec. 335. Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence Agency 
              relating to products of Federal prison industries.
Sec. 336. Improvement of information sharing among federal, State, and 
              local government officials.

              Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments

Sec. 341. Extension of deadline for final report of the National 
              Commission for the Review of the Research and Development 
              Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.
Sec. 342. Modification of various reports required of intelligence 
              community elements.
Sec. 343. Technical amendments.
Sec. 344. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Protection from tort liability for certain Central 
              Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 402. Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central Services 
              Working Capital Fund.

          TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 501. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities 
              for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Authority to provide living quarters for certain students in 
              cooperative and summer education programs of the National 
              Security Agency.
Sec. 503. Authority for intelligence community elements of Department 
              of Defense to award personal service contracts.
Sec. 504. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel from 
              tort liability.
Sec. 505. Measurement and signatures intelligence program.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2004 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (14) The Coast Guard.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to

[[Page H5884]]

     be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
     personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct 
     of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
     the elements listed in such section, are those specified in 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to 
     accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One Hundred Eighth 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2004 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2004 the sum of $192,640,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee shall remain available until September 
     30, 2005.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel 
     as of September 30, 2004. Personnel serving in such elements 
     may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements 
     of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account for fiscal year 2004 such 
     additional amounts as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). 
     Such additional amounts shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2004.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2004, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel 
     for such elements as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2004 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2005, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                   TREASURY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


   "bureau of intelligence and enforcement of the department of the 
                                treasury

       "Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is within the Department 
     of the Treasury a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement 
     headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Enforcement, who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       "(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The Assistant Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Enforcement shall oversee and coordinate 
     functions of the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement.
       "(2) The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the 
     Secretary of the Treasury.
       "(c) Composition of Bureau.--The Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Enforcement shall consist of the following offices:
       "(1) The Office of Intelligence Support.
       "(2) The Office of Foreign Assets Control.
       "(3) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
       "(4) Such other offices as the Assistant Secretary may 
     establish.".
       (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of 
     such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 118 the following new item:

"Sec. 119. Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of 
              the Treasury.".
       (b) Consultation with DCI in Appointment of Assistant 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement.--Section 
     106(b)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       "(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
     Enforcement.".
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 3(4) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
       (A) by striking "the Department of the Treasury," in 
     subparagraph (H);
       (B) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (J);
       (C) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L); 
     and
       (D) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       "(K) the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the 
     Department of the Treasury; and".
       (2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
     in the item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury 
     by striking "(7)" and inserting "(8)".

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2004 the sum of $226,400,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise permitted under 
     the Constitution or authorized pursuant to the laws of the 
     United States.

                        Subtitle B--Intelligence

     SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENTS ON 
                   PROJECTS TO CONSTRUCT OR IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY FACILITIES.

       (a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
     (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking "$750,000" each place it appears and 
     inserting "$5,000,000";
       (2) by striking "$500,000" each place it appears and 
     inserting "$1,000,000"; and
       (3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this 
     subsection, by inserting after "$1,000,000" the second 
     place it appears, the following: "but less than 
     $5,000,000".
       (b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.--
     Section 602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 
     U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in the third sentence, by striking "21-day" and 
     inserting "7-day"; and,
       (2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     "Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, 
     when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of 
     Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the 
     national security or to the protection of health, safety, or 
     environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably 
     harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on 
     the date the notification is received by such committees.".

                    Subtitle C--Counterintelligence

     SEC. 321. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:


                   "counterintelligence initiatives

       "Sec. 1102. (a) Inspection Process.--(1) In order to 
     protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     establish and implement an inspection process for all 
     agencies and departments of the United States that handle 
     classified information relating to the national security of 
     the United States intended to assure that those agencies and 
     departments maintain effective operational security practices 
     and programs directed against counterintelligence activities.

[[Page H5885]]

       "(2) The Director shall carry out the process through the 
     Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
       "(b) FBI Counterintelligence Office.--The Attorney 
     General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall establish an Office of 
     Counterintelligence within the Bureau to investigate 
     potential espionage activities within the Bureau.
       "(c) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--(1) The 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and 
     implement a process for all elements of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 101(4)) to review, on an 
     annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists for 
     access to classified information. Such process shall ensure 
     that only individuals who have a particularized `need to 
     know' (as determined by the Director) are continued on such 
     distribution lists.
       "(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director 
     shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees 
     that the review required under paragraph (1) has been 
     conducted in all elements of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year.
       "(d) Required Completion of Financial Disclosure 
     Statements.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     establish and implement a process by which heads of the 
     elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     101(4)) direct that all employees, in order to be granted 
     access to classified information, submit financial disclosure 
     forms required under section 1.3(b) of Executive Order No. 
     12969 (August 2, 1995; 60 F.R. 40245; 50 U.S.C. 435 note).
       "(2) The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) through 
     the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
       "(e) Arrangements To Handle Sensitive Information.--The 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall establish, for all 
     elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     101(4)), programs and procedures by which sensitive 
     classified information relating to human intelligence is 
     safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by employees of 
     those elements.".
       (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of 
     such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by 
     adding at the end the following new item:

"Sec. 1102. Counterintelligence initiatives.".
       (b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage 
     Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the 
     Office of Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of 
     Justice, in consultation with the Office of the National 
     Counterintelligence Executive, shall establish policies and 
     procedures to assist the Attorney General in the Attorney 
     General's consideration of intelligence and national security 
     equities in the development of charging documents and 
     related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.

                       Subtitle D--Other Matters

     SEC. 331. EXTENSION OF SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF 
                   DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM 
                   OFFICE.

       Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22 
     U.S.C. 7301 note), as amended by section 351 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is 
     amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking "two-year" before 
     "suspension of reorganization"; and
       (2) in the text, by striking "ending on October 1, 2003" 
     and inserting "ending on the date that is 60 days after the 
     date on which appropriate congressional committees of 
     jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22 
     U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of 
     State (or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the 
     Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) 
     that the operational framework for the office has been 
     terminated".

     SEC. 332. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITIES ON EXPLOSIVE 
                   MATERIALS.

       (a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials To 
     Qualified Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, it shall be lawful for any person knowingly to 
     distribute explosive materials to any qualified alien--
       (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to, 
     transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of 
     the explosive materials is in furtherance of such 
     cooperation; or
       (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to, 
     transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of 
     explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized 
     military purpose.
       (b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive 
     Materials.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it 
     shall be lawful for a qualified alien to ship or transport 
     any explosive in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce 
     or to receive or possess any explosive which has been shipped 
     or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign 
     commerce--
       (1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or 
     transportation by the alien of the explosive materials is in 
     furtherance of such cooperation; or
       (2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in 
     subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or 
     transportation by the alien of explosive materials is in 
     furtherance of the authorized military purpose.
       (c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term 
     "qualified alien" means an alien--
       (1) who is lawfully present in the United States in 
     cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or
       (2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as 
     determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of 
     the Secretary of Defense) who is present in the United States 
     under military orders for training or other military purpose 
     authorized by the United States.

     SEC. 333. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON THE NATURALIZATION 
                   OF CERTAIN PERSONS.

       Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting "when Department of Defense activities 
     are relevant to the determination" after "Secretary of 
     Defense"; and
       (2) by inserting "and the Secretary of Homeland Security" 
     after "Attorney General".

     SEC. 334. MODIFICATION TO DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
                   IN THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT.

       (a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial 
     Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by 
     inserting ", except as provided in section 1114," before 
     "means any office".
       (b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       "(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial 
     institution' has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of 
     title 31, United States Code, except that, for purposes of 
     this section, such term shall include only such a financial 
     institution any part of which is located inside any State or 
     territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
     Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States 
     Virgin Islands.".

     SEC. 335. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY RELATING TO PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON 
                   INDUSTRIES.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


 "procedural requirements for central intelligence agency relating to 
                 products of federal prison industries

       "Sec. 23. (a) Market Research.--Before purchasing a 
     product listed in the latest edition of the Federal Prison 
     Industries catalog under section 4124(d) of title 18, United 
     States Code, the Director shall conduct market research to 
     determine whether the Federal Prison Industries product is 
     comparable to products available from the private sector that 
     best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and 
     time of delivery.
       "(b) Competition Requirement.--If the Director determines 
     that a Federal Prison Industries product is not comparable in 
     price, quality, or time of delivery to products available 
     from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in 
     terms of price, quality, and time of delivery, the Director 
     shall use competitive procedures for the procurement of the 
     product or shall make an individual purchase under a multiple 
     award contract. In conducting such a competition or making 
     such a purchase, the Director shall consider a timely offer 
     from Federal Prison Industries.
       "(c) Implementation by Director.--The Director shall 
     ensure that--
       "(1) the Agency does not purchase a Federal Prison 
     Industries product or service unless a contracting officer of 
     the Agency determines that the product or service is 
     comparable to products or services available from the private 
     sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, 
     quality, and time of delivery; and
       "(2) Federal Prison Industries performs its contractual 
     obligations to the same extent as any other contractor for 
     the Agency.
       "(d) Market Research Determination Not Subject to 
     Review.--A determination by a contracting officer regarding 
     whether a product or service offered by Federal Prison 
     Industries is comparable to products or services available 
     from the private sector that best meet the Agency's needs in 
     terms of price, quality, and time of delivery shall not be 
     subject to review pursuant to section 4124(b) of title 18.
       "(e) Performance as a Subcontractor.--(1) A contractor or 
     potential contractor of the Agency may not be required to use 
     Federal Prison Industries as a subcontractor or supplier of 
     products or provider of services for the performance of a 
     contract of the Agency by any means, including means such 
     as--
       "(A) a contract solicitation provision requiring a 
     contractor to offer to make use of products or services of 
     Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract;
       "(B) a contract specification requiring the contractor to 
     use specific products or services (or classes of products or 
     services) offered by Federal Prison Industries in the 
     performance of the contract; or
       "(C) any contract modification directing the use of 
     products or services of Federal Prison Industries in the 
     performance of the contract.
       "(2) In this subsection, the term `contractor', with 
     respect to a contract, includes a subcontractor at any tier 
     under the contract.
       "(f) Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information.--
     The Director may not enter into any contract with Federal 
     Prison Industries under which an inmate worker would have 
     access to--
       "(1) any data that is classified;
       "(2) any geographic data regarding the location of--
       "(A) surface and subsurface infrastructure providing 
     communications or water or electrical power distribution;
       "(B) pipelines for the distribution of natural gas, bulk 
     petroleum products, or other commodities; or
       "(C) other utilities; or
       "(3) any personal or financial information about any 
     individual private citizen, including information relating to 
     such person's real property however described, without the 
     prior consent of the individual.
       "(g) Application of Provision.--This section is subject to 
     the preceding provisions of this Act, and shall not be 
     construed as affecting any right or duty of the Director 
     under those provisions.

[[Page H5886]]

       "(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       "(1) The terms `competitive procedures' and `procurement' 
     have the meanings given such terms in section 4 of the Office 
     of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
       "(2) The term `market research' means obtaining specific 
     information about the price, quality, and time of delivery of 
     products available in the private sector through a variety of 
     means, which may include--
       "(A) contacting knowledgeable individuals in government 
     and industry;
       "(B) interactive communication among industry, acquisition 
     personnel, and customers; and
       "(C) interchange meetings or pre-solicitation conferences 
     with potential offerors.".

     SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, 
                   STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials, 
     As Well As Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To 
     Collect and Share Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 
     U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       "(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
     Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to 
     encourage officials of State and local government, as well as 
     representatives of industries that comprise the critical 
     infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to 
     pass on to the appropriate Federal officials information 
     vital for the prevention of terrorist attacks against the 
     United States.
       "(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out 
     any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the 
     Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
       "(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to 
     such officials and representatives to--
       "(i) identify sources of potential threats through such 
     methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
       "(ii) report information relating to such potential 
     threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the 
     appropriate form and manner; and
       "(iii) assure that all reported information is 
     systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department 
     for use by appropriate Federal agencies.
       "(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project 
     under this paragraph for a period of 3 years.
       "(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the 
     pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project 
     conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall 
     include--
       "(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; 
     and
       "(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the project 
     as well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness 
     of information collection and sharing by such officials and 
     representatives and the Federal government.".
       (b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence 
     Reports.--(1) Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new section:

     "SEC. 226. PILOT PROJECT TO TEST USE OF TEAR-LINE 
                   INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

       "(a) Authority.--The Under Secretary for Information 
     Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of 
     Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, may carry out a pilot program under 
     which the Under Secretary may make intelligence information 
     in the possession of the Department available to officials of 
     State and local governments through the use of tear-line 
     intelligence reports.
       "(b) Tear-line Intelligence Reports Described.--For 
     purpose of this section, a tear-line report is a report 
     containing intelligence gathered by an agency or department 
     of the United States that is in the possession of the 
     Department that is prepared in a manner such that information 
     relating to intelligence sources and methods is easily 
     severable from the report to protect such sources and methods 
     from disclosure. Such a report may be in a paper or an 
     electronic format.
       "(c) Duration of Project.--The Under Secretary shall carry 
     out the pilot project under this section for a period of 3 
     years.
       "(d) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, 
     the Under Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     pilot project conducted under this section, and shall include 
     in the report an assessment of--
       "(1) the effectiveness of the use of the tear-line reports 
     in providing intelligence information on a timely basis to 
     State and local authorities; and
       "(2) if the use of such tear-line reports were to be made 
     permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with 
     respect to the use of such reports.
       "(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated to the Under Secretary such 
     sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.".
       (2) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is 
     amended in subtitle C of title II by adding at the end the 
     following new item.

"Sec. 226. Pilot project to test use of tear-line intelligence 
              reports.".
       (c) Homeland Defender Intelligence Training Program.
       (1) Establishment of program.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may establish a comprehensive program of 
     orientation and training to qualified State and local 
     officials in accessing and using available resources of the 
     intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
       (2) Consultation.--Insofar as the Director establishes the 
     intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall consult and coordinate with the director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security on the development and administration of 
     the program.
       (3) Program goals.--Any intelligence training program 
     established under paragraph (1) shall provide qualified State 
     and local officials instruction on the mission and roles of 
     the intelligence community to promote more effective 
     information sharing among Federal, State, and local officials 
     to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States.
       (4) Curriculum.--Insofar as the Director establishes the 
     intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall develop a curriculum for the program after 
     consultation with qualified State and local officials. The 
     curriculum shall include classroom instruction with respect 
     to and orientation to the various elements of the 
     intelligence community.
       (5) Reports to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     initial implementation of the intelligence training program 
     under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Director 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the program. Each such 
     report shall include--
       (A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
       (B) recommendations on the continuation of the project as 
     well as any recommendations to improve the effectiveness of 
     information collection and sharing by qualified officials and 
     representatives and the Federal government.
       (6) Qualified state and local officials defined.--For 
     purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified State and 
     local officials" means officials of State and local 
     government agencies that Director of Central Intelligence 
     determines--
       (A) have received appropriate security clearances from the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for access to 
     classified information; and
       (B) oversee or manage first responders or counterterrorism 
     activities.
       (7) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Director such sums as are necessary 
     to carry out the intelligence training program under this 
     subsection.
       (d) Advisory Councils.--(1) The Director of the Terrorist 
     Threat Integration Center shall establish two advisory 
     councils (described in paragraph (2)) to provide the Director 
     such advice and recommendations as the Director may require 
     to effectively carry out the functions of the Center.
       (2)(A) One advisory council shall have as its focus privacy 
     and civil liberties issues.
       (B) The other advisory council shall have as its focus 
     State and local government information needs.

              Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments

     SEC. 341. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR FINAL REPORT OF THE 
                   NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
                   RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED 
                   STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
     Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended 
     by striking "September 1, 2003" and inserting "September 
     1, 2004".
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 
     1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2003.

     SEC. 342. MODIFICATION OF VARIOUS REPORTS REQUIRED OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS.

       (a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
     Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 721 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public 
     Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by 
     section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50 
     U.S.C. 2366), is amended by striking "a semiannual" and 
     inserting "an annual".
       (b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of 
     Intelligence Information to United Nations.--Section 
     112(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking "semiannually" and 
     inserting "annually".

     SEC. 343. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is 
     amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting 
     "section 103(c)(7)".
       (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of  1949.--(1) Section 
     6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
     403g) is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6)" and 
     inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
       (2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen 
     of the General Services Administration perform under the 
     first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the 
     Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works 
     Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman 
     for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the 
     Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 
     318)," and inserting "officers and agents of the Department 
     of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of 
     title 40, United States Code,"; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of 
     the Act referred to in subsection (a) of

[[Page H5887]]

     this section (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and inserting "section 
     1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code".
       (c) National Security Agency Act of  1959.--Section 11 of 
     the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen 
     of the General Services Administration perform under the 
     first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the 
     Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works 
     Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policeman 
     for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the 
     Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 
     318)" and inserting "officers and agents of the Department 
     of Homeland Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of 
     title 40, United States Code,"; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of 
     the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and 
     inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States 
     Code".
       (d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--
     Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 
     404n-2) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by striking "section 103(c)(6) of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" 
     and inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))"; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking "section 103(c)(6)" 
     and inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
       (e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the 
     Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 
     (Public Law 107-173; 116 Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) 
     is amended by striking "section 103(c)(6) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" and inserting 
     "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))".
       (f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.--
     Section 3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added 
     by section 1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (Public Law 107-296), and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, 
     United States Code, as added by section 301(b)(1) of the E-
     Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), are each amended 
     by inserting "or any other law" after "1978".

     SEC. 344. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS 
                   IN IRAQ.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
     report on the intelligence lessons learned as a result of 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons relating to the 
     following:
       (1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, 
     analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.
       (2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence 
     analysis.
       (3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the 
     Armed Forces in combat.
       (4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations 
     with military operations.
       (5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and 
     equipment.
       (6) Such other matters as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include such recommendations on improvement in the matters 
     described in subsection (a) as the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       "(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
     Agency personnel designated by the Director under subsection 
     (a) shall be deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, 
     United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to 
     tort liability, to be acting within the scope of their office 
     or employment if the Agency personnel take reasonable action, 
     which may include the use of force, to--
       "(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency 
     personnel from a crime of violence;
       "(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has 
     suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
       "(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency 
     personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of 
     violence in the presence of such personnel.
       "(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United 
     States Code.".
       (b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added 
     by subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the 
     authorities of the Attorney General under the Federal 
     Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 
     (Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671, 2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)).

     SEC. 402. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN CENTRAL 
                   SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND.

       Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "(A) Subject to 
     subparagraph (B), the Director" and inserting "The 
     Director"; and
       (2) by striking subparagraph (B).

          TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

     SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
                   ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.

       (a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 
     (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking 
     "for fiscal years 2002 and 2003" and inserting "for each 
     of fiscal years 2002 through 2005".
       (b) Modification.--(1) Subsection (e) of such section is 
     amended to read as follows:
       "(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces 
     personnel, United States civilian employee or contractor 
     engaged by the United States will participate in any combat 
     operation in connection with assistance made available under 
     this section, except for the purpose of acting to protect the 
     life or the physical security of others, in self defense, or 
     during the course of search and rescue operations.".
       (c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
     amended by striking "Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public 
     Law 107-115, section 8093 of the Department of Defense 
     Appropriations Act, 2002," and inserting "Section 553 and 
     the certification requirements of section 564(a)(2) of the 
     Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
     Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117 
     Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of 
     Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116 
     Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C. 182 note),".
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b) 
     and (c) shall apply to assistance made available under such 
     section 501 during fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

     SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LIVING QUARTERS FOR CERTAIN 
                   STUDENTS IN COOPERATIVE AND SUMMER EDUCATION 
                   PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       "(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may 
     provide a qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that 
     Agency with living quarters at no charge, or at a rate or 
     charge prescribed by the Director by regulation, without 
     regard to section 5911(c) of title 5.
       "(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee' 
     means a student who is employed at the National Security 
     Agency under--
       "(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the 
     Agency conducted under this section or any other provision of 
     law; or
       "(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of 
     the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or 
     summer education programs prescribed by the Office of 
     Personnel Management.".

     SEC. 503. AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS OF 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO AWARD PERSONAL SERVICE 
                   CONTRACTS.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     "Sec. 426. Personal services contracts: authority and 
       limitations

       "(a) Personal Services.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may, 
     notwithstanding section 3109 of title 5, enter into personal 
     services contracts in the United States if the personal 
     services directly support the mission of a defense 
     intelligence component or counter-intelligence organization.
       "(2) The contracting officer for a personal services 
     contract shall be responsible for ensuring that a personal 
     services contract is the appropriate vehicle for carrying out 
     the purpose of the contract.
       "(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `defense 
     intelligence component' means a component of the Department 
     of Defense that is an element of the intelligence community, 
     as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).".
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new item:

"426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations.".

     SEC. 504. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
                   PERSONNEL FROM TORT LIABILITY.

       Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
     U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       "(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency 
     personnel designated by the Director of the National Security 
     Agency under subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes 
     of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other 
     provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting 
     within the scope of their office or employment when such 
     agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include 
     the use of force, to--
       "(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency 
     personnel from a crime of violence;
       "(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has 
     suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
       "(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency 
     personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of 
     violence in the presence of such agency personnel.
       "(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the 
     Attorney General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United 
     States Code.
       "(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United 
     States Code.".

[[Page H5888]]

     SEC. 505. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting 
     through the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's 
     Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, shall carry 
     out a program to incorporate the results of basic research on 
     sensors into the measurement and signatures intelligence 
     systems of the United States, to the extent the results of 
     such research is applicable to such systems.
       (b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) 
     shall review and assess both basic research on sensors and 
     technologies conducted by the United States Government and by 
     non-governmental entities. In carrying out the program, the 
     Director shall protect intellectual property rights, maintain 
     organizational flexibility, and establish research projects, 
     funding levels, and potential benefits in an equitable manner 
     through Directorate.
       (c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an 
     advisory panel to assist the Director in carrying out the 
     program under subsection (a).
       (2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who 
     shall determine the selection, review, and assessment of the 
     research projects under the program.
       (3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the 
     advisory panel representatives of each entity of the MASINT 
     community, and may appoint as such members representatives of 
     national laboratories, universities, and private sector 
     entities.
       (B) For purposes of this subsection the term "MASINT 
     community" means academic, professional, industrial, and 
     government entities that are committed towards the 
     advancement of the sciences in measurement and signatures 
     intelligence.
       (C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be 
     established by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 
     consecutive years.
       (D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive 
     additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their 
     service on the advisory panel, but may receive per diem in 
     lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code.
       (4) The Director may accept contributions from non-
     governmental participants on the advisory panel to defray the 
     expenses of the advisory panel.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to the committee amendment is 
in order except those printed in House Report 108-176. Each amendment 
may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member 
designated in the report, shall be considered read, and shall not be 
subject to a demand for division of the question.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 108-176.


                   Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Cox

  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Cox:
       Strike section 336.

  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, I am pleased to rise in support of H.R. 2417. The 
amendment that I have introduced I will address in a moment but let me 
state at the outset that there is no more important function in the war 
on terrorism than having and acting on good intelligence, intelligence 
about attacks that are yet to come, intelligence about who is involved, 
what is planned, where and when it will take place and how it might be 
executed.
  The bill as it is written provides critical support for the 
Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism. I especially 
appreciate the provisions in the legislation focusing additional 
attention on enhancing our capability for gathering human intelligence 
as well as the provisions that provide additional resources to increase 
our analytical capacity to process and make use of the intelligence we 
do gather.
  The amendment that I am offering seeks to strike section 336 of the 
legislation. Section 336 would amend the Homeland Security Act to 
create two pilot programs, one, to encourage State and local officials, 
critical infrastructure owners to collect and share relevant 
information; and, two, to test use of tear-line intelligence reports. 
However, Mr. Chairman, the Homeland Security Act already includes 
training and information sharing requirements for State, local and 
private sector officials. The Director of Central Intelligence, the 
head of the CIA, would under the language of the bill as it is written 
have a central role in both of these pilot programs which would inject 
the CIA into this domestic, homeland security function.
  Under the first section 336 pilot program on sharing critical 
infrastructure information, the DCI would carry out his 
responsibilities through the Director of the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center, or TTIC, which has never before been recognized in 
law and has no responsibilities whatever for critical infrastructure 
information. Using TTIC in this way would undermine the statutory 
function of the Office of Infrastructure Protection subdirectorate of 
the Department of Homeland Security. We do not need to pilotize the 
Department's existing statutory obligations.
  The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 
already is required to, and this is now a quote from existing law, 
"coordinate training and other support to the elements and personnel 
of the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, and State 
and local governments that provide information to the Department, or 
are consumers of information provided by the Department, in order to 
facilitate the identification and sharing of information." That is the 
Homeland Security Act as it is written.
  The Homeland Security Act already requires that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security "coordinate with elements of the Intelligence 
Community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, 
and the private sector." Extensive information sharing requirements 
covering State, local and private officials already exist in the 
Homeland Security Act, for example, in sections 891 and 892.
  Tear-line reporting, unclassified reports to convey the critical 
substance of classified intelligence reporting, is already a common 
practice. There is not a need for a pilot program. The Homeland 
Security Act already requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
"in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall work 
to ensure that intelligence or other information relating to terrorism 
to which the Department has access is appropriately shared with State 
and local governments."

                              {time}  1830

  At this point I hope that the distinguished gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
could rise to enter into a colloquy so that I might obtain additional 
information on the amendments to the Homeland Security Act contained 
within section 336 of the legislation, and I would yield for this 
purpose to the chairman.
  As the chairman knows, I am offering an amendment to strike section 
336 of the legislation as it proposes amendments to the Homeland 
Security Act that fall within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Homeland Security. I am prepared to withdraw this 
amendment pending appropriate clarification by the gentleman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COX. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I would like to clarify for the record that the provisions of H.R. 
2417, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, amending the 
Homeland Security Act, fall within the jurisdiction of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the act 
by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Furthermore, I would 
like to clarify for the distinguished chairman that the chairman of the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security and I have indeed agreed upon a 
revision of the provisions that are acceptable to both our ranking 
members, that is, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the gentleman's committee's ranking 
member. I will commit to work with the gentleman's committee and the 
Committee on the Judiciary for substitution of the revised language in 
the conference negotiations between the House and the Senate, and to 
that end I have also agreed to support the request of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of two conferees on 
H.R. 2417.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for 
his comments.

[[Page H5889]]

  I include in the Congressional Record copies of the exchange of 
correspondence between our two committees on this topic.

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                   Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
     Hon. Christopher Cox,
     Chairman,
     Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter is to memorialize our 
     understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the 
     "provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the 
     "Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee 
     on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
     does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction 
     over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence.
       We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is 
     acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is 
     attached, and we agree to work for a mutually agreeable 
     resolution of this provision with your Committee and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, for substitution in the 
     conference negotiations between the House and the Senate.
       To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of 
     two conferees on H.R. 2417.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                        Select Committee on Homeland Security,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
     Hon. Porter Goss,
     Chairman,
     House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Chairman Goss: This letter is to memorialize our 
     understanding that the provisions of H.R. 2417 (the 
     "provisions") amending the Homeland Security Act (the 
     "Act") fall within the jurisdiction of the Select Committee 
     on Homeland Security, and that their inclusion in H.R. 2417 
     does not create a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction 
     over the Act by the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence.
       We have agreed upon a revision of the provisions that is 
     acceptable to both of our Ranking Members, a copy of which is 
     attached, and we agree to work for substitution of the 
     revised language in the conference negotiations between the 
     House and the Senate.
       To that end, I have agreed to support the request of the 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of 
     two conferees on H.R. 2417.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Christopher Cox,
     Chairman.
                                  ____


 Amendment to H.R. 2417, as Reported Offered by Mr. Cox of California 
                 (for himself and Mr. Turner of Texas)

       Amend section 336 to read as follows:

     SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, 
                   STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

       (a) In General.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security 
     Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       "(3)(A) The Secretary shall establish a program to provide 
     appropriate training to officials described in subparagraph 
     (B) in order to assist such officials in--
       "(i) identifying sources of potential terrorist threats 
     through such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
       "(ii) reporting information relating to such potential 
     terrorist threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the 
     appropriate form and manner;
       "(iii) assuring that all reported information is 
     systematically submitted to and passed on by the Department 
     for use by appropriate Federal agencies; and
       "(iv) understanding the mission and roles of the 
     intelligence community to promote more effective information 
     sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent 
     terrorist attacks against the United States.
       "(B) The officials referred to in subparagraph (A) are 
     officials of State and local government agencies that oversee 
     or manage first responders or counterterrorism activities.
       "(C) The Secretary shall consult with the Attorney General 
     to ensure that the training program established in 
     subparagraph (A) does not duplicate the training program 
     established in section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 
     107-56; 28 U.S.C. 509 note).
       "(D) The Secretary shall carry out this paragraph through 
     the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
     Infrastructure Protection (acting pursuant to the duties 
     described in section 201(d)(16)), in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General.".-
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to Congress a report that describes the 
     Secretary's plan for implementing such section 892 (as in 
     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act) and an estimated date of completion of the 
     implementation.

  Because of the agreement between our two committees, I will also ask 
unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.
  I look forward to working with the chairman and members of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an agreeable resolution 
of this matter in conference.
  Mr. Chairman, if I have remaining time, I yield to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise 
to state that I fully support the agreement that has been worked out 
between the chairmen of the two committees on which I serve. Since the 
language at issue was language that was inserted in our bill at my 
request, I want to make clear that we should work out these 
jurisdictional issues, but we also should proceed to find the right 
sections of the right bills to insert additional language on 
information sharing which is still a critical need in the homeland 
security and the terrorist threat areas.
  We also need to insert language at the right places about the 
protection of civil liberties. I listened to the comments by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) concerning the fact that we have no 
statutory language for TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 
and perhaps we should decide about that in some other forum. 
Nonetheless, TTIC exists, and it is critically important that we make 
sure that it respects the civil liberties of Americans. So we will 
continue to search for new venues, but I thank both chairmen for 
finding the proper way to solve this issue.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use the 5 minutes. I just want to 
clarify this point while the distinguished chairman of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security is here that his efforts and the 
gentlewoman from California's (Ms. Harman) efforts to work out 
acceptable language had in fact transpired and we were prepared to 
accept an amendment to the bill to do that. There is another party 
involved, and we wanted to make sure that the appropriate full dialogue 
took place because what we are about here is really trying to plug in a 
Foreign Intelligence Program, which is what our portfolio is with the 
new efforts domestically to deal with terrorism on the homeland.
  We are not interested in any territorial acquisition, as I have said 
many times. We are interested in plugging in the national foreign 
intelligence activity and capability in the right places in the right 
way. That will involve working with a number of committees. 
Fortunately, we have good Members who serve on a number of committees 
and we are using that expertise to make these bridging arrangements. I 
would like to publicly thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for their efforts 
to get the homeland security piece done. We have more work to do on 
this particular element. They have my pledge in the colloquy that we 
will work together to get this done properly, and I have nothing 
further to add to that.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I want to return the favor and thank both the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), ranking member, for all of the work that went 
into making this language acceptable, the language that we had agreed 
upon. I am sorry it cannot be included procedurally, but our 
understanding to do it at the next step is certainly satisfactory to 
me; and I just want to say that I could not agree more with the 
sentiments of both the chairman and the ranking member about the 
importance of sharing information. That is what the mission of Homeland 
Security is all about, and we do have between us and among us ample 
opportunity to amend whatever laws it takes to get this job done; and I 
would point out that the Speaker has made it possible for all three of 
us to work together on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So we 
are doing our version of fusion here in the House, and I am confident 
we will succeed.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.

[[Page H5890]]

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 2 printed in House Report 108-176.
  If the amendment proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) 
is not to be offered, then it is now in order to consider amendment No. 
3. printed in House Report 108-176.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Harman

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Harman:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. MODIFICATION OF TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION 
                   CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

       (a) Certification Requirement for Consolidation of Watch 
     Lists.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 343 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 
     116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n2) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       "(D) Whether further consolidation or elimination of watch 
     list databases in the departments and agencies with access to 
     the System would contribute to the efficiency and 
     effectiveness of the System in identifying individuals who 
     are known or suspected international terrorists."; and
       (3) in subparagraph (E), as so redesignated, by adding at 
     the end the following: "If the certification under 
     subparagraph (D) is in the positive, the steps required to 
     consolidate or eliminate such watch lists.".
       (b) Establishment of Advisory Council.--Subsection (b) of 
     such section is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       "(4) The Director shall establish an advisory council 
     comprised of experts in the field of civil liberties and 
     privacy issues to advise the Director on issues of civil 
     liberties and privacy as they relate to the maintenance of 
     the System.".

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say first that the amendment which 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) would have offered is an 
excellent amendment having to do with language skills, and my 
understanding is that we have accommodated him in some other way. I am 
sure the chairman will speak to that. And I would be happy to yield to 
him first on that subject.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentlewoman for yielding.
  All I would say is that I was going to compliment the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Farr) for a very helpful, thoughtful contribution to 
our work product. In fact, we have been working on this subject for a 
number of years, which is the training question and the language 
question; and the gentleman has some very unique perspectives on this 
which have been very helpful to us. We are improved in our committee 
for his participation in this process. I do not believe it is necessary 
to offer the amendment. Apparently he has not, but I nevertheless 
wanted to appreciate publicly the contribution he has made.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, turning to my amendment, in August, 2001, 
the FBI was frantically looking for two men who became part of the 
terrorist suicide team on 9-11. Had we been able to find Nawaf al-Hazmi 
and Khaled al-Mihdhar, we may have been able to unravel the plot for 9-
11. At least we would have stopped these two individuals from 
participating in it.
  The problem, it turns out, was that the State Department and INS 
watchlists, which included their names, were not available to the FAA 
and the airlines. So the hijackers were freely allowed to board the 
ill-fated American Airlines Flight 77.
  Two years later, the Federal Government still has as many as 50 
databases used for tracking international terrorists and international 
terrorist organizations. Just recently, the GAO highlighted 12 
watchlists run by nine agencies.
  This is shocking. Information contained in one database need not be 
connected to information in another. Vital data that could help prevent 
the next terrorist attack could be missed. We must consolidate or at 
least ensure the interoperability of government watchlists, and my 
amendment pending before this House to this intelligence authorization 
bill addresses this.
  In last year's intelligence authorization act, the Congress required 
the creation of a Terrorist Identification Classification System, TICS. 
This system is intended to be an authoritative real-time compilation of 
individuals and organizations known or suspected of international 
terrorism derived from all-source intelligence and available for use by 
other government agencies. The establishment of TICS is still a work in 
progress. The Director of Central Intelligence is required to report on 
progress by the end of November.
  My amendment requires the Director of Central Intelligence to certify 
whether further consolidation, or increased interoperability, is the 
best way to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of TICS. Either 
way we go, the point is to connect the dots in real time.
  The concept of a single government database to track suspected 
terrorists does raise some civil liberties concerns. To address the 
privacy and civil liberties concerns, my amendment requires the 
Director of Central Intelligence to establish an advisory council of 
experts on matters of civil liberties and privacy.
  Mr. Chairman, the relationship of civil liberties and security has 
been an abiding concern for this committee. The gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Holt), one of our members, has been active in this area, 
and so has our chairman, who convened the first hearing, public 
hearing, on civil liberties earlier this year where a panel of 
witnesses from the ACLU to the Heritage Foundation agreed that we need 
to balance civil liberty and security.
  As Ben Franklin once said: "They that can give up essential liberty 
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor 
safety." The Harman amendment addresses both liberty and safety, and I 
urge its adoption.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  First of all, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman on an amendment 
that she has worked hard on and I know cares a great deal about, and I 
will say right up front that the amendment is acceptable to the 
committee. I do want to make a comment on it, though.
  The amendment requires the DCI to consider whether further 
consolidation of the various U.S. Government terrorist watchlist 
databases might add to the efficiency of the watchlist system in 
identifying known or suspected terrorists. Absolutely a goal that we 
have to achieve. The question is what is the right way to do it? And 
the gentlewoman has raised the question properly. I commend her for it. 
Her dedication and expertise on counterterrorism issues I think is well 
known. She has served not only the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of this Congress but previous iterations of this effort on 
national commissions and so forth; and I think we all very much respect 
her judgment.
  And as I said, this amendment is a good one and it brings the issue 
to the floor. It asks the DCI to review and determine how much more 
consolidation of the various terrorist watchlists is needed, but I 
would add the words "if any." And the reason I say that is I am 
concerned about the potential loss of data that might result from the 
consolidation of all the watchlists available to the government. I do 
not know that that would happen. It is a question that has to be asked.
  Additionally, I would think that there is one other area that I worry 
about a little bit, and that is sort of the idea of Big Brother. The 
one big unified, centralized U.S. Government computer database with all 
of the information available to the U.S. Government on individuals and 
their associates might be viewed to some as concerning, particularly 
those who worry about Big Brother invading their privacy.
  I am not saying I have the answer; but at this stage of my thinking, 
I am sort of in the position to be inclined to support a network 
solution that virtually combines the data in various databases without 
actually dumping all of the information from all the databases into one 
big government Big

[[Page H5891]]

Brother database. So I would think that something on the order perhaps 
of Web browser or Web sniffer, some way of searching out all the 
databases simultaneously, using some of those extraordinary 
technological tools that are developed in the gentlewoman's district, 
the software that is out there that not only searches all of them at 
the same time but also crossreferences the search results in such a way 
that maximizes the researchers' efficiencies and at the same time gives 
us some of the safeguards, or the appearance of safeguards anyway, the 
perception that we are safeguarding better than one big database.
  I do not wish to prejudge the outcome of the review. As we always do, 
we candidly state our positions on these things. As I said, I think the 
gentlewoman has raised exactly the right question. I thank her for her 
contribution in doing that, and I believe the amendment is worded 
properly so we go forward, and I will accept the amendment on behalf of 
the committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I support the gentlewoman's amendment also, and I am very pleased to 
acknowledge the atmosphere in this committee that allows us to function 
so well. It is what a committee should be. The gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), 
ranking member, avoid, I think, destructive partisanship and allow us 
to air our differences in a very constructive way.
  I would like to draw attention to section 336 of this bill that 
includes a provision that I have strongly advocated for to require the 
director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to establish two 
advisory councils to help the center carry out its critical and time-
sensitive work, Mr. Chairman.

                              {time}  1845

  One Advisory Council will focus on privacy and civil liberty 
concerns. We all know and understand that we are engaged in an ongoing 
fight against global terrorism and that our entire Intelligence 
Community is central to prosecuting and winning this struggle. But, at 
the same time, as we enhance our intelligence-gathering and analysis, 
it is equally important that the Director of the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center and all employees there must respect the basic civil 
liberties that define our lives as Americans. Surely this Advisory 
Council will help us more nearly achieve the right delicate balance 
between security and liberty.
  Now, equally important, this section of the bill also requires an 
Advisory Council to the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center be established to concentrate on getting more and better 
information to State and local governments. The efforts to improve 
substantially our homeland security as a matter of urgency fall 
primarily upon our first responders and the local and State governments 
who employ them. In my meetings with State and local officials in New 
Jersey, and with first responders in my district, I have heard 
repeatedly that they receive only the most general and vague and almost 
useless information from Washington. They seldom, if ever, receive any 
more specific information about what they should guard against. 
Clearly, they deserve more timely and useful information if they are to 
function to protect the lives, the safety, and the security of 
Americans. This Advisory Council should help overcome this incomplete 
communication of practically useful intelligence information from the 
Federal to the community level.
  Third, I would like to comment about the importance of incorporating 
information based on open sources. These sources of information are not 
classified secret. And traditionally, within the Intelligence Community 
and to this day, some individuals seem to think that if information is 
not classified secret, it is not valuable. In the 21st century this 
institutionalized mindset is unfortunate, since our sources of 
information and the amount of information readily available to the 
public domain and in the public domain have grown enormously. The 
Internet has enabled one to access information that was once extremely 
hard or impractical to obtain, and the dynamics of globalization, the 
accelerated integration of global industry, commerce, communication, 
and travel have created many new sources of information. The civil and 
commercial sectors, for instance, are looking into subjects and 
technologies that once were the exclusive preserve of governments and 
intelligence services. A prominent example is imagery from satellites 
that is publicly or commercially available. In HUMINT intelligence, 
open access to officials and experts is unparalleled today.
  I believe that the Intelligence Community should be exploiting such 
open source information far more than it is today, and achieving this 
goal will require a culture change and the application of technology. I 
thank the chairman for agreeing to include in the report a call for the 
Director of Central Intelligence to study and report back to Congress 
within 6 months how to incorporate and use open source material in 
virtually every aspect of intelligence, from collection to analysis, 
and across all disciplines. There are many instances where open source 
information can be useful, perhaps even more useful than classified 
sources, and surely, in many cases, cheaper.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier about the decision by the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ranking Member Harman) to investigate thoroughly concerns 
about weapons of mass destruction and the intelligence that led into 
our fighting in Iraq. Our committee intends to issue a written report 
on its findings as promptly as possible, and I spoke about that 
earlier.
  I would like to say a bit more, though. One concern that I have had 
is that the administration officials too often appear to have dropped 
the caveats and the uncertainties expressed in the intelligence 
reporting. Another concern is that at times the intelligence reporting 
or the officials presenting the intelligence appear to have been very 
certain about their conclusions that were based on uncertain evidence.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, it is critically important to determine 
whether the Intelligence Community's estimates on Iraq were badly off 
base, or whether the Iraqi regime managed to destroy or spirit away the 
suspect weapons or materials. Either way, it seems clear that 
performance of the Intelligence Community was less than we would 
expect. It is clear to all of the world that the coalition did not have 
the intelligence information specific enough to find, identify, and 
secure any massively destructive weapons. That realization certainly 
raises questions about whether we were ready to go to war if the 
Commander in Chief and the Pentagon were convinced that the weapons 
were real, but they did not know quite where they were or how we would 
secure them once we went to war. But that is a question for another 
day. We will be talking about that in weeks to come.
  Now, I would say, with the amendments that we have in front of us 
today, I offer my full support to this legislation.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider Amendment 
No. 4 printed in House Report 108-176.


           Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
       At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF 
                   ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Pilot Project to Improve Diversity Throughout the 
     Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the 
     Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural 
     Minorities and Women

[[Page H5892]]

     With the Diversity of Skills, Languages and Expertise 
     Reflective of the Current Mission.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall carry out a pilot project under this 
     section to test and evaluate alternative, innovative methods 
     to recruit and hire for the intelligence community women and 
     minorities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, 
     skills, language proficiency, and expertise.
       (b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the 
     Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign 
     language newspapers in the United States, site visits to 
     institutions with a high percentage of students who study 
     English as a second language, and other methods that are not 
     used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan 
     to increase diversity of officers and employees in the 
     intelligence community.
       (c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the 
     project under this section for a 3-year period.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the 
     Director implements the pilot project under this section, the 
     Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. 
     The report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
       (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as 
     well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in 
     meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of 
     women and minorities within the intelligence community.
       (e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, 
     the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress 
     a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled 
     the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent 
     revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and 
     employees in the intelligence community, including the short- 
     and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also 
     provide a detailed description of the progress that has been 
     made by each element of the intelligence community in 
     implementing the plan.
       (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall 
     incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring 
     of women and minorities that the Director has determined to 
     be effective from the pilot project carried out under this 
     section.
       (f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence 
     community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an 
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization bill on behalf of myself 
and the following members who are immediate cosponsors of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence: The gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Harman), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger), and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell). I would also 
like to thank the chairman of the committee, my good friend, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his previously stated support 
for this amendment.
  Further, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the efforts of 
former member Louis Stokes and now departed and former member Julian 
Dixon; our present minority leader of the Democratic Caucus, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Bishop), and I had forgotten about Tim Roemer, who also 
was very instrumental in this particular arena as a former member, and 
others on both sides of the aisle that have been interested in this 
issue.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment directs the Director of Central 
Intelligence to establish a pilot program to improve the recruitment, 
hiring, and retention of ethnic and cultural minorities throughout the 
Intelligence Community.
  Leaders in the Intelligence Community have, for a number of years, 
expressed the view that diversity within their population can pay 
dividends with respect to cultural understanding and especially 
language capabilities. And, for an equal number of years, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence has urged them to improve their efforts of 
hiring, promoting, and retaining individuals from diverse backgrounds.
  While we noted in our report to accompany H.R. 2417 that progress has 
been made and, indeed, it has been, especially in the more recent years 
just passed, we also noted a lack of progress with respect to hiring, 
promotion, and retention of women and minorities under the current 
plan. The Secretary of Defense has stated that, "The current personnel 
system is not flexible enough to confront the dangers of the 21st 
century."
  The amendment we offer today addresses one of the many concerns 
raised by the Secretary and proposes a potential solution. It directs 
the DCI to develop a pilot program to achieve the goals for increased 
diversity amongst the Intelligence Community staff.
  This amendment requires that the Director use methods such as 
advertising in foreign language newspapers or conducting site visits to 
high schools, and I would even encourage middle schools as we look 
toward the future, because it is interesting that in those areas I feel 
we find many of our grandchildren and little children know a lot about 
computers that a lot of us older hands do not know about; and colleges 
as well, with a high percentage of students from diverse backgrounds as 
two or more recruitment methods. It also requires an annual report from 
the Director to assess the effectiveness of this project in meeting his 
goals.
  If the horrors of 9/11 taught us anything, it is that the biggest 
threat to our democratic ideals and cultural beliefs comes from those 
who do not share our ideals and beliefs.
  The war on terrorism has focused even greater attention on the 
Intelligence Community as they have collectively faced these and many 
other challenges with commendable determination. It will take time, 
innovation, and a long-term strategy to ensure that the Intelligence 
Community remains capable of both understanding and responding to the 
threats of the 21st century.
  I believe that this amendment will help the Intelligence Community 
meet the goals they have set for themselves and challenges in the 
decades to come. I urge my colleagues to support this noncontroversial 
amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this amendment is before us. It is 
entirely consistent with the committee position, and I am very happy to 
accept it. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) for his continued, persistent, effective leadership on this, 
along with our colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), who 
have both done the committee a big favor by keeping us focused on this.
  The amendment directs the DCI to establish a pilot project to test 
and evaluate alternative and innovative methods to recruit and hire 
women and minorities with diverse skills, expertise, cultural, and 
ethnic backgrounds, and language proficiencies. That is obviously a 
very rich contribution to the Intelligence Community.
  The pilot project would be carried out for a 3-year period, with a 
report on the effectiveness of the project at the end of the second 
year, as I understand the amendment.
  The amendment also includes direction to the DCI to report to the 
committee by mid-February of the next calendar year on the DCI's 
diversity strategic plan, which is something we have been after for a 
while. This aspect of this amendment incorporates, in part, the 
amendment made to the schedule of authorizations by the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes) in the committee's markup. I think they are 
complementary to each other. I see no conflict, and I think that 
combined, they are a benefit.
  Both members deserve and are commended for promoting the needs of the 
Intelligence Community in the area of diversity of skills, expertise, 
languages, cultural understanding, and ethnic background, which is not 
a fully met need, very clearly, in the Community, as we know.
  In the committee report we stated that, and I am going to quote the 
language, "Diversity throughout the Intelligence Community population 
can pay dividends with respect to the richness it brings to the work of 
the IC, particularly as it relates to cultural understandings of 
particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and increased 
skills to address particular intelligence problems." Amen.
  I believe that this project will help. I very eagerly accept the 
amendment without reservation, and I am pleased that the gentleman has 
offered it.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for the civilized and 
collaborative way in which this whole debate is going.
  I rise in strong support of this amendment, and I just want to make a 
few brief points, Mr. Chairman.

[[Page H5893]]

  When the DDCICM, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
Community Management--that is a mouthful--Joan Dempsey, came to say 
good-bye recently, it occurred to me that she was one of the few senior 
women in the entire Intelligence Community. The only other one I can 
think of is Joanne Isham, who is the Deputy Director of the National 
Security Agency. The same story can be said about people from other 
ethnic groups. That is unfortunate.
  This amendment, which is carefully drafted and consistent with our 
policy in our committee for the last 15 years, will hopefully move the 
Community forward.

                              {time}  1900

  Earlier in this debate, I spoke, and others did, about the importance 
of beefing up HUMINT, our human intelligence resources. What is the 
point of human intelligence? The point is obviously to learn about 
terrorists. Their plans and intentions.
  How do you do that? Well, you try to penetrate terrorist cells. How 
do you do that? Well, it would help if you looked like the terrorists 
and spoke their languages. And we cannot succeed in our effort if we 
just recruit the same old, same old. So it should be obvious that this 
is not the politically correct thing to do; it is the intelligent thing 
to do if we are trying to expand the talent pool and the capability of 
our intelligence agencies.
  I strongly support this amendment. I thank the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Hastings), and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). They and 
others have done us a huge service.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Hastings amendment. As 
has been stated, and I hope those that are watching this debate tonight 
can see the kind of cooperation and willingness to work together to 
solve some of the issues that greatly effect the national security of 
our country watching our chairman and ranking member and other members 
of the committee talk about what is good for our country.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that people of diverse backgrounds can bring 
their unique cultural experiences, skills and language proficiencies to 
bear on intelligence problems, intelligence issues and intelligence 
expertise. The percentage of women and minorities in the intelligence 
community has for way too many years been smaller than the percentage 
of women and minorities in the total Federal workforce and the civilian 
workforce. Fiscal year 2002 data demonstrates that women and minorities 
continue to be under-represented in the intelligence community, 
especially in core mission areas and the senior ranks, as has been 
noted here by other members of our committee.
  The committee has repeatedly expressed grave concern about the lack 
of progress made by the intelligence community in recruiting, in hiring 
and retaining a diverse workforce, essential if we are going to protect 
our country's national security. New tools must be brought to bear on 
the challenge of sufficiently diversifying the intelligence community 
workforce. Intelligence agencies must think, as we like to say, outside 
the box. I believe that the Hastings amendment encourages this kind of 
thinking, out-of-the-box thinking, by requiring the Director of Central 
Intelligence to carry out a pilot project to test and evaluate 
innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring people with 
diverse backgrounds.
  The amendment, like the general provisions that have been reported 
out of our committee, also requires that the DCI report to Congress on 
his current diversity plan, including short- and long-term goals and 
the progress that is being made in implementing it by each of the 
intelligence community agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, not only does this make good sense. It is good 
practice, it is good business, and it is good public policy. And, 
therefore, I urge all of my colleagues to support the Hastings 
amendment.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) for 
putting this before us. I think its time is overdue, and I think it is 
reasonable that he would have a pilot project.
  I just have to think back on my own life experience, and I will not 
tell you about that today, in starting in a country home, way out in 
the country. But I go to schools a lot, and I particularly want to talk 
to the young folk in regard to their futures and education and what it 
means to them. And I often tell them my story and, again, I will not 
tell you tonight, but what it can do for equal opportunity. It is the 
road to success.
  So I think that it would be very good if I can go to my African 
American schools, which I will, to my Hispanic community, to my Asian-
Americans and all the others and say to them, this opportunity is 
happening and you too can be an effective person if you will get your 
education and come forth, and we will have a pilot project to show 
that; but you can come forth, and you can be in the high-level place to 
make sure our country is secure as the others have done before you.
  So I encourage you to do this, and I am really glad that you have 
done this. It is a reasonable request that is needed. It ought to be 
done, and I am glad to hear the responses that we are hearing here 
tonight. I congratulate the gentleman, and I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding. I join him 
in expressing support for this amendment and accolades to the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), and 
the others who are working on this.
  I wanted to reiterate my concern about the lack of racial, 
linguistic, cultural and gender diversity within the intelligence 
community. Our intelligence network should reflect much more of the 
diversity and multicultural composition of the American people and of 
the world that we seek to understand. But no one should be comforted by 
the words in this amendment. This is the umpteenth time that the 
problem has been identified and that intelligence agencies have been 
exhorted, even required, to do better. I hope this amendment produces 
real results.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments.
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the chairman, and the 
members of committee for the sensitivity and the concern that we are 
now paying to the issue of diversity.
  For some time now this committee has been wrestling with the idea of 
diversity going back to former chairman Lou Stokes, former ranking 
member Julian Dixon. In my service on the committee for 6 years up 
until this term of Congress we have repeatedly been concerned. And I 
believe that the director has made it clear that diversity, cultural 
diversity, lingual diversity is a matter of good business sense for the 
intelligence community.
  We all wish that we had been a little more sensitive and a little 
more knowledgeable prior to 9-11. But this I think is an opportunity 
now for us to get it right. And the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) has done an excellent job in helping us to think out of the 
box by requiring the director to carry out this pilot test project to 
evaluate innovative alternative methods for recruiting and hiring and 
retaining members of the intelligence community with a diverse 
background.
  Let me take this opportunity to mention just one member of the 
African American community who is completing 30 years of service to 
both the military and the intelligence community, and that is Mr. 
Garnett Stowe who has retired as chief of staff of the National 
Reconnaissance Office. Mr. Stowe made tremendous contributions in his 
own right as a member of the intelligence community, but he too was 
very sensitive. And he took the time to come with the Congressional 
Black Caucus last year to appear on a panel that we had dealing with 
this issue of diversity in diplomatic and intelligence matters.
  He has made a tremendous contribution to our country, to the free 
world through his 30 years of service; and I

[[Page H5894]]

certainly would like to take this opportunity as we debate this bill to 
congratulate him on a career of great service and wish him well in the 
future.
  With that, I would just like to associate myself with all of the 
remarks that have been said in a positive way in support of the 
Hastings amendment. I worked very hard when I was on the committee. I 
am delighted that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the other members of the committee 
are continuing this work because it is one on which we must be 
vigilant. We cannot afford to give it up. We have got to get it done, 
and we have got to do it until we get it right. And I want to commend 
the committee and commend my colleagues for a job well done. Hopefully, 
we can complete this and get on the road to having the best real-time 
intelligence for our policymakers and our war fighters based on the 
most broad net of collection devices and individuals.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I just wanted to say I 
was remiss in my remarks not to note the gentleman's service on the 
committee on this particular issue and many other issues as well. It is 
a pleasure to welcome you back to the debate here.
  Mr. BISHOP of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Hastings amendment and to again 
restate my appreciation for the service of the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) and the service of the ranking member, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman). I also want to thank the members who 
served on this committee, and I do not want to say served, I want to 
have it correct, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is still 
serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. His 
leadership we have appreciated.
  In the debate previously, he extended to me an opportunity to pursue 
reviewing a number of documents dealing with the question of the 
weapons of mass destruction. I wanted to publicly say to him that I 
noted in my remarks earlier how pleased I was in a bipartisan way this 
committee would not only open up this massive documentation but also 
work together in a bipartisan way to find out the truth. And I still 
hold to that, and I will comment very briefly in my remarks on that 
point. But I wanted to rise initially to support the Hastings amendment 
because we learned a lot after 9-11.
  We learned that information would come or has come or needs to come 
from people from all walks of life, ethnic backgrounds and languages. 
We found that in our intelligence community we did not have the reach 
that we possibly needed to ensure the safety of this Nation, to secure 
the kind of intelligence we needed to have representation in parts of 
the world where languages are spoken that we may not be familiar with. 
And so the issue of diversity is crucial. Not only that, I think it is 
important to have the "mosaicness" of America represented in the 
intelligence community, the intellect that they bring, the sensitivity 
that they bring, the cultural understanding that they bring, the 
knowledge that they bring about the Muslim faith, and also the 
understanding that all immigration, all people who are different does 
not equate to terrorism. That comes from a cultural understanding.
  We know that in the United States military, we found that the 
military expanded its chaplain corps and that is, of course, to include 
people from many different faiths, and that those serving in the 
military come from many different faiths and many different racial and 
ethnic backgrounds. Many Hispanics are serving. Many Muslims are 
serving, many Native Americans, African Americans, obviously 
Caucasians, and certainly the wide breadth of diversity, Asian-
Americans, in our Nation.
  So this is a very good amendment, and I applaud the gentleman and I 
believe this will go a long way in securing America because that is 
what we are talking about in actually securing America.
  I would like to take this opportunity also to lend my support to the 
Kucinich amendment. That clearly speaks to, I think, us getting at the 
truth, and that is to secure an audit that would include information 
about telephone and electronic communications between the CIA and the 
office of the Vice President.
  I also lend my support to the distinguished representative, the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee), her amendment to require the 
Government Accounting Office to conduct a study to determine the extent 
of intelligence sharing by the Defense Department and the intelligence 
community with the United Nations.
  Collectively, these amendments do not in any way indict the good work 
of the intelligence committee. What it does is helps to build, it 
provides anchors, it moves us forward in staffing diversity, but it 
also moves us forward in finding out particular aspects of this 
question dealing with the weapons of mass destruction.
  I have already said on this floor that I believe that ultimately a 
commission, after the work of this House committee and after the work 
of the Senate committee, whatever their processes will be, that we look 
at creating an independent commission. I also believe that if we are to 
find wrong-doing that a special prosecutor would be appropriate as 
well.
  I am prepared to work in this bipartisan effort, but I think truth is 
important. And, again, it is important not only for the American 
people, but my colleagues who in good faith, many who, sincerely, all 
of us, might I say came to the floor of the House and voted our 
conscience, many voting because they believed that we were under 
imminent attack by the alleged weapons of mass destruction. Many would 
say that those of us who argue this point will find it out. We will get 
ours. They will find the weapons of mass destruction.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. Chairman, I will not be in any way offended because the question 
of America is about democracy and truth. It is about sharing with the 
American people the reasons why we make such decisions. It is not about 
a "get you" foreign policy. I do not need a "get you" foreign 
policy. I do not need to be victorious in this independent commission 
or the work of the intelligence committee. I do not need to find out 
that there were no weapons of mass destruction. I simply need to find 
the truth because the administration is obligated to tell the truth to 
the American people and to this Congress, for us to make the life and 
death decision of war and peace.
  I also believe that war should have been the last option, but I 
believe my colleagues voted in good faith, and therefore, they should 
have the truth, the American people should have the truth, and I think 
a commission will bring us to a point of securing the truth.
  So I rise in support of the Hastings amendment enthusiastically, the 
Kucinich amendment and the Lee amendment so we can move forward in a 
bipartisan manner.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) 
will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House 
report 108-176.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

[[Page H5895]]

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE 
                   PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone 
     and electronic communications between the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that 
     relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed 
     by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after 
     September 11, 2001.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, we now know that there were not vast 
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when the U.S. invaded 
and that, therefore, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United 
States, as the administration claimed before the war.
  The question remaining is whether the administration compelled the 
Central Intelligence Agency to release raw, undisseminated information 
they knew to be unreliable because it helped support the worst case 
scenario concerning Iraq's weapons program and, therefore, helped make 
the case, an erroneous case it turns out, that Iraq posed an imminent 
threat to the United States.
  The administration has made numerous assertions. The President in his 
State of the Union said, The British government has learned that Saddam 
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. 
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high 
strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
  Number one, the claim about uranium from Africa was forged. Number 
two, the aluminum tubes were not suitable for a nuclear enrichment 
program. These assertions made by the President in his State of the 
Union to justify an immediate war with Iraq were false.
  Did the Vice President play a role in making false information become 
the public reason the President went to war in Iraq? The Vice 
President, as reported in the Washington Post of June 5, 2003, Vice 
President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to the 
CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons 
programs and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating an environment in 
which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their 
assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy objectives. That 
is from the Washington Post on June 5, 2003.
  Number two, the Vice President knew or should have known that 
documents purporting to show that Iraq had bought uranium from Niger 
were forged. On March 7, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei 
reported the following to the U.N. Security Council: These documents 
which form the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between 
Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not authentic. We have, therefore, 
concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. We have found 
no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons 
program in Iraq.
  It turns out that the forgeries were crude. Anyone with an Internet 
search engine could determine that these documents were forgeries. Yet 
on March 16, nine days afterwards, the Vice President repeated the 
falsehood on national television. He said, We believe, and he was 
talking about Hussein, has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.
  The Vice President knew 1 year earlier, it appears, that the 
documents were forgeries and, therefore, the allegations false. 
According to the New York Times of May 6, 2003, More than a year ago 
the Vice President's office asked for an investigation of the uranium 
deal. So a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In 
February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy 
reported to the CIA and the State Department that the information was 
unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been forged.
  So public reports indicate the Vice President made assertions which 
were unreliable, and the Vice President visited the CIA, making 
analysts there feel, according to the Washington Post, that a certain 
output was desired from here.
  In summary, what this amendment seeks to do is to probe what role the 
Vice President played in causing the CIA to disseminate unreliable, 
raw, previously undisseminated, untrue information about Iraq's alleged 
threat to the United States.
  Specifically, this amendment would direct the Inspector General of 
the Central Intelligence Agency to audit all electronic and telephone 
communications between the Office of the Vice President and the CIA 
which would answer the question about how extensive the visits by the 
Vice President to the CIA were.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Kucinich 
amendment.
  The gentleman from Ohio has woven an interesting story and made a 
number of bald and bold assertions, but I think it is important to look 
at what the amendment says.
  The amendment calls for the Inspector General of the CIA to conduct 
an audit of all telephone electronic communications between the CIA and 
the Office of the Vice President relating to Iraq and WMD. The 
amendment is unusual and frankly a bit confusing. It purports to 
address what is allegedly a very serious issue, the altering or shading 
of intelligence for political, perhaps for strategic, purposes, but 
then it focuses only on the Vice President and only on his phone and e-
mail communications.
  If there was a real problem, one would expect a comprehensive review, 
but the amendment targets only one individual, the Vice President, and 
this is an individual who has the right, indeed he has the obligation, 
to receive information related to, for example, Iraq WMD and a run-up 
to a war.
  However, the Vice President's telephone conversations are not 
recorded. Thus, the information that is sought in this amendment does 
not exist when it comes to telephone calls. Perhaps a record of the 
number of telephone conversations between the Vice President and the 
CIA could be compiled, but this would tell us only how many calls were 
made and when they occurred. Frankly, this is not useful information.
  Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Vice President was in contact with 
the Intelligence Community should not be surprising. Frankly, it would 
be very upsetting if there was insufficient contact. These are 
sensitive communications, of course, on important matters. We should 
all expect the Vice President's office to talk regularly with the CIA, 
to visit the CIA for that matter, and the rest of the Intelligence 
Community. So should not the Vice President and the President be avid 
consumers of intelligence in order to be well-informed in the decisions 
that they make?
  Remember what the amendment says. It is targeting the telephone calls 
between the Vice President, only the Vice President, and the CIA, only 
that component of the Intelligence Community, and the electronic 
communications that took place between that individual and that agency.
  So it seems very clear to me that it is not a comprehensive review. 
It is targeted at the Vice President, and one simply has to realize 
that it is going to be unsuccessful in really revealing any information 
that it purports to have as an interest of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment should be defeated.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out for clarification 
purposes, and I thank the gentleman for yielding, that the result of 
this amendment would be both a count of the number of communications 
and an inventory of the substance of the communications. The count 
would establish the number of times the Vice President took the unusual 
step of traveling to the CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts and the 
inventory would establish the nature of those visits.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio raises the serious issue of 
politicization of intelligence. The question of the integrity of the 
intelligence process is a legitimate one and has

[[Page H5896]]

been a continuing concern in the oversight of the intelligence 
agencies. The question of politicization of intelligence is an area 
that our committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
will explore in its investigation of Iraq intelligence.
  I must, however, oppose the gentleman's amendment. The amendment, in 
my view, does not take the best approach to ensuring a comprehensive 
look at the matter. It is narrowly focused on one possible area for 
investigation, and it addresses that one area in a way I believe would 
be counterproductive.
  It is not clear to me that the audit as described in the amendment 
would develop useful information. The offices of the Inspectors General 
can be effectively utilized in congressional investigations and 
oversight, but the resources of these offices should be deployed 
according to a comprehensive plan of investigation.
  In sum, I believe the gentleman has raised an important issue, and 
that issue should and will be examined in the context of our 
committee's investigation. The amendment in this form should be 
defeated.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. HARMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, just to point out to the gentlewoman that 
I think it would be helpful if the committee supported the amendment 
because, at worst, if the amendment would be repeating the work of the 
committee, if it would be essentially redundant, then it could not 
hurt, and I would also want to point out that the gentlewoman is 
correct.
  I mean, this amendment is narrowly focused, and it is aiming 
specifically at obtaining information relative to the relationship 
between the Vice President and the CIA. I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding.
  Ms. HARMAN. Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we can get 
to the issue of politicization of intelligence in a different manner, 
one that is bipartisan and one that falls within the thorough and 
comprehensive investigation of this committee. That would be a better 
way for this House to go.
  Once again, I commend the gentleman for raising this issue but hope 
that we will decide to take a different course on this subject.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, the way I would characterize this amendment is as the 
cheap shot amendment. This is a totally political amendment. It is a 
totally cheap shot at the Vice President. It is an extension of a 
campaign being waged by the gentleman from Ohio who has made a number 
of speeches on this floor and around the country. I believe it is an 
extension of his presidential campaign to try and besmirch the record 
of this administration, to besmirch the good name of the Vice 
President, and I think when people have an opportunity to really look 
at the amendment, they can see that it is so shallow in its wording and 
in its nature, that it is what it is.
  It is a political amendment. It is only brought here to the floor to 
continue an opportunity for the gentleman from Ohio to try and find 
something that simply cannot be found.
  It also, I think, degrades the work of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence. This gentleman who is offering this amendment has been 
a Member of this House. He knows of the work of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. He knows that if he had some kind of a 
complaint about the kind of activity that he is trying to allege the 
Vice President has engaged in that he could come to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. He could petition the chairman, he 
could petition the ranking member. He could ask the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I guess we are not good enough to do our 
work that you have to seek some kind of an outside counsel or outside 
organization to try and look into it.

                              {time}  1930

  This is unprecedented what this amendment asks for. It is 
unprecedented in its nature to think that this body, under this 
amendment, is going to go after the phone records of the Vice 
President. Now, anybody who does not see the politicizing of what is 
going on here cannot see the nature of it. You can see it in the words, 
because they are very shallow.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. Under the 
gentleman's logic, there would be no reason at all for any amendments 
to be offered from this floor. We might as well dispense with the 
amendment process and move to a system in which the committees of 
Congress report bills for a simple up or down vote from the whole 
House. So we might as well extend the suspension calendar for all 
bills.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the 
gentleman by saying this. If this is the authorization for the 
intelligence bill, and the gentleman is offering this amendment under 
our authorization, why does the gentleman not give some direction to 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to look into the matter? 
Why does the gentleman have to find somebody else to do it? And the 
gentleman may respond, if he would like.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
continuing to yield, and I would say that, first of all, the idea that 
it is the committee's jurisdiction and, therefore, should be left to 
the committee, I do not believe the gentleman is seriously proposing 
what I think is an absurdity, but the argument rests on the same absurd 
logic. All Members of the Congress have the privilege to offer 
amendments, and if a majority of the House agrees with the amendment, 
it passes. However, I do not believe it is legitimate or logical 
against my amendment to say that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence should enjoy an exemption from the amendment process.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, what I am saying to the gentleman is 
apparently the gentleman does not think the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence is doing their job. Apparently, the gentleman does not 
think we have the capability to carry this out, and so he has crafted 
an amendment to go to some outside group, some outside organization 
because the gentleman does not have trust and faith in what we have 
been doing and the work that we have been doing.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, 
I would ask that the gentleman not take offense. This is certainly, I 
would hope the gentleman would agree, a salient issue of interest to 
the American people and that the public does have a right to know, and 
there have been published statements that provide contradictory 
information relative to what is really a question of a singular cause 
of war. So I respect the gentleman's right to make these statements, 
and I would ask the gentleman to respect my right as a Member of 
Congress to offer this amendment.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if the gentleman 
wanted to offer an amendment on our authorization bill, at least he 
ought to give us the benefit of the doubt that we have professional 
staff and we have people who spend an inordinate amount of time, 
including the gentleman's ranking member because this is her only 
committee assignment. She spends all of her time in this Congress 
working on intelligence activities. Apparently the gentleman does not 
think enough of her expertise and the expertise of the committee staff 
on that side to give them some kind of an assignment.
  And why the Vice President? Why not the President? Why not the 
Director of the CIA? Why not the Director of the FBI? This is a 
political amendment. This is an extension of a campaign.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Upton). The time of the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. LaHood) has expired.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  Mr. KUCINICH. Reserving the right to object, I would be happy to 
grant the gentleman an additional 2 minutes if he would be happy to 
return the favor to me.

[[Page H5897]]

  Mr. LaHOOD. I will be more than happy to yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is 
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Why the Vice President? Why not other officials of the 
government? Why not officials of the government who have direct 
responsibility for intelligence-gathering information? If there is some 
kinds of a cabal going on around here, why did the gentleman just 
happen to pick this individual?
  I believe this is what it is. This is a political amendment. This is 
an amendment to try and embarrass one member of this administration. 
This is an amendment to try and embarrass the second-highest-ranking 
elected official in our government by some way, shape, or form, 
thinking that if the gentleman gets some kind of phone records he is 
going to find something out.
  As members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we get 
information every day, 24-7, our staff. Pretty much 24-7, our staff are 
working on gathering intelligence; and this is a slap in the face at 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to the gentleman's own 
members, to our members.
  It really is what it is. It is a political amendment, and I stand by 
what I said. It is the cheap shot amendment. It is the cheap shot 
amendment of the year. It gets the award, in my opinion; and I hope 
people see it for what it is.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 
2 minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) is 
recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), that I would hope the gentleman would 
appreciate receiving clear direction for an inquiry. I can only assume 
that the gentleman does not want the direction of the whole Congress to 
get to the bottom of the Vice President's role.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I simply would say to the gentleman that he 
knows that we have established in this bill two advisory committees. We 
had people on the floor earlier suggesting a commission; but 
apparently, the gentleman does not think the oversight obligation that 
we serve, as the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, is enough. 
And I say it is a slight. It is a slap at us.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just tell the 
gentleman that as a member of the Committee on Government Reform I 
certainly appreciate the role of government oversight, and I certainly 
appreciate the role of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
as well. I would say that if the gentleman did not want to get to the 
bottom of the role of the Vice President, which has been a matter of 
public contest and controversy long before I have spoken here, that 
would indeed be a reason to oppose the amendment; but it would not be a 
reason for anyone else in Congress to vote "no" on the amendment.
  And to the Members of Congress, I say if they want to demand a 
thorough investigation into the role that the Vice President may have 
played in offering the American public discredited intelligence reports 
of a nonexisting Iraqi weapons program, then they should vote "yes" 
for my amendment.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield once again?
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, let me simply say this. I would say that 
the gentleman's ranking member has bent over backwards. It was the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and others who asked for the two 
advisory committees. And it is other people on the gentleman's side who 
are asking for some kind of a commission. Now, we have not acted on 
that, and that is not in this bill; but I think every request that was 
made by the gentleman's side to the chairman has been granted.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) has expired.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) is 
recognized for 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Really, Mr. Chairman, I think we have done everything we 
can. Now, to go outside of the jurisdiction of the committee and to 
take a cheap shot at the Vice President, it makes no sense, I say to 
the gentleman. It really does not. I think, really, the truth is, after 
listening to this and listening to the fact that the gentleman's 
ranking member is not going to support the gentleman's amendment, I 
think it is in his best interest to withdraw the amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the kind words, and it's nice 
that the gentleman from Illinois is worried about me and whether I am 
respected. I believe I am respected, and I believe that the person who 
offers this amendment respects me, and I certainly hope that he 
respects our committee.
  I just want repeat something I said earlier, which is that our 
investigation will be thorough and it will be bipartisan and we will 
follow the facts unflinchingly. So I do not want the gentleman from 
Ohio to assert, because it is not correct, that we are taking things 
off limits. The reason I oppose the gentleman's amendment is that I 
think we will do a comprehensive job in a fair way, and all of us, on a 
unanimous basis, will proceed and go forward. We will do the right job 
for this House, and we should have a chance to proceed and do it that 
way.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LaHOOD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in serving in the 
Congress with the gentlewoman and the gentleman. I would say, though, 
that I do not see this so much as being a battle over turf as I see it 
being an assertion of the need for pursuing the truth. And I would 
expect that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the 
capability to do the job, but I also think that this particular matter 
is so unique that it receive the attention of the House, which is why I 
have offered this amendment and why I will continue to insist on it.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to my colleague's amendment, and I 
put it in the context of the work that this committee has done and that 
we have accomplished and the vision that we outlined in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for 2004.
  I serve as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence. As such, one of our jobs is to oversee some of the 
Nation's most sophisticated intelligence technologies. I have the 
opportunity and responsibility for critically reviewing new concepts of 
operation. I must ensure that currently fielded systems continue to be 
capable of meeting the needs that we have outlined.
  In this area, we are pursuing aggressive oversight. We have worked 
with the ranking member. We have been to the ranking member's district 
to meet with some of the contractors there; and I think it is a good 
example of how, in a bipartisan way, we have asked some tough questions 
of the intelligence community and of those groups that provide us with 
the materials and the equipment that we need. We have asked the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide us with a long-
range plan and how all of these pieces will fit together and what a 
strategic plan may look like for the next 6 to 10 years.
  In the comments attached to the bill, we have outlined our 
disappointment

[[Page H5898]]

that that plan has not come forward to the committee, so that we are 
moving forward with a little bit less information, perhaps, at this 
time, than what we would like to have had. But I do not think that the 
amendment that the gentleman is bringing up is one that is going to 
work in the best interest of what we are trying to get accomplished.
  On a weekly basis, this committee meets with the communities analytic 
cadre. We have met with them on a regular basis to review the 
intelligence that they prepared for us and they prepared for the 
President, the Vice President and Members of Congress; and that 
information is now available to all 435 Members of Congress so that 
they can take a look at what we were looking at and how we were shaping 
our judgments and where we were getting our information from.
  I think it is important for the American people to know that. That 
information is not secret. We are being very open with our colleagues 
because we recognize the importance of maintaining the credibility of 
the process, the individuals, and the analysis that goes into the 
intelligence that we have gathered. We take this job very, very 
seriously.
  One of the things that I am concerned about with this gentleman's 
amendment is that if we pursue this path, and in this case it 
identifies the Vice President but also implicates the folks at the 
different intelligence agencies as perhaps not keeping the best 
interest of the country in the forefront, then what we will end up 
with, and I agree with my colleague from Illinois that it is a cheap 
shot amendment because there is not a basis in fact to make these 
accusations against the Vice President or against the folks at the 
intelligence agency, but the result and danger is that what we are 
going to end up with is we are going to end up with a cadre of analysts 
that are going to be intimidated to such a point that they are going to 
go through the process, they are going to gather the intelligence, and 
they are going to be sitting there and saying, you know, I really 
cannot take the next step of providing some expert judgment, which I 
have been trained for, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years. I am not going to be 
able to share that expert judgment with the folks who recognize the 
source and the art of this work.
  Remember, the job we give these folks, in plain English, is we ask 
them to go out and steal other people's secrets. We ask them to do that 
in an imprecise way and to put the pieces together. And when they have 
a few pieces of the puzzle, we ask them to try to paint for us what the 
picture and what the final puzzle may look like. If we put a cloud over 
their heads and say every time you have a few of the pieces out there 
and you have painted a picture for us, for us to better understand the 
environment after the fact, if what you laid out beforehand does not 
perfectly match what we find out afterwards, you have failed.
  In reality, these are talented people. They are doing a very, very 
good job.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoekstra was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)

                              {time}  1945

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. They come back and they give us their best judgment. I 
am impressed with the work of the chairman and the ranking member, how 
they have set a course that says we are going to go through this in a 
bipartisan way. We are going to take a look at the information and how 
the people processed the information. We are going to take a look at 
how we analyzed it and how decisions were made off that information, 
but we are going to do that in a bipartisan way and we are going to 
make sure that we do not take this down a road of pure partisan 
politics because in the 2\1/2\ years I have been on this committee, in 
a bipartisan way we have kept as our primary focus what is good for 
this country, recognizing the sensitive nature of the information that 
we deal with, recognizing the importance of us to work through very, 
very difficult issues, but to reach a consensus that enables us to move 
forward.
  That is exactly what the leadership of this committee has done, it is 
exactly the way that the members of the committee have guided their 
behavior, and it is what sets the behavior of our committee and the 
members of that committee apart from the amendment that is brought 
forward at this time.
  It is a partisan amendment, it has a potential to be used in many, 
many different ways, but primarily in my analysis it hurts the prospect 
of truly improving the process so that when we move forward in the 
future, we will have the intelligence, the capability and the right 
people in place to ensure that we make the best possible decisions.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise to underscore the right of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) to offer this amendment and say that he is getting at a very 
important point, but to say further it is a bad amendment and should be 
opposed. It is both too narrow and too broad. He is certainly intending 
to get at an important point, but it is too narrow in that it deals 
with the phone records of one public official, and it is too broad in 
the sense that it is a fishing expedition. It is the kind of fishing 
expedition which I think so sullied some previous Congresses.
  The question of whether intelligence has been cooked or coerced is a 
critical question, and I thank the gentleman for raising it. But in 
fact in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we have already 
raised that, and we will continue to raise that issue. I ask the 
assistance of every Member of this body on both sides of the aisle to 
help us formulate the questions that need to be asked and to hold us to 
task that those questions are asked to the satisfaction of all Members 
of this body and of the citizens of America. But I do not believe that 
this amendment will help us do that. I must oppose this amendment, and 
I encourage my colleagues to oppose it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful as we begin 
these debates for us to reflect on the essential constitutional role of 
the Congress and on the importance of separation of powers and on the 
cause which took a Nation into war because we are not talking about 
just any other matter here, we are talking about a matter that resulted 
in the people of this country having their sons and daughters sent to 
Iraq.
  Nothing less than the entire involvement of this Congress will do to 
be able to hold safe the constitutional prerogatives of separation of 
powers. No congressional committee can override the requirements of the 
Constitution and the role of this Congress.
  When Members of this Congress gave the President authority to pursue 
an attack against Iraq, they took upon themselves a serious and grave 
responsibility, and since information has been presented that raises 
grave questions about the cause of our action against Iraq, we have a 
moral obligation to get into this, and I take nothing away from the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but I would tell Members, 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should take nothing away 
from Members of the House.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, perhaps the gentleman did 
not hear me earlier this evening when I said that what we are looking 
at are critical questions that have to do with lives and deaths that 
have occurred or might occur. It has a lot to do with the future 
direction of our country; but I do not believe that this amendment will 
help us carry out the investigation that we need to carry out and ask 
the questions that we need to ask and have for the future the kind of 
truth-telling intelligence agents and analysts who will help this 
country get where we want to go.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to respond to the latest speech of 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), and that is to say if the 
gentleman really wants the prerogatives of the House to be worked out, 
let the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence do it. The 
gentleman's amendment says the IG or the GAO is supposed to

[[Page H5899]]

go in and get the Vice President's phone records. If the gentleman 
thinks it is such a great idea, let us do it. We have been doing it. 
Why have some outside group do it? That is the flaw in the gentleman's 
amendment. That is what our committee is supposed to do. That is the 
flaw, and that is what politicizes it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I would direct the gentleman from 
Illinois to an article in the Washington Post on June 5 which says that 
the esteemed chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
said there is "no indication that analysts at DIA or CIA changed their 
analysis to fit what they perceived as the desire of the administration 
officials."
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Kucinich, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Holt was 
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOLT. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it goes on to say the intelligence 
oversight panels have received no whistleblower complaints from the CIA 
or other intelligence agencies on the issue. I would maintain that this 
would not be a subject of whistleblowing, and only the Office of 
Inspector General or in this case the investigative agency would have 
an opportunity to be able to get this in an evenhanded way, and it 
takes it out of politics at a time when Members suggest this is only 
political.
  I might further add that I did not make my reputation in this House 
by raising partisan issues, and I do not see this as a partisan issue, 
I see this as justifying the administration's claim that this country 
had to go to war against Iraq because there was imminent threat.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I want to point out two things, and they are meant to be 
constructive. First of all, it is certainly true everybody in the 
United States counts on it being true and it is true that the Vice 
President and the President are responsible for the protection of the 
national security. The national security team involves the Vice 
President. The President and the Vice President are regular consumers 
of intelligence information, and were they not, we probably should be 
calling for some kind of an investigation.
  I do recall it was not so long ago that one of the complaints from 
one of the Directors of the CIA was in fact just that, that he did not 
get enough quality time and enough access with the top leaders of the 
country and the Intelligence Community was not being well-served. That 
was at another time and we need not go into that.
  My suggestion to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), who I have 
great respect for, is that this amendment is truly not worthy of his 
best efforts. I do not believe the gentleman is fully informed on it. 
It appears that the gentleman is basing his amendment and information 
and his case on media. Again, at the risk of getting impaled by the 
media, I have this trouble with the errancy problem in the media.
  Media simply does not know everything, and if they did, they would 
stop asking me and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and 
other members of the committee questions. Believe me, the media does 
not know everything. They are not fully informed, and if the gentleman 
is using the media, the gentleman is not fully informed.
  I invite the gentleman to come upstairs, sign the secrecy agreement 
if the gentleman has not already, and review the material. That is why 
we have it there. If the gentleman took advantage of that, the 
gentleman would be better able to understand what we are doing, and I 
would hope would be supportive of our efforts. Having said all that, I 
hope we are getting ready for a vote on this amendment.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in support of the Kucinich amendment.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) is familiar 
with the amendment and the letter of the amendment, and I would ask if 
the chairman would be willing to commit the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence to seeking specifically the information that I am 
asking here of the Inspector General. Would the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence be willing to conduct publicly an audit of 
all telephone and electronic communications between the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President as they relate 
to this matter?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, certainly we will publicly not commit to 
that. We will publicly commit to where the review of the information 
takes us. We have a bipartisan agreement on that. We have 20 able 
members who are members of good judgment and good sense who will follow 
the review and the material that comes in to the appropriate places.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has used the word 
"unflinching." It is a fair word. I assure the gentleman I am going 
where the information takes us.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would suggest to the gentleman and I would not impugn 
his answer by stating that his unwillingness to clearly commit to 
gathering this information publicly would in any way reflect a partisan 
position on his part, just as my desire to have the Inspector General 
bring that information forward is not reflective of a partisan position 
on my part.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. There are two reasons why this would be a difficult task to 
do publicly, and I would not make that broad a commitment. The first is 
that much of the material that the gentleman is talking about is 
probably classified if the gentleman is talking about the content of 
what may or may not be involved in calls, and I cannot go there.
  The second part is the matter of Constitution which does understand 
that working documents and so forth of the executive are respected and 
privileged. That has always been the case no matter who is in the White 
House.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, it would be more than instructive. It 
would be classified information if the Vice President manipulated CIA 
analysts to disseminate false, raw unreliable information to justify a 
war in Iraq. I am hopeful no one is saying that and I am not aware that 
the administration has asserted executive privilege in an attempt to 
shield such information from the Congress. I am not aware of that at 
all. Maybe that has happened privately, but I am not aware that such an 
assertion can be private and that in fact such an assertion has been 
made.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. That is an option that they have and that is why I cannot 
make a commitment. I cannot overcome that.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would say in order for the test to be made to make 
the request first then imposes our responsibility as Members of 
Congress, and as a coequal branch of government, we are entitled to do 
that and the executive branch is entitled to assert executive 
privilege, if they so choose, and that would be illuminating, I think.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to ask that the Bush 
administration provide the American people with a full account of the 
events leading up to the war with Iraq.

[[Page H5900]]

  The amendment sponsored by Representative Kucinich is a good starting 
point but there is still much that we do not know about the basis of 
our war with Iraq. Since August of last year, when the administration 
began beating the war drum, they have offered little concrete evidence 
backing up their claims that Iraq posed an "imminent threat" to the 
United States.
  The rhetoric employed by the administration was strong and 
unwavering:
  On September 12, 2002, the President told the UN: "Right now, Iraq 
is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production 
of biological weapons . . . . Iraq has made several attempts to buy 
high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear 
weapon."
  On October 7, 2002, the President said: "It [Iraq] possesses and 
produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear 
weapons."
  The Vice President said earlier this year on "Meet The Press" that: 
"we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 
weapons."
  And the Secretary of Defense joined in saying: "We know where they 
[weapons of mass destruction] are, they are in the area around Tikrit 
and Baghdad."
  Yet, despite this certainty, 3 months after the fall of Baghdad, no 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Nor have the 
facilities to make these weapons been found. The administration has 
tried to capitalize on our fears born out of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, suggesting there was a link between Saddam Hussein 
and leaders of al Qaeda.
  Even though this connection has been disproved consistently, the 
President still cites it as fact.
  And today, we learned that at least one member of the intelligence 
community felt pressured to shape his reports to fit the 
administration's position on weapons of mass destruction even though he 
had no evidence to support those claims.
  Congress must work to ensure that the information that comes out of 
the intelligence community is reliable and is not unduly influenced by 
anyone. This is not a partisan issue. This is about restoring the 
credibility of the United States both with our constituents and 
throughout the world.
  The President has said that he is confident that weapons of mass 
destruction will be found; the evidence is strong he says.
  I encourage him to shine the light of day on the evidence so that the 
world can understand why the United States went to war--unprovoked--and 
put the lives of thousands in danger.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) will be postponed.

                              {time}  2000

  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House 
Report 108-176.


                   Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The Clerk will designate the 
amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS 
                   WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF 
                   MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which 
     intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by 
     the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass 
     destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations 
     weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the 
     information that was provided (if any).
       (b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for 
     an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided 
     by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons 
     inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a 
     timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to 
     enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct 
     investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites 
     of weapons of mass destruction.
       (c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), 
     the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency 
     or department of the United States information necessary to 
     carry out the study under subsection (a).
       (2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall 
     cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously 
     providing appropriate security clearances to individuals 
     carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to 
     existing procedures and requirements, except that no person 
     shall be provided with access to classified information under 
     this section without the appropriate security clearances.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to thank the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) for 
her support and her leadership in crafting this bipartisan bill. Also 
to my staff, Julie Little and Shannon Smith, I want to thank them for 
their very diligent work.
  This is a commonsense amendment seeking an answer to a question that 
the American people have a right to know: How was our intelligence 
regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction handled in the months 
before the war? Specifically, this amendment seeks a GAO study to 
determine the extent and timeliness with which the Intelligence 
Community shared information about suspected weapons in Iraq with the 
United Nations inspectors on the ground searching for those weapons.
  There are growing questions being raised about the use or possible 
misuse of intelligence in the months leading up to the war against 
Iraq. If intelligence was distorted, that raises serious doubts around 
the world about United States credibility. Our President told the 
American people, the Congress and the world that inspections had 
failed, that Iraq unquestionably possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
and that these weapons posed such a dire, imminent threat to the United 
States that we had no choice but to go to war. All other options, he 
said, had been exhausted. But the question we must continue to ask is, 
were those options truly exhausted? Were they, in fact, fully pursued? 
Did the United States Intelligence Community share information with the 
United Nations inspectors about suspected weapons sites? Did it happen 
in a timely and sufficient manner?
  President Bush went before the United Nations General Assembly and 
stated, "My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet 
our common challenge." He and Secretary Powell pledged to work with 
the United Nations to pursue inspections to seek out and destroy 
weapons of mass destruction. What we have before us is a question of 
both policy and credibility. If we failed to fully share intelligence 
with United Nations inspectors, we may have undermined their 
effectiveness. If we relied on intelligence that was distorted or less 
complete than implied, if we failed to share crucial information with 
our allies, then we have undermined our own national credibility.
  This Nation launched a preemptive war based on what it claimed was 
indisputable evidence. If that evidence was not so solid and especially 
if it was distorted, then we severely undercut our ability to convince 
the world about future dangers from weapons of mass destruction in 
other countries. The doctrine of preemption, which I happen 
incidentally to strongly oppose, totally collapses without credibility.
  For these reasons, we need to find the answer to these questions. The 
American people have a right to know. A respected and esteemed member 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that he has been 
working for the last 6 months to try to force disclosure of important 
facts relevant to the sharing of intelligence information on suspect 
weapons of mass destruction sites by the CIA with the United Nations 
arms inspectors.
  He continued, and I quote, "If it had been public knowledge in 
February or March of this year that the CIA had not shared information 
on all of the top Iraqi WMD suspect sites with the United Nations 
inspectors, it could have worked against the administration's timetable 
for initiating military

[[Page H5901]]

action against Iraq. There could have been questions as to why; it 
could have made the administration's decision to cut short the U.N. 
inspection process and to institute military action less compelling; 
and there could have been greater demand that we share all such 
information with the United Nations before abandoning the inspection 
process."
  I share his concerns and I echo his call for a bipartisan 
investigation. These are not partisan issues, they are fundamental 
questions about credibility and they need to be answered. This 
amendment calls for a GAO study into the sharing of United States 
intelligence with the U.N. inspections teams. It calls for a report to 
Congress with a classified annex if necessary for security reasons. We 
are all aware that to date the United States military has not found 
weapons of mass destruction in its searches since the end of the war. 
We also know that that does not prove the weapons are not there. They 
may well be. And I believe we should bring in more IAEA and United 
Nations inspectors to help seek out, secure and destroy them if they 
are hidden in Iraq.
  Given the Administration's confident and unequivocal statements that 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and given the President's 
assurances that he wanted to work with the United Nations to seek non-
military solutions through a renewed inspections process, it is 
important that we learn to answer to the question of whether or not 
intelligence was shared in a timely and sufficient manner with the UN 
inspections teams.
  I urge you to support this amendment.


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from 
improper references to the Senate.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I rise in 
opposition to the Lee amendment. It calls, of course, for the 
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study and 
determine the extent of intelligence sharing within the Intelligence 
Community, DOD and the U.N. inspectors in Iraq.
  I would like to make two general points first. As a part of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's review of the Intelligence 
Community regarding prewar intelligence on Iraq, the committee has 
already begun to examine this issue and will assess the effectiveness 
and procedures governing the sharing of intelligence to international 
and foreign bodies.
  Secondly, the committee acknowledges that the Comptroller has some 
capabilities for investigation. But I would note that the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence has a long and distinguished record of 
conducting bipartisan and thorough reviews of intelligence matters. 
Therefore, before outside help is requested, it seems only appropriate 
that the committee should have an opportunity to fulfill its mandate 
for the House and for the Congress to conduct rigorous oversight of the 
Intelligence Community. This subject area of the amendment is not going 
to be neglected.
  Now a few details. In the run-up to renewed weapons inspections in 
Iraq late last year, U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix told the press 
that although his team could use U.S. intelligence, the team was not 
supposed to trust anyone, and that it was the team's decision, not a 
particular government's, as to what facilities and where the 
inspections were to be carried out.
  The earlier U.N. mission to Iraq was accused of spying for the United 
States. Therefore, Hans Blix indicated that he had to make the 
distinction between his possible use of intelligence and his team's 
ability to conduct an independent and neutral investigation of Iraq's 
WMD facilities. Blix admitted using CIA reports in a November 28 
interview with CNN but cautioned that he would not allow his team to be 
dictated to by a foreign government.
  Some have suggested that the U.S. failed to provide the arms 
inspectors with useful information. At this point, this Member believes 
that this is simply not true, not true at all. We are going to find out 
about that, however, when we complete our investigation. Hans Blix 
actually received, I think, unprecedented access to intelligence.
  The U.S. provided the U.N. weapons inspectors with the ability to 
task and assign U.S. U-2 surveillance aircraft operating over Iraq. He 
told the U-2s where to go and what to target. This is virtually unheard 
of, U.N. civilians ordering U.S. pilots on hazardous missions. Why did 
we do this? Why did we give a U.N. official this extraordinary 
opportunity and authority? In the words of Hans Blix, "The U-2 data 
will improve our ability to carry out our inspections."
  If there was a problem in timely response to intelligence, the 
problem was in the U.N.'s ability to act on information after they had 
received it from the United States or from other sources. This is not 
really too surprising since there were literally hundreds of Iraqi 
agents or personnel whose job it was to slow down the inspectors, to 
send them in the wrong direction, or to make sure they would end up in 
the wrong place, or to report on their progress so that deception and 
deceit and cover-up could take place before they arrived. This is not a 
failing of the United States but, rather, the inability of UNMOVIC to 
overcome Iraqi denial and deception techniques.
  The gentlewoman, I hope, would understand that if there were problems 
in communication of intelligence, much of the problem was the U.N. 
reluctance to rely on U.S. sources. This is addressed in an article in 
USA Today and I do not cite it except that they are quoting Blix. They 
were reluctant, they said, to rely on U.S. intelligence for fear that 
Iraq would accuse them of spying for the United States, an accusation 
that Iraq made, of course, the first time we had inspectors in. Here is 
a quote:
  "Still smarting from their admission that U.S. intelligence gave 
inspectors secret missions during the last round of inspections in 
1998, U.N. officials have deliberately curbed access to the CIA and 
allied intelligence agencies."
  The ground rules established by the U.N. stipulated that the CIA 
would not equip the inspectors, unofficial discussions between the CIA 
and the inspectors were prohibited, and only the U.N. would be allowed 
to analyze the data that was collected.
  We have got a lot to look at. Members will have access to some of 
this very information across the board in an unprecedented fashion. 
This is a responsibility of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. We have the capabilities. We have the intent. I would say 
we ought to be given the opportunity. Therefore, I rise in opposition 
to the gentlewoman's amendment. I hope it will be rejected.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have enormous respect for the sponsor of this 
amendment. She is prepared to vote her conscience in this House, even 
if she is a minority of one. I think that is admirable, courageous and 
her constituents should be enormously proud to be represented by her. I 
am certainly proud to serve with her.
  I listened carefully to the comments made by the gentleman from 
Nebraska. Frankly, I agree with them. I think that is the context of 
the search for weapons by the U.N. inspector. However, agreeing with 
them does not get me to his conclusion. My conclusion is that we should 
support this amendment because it contains a specific request for a 
discrete investigation that would be of value in understanding 
precisely what information was shared with the U.N. weapons inspectors.
  It may turn out that more was shared than we know. It may turn out 
that less was shared than we know. And it may turn out, and I think it 
will, that what the gentleman from Nebraska had to say includes the 
context in which it was shared. Nonetheless, I think this investigation 
could provide a constructive baseline in understanding the difficulties 
of conducting U.N. inspections.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the specific matters to 
be studied under this amendment are not to my knowledge currently part 
of the scope of our Committee's review. We are not specifically 
investigating what information was shared with the U.N., though we 
certainly could, I suppose. Thus, I believe the amendment is helpful 
and I would urge us to support it.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise to support the Lee amendment. I thank the ranking member for 
her support. As this House, our Nation and

[[Page H5902]]

the world debate the quality of the intelligence that the war in Iraq 
was fought over, it is too easy to forget that our troops were not the 
first to search the Iraqi desert for weapons of mass destruction. 
United Nations inspectors spent a decade searching for and destroying 
illegal Iraqi weapons facilities, but in the days and months leading up 
to the war, they were scorned for their failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction.
  This resolution calls on the GAO to investigate how much cooperation 
the United States intelligence agencies gave United Nations inspectors. 
Understanding about that cooperation with the United Nations, or lack 
thereof, will give us a better picture of the efforts this Nation took 
to avoid war with Iraq. If America did not fully share its intelligence 
with U.N. inspectors, Congress needs to find out why.
  The fact is that the rhetoric leading up to the war in Iraq led many 
Americans to believe that finding weapons of mass destruction would be 
absolutely easy, that the U.N. inspectors must have been grossly 
incompetent. But I do not believe that to be true and I think that our 
inability to find weapons of mass destruction now requires the United 
States to reexamine the rhetoric and the events that led up to the war. 
We need to find out beyond reports from USA Today if our U.S. 
intelligence agencies were cooperating fully with the U.N. inspectors. 
And we need to find out if the prewar rhetoric reflected the 
intelligence we shared with the United Nations.
  This amendment is about getting answers to questions that we are all 
asking in this country. I urge my colleagues to support the Lee 
amendment.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I have given this amendment very careful consideration, and I 
appreciate the effort. I do believe we have got the matter handled 
already in the committee, and I will tell the gentlewoman that; and I 
would invite the gentlewoman upstairs to talk to us about it in a 
classified setting if she would like to.
  The reason I say that I think this is unnecessary is I think it is 
duplicative of work we are doing that, frankly, we are best prepared to 
do. But I would like to point out there are a couple of problems with 
the United Nations that we have been working with for quite a number of 
years, and I think we, frankly, have the expertise to judge better than 
anybody else. Perhaps our sister body in the Senate, Senate 
Intelligence Committee, would dispute that; but I would say that either 
the Senate or us are going to do a pretty good job on this, and in fact 
we are both working on it.
  The question of how much information we shared with the U.N. is a 
fair question to ask, and the answer is we shared a remarkable amount, 
more than they could handle. It turns out as we heard from the 
gentleman from Nebraska's (Mr. Bereuter) comments that the U.N. 
inspectors were very worried about being called spies of the United 
States and there was quite a debate about taking any information from 
the United States at all lest this be a U.S.-driven thing and Hans Blix 
did not want that and he said so publicly a number of times and said 
that frankly they could do the job fine without us.
  But notwithstanding, we had been working with them for some time and 
giving them some good information and frankly at some peril because the 
U.N. leaks like a sieve, and there are some things about the U.N. that 
are worth noting. Not all the members of the U.N. are particularly 
friendly to the United States of America, and that brings us to the 
question of do Americans want us to be sharing our crown jewels and our 
sovereignty with nations who may not want to be particularly helpful to 
us and some who may actually want to be harmful to us.
  So there is a question there of whether our American constituency 
would like us to keep this in control in the House or get it out where 
some other people might want to make some mischief for the United 
States of America and our security. And I am very much aware of that 
because we have actually had problems in the past that are documented, 
which I am not going to go into but which are documented, where 
materials and information was not properly safeguarded or was willfully 
given to the wrong people in the U.N. That is not a good track record 
and I think would not be prudent of us to ignore.
  I would say that for some time U.N. weapons inspectors had 
unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence information. Whether they 
used it or not or wanted to use it was their problem, including 
analytical reports. We obviously protected our sources. We had imagery 
from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which I think everybody knows 
now. Probably what some people do not know which I believe I can say is 
that the U.N. inspectors had the ability, the task to request how that 
U-2 was used. That is rather remarkable, turning over an asset like 
that to another country, a set of countries.
  I believe everybody knows that Colin Powell played intercepts for the 
Security Council that are frankly things that do not happen in our 
committee very often. They do not play intercepts for us very often. So 
I would say an unusual amount of information, perhaps more than I would 
have approved of, was given to the U.N.
  And there is a problem with the U.N. that I want to go into a little 
further, and it is an appearance problem; and it is one I think we are 
better prepared to handle in the House than an outside group trying to 
come in here. There is a lot of feeling, I think, that the U.N. does 
not always get it right in terms of our national purpose or national 
mission, and I would point out that the presidency of the Security 
Council for the month of June is the Russian Federation. I would like 
to also point out, and I think I can say this in a responsible way, 
that there are an extraordinary number of Russian espionage activities 
going on in our Nation's capital as I speak, even though we are on a 
friendly basis. Nations do spy on each other. Russians are still in a 
little bit of their paranoia and their conspiratorial mode that there 
are things to find out about us that if they just ask us, they will not 
believe the answer; so they have to spy on us. We have a good 
friendship with them, but it has got a ways to go. There is a little 
bit of a problem there.
  There is a problem with Syria which is on our terrorist list being on 
the Security Council. These kinds of things lead one to pause about how 
we do business, and these are matters which we are well aware of on our 
committee. And on the Commission on Human Rights, which has recently 
been in the news at the U.N., it is clearly true that the U.N. took a 
slap at the United States by throwing us off that commission in order 
to put Cuba on it. That is not really great. The chairmanship of that 
committee, I understand, right now is Libya. Libya's human rights 
record is not worth commenting on, it is so terrible. Zimbabwe? Give me 
a break.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The time of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, when we take a look at this, the U.N. 
business is a complicated, complex business. We work closely with the 
Department of State, I&R, and others in this. We for years had a good 
working relationship. I do not think it is necessary for us to abandon 
that relationship or supplement it. So I am going to urge that we do 
not mess with what we have got now. If it turns out that there is a 
need to do that down the road, I will come back and admit it. But I do 
not think we are there at this point; so I will thank the gentlewoman 
for her amendment and the spirit in which it is offered.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank the gentleman very much for 
his response and for this debate, but I want to reiterate the purpose 
of this amendment, really, and it has nothing to do with whether one 
supports or opposes the United Nations. Basically, this amendment 
requires the GAO to conduct a study, a report, that would be submitted 
in an unclassified form but may contain a classified annex with regard 
to the sharing of information between our intelligence agencies and the

[[Page H5903]]

United Nations leading up to the war against Iraq. I believe the 
American people have a right to know this and this is what this 
sentiment of this amendment is, and I would urge the gentleman to 
reconsider.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) has again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I well understand the purpose of the 
gentlewoman's amendment, and what I am trying to say and outline for 
her is that dealing with the United Nations with intelligence is an 
extraordinarily complex issue, and I do not think there is a particular 
body in Congress that has more experience than the oversight committees 
on intelligence, House and Senate. And I therefore say give us a chance 
to do our job and I think she will understand. If the gentlewoman wants 
to know how much intelligence has been shared with the U.N., I 
guarantee we can find out upstairs.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman again for that response; 
but, again, this amendment allows the American people to know what that 
information was in a declassified form. This amendment allows for a 
classified index, and I believe in terms of the fact that U.S. tax 
dollars were of course used in this war that people, the American 
people, just have a right to ask these questions and have the right to 
know. This has nothing to do with whether one supports or opposes the 
United Nations.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, this is not supporting or opposing the 
U.N. I will tell the gentlewoman flat out that I do not have the 
capacity to declassify information. Our committee does not. We can get 
involved in a process, but the declassification question is another 
issue which I would love to enlist her support on on how we can make it 
better, but that is not part of this amendment.


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will once again remind Members to 
refrain from improper references to the Senate.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Lee) will be postponed.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Dreier) having assumed the chair, Mr. Simpson, Chairman pro tempore of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________


Congressional Record: June 26, 2003 (House)
Page H5943-H5946


 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pence). Pursuant to House Resolution 295 
and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill, H.R. 2417.

                              {time}  1020


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mrs. Biggert (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on 
Wednesday, June 25, 2003, a request for a recorded vote on amendment 
No. 6 printed in House report 108-176 by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee) had been postponed.


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee Of The Whole

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, 
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further 
proceedings were postponed in the following order:
  Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings); 
amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich); 
amendment No. 6 by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  The first electronic vote, if ordered, will be conducted as a 15-
minute vote. Remaining electronic votes will be conducted as 5-minute 
votes.




             Amendment No. 4 Offered by Hastings of Florida

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Hastings) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hastings of Florida:
       At the end of subtitle D of title III, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 337. IMPROVEMENT OF RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND RETENTION OF 
                   ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MINORITIES IN THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Pilot Project To Improve Diversity Throughout the 
     Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies for the 
     Recruitment, Hiring and Retention of Ethnic and Cultural 
     Minorities and Women With the Diversity of Skills, Languages 
     and Expertise Reflective of the Current Mission.--The 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out a pilot 
     project under this section to test and evaluate alternative, 
     innovative methods to recruit and hire for the intelligence 
     community women and minorities with diverse ethnic and 
     cultural backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and 
     expertise.
       (b) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the 
     Director shall employ methods such as advertising in foreign 
     language newspapers in the United States, site visits to 
     institutions with a high percentage of students who study 
     English as a second language, and other methods that are not 
     used by the Director under the DCI Diversity Strategic Plan 
     to increase diversity of officers and employees in the 
     intelligence community.
       (c) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the 
     project under this section for a 3-year period.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the 
     Director implements the pilot project under this section, the 
     Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. 
     The report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the project; and
       (2) recommendations on the continuation of the project as 
     well as for improving the effectiveness of the project in 
     meeting the goals of increasing the recruiting and hiring of 
     women and minorities within the intelligence community.
       (e) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, 
     the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress 
     a report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled 
     the "DCI Diversity Strategic Plan", and any subsequent 
     revision to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and 
     employees in the intelligence community, including the short- 
     and long-term goals of the plan. The report shall also 
     provide a detailed description of the progress that has been 
     made by each element of the intelligence community in 
     implementing the plan.
       (2) In implementing the plan, the Director shall 
     incorporate innovative methods for the recruitment and hiring 
     of women and minorities that the Director has determined to 
     be effective from the pilot project carried out under this 
     section.
       (f) Definition.--In this section, the term "intelligence 
     community" has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.

[[Page H5944]]

  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 418, 
noes 0, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 318]

                               AYES--418

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballance
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Becerra
     Bell
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Janklow
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Majette
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Engel
     Fattah
     Gephardt
     Hulshof
     Jefferson
     Kaptur
     Kleczka
     Rangel
     Sessions
     Smith (WA)
     Weldon (PA)
     Wynn
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members 
are reminded there are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.

                              {time}  1042

  Messrs. TANCREDO, SIMPSON, CANTOR, GARY G. MILLER of California, and 
FLAKE changed their vote from "no" to "aye."
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Kucinich

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on Amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kucinich) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Kucinich:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE 
                   PRESIDENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall conduct an audit of all telephone 
     and electronic communications between the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Vice President that 
     relate to weapons of mass destruction obtained or developed 
     by Iraq preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom on or after 
     September 11, 2001.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the audit conducted under sub-section 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 76, 
noes 347, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 319]

                                AYES--76

     Allen
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Blumenauer
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hinchey
     Honda
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Maloney
     Markey
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Miller, George
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Rahall
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Stark
     Strickland
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey

                               NOES--347

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballance
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bell
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Case
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (TN)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dooley (CA)
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emanuel

[[Page H5945]]


     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harman
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley (OR)
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Israel
     Issa
     Istook
     Janklow
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Lynch
     Majette
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Schiff
     Schrock
     Scott (GA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Turner (TX)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Gephardt
     Jefferson
     Kaptur
     Rangel
     Sessions
     Smith (WA)
     Wynn
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert) (during the vote). Members 
are reminded that there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1051

  Ms. DeLAURO and Mr. REYNOLDS changed their vote from "aye" to 
"no."
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                   Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Lee

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on amendment No. 6 offered by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on 
which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Lee:
       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 345. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH UNITED NATIONS 
                   WEAPONS INSPECTORS SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS OF 
                   MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study to determine the extent to which 
     intelligence developed by the Department of Defense and by 
     the intelligence community with respect to weapons of mass 
     destruction obtained or developed by Iraq preceding Operation 
     Iraqi Freedom was made available to the United Nations 
     weapons inspectors and the quantity and quality of the 
     information that was provided (if any).
       (b) Specific Matter Studied.--The study shall provide for 
     an analysis of the sufficiency of the intelligence provided 
     by the Director of Central Intelligence to those weapons 
     inspectors, and whether the information was provided in a 
     timely manner and in a sufficient quantity and quality to 
     enable the inspectors to locate, visit, and conduct 
     investigations on all high and medium value suspected sites 
     of weapons of mass destruction.
       (c) Access to Information.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), 
     the Comptroller General may secure directly from any agency 
     or department of the United States information necessary to 
     carry out the study under subsection (a).
       (2) The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall 
     cooperate with the Comptroller General in expeditiously 
     providing appropriate security clearance to individuals 
     carrying out the study to the extent possible pursuant to 
     existing procedures and requirements, except that no person 
     shall be provided with access to classified information under 
     this section without the appropriate security clearances.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the study conducted under subsection 
     (a). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may contain a classified annex.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185, 
noes 239, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 320]

                               AYES--185

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Ballance
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Case
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Costello
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Majette
     Maloney
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NOES--239

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris

[[Page H5946]]


     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Janklow
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Conyers
     Cubin
     Gephardt
     Lynch
     Rangel
     Sessions
     Smith (WA)
     Wynn
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (during the vote). Members are reminded that 
there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1059

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  1100

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). The question is on the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Shimkus) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Biggert, Chairman pro tempore 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
2417) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 295, she reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  (By unanimous consent, Mrs. Harman was allowed to speak out of 
order.)


                       Thanking Members and Staff

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, now that we have completed debate on our 
intelligence authorization bill for 2004, I just wanted to thank our 
chairman who is graceful, collaborative and bipartisan and the members 
and staff on the majority side and to thank the strong team we have on 
the Democratic side and especially our staff. By name: Christine 
Healey, John Keefe, Marcel Lettre, Wyndee Parker, Beth Larson, Kirk 
McConnell, Bob Emmett and Ilene Romack; and also David Flanders of my 
personal staff for all the effort they put into yesterday's very 
thorough and, I thought, outstanding debate.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to speak out of order.)


                       Thanking Members and Staff

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I too would like to congratulate my ranking 
member and the members of the staff on both sides of the aisle. 
Normally I would name all those staff. This year I am just going to 
point to one individual who really was the architect of the bill for 
the majority, put it together, did the hard work as he always does. He 
does the budget number and he understands the programs. His name is 
Mike Meermans. In addition to the spectacular work he did for us in a 
bipartisan and a thoroughly professional way, Mr. Meermans and his 
family had a sudden and significant illness in the family. We wish his 
family well and we wish his son Godspeed, full and complete recovery.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                          ____________________