113th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 113-102
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
----------
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 1960
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
June 7, 2013.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
[...]
Defense Science Board recommendations on Deterrent Response
Capabilities
The committee is aware that the Defense Science Board (DSB)
completed its report ``Resilient Military Systems and the
Advanced Cyber Threat'' in January 2013. As part of that
review, the committee noted that the DSB made several
observations relevant to U.S. deterrent response capabilities
in the face of severe and/or catastrophic cyber attacks on the
United States.
First, the committee is aware that the DSB concluded that
the severity of certain types of cyber threats added further
reason for a non-nuclear conventional strike capability. The
committee continues to support expeditious development of
conventional prompt global strike capabilities, as well as the
supporting doctrinal and concept development to guide potential
employment, and states its views on conventional prompt global
strike in another section of this report.
In addition, the DSB observed that, ``[p]resumably one
would characterize a catastrophic Tier V-VI adversary cyber
attack on the United States as `extreme circumstances' in the
public language of the 2010 NPR, so that is not precluded in
the stated policy, but it is not explicitly mentioned.'' The
committee encourages the Department to consider cyber in the
Nation's deterrence doctrine, including better articulation of
what circumstances might fall within the ``extreme
circumstances'' language of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
Based on the findings of the DSB, the committee is
concerned that the United States should make further progress
in developing response options and capabilities to support a
full-spectrum cyber deterrence strategy, including the
potential leverage of both conventional and nuclear
capabilities. Additionally, the committee awaits the response
from the Department on their views of the DSB's findings and
recommendations, as promised during the March 13, 2013, hearing
with the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer and
the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. The committee encourages the
Department to consider all of these concerns as they draft
their response.
[...]
Open-Source Intelligence Utilization
The committee notes that open-source intelligence (OSINT)
is intelligence that is produced from publicly available
information collected, exploited, and disseminated to an
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific
intelligence requirement. The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) directed the
Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for OSINT to be
incorporated into the larger military intelligence strategy.
The committee recognizes that the accessibility of open-source
information has increased significantly in recent years due to
rapid growth of international internet use and consideration as
a global commons. Therefore, the committee directs the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing to
the congressional defense and the congressional intelligence
committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, on the current status of the OSINT strategy and
operations within the Department of Defense. The briefing
should include the following:
(1) An overview of the current strategy for OSINT
collection, to meet the intelligence priorities of the
military services and combatant commands;
(2) A description of all OSINT activities within the
military services and combatant commands including the
level of coordination and deconfliction between ongoing
joint efforts;
(3) A description of the current level of
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence
Open Source Center;
(4) Gaps in OSINT capabilities within the Department;
(5) Research, development, test and evaluation
efforts in the Department related to collection,
processing and sharing of open-source intelligence; and
(6) Recommendations for future improvements in the
Department's OSINT strategy and efforts.
[...]
Subtitle B--Space Activities
Section 911--National Security Space Satellite Reporting Policy
This section would amend chapter 135 of title 10, United
States Code, to add a notification, required of the Secretary
of Defense, of each attempt by a foreign actor to disrupt,
degrade, or destroy a U.S. national security space capability.
The notification shall be submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees not later than 48 hours after the
Secretary determines that there is reason to believe such
attempt occurred. Not later than 10 days after the date on
which the Secretary determines that there is reason to believe
such attempt occurred, further information should be provided
including the name and a brief description of the national
security space capability that was impacted by such attempt; a
description of the attempt, including the foreign actor, the
date and time of the attempt, and any related capability outage
and the mission impact of such outage; and any other
information considered relevant by the Secretary.
The appropriate committees are defined as the congressional
defense committees, and with respect to a U.S. national
security space capability that is intelligence-related, the
congressional intelligence committees.
The committee notes the Director of National Intelligence's
2013 Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment that
threats to vital United States space services will increase
during the next decade as disruptive and destructive counter-
space capabilities are developed.
Section 912--National Security Space Defense and Protection
This section would require the Secretary of the Air Force
to enter into an arrangement with the National Research Council
to conduct a review in response to the near-term and long-term
threats to the national security space systems of the United
States. The review should include:
(1) The range of strategic options available to
address such threats, in terms of deterring hostile
actions, defeating hostile actions, or surviving
hostile actions until such actions conclude;
(2) Strategies and plans to counter such threats,
including resilience, reconstitution, disaggregation,
and other appropriate concepts; and
(3) Existing and planned architectures, warfighter
requirements, technology development, systems,
workforce, or other factors related to addressing such
threats.
The National Research Council should also identify
recommend courses of action to address the threats, including
potential barriers or limiting factors in implementing such
courses of action.
This section would also modify section 911(f)(1) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (10
U.S.C. 2271), to include a description of how the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community plan to provide the
necessary national security capabilities, through alternative
space, airborne, or ground systems, if a foreign actor
degrades, denies access to, or destroys U.S. national security
space capabilities.
Section 913--Space Acquisition Strategy
This section would require the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in consultation with
the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense, to
establish a strategy for the multi-year procurement of
commercial satellite services to include:
(1) An analysis of financial or other benefits to
multi-year acquisition approaches;
(2) An analysis of the risks associated with such an
approach;
(3) An identification of methods to address planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution challenges to
such an approach, to include consideration of methods
to address potential termination liability or
cancellation costs associated with these types of
contracts;
(4) An identification of any changes needed in the
requirements development and approval processes of the
Department of Defense to facilitate effective and
efficient implementation of such strategy; and,
(5) An identification of any necessary changes to
policy, procedures, regulation, or legislation in order
for such strategy to be successful.
This section would also require the strategy and the
elements supporting it to be provided to the congressional
defense committees by the Under Secretary not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 914--Space Control Mission Report
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the
space control mission of the Department of Defense.
Section 915--Responsive Launch
This section would require a study by the Department of
Defense Executive Agent for Space on responsive, low-cost
launch efforts to include a review of existing and past
operationally responsive, low-cost launch capabilities; a
technology assessment of various methods to develop an
operationally responsive, low-cost launch capability; and an
assessment of the viability of any other innovative methods,
such as secondary payload adapters on existing launch vehicles.
In addition, this section would require a report from the
Executive Agent for Space regarding the results of the above
mentioned study, as well as a consolidated plan for development
within the Department of an operationally responsive, low-cost
launch capability.
The committee notes that there are multiple ongoing efforts
in the Department, including Air Force, Army, and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency programs. The committee is
concerned that these efforts may be duplicative and are not
fully coordinated across the Department.
[...]
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Matters
Section 921--Revision of Secretary of Defense Authority to Engage in
Commercial Activities as Security for Intelligence Collection
Activities
This section would amend current statutory authority for
the Secretary of Defense to authorize the conduct of those
commercial activities necessary to provide security for
authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken
by the Department of Defense. This section would:
(1) Delete the requirement that the Secretary of
Defense designate a single office within the Defense
Intelligence Agency to be responsible for the
management and supervision of all commercial activities
authorized by the intelligence commercial activity
statute (10 U.S.C. 431-437);
(2) Change the annual audit requirement to a biennial
audit requirement;
(3) Add the congressional defense committees to the
reporting requirement; and
(4) Insert a definition of ``congressional
intelligence committees'' for purposes of section 437
of title 10, United States Code.
Section 922--Department of Defense Intelligence Priorities
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
establish a written policy governing the internal coordination
and prioritization of intelligence priorities of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant
commands, and the military departments to improve
identification of the intelligence needs of the Department of
Defense. This section would also require the Secretary of
Defense to identify any significant intelligence gaps of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
combatant commands, and the military departments. The Secretary
would provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees and the congressional intelligence committees
regarding the policy established under this section and any
identified significant intelligence gaps.
Section 923--Defense Clandestine Service
This section would prohibit the use of 50 percent of the
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2014 for
the Defense Clandestine Service to be obligated or expended for
the Defense Clandestine Service until such time as the
Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense
committees, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate that the Defense Clandestine Service
is designed primarily to fulfill priorities of the Department
of Defense that are unique to the Department of Defense or
otherwise unmet; and provide unique capabilities to the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
This section would also require the Secretary of Defense
to: design metrics that will be used to ensure that the Defense
Clandestine Service is employed in the manner certified;
provide annual assessments for 5-years based on the metrics
established; submit prompt notifications of any significant
changes; and provide quarterly briefings on deployments and
collection activities.
Section 924--Prohibition on National Intelligence Program Consolidation
This section would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from
using any of the funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise available to the Department of Defense to be used
during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act and ending on December 31, 2014, to execute: the
separation of the portion of the Department of Defense budget
designated as part of the National Intelligence Program from
the rest of the Department of Defense budget; the consolidation
of the portion of the Department of Defense budget designated
as part of the National Intelligence Program within the
Department of Defense budget; or the establishment of a new
appropriations account or appropriations account structure for
such funds.
This section would also require the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of National Intelligence to jointly brief the
congressional defense and intelligence committees not later
than 30 days after enactment of this Act on any planning
relating to future execution that has occurred during the past
two years and any anticipated future planning and related
efforts.
The committee is concerned that the executive branch has
failed to notify the appropriate congressional committees about
its continuing efforts to pursue consolidation of the portion
of the Department of Defense budget designated as part of the
National Intelligence Program.
[...]
Secure Internet Protocol Router Network for the Congressional Defense
Committees
The Department of Defense maintains a classified Secure
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to provide secure
networking among Department of Defense components, as well as
with selected interagency partners. The committee is aware that
access to the network is available to much of the executive
branch, but to virtually none of the legislative branch of the
U.S. Government. The committee believes that having access to
SIPRNET would improve its ability to conduct oversight of the
Department of Defense, as well as help save funds by
eliminating printing, travel, shipping, and courier costs of
required communications. The committee notes that it is
supplied with the means for secure telephony and believes this
provides a suitable precedent to expand into other methods of
secure collaboration between the Department and Congress.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees
by February 1, 2014, on extending SIPRNET access to the
aforementioned committees by December 1, 2014. The briefing
should include an assessment of the operational policies for
implementing SIPRNET, as well as the costs, logistics, security
considerations, and other matters the Secretary deems
pertinent.
[...]
Subtitle E--Sensitive Military Operations
Section 1041--Congressional Notification of Sensitive Military
Operations
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
promptly submit to the congressional defense committees notice
in writing of any sensitive military operation following such
operation. This section would also require the Secretary of
Defense to establish procedures not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act for providing such notice
in a manner consistent with the national security of the United
States and the protection of operational integrity.
The term ``sensitive military operation'' would include
lethal and capture operations conducted by the U.S. Armed
Forces outside of the United States pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50
U.S.C. 1541 note) or any other authority except a declaration
of war or a specific statutory authorization for the use of
force other than the 2001 authorization.
This section is not intended to create or alter reporting
requirements of any other agency or department outside of the
Department of Defense.
Section 1042--Report on Process for Determining Targets of Lethal
Operations
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report within 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act containing an explanation of the legal and policy
considerations and approval processes used in determining
whether an individual or group of individuals could be the
target of a lethal operation or capture operation conducted by
the Armed Forces of the United States outside the United
States.
Section 1043--Counterterrorism Operational Briefings
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
provide quarterly briefings to the congressional defense
committees outlining Department of Defense counterterrorism
operations and related activities. Each briefing would include:
a global update on activity within each geographic combatant
command; an overview of authorities and legal issues including
limitations; an outline of interagency activities and
initiatives; and any other matters the Secretary considers
appropriate.
Subtitle F--Nuclear Forces
Section 1051--Prohibition on Elimination of the Nuclear Triad
This section would prohibit any of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense from being
obligated or expended to reduce, convert, or decommission any
strategic delivery system of the United States if such
reduction, conversion, or decommissioning would eliminate a leg
of the nuclear triad. This section defines ``nuclear triad'' to
be composed of: (1) land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles; (2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their
associated ballistic missile submarines; and (3) nuclear-
certified strategic bombers.
Section 1052--Limitation on Availability of Funds for Reduction of
Nuclear Forces
This section would provide that none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense or
the National Nuclear Security Administration may be obligated
or expended to carry out reductions to the nuclear forces of
the United States required by the New START Treaty until the
Secretary of Defense provides the plan required by section
1042(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) and the President certifies that
any reductions to U.S. nuclear forces below the level required
by the New START Treaty will be carried out only pursuant to a
treaty or international agreement approved according to the
Treaty Clause of the Constitution of the United States or an
affirmative Act of Congress. This section would except those
funds required to carry out inspections pursuant to the New
START Treaty or reductions made to ensure the safety, security,
reliability, and credibility of U.S. nuclear weapons and
delivery systems.
Section 1053--Limitation on Availability of Funds for Reduction or
Consolidation of Dual-Capable Aircraft Based in Europe
This section would provide that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available may not be
used to reduce or consolidate United States Dual-Capable
Aircraft in Europe until 90 days after the Secretary of Defense
certifies to the congressional defense committees that the
Russian Federation has carried out similar actions; the
Secretary has consulted with the member states of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) about the proposed action
with respect to United States Dual Capable Aircraft; and, there
is a consensus among NATO member states in support of such
action.
Section 1054--Statement of Policy on Implementation of Any Agreement
for Further Arms Reduction Below the Levels of the New START Treaty;
Limitation on Retirement or Dismantlement of Strategic Delivery Systems
This section would provide a Statement of Policy that
reductions of United States nuclear forces that would rely on
the verification regime of the New START Treaty can only be
made pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President as
set forth in the Treaty Clause of the Constitution of the
United States or by Act of Congress.
This section would also provide that reductions below 800
strategic delivery vehicles, as defined by the New START
Treaty, may not be made unless the President certifies a treaty
has entered into force or an international agreement made
pursuant to an affirmative Act of Congress has entered into
force and such agreement includes significant and proportional
reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons of the Russian
Federation; the President certifies the Russian Federation is
in compliance with its nuclear arms control obligations to the
United States; and, the President has ``high confidence'' in
intelligence community judgments on the nuclear forces of the
People's Republic of China.
Section 1055--Sense of Congress on Compliance with Nuclear Arms Control
Agreements
This section would state the sense of Congress that the
President should consider not seeking to further limit or
reduce the nuclear forces of the United States, including by
negotiation, with a foreign country that remains in active
noncompliance with existing nuclear arms control obligations,
such as the Russian Federation.
This section would also require the President, if he
determines that a foreign country is not in compliance with its
nuclear arms control obligations, to immediately consult with
the Congress on the implications of such noncompliance; to
submit to Congress a plan concerning the diplomatic strategy of
the President to engage such foreign country to bring it into
full compliance with such obligations; and, at the earliest
date, to submit a report to Congress detailing whether
adherence to such agreement remains in the national security
interest of the United States and how the United States will
redress the effect of such noncompliance.
Section 1056--Retention of Capability to Redeploy Multiple
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
This section would require the Secretary of the Air Force
to ensure that the Air Force is capable of deploying multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to Minuteman
III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and any ground-
based strategic deterrent follow-on to such missiles. This
section would require the Secretary to ensure that the Air
Force is capable of commencing such deployment not later than
270 days after the date on which the President determines such
deployment is necessary.
This section would also require the Nuclear Weapons Council
to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile contains a
sufficient number of warheads that are capable of being
deployed as MIRVs on Minuteman III and any ground-based
strategic deterrent follow on to such missiles and that such
deployment is capable of being commenced not later than 270
days after the date on which the President determines such
deployment is necessary.
The April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that, ``the
United States will `deMIRV' all deployed ICBMs, so that each
Minuteman III ICBM has only one nuclear warhead.'' The
committee believes that the capability to ``reMIRV'' the
Nation's ICBMs must be retained to mitigate the risk of a
widespread technical failure in another leg of the nuclear
triad or changes in the geopolitical environment that requires
a more robust U.S. nuclear force posture.
The committee's intent is to mandate retention of the
capability to reMIRV ICBMs, but it does not intend to impose
undue costs by an unreasonable timeframe for initiating
``reMIRVing.'' The committee is also aware that the commander,
U.S. Strategic Command is assessing the requirements related to
reMIRVing capabilities. The committee expects the Secretary of
the Air Force, in coordination with the commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, to provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees by October 1, 2013, on the current and
expected future requirements, costs, and timelines for
beginning to reMIRV the Nation's ICBMs.
Section 1057--Assessment of Nuclear Weapons Program of the People's
Republic of China
This section would amend section 1045(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-
239) to extend the date of the required assessment until August
15, 2014.
This section would also provide not more than 75 percent of
the funds made available to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for travel may be obligated or expended until 30 days
after the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional
committees that the assessment has begun.
Section 1058--Cost Estimates for Nuclear Weapons
This section would amend section 1043(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-
81) to include in the annual report required by such section a
detailed estimate of the personnel costs associated with
sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent and nuclear
weapons stockpile of the United States. The report required by
section 1043(a) of Public Law 112-81 would also be required to
describe how and which locations were included with the cost
estimate provided by the report.
Section 1059--Report on New START Treaty
This section would require the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to jointly submit to the
congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate on whether the New START Treaty
is in the national security interests of the United States.
[...]
Section 1061--Enhancement of Capacity of the United States Government
to Analyze Captured Records
This section would allow the Secretary of Defense to
establish a Conflict Records Research Center to facilitate
research and analysis of records captured from countries,
organizations, and individuals, now or once hostile, to the
United States.
The committee recognizes that there are significant records
available to the U.S. Government that could be useful for
academic and policy research once immediate, tactical
exploitation and dissemination has occurred. The committee
believes that research and analysis of such captured records
would increase the understanding of factors related to
international relations, counterterrorism, conventional and
unconventional warfare and, ultimately, enhance national
security.
The committee notes that such a center currently exists,
but additional statutory authorization would allow the Center
to be funded collectively by the Department of Defense and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other
departments and agencies, rather than rely on discrete partner
funding for each activity. This would also allow the Center to
receive funding from other agencies, states, or other foreign
and domestic entities.
The committee also understands that there exists procedures
by which the intelligence community works with this Center to
ensure that the intelligence value of specific documents is
exhausted before releasing them to the academic community, as
well as ensure the protection of classified information,
sources and methods, and personally identifiable information.
The committee expects the Center to ensure such procedures
continue to be implemented in a manner to protect such
information and encourages the Department to continue working
with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to
refine and improve those procedures.
[...]
Report and Briefings on Declassification of Certain Missile Defense
Information
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to make available to
the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, a summary of the deliberations
of the National Disclosure Policy Committee related to the
release of classified, Official Use Only, or For Official Use
Only information on U.S. missile defenses to the Russian
Federation since at least January 1, 2007, by not later than
November 30, 2013. Such summary should include, at a minimum,
the reason for the proposed release, the outcome of the
deliberation of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, and a
risk assessment of the potential use or misuse of the
information, including whether the information could be
transferred to another party, if the National Disclosure Policy
Committee determined to release information to Russia on U.S.
missile defenses.
The committee also directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, or a designee, to
provide the aforementioned congressional committees with
regular briefings, beginning November 30, 2013, and every 6
months thereafter until November 20, 2018, if there are
additional disclosures, on additional releases and associated
deliberations of the National Disclosure Policy Committee.
[...]
Use of Missile Defense Declassification Authority by Director, Missile
Defense Agency
The committee is aware that, pursuant to the Ballistic
Missile Defense System Security Classification Guide, the
Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is given the authority
by the Secretary of Defense to exercise Original Classification
Authority and Foreign Disclosure Authority to establish
security classification policy and guidance over MDA funded
technology, development, and acquisition programs. This
authority is delegated to the Director because of his expertise
of MDA technology and the risks of its disclosure.
The committee continues to be concerned about the potential
risks of disclosure of sensitive missile defense technologies
to foreign parties. Therefore, the committee directs the
Director, Missile Defense Agency to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives by August 16, 2013, that lists
each example of a request for an exception made by the
Director, or submitted to the Director, for use of the Foreign
Disclosure Authority related to the Russian Federation covering
the period between January 1, 2007 through April 1, 2013. The
report should include a brief summary of each example,
including the Russian entity receiving the information and the
specific information or MDA technology involved.
The committee directs the Director to provide an interim
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives by July 15, 2013, regarding the
expected scale of this report.
[...]
