1. Introduction

When the United States has common political or strategic objectives with allied and friendly nations, some situations may require that their military capabilities act in concert as a single and seamless force or as one operable system against an adversary. Military operations with coalition partners may take place under bilateral, multinational, or United Nations (UN) auspices. There may be situations where intelligence should be shared with nongovernmental organizations, outside usual politico-military channels, requiring policy and dissemination criteria and authority for each instance.

2. Doctrine for Multinational Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine. There are, however, principles and concepts that provide an initial position for developing the objectives and nature of multinational doctrines.

3. Multinational Intelligence Architecture

The single joint intelligence architecture discussed in Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture," provides a framework to build the multinational intelligence architecture. Figure VIII-1 provides an example of a multinational architecture that supports coalition forces and features JDISS as the core capability for disseminating released or approved for release US intelligence information. The multinational architecture portrayed in Figure VIII-1 was established to provide support the US and UN forces in Somalia as members of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) effort. As the figure shows, two levels of information (intelligence) were established: Level 1 (can be shown to, but not retained by coalition/UN) and Level 2 (intelligence that has been properly cleared for release to coalition/UN). Level 1 intelligence remains within US-only channels, while Level 2 flows to the UNOSOM II information center in Mogadishu either from the UN or via the US Intelligence Support Element in Somalia.

Figure VIII-1Multinational Intelligence Architecture

4. Joint and Multinational Doctrine Relationship

There are close analogies between joint and multinational doctrines that stem from similar needs--to present an adversary a seamless force and for unity of effort of multiple force elements. Many of the principles, issues, and answers to joint operations will be the same or similar in multinational operations. For multinational doctrines, differences in cultural and national perspectives must be understood in order to adapt doctrines or forge new ones.

5. Multinational Intelligence Principles

The principles in Figure VIII-2 are offered as consideration for building intelligence doctrine for multinational operations in addition to the appropriate principles found in joint intelligence doctrine.

a. Adjust National Differences Among Nations. A key to effective multinational intelligence is a readiness, beginning with the highest levels of command, to make required adjustments to national concepts for intelligence support to make the multinational action effective. Areas that need to be addressed include designating a single Director of Intelligence (C-2) and adjusting those intelligence support differences that may affect the integrated employment of intelligence resources and the sharing of intelligence and information. With these things done, successful intelligence support rests in the vision, leadership, skill, and judgment of the multinational command and staff groups.

Figure VIII-2 Intelligence for Multinational Operations

b. Unity of Effort Against Common Threat. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. When the alliance or coalition is constituted against a common adversary, a threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the common adversary should be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.

c. Determining and Planning Intelligence. The multinational command and national forces' intelligence requirements, production, and use should be agreed on, planned, and exercised well in advance of operations. For anticipated situations and operations, a prime objective should be attaining compatibility of intelligence and operating doctrine and concepts, intelligence systems, intelligence-related communications, language and terms, and intelligence services and products. Solutions to problems should be developed and tried before they are required for actual operations so doctrines and procedures are not left to a trial and error methodology during combat. Illustrations of multinational doctrine development and testing can be found in the concepts and exercise programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command.

d. Special Arrangements. Special arrangements unique to coalitions and alliances should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence where there are differences in nations' culture, language and terminology, organizations and structures, operating and intelligence concepts, methodologies, and/or equipment.

PICTURE: UN, Serbian and Croation officials observe preparations and exchange final information prior to launch of a relief airdrop into occupied Croatia.

e. Full Exchange of Intelligence

• Intelligence. The nations should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, determine relevant and attainable objectives, and achieve unified efforts against the adversary. The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be conceived and exercised well before opeations begin. The exchange must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet better understood or changing circumstances. The combatant command J-2s should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the DIA as soon as possible. Assignment to the joint or multinational task force of personnel familiar with foreign disclosure regulations will facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence.

• Sources and Methods. Sharing intelligence sources and methods, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When, however, intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.

g. Multinational Intelligence Center. When there is a multinational command, a multinational intelligence center should be established so that the commander, the C-2, and staffs have the facility and capability for developing multinational intelligence requirements statements and for acquiring and fusing the nations' intelligence contributions. The Multinational Intelligence Center should include a representative from all nations participating in the multinational operation.

h. Liaison Exchange. Intelligence liaison among commands and among supporting and supported organizations should be used to bridge problems of understanding between cultures, languages and terms, doctrines and methodologies, and operational intelligence requirements.

07-16-1996; 15:58:10