

**ANNUAL REPORT 2001**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE**



## Foreword

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The theme of this annual report is, naturally, one of today's hot security topics: radical-Islamic inspired international terrorism, with the attacks on 11 September 2001 as its unprecedented dramatic climax. The National Security Service (BVD) has devoted great energy to this subject and has given it full priority.

The BVD's role in the combat of terrorism is mainly a preventive one. The service collects information in order to gain insight into certain individuals and organisations with a view to preventing terrorist attacks. International co-operation in this field is of essential importance. At the same time, the BVD promotes security measures in order to enhance the protection against possible attacks. In its 'Action Plan for Counter-Terrorism and Security' the Cabinet has defined several measures aimed at countering terrorism. One of these measures is the decision to expand the BVD in the next few years.

This annual report is the last annual report of the National Security Service (BVD). As from 29 May 2002 the service will be renamed General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst). The AIVD's motto remains unchanged: 'per undas adversas' (against the current). After all, also the new service is expected to warn us when vital interests of the state are at stake, even if the message is not always welcome.

Finally, the annual report does not include any information on operational details. This information has been provided to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services.

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*Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations*



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# 1 Developments relating to national security

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This chapter, dealing with general developments in the field of national security, first describes developments within international terrorism. This is followed by an overview of the principal developments in other fields on which the BVD focuses attention. The chapter is concluded by some information about the new Intelligence and Security Services Act, which comes into force in 2002.

## 1.1 International terrorism

In the past year the world was confronted with a serious aggravation of the international security situation. Dramatic events demonstrated that the rapidly expanding transnational network of Muslim extremists has developed an inconceivable strike power. The simultaneous attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September did not only hit the heart of the United States, but also the entire international community. Since then a hurriedly set up broad coalition has been trying to beat radical Islamic or Islamist terrorism. The first target was Afghanistan, since this was the principal base of operation and hiding place of the 'Islamic front' headed by Osama bin Laden and other leaders. In annex 3 the development of Islamist terrorism over the years has been described in detail.

Major problems in combating the expansive terrorist network are the multitude of its international branches and its diffuse character. Over the past few decades, taking advantage of mass migration flows and increased opportunities for transport and communication, members of the network have scattered all over the world, but kept in contact with each other. This enables them in principle to plot or to carry out a violent attack wherever and whenever they like. In 2001 it became evident that the Netherlands, too, may function as a base of operation for such terrorist activities. On the basis of BVD information, part of an international terrorist cell that was preparing an attack on an American target in Paris was rounded up in Rotterdam. An analysis of the background of the extremists involved in the thwarted attack in France, in combination with information on the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks and other members of the Islamist terrorist network in western Europe, shed light on another alarming development. Until recently, Afghanistan veterans and members of small groups of radical Muslims resident in the Netherlands - usually illegals - used to occupy a practically completely isolated position in society. At present, however, they are increasingly joining up with the ultra-orthodox sector of established Islamic communities in the Netherlands. In these circles people repudiate the 'heathen' western society while they feel an emotional involvement in the plight of oppressed religious brothers in other countries. Extremists take advantage of these feelings by influencing and thus radicalising particularly young Muslims in order to enlarge their support in the West. Not only in the Netherlands, but also in other European countries it has turned out that a number of young Muslims who grew up in the West and who are often going through an identity crisis are receptive to recruitment for the armed Islamic fight.

It has become clear that a network of Muslim extremists operating in the Netherlands can directly be linked to the tragic death of two Dutch youths of Moroccan origin who lived at Eindhoven. They left the Netherlands late December 2001 and were killed in the Indian federal state of Kashmir early January 2002. It has been established that the two boys were recruited and psychologically prepared for participation in the jihad, the holy war against all enemies of Islam, in the Netherlands. They also got all the logistical support they needed to achieve what they saw as their

ultimate ideal, i.e. martyrdom at the Islamic front. The boys were well-educated second-generation Muslims who were raised in the Netherlands and who seemed to be largely integrated into the Dutch society. It has turned out that also a number of other young Muslims with a comparable background are receptive to such radical ideas.

Never before has it been so manifest that extreme religious convictions within part of the Muslim community also involve risks in the sphere of radicalisation and terrorism, in addition to other security-related problems, such as a polarisation between population groups or imported conflicts. But terrorism and radicalism also affect the image and acceptance of Islam in the Netherlands and thus the integration of Muslims into society. This calls for special attention for anti-integration tendencies. We should prevent Dutch residents from getting involved in political-Islamic inspired violence in other countries or even in this country.

## **1.2 Wide-ranging approach**

The recent development of the global threat from Islamist terrorism shows that it would be wrong to isolate counter-terrorism from other problem areas. The emphasis should be put on prevention. This requires knowledge about radical-Islamic and other extremist movements at home and abroad, knowledge about massive migration movements and their 'push and pull factors', insight into the breeding ground for new terrorist movements, insight into developments within the 'new minorities' in the Netherlands (e.g. Afghans, Somalians and Iraqis) and attention for phenomena that frustrate the integration of Muslims into the Dutch society.

Neither should we lose sight of the relations between population groups in the Netherlands. An involvement of ethnic minorities in terrorist attacks or appreciative reactions to such attacks from small groups of sympathisers may trigger hostile feelings among the indigenous population towards certain ethnic minorities. It is also possible that such an intensified interethnic polarisation will trigger unwelcome activities by extreme right-wing groups on the one hand and ethnic-religious radical organisations on the other. The BVD has therefore intensified its focus on these processes, which threaten social cohesion.

The events in the United States and Afghanistan have prompted the international community to put the phenomenon of terrorism high on the political agenda. By now various initiatives have been taken to enhance the protection of the vulnerable western society against such violent attacks by political extremists. In view of the transnational character of terrorism, it is necessary to intensify international co-operation on the combat of this phenomenon. Despite the internationally shared resolve and determination to stem the tide of terrorism, there are also differences of opinion between, for example, the United States and Europe, but also between some European countries, about the course of action to be followed. Ideas about what should be ranged under terrorism and what measures would be appropriate to safeguard the world from this type of violence are not always in agreement, which makes close consultation and co-ordination necessary.

In general the policy of the Dutch government is focused on the prevention of radicalisation processes. Political organisations or groups that propagate extreme, intolerant and undemocratic views are kept within the limits of the democratic legal order by means of a wide range of measures. This approach ranges from dialogue to legal action. This approach, which not only applies to radical-Islamic organisations, but also to other radical groups, is aimed at, for example, preventing radicalisation processes from growing into terrorism. The Netherlands advocates such a broad and differentiated approach of political extremist minorities also within a European context.

With respect to organisations that have already moved from radicalism to terrorism there is no room for any differentiation. In this case the Netherlands follows the international, widely approved repressive course. Terrorist threats should be tackled with great resolve, which implies that security services should mainly focus on targeted intelligence gathering on the basis of a good combination of human and technological resources. They should seek to optimise the present methods and to realise close co-operation and intensive information exchange at a national and international level. The information exchange within the long-time co-operation group of European security services has been improved on the initiative of the BVD.

The attacks in the US have once more poignantly demonstrated that counter-terrorism is a long-term process. Terrorists inspired by radical-Islamic motives are not driven by an urge for quick success, they see their actions as efforts in the light of eternity. Experience has shown that the preparation of attacks may even take years, possibly with long intervals of inactivity. Such a mode of operation prompts security services to work with an entirely different time frame. Their operations and resources should stretch over a much longer period of time than in the past, while meagre-result periods should not immediately lead to a reduction in or discontinuation of the monitoring of certain individuals and groups. Within the context of its recent 'Action Plan for Counter-Terrorism and Security', the Dutch government has decided to reinforce the BVD in order to guarantee adequate counter-terrorist efforts also in the long term.

### **1.3 Other developments**

The fields of interest described in this annual report cover a wide area. In addition to terrorism, as described above, the BVD also focuses on aspects relating to the integration of ethnic minorities, for example on foreign, anti-western influencing attempts aimed at frustrating this integration. It is becoming more and more evident that terrorism and counterforces in integration have grounds in common. Terrorism-related activities have also manifested themselves in the field of illegal migration. The BVD tries to gain insight into the way in which certain terrorist groups are building networks that enable them to smuggle people into western Europe.

BVD investigations are also focused on politically motivated violent activism. At the moment violent types of activism mainly manifest themselves within animal rights activism and within the anti-globalisation movement. It is remarkable that within anti-globalisation the neo-Marxist/neo-Trotskyist movement is winning ground.

It is still necessary to watch the activities of foreign powers and their intelligence services in the Netherlands. These activities do not only include traditional forms of espionage as initiated by, for example, Russia, but also attempts by countries to get a grip on their former subjects who fled to the Netherlands. Countries like Iraq and Iran are using their intelligence services to track down and register opposition members who fled to the Netherlands. The attempts by the Chinese government to pressure followers of the Falun Gong movement in other countries are also reason for concern.

Within the context of national security, the BVD contributes in various ways to Dutch efforts to safeguard the international legal order. The service helps, for example, to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Several countries of concern in the Middle East and the Far East are still continuing their efforts to build up their own arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The BVD also investigated a possible involvement of the Netherlands in undesirable trade in conventional weapons. At the moment there is no specific evidence to suggest that flows of

weapons are being transported from or via the Netherlands to trouble spots.

The BVD's efforts in relation to the international legal order also include the identification and assessment of threats to international organisations based in the Netherlands, in particular the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which are both located in The Hague.

When the new Intelligence and Security Services Act comes into force in 2002, the duties of the BVD will be extended by conducting investigations into other countries, the so-called foreign intelligence task. This widens the possibilities of the new General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) to investigate phenomena such as terrorism, illegal migration, etc. The subjects for investigation are determined by the Prime Minister in agreement with the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. At the moment the BVD is discussing the selection of these subjects with the ministries concerned on the basis of a list of requirements of the future clients. With a view to the new foreign intelligence task, the working-level relations with the relevant ministries, the future Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and with foreign intelligence services are being intensified and expanded.

Under the current Act, protective security is a separate task. The incorporation of the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA) into the BVD has reinforced the BVD's role as security advisor. This security advice is partly focused on vital sectors in society. Within this context an extensive survey was made of security at Schiphol Airport. The recommendations resulting from this survey are now being worked out.

Security advice may also relate to the protection of information. As a consequence of the rapid developments in communication and information technology, information security has to meet more and more new requirements. The likeliness of large-scale eavesdropping systems like Echelon has increased the awareness of the need for security measures. A new development is the fact that it will soon be possible to evaluate and certify security equipment in the Netherlands according to internationally endorsed standards.

A third element in the protective security function is security screening of applicants for positions involving confidentiality. At the moment the BVD is developing a new investigation model for this screening. The BVD recently started screening applicants for positions involving confidentiality at the police.

#### **1.4 Towards a new Intelligence and Security Services Act**

The Intelligence and Security Services Act, which has provided for the general statutory terms of reference for the BVD and the Military Intelligence Service (MID) since 1988, will be replaced by a new Act of Parliament. The name of the BVD will be changed into General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst), and the MID will be renamed Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD, Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst).

Both the First and the Second Chamber of the States General (Dutch Lower and Upper House) passed the bill, which seeks to find the right balance between the need to have well-equipped intelligence and security services - with all required special powers - in the interest of national security, and the need to respect the fundamental rights of citizens and to comply with the

requirements of democracy. The key principle is the fact that the activities of public services should be foreseeable, transparent and subject to supervision. The attacks in the United States did not give cause to amend the bill. It seems that the right balance has been found between the sometimes contradictory requirements to be met. This gives the new act lasting value.

The new act provides for an exhaustive regulation of the tasks and powers of the AIVD. A new function has been added to the traditional BVD tasks, the so-called foreign intelligence function, i.e. conducting investigations into other countries. A limitative list of special powers, such as surveillance and interception of communications has been set out in the act, as well as the criteria for the exercise of these special powers. The act also provides for an obligation to notify persons of the fact that certain special powers have been used against them.

The act obliges the AIVD to bring out an annual report. The BVD has already brought out annual reports since 1991. The annual report should look back to the fields of interest in the year under review and look ahead to areas of interest in the current year.

Oversight of the AIVD's activities is provided for by the setting up an independent committee. The members of this committee will be appointed on the recommendation of the Second Chamber. The committee has access to all information it needs for a proper performance of its duties. Under the act it is possible to provide certain information to the committee that will not be in the public domain.

The new Intelligence and Security Services Act will come into force on 29 May 2002, except for Chapter 6. This chapter, dealing with the supervisory committee, will come into effect on 26 April 2002.



## 2 Counterforces in integration

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The integration of ethnic minorities is of great importance to the preservation of cohesion in society. Consequently, a frustration of this integration process, whether purposeful or not, constitutes a threat to that cohesion. It may interfere with the free exercise of democratic constitutional rights of Dutch residents or it may trigger conflicts between population groups from various ethnical or national origin. Another consequence may be that people resident in the Netherlands feel insecure because of intimidation or undesirable interference from their mother countries. This affects the principles of our democratic legal order.

A stagnating or failing integration process may also involve new security problems when individuals and groups alienate themselves from the Dutch society. Isolated groups are more receptive to radical ideas. They might turn against the society surrounding them or against part of that society.

This chapter describes the various counterforces in the integration process. The first paragraph focuses on the various extreme right-wing groups in the Netherlands. The next paragraphs describe specific integration problems in various migrant communities. The chapter is concluded by a paragraph on the influence of Islamic non-governmental organisations.

### 2.1 The far right

Extreme right-wing groups usually propagate an undemocratic range of ideas and react against the presence of foreigners in the Netherlands in a xenophobic or even racist manner. The extreme right-wing political organisations and movements in the Netherlands are divided among themselves and in some cases they adhere to quite different ideologies. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish roughly two extreme right-wing categories. The first is the so-called 'civil ultra right', the representatives of which propagate ultra-nationalist and xenophobic ideas. The second, more radical category encompasses the 'neo-Nazi' groups, which hold unadulterated anti-democratic and racist views.

The civil extreme right-wing parties did not succeed in recovering from the electoral blows and the organisational depression with which they were faced in the past few years. Although it was not officially confirmed, the 'Nederlands Blok' (NB, Dutch Bloc) has been dissolved since it lost its only seat on the council of Utrecht in 1998. Also Mr Janmaat, the political leader of the 'Centrumdemocraten' (CD, Centre Democrats), has publicly stated that he hardly saw any gain in returning to the political arena. Lacking a cadre, the CD now seems definitely to be on the way down.

The 'Nieuwe Nationale Partij' (NNP, New National Party) is the only civil ultra right party that has a distinct following. The party mainly caught the public eye in 2001 through its Internet page and through pamphlet campaigns. The NNP cadre, which mainly consists of CD and CP'86 veterans, is gradually being replaced by a younger generation. The 'All-Dutch' organisation 'Voorpost' hardly attracted any public attention in 2001.

As opposed to the less radical ultra right groups, the Dutch neo-Nazi groups were quite active in 2001. 'Stormfront Nederland' (SFN), which was set up by dissident members of the 'Nederlandse Volksunie' (NVU, Dutch People's Union), held unannounced, short demonstrations in a number of big cities. The police could barely prevent violent confrontations with leftist adversaries. SFN

believes in a national-socialist and racist ideology and presents itself as an advocate of unity within the far right. The membership changes frequently and consists mainly of young skinheads and members of the rave scene, who are hardly politically motivated. The leaders do not have much grip on the individual members.

The NVU successfully contested in court a demonstration ban imposed by the local authorities at Kerkrade. On 24 March a group of about 150 Dutch and German neo-Nazis marched the streets of the cordoned off town of Kerkrade with the slogan 'Against criminalisation of nationalists'. Using the opportunity offered by the court decision, the NVU leadership announced its intention to organise legal demonstrations in Dutch towns twice a year. NVU chairman Constant Kusters, the key figure within the organisation, had to serve a prison sentence soon afterwards, however, and the NVU has not appeared in public since the above-described demonstration. Due to this inactivity, the party experienced a certain decline, probably to the benefit of SFN. The position of German neo-Nazis within the NVU has been reinforced by the appointment of Christian Malcoci as party secretary. The 'Nationaal Offensief' (NO, National Offensive), which was set up in 1999, was dissolved.

The Netherlands again experienced a rise in the racist-motivated violent crime rate in 2001. As these incidents are largely indicative of the seriousness and scope of racism and xenophobia in the Dutch society, the BVD tried to get a complete picture of the perpetrators, backgrounds, affiliations and possible involvement of extreme right-wing groups. So far, however, most of the cases appeared to be isolated, usually ill-prepared and poorly organised incidents. Although in a number of cases individual members of extreme right-wing groups could be held responsible for racist-motivated crimes, the BVD did not find any proof that the incidents were planned by or carried out on the instructions of extreme right-wing organisations. In one case, however - partly on the basis of an official message from the BVD - three SFN members were arrested and convicted for daubing tombstones at a Jewish cemetery at Oosterhout.

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September, the Netherlands experienced a brief wave of anti-Islamic violence. By far most of these incidents took place in September and in the first weeks of October. Part of the incidents could be linked to the events in the US on the basis of, for example, the slogans that were used. It was remarkable that the perpetrators mainly aimed their aggression at obvious symbols of Islam, such as mosques and Islamic schools. More than twenty mosques in the Netherlands were threatened by telephone or by letter, or they were confronted with graffiti, vandalism and in a few cases arson attempts. Most of the acts of violence were rather amateurish and did not cause very much damage. Except for one serious incident, hardly any reports came in about assault or other violence leading to physical injury. Some NVU and SFN members were apprehended for involvement in anti-Islamic violence, but there is no evidence to that they acted on the instructions or initiative of these extreme right-wing organisations.

The extreme right-wing organisations showed great reserve in their reactions to the attacks in the United States and the consequences of these attacks. In NNP and CD circles people fear that their comments will be misinterpreted and that this may lead to legal action against them.

As usual, the BVD provided information relating to the nature and scope of racist and extreme right-wing violence to the University of Leiden and the Anne Frank Foundation. These institutions brought out the fourth issue of 'Monitor Racism and the Far Right'.

## **2.2 The Moroccan community**

The BVD distinguishes a number of aspects that might have a negative effect on the integration of the Moroccan community into the Dutch society. These aspects lie in the nature of the Moroccan immigrants' organisations (i.e. organisations that were set up on the initiative of the Moroccan community itself) and the Moroccan control network (i.e. the network of persons and organisations that have been tasked by the Moroccan authorities with monitoring Moroccan subjects abroad). Other aspects to be watched by the BVD are the post-11-September-effect on the Moroccan community and the first signs of radicalisation within that community.

### **2.2.1 Representativeness of Moroccan immigrants' organisations**

A key question is whether the Moroccan representatives and interest organisations with whom Dutch officials have begun dialogues actually represent the group they claim to represent and whether they are using hidden agendas. Such a hidden agenda might be dictated by the Moroccan government or by certain political, religious or other interests. Both national and local Dutch authorities often find it difficult to assess the representativeness and loyalty of their Moroccan contacts. A complicating factor is the great diversity of Moroccan immigrants' organisations in the Netherlands. A situation in which the authorities would accept inadequate control of and account for (local) projects involves a serious risk that the interests of the group to be represented are not properly protected. In that case Moroccan immigrants' organisations pursuing other aims than they claim to do will have the opportunity to follow their own course unimpeded. In a few specific cases the BVD provided the authorities with information about the real motives and objectives of Moroccan immigrants' organisations.

### **2.2.2 The Moroccan control network**

After King Mohammed VI's accession to the Moroccan throne, he announced a multitude of reforms in his country. It was expected that also the traditional efforts by the Moroccan government to influence and monitor all Moroccans abroad would be stepped down. These expectations seem to be partially fulfilled. The traditional control network of Rabat-controlled organisations and persons now seems largely to have discontinued its monitoring of political opponents abroad. While in the past, for example, political conflicts in Morocco manifested themselves also in the Netherlands, last year no such tensions were seen within the Moroccan community.

However, for nationalist and - mainly - financial reasons the Moroccan government still does not want to loosen its grip on the Moroccans abroad. The savings transmitted to the mother country by Moroccans abroad are still a major source of income. Consequently, initiatives from the Moroccan government to help Dutch local authorities with problems within the Moroccan community in the Netherlands seem partly to be inspired by the need to preserve the (financial) ties between that community and Morocco.

### **2.2.3 The Moroccan community after 11 September**

Immediately after the 11 September attacks, reports about the reaction of some members of the Moroccan community at Ede attracted much attention. According to one of these reports - also broadcast by CNN - some young Moroccans had publicly expressed their joy over the attacks. Allegedly, it appeared from surveys that particularly Moroccans had adopted a not quite negative or even positive attitude towards the attacks. On closer investigation of the Ede incident the police

concluded, however, that the rumours about public expressions of joy over the attacks were false. There were also doubts about the representativeness of the media surveys. In relation to these negative reports, the Moroccan community practically immediately took initiatives to express its disapproval of the attacks in order to smooth ruffled feathers. Several Muslim organisations called on the communities to remain calm. The Moroccan embassy asked imams to express themselves in moderate terms about the events in the United States.

The idea that the attacks in the United States can be seen as an attack by Muslims on non-Muslims and on Western values and standards has also affected the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. Consequently, the many appeals for tolerance both from the Moroccan community and from the Dutch government were not always successful. Certain comments made by intolerant Muslim representatives and activities of criminal Moroccan youths sometimes counteracted the positive effects of the appeals. They added to a negative image of Muslims in general and of Moroccans in particular.

#### **2.2.4 Radicalisation**

The BVD's intensified attention for counter-terrorism is partly focused on the identification of breeding grounds for radical ideas that might eventually lead to actual support to or participation in terrorist attacks by Dutch residents. The BVD has information that among members of Muslim communities in the Netherlands there is a small number of people who are receptive to such radical ideas. As described in chapter 1, these people are even prepared to devote themselves actively to supporting or carrying out acts of violence. Within this context the BVD tries to probe the feelings within the Moroccan community in the Netherlands.

### **2.3 The Turkish and Kurdish community**

At present more than 300,000 people of Turkish origin are resident in the Netherlands. This community is characterised by a great diversity in religious and political movements. It is a reflection of the broad political spectre in Turkey itself, which ranges from extreme left-wing to ultra nationalist. This implies that developments in the country of origin, for example those relating to the political latitude of religious opposition movements, have repercussions on the Turkish community in this country.

The Turkish government, in its role of guardian of the unity and the secular character of the state, tries to hold on to the ties with the Turkish community in the Netherlands and to influence that community. Because of its strong bond with the mother country, part of the Turkish community in the Netherlands seems to be receptive to directives from Turkey intended to safeguard the secular character and the unity of the state. During the long drawn-out issue of the memorial stone that was to be placed at Assen in memory of the Armenian victims in the period 1910-1920, it appeared that the intentions of the Turkish control network not always have the desired result. As a result of open debate and democratic and transparent decision-making, the much-discussed memorial stone could eventually be unveiled on 24 April 2001.

The Turkish and Kurdish community in the Netherlands does not only focus attention on Turkish politics, but also on Dutch political developments. Several groups are specifically seeking opportunities to promote their interests within the Dutch political system. Such initiatives were taken at various places in the Netherlands. In Amsterdam the Turkish Committee Netherlands was set up, consisting of the chairmen of a dozen Turkish organisations represented in this country, including the Turkish Federation Netherlands (TFN), the unofficial representative of the

Turkish extreme nationalist MHP in the Netherlands. Supporters of the MHP are also referred to as Grey Wolves and they indeed frequently use this mythical symbol in picture and gesture.<sup>1</sup>

The Turkish Committee Netherlands, now renamed Turkish Platform, wanted to promote the election in 2002 of about two hundred Turks to municipal councils and a few to parliament via the election lists of the various political parties. These candidates are expected to protect the interests of the Turks in the Netherlands better than the current members of municipal councils and parliament. In view of the background of some of the candidates, including the Grey Wolves, there is a risk that the interests to be promoted will also include those of the Turkish Republic or the interests of certain extreme nationalist political parties in Turkey. Anyway, in the second half of 2001 hardly any activities of the Turkish Platform were observed. Among the Kurds in the Netherlands a similar development seems to be going on. They have placed their hopes for a better political protection of their interests in a number of existing political parties.

Following the attacks in the United States, the various Turkish and Kurdish groups and movements in this country have put considerable effort into reacting immediately and publicly on behalf of their supporters. By unanimously renouncing the attacks, the emergence of a possible breeding ground for renewed tensions between (part of) the various migrant communities in the Netherlands or between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population has been prevented. Particularly the political-Islamic Milli Görüş organisation was quick to repudiate the attacks publicly and adequately. This helped to keep the emotions and commotion within the Turkish and Kurdish community sparked by the 11 September events under control.

## **2.4 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)**

In Rotterdam the Kurdish Economic Congress (KEC) was set up in January 2001. The congress, in which also PKK members participated, seeks to set up an organisation of Kurdish businessmen and to interest them in economic activities in southeast Turkey. To that end an international association of Kurdish employers, called Karsaz, was set up. The KEC initiative fits in with the PKK's peaceful and political activities since 1999.

In 2001 the PKK continued the political course on which it embarked in 1999. Since the arrest and conviction of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, on whose case the European Court of Human Rights has not yet passed judgement, the so-called Presidential Council has been responsible for the executive leadership.

Like in 2000, when M. Karayilan, a member of the Presidential Council, resided temporarily in the Netherlands, also in 2001 a member of the Presidential Council applied for asylum in this country. N. Kesbir has been in the Netherlands since September 2001. Like Presidential Council member R. Altun in France, she has been stationed in Europe in order to further the propagation of the political PKK course. Meanwhile the State Secretary of Justice has rejected her application for asylum.

## **2.5 The Afghan community**

At present there are about 30,000 to 40,000 Afghans in the Netherlands. It is one of the fastest growing new minorities groups. In recent years the Netherlands has been one of the principal European destinations for Afghan refugees, partly because of the attraction of the growing Afghan

community here. This community in the Netherlands is quite heterogeneous. It consists of various groups that arrived during the different phases of the conflict in Afghanistan over the past 23 years. By now all parties to that conflict are represented in the Netherlands: former Moscow loyalists and non-loyal communists, members of the Islamic resistance against the communist regime, democrats, Maoists and nationalists. This leads to tensions within the Afghan community in the Netherlands, but so far these tensions have not sparked any serious conflicts or confrontations, except for one or two incidents.

The tensions within the Afghan community are partly caused by the presence of several leading figures from the former regimes and combat groups in Afghanistan. Most of these prominent figures seem to have no intention to continue the Afghanistan conflict in the Netherlands. A number of them are faced with pending judicial inquiries for war crimes. The war crimes issue is the basis for a conflict between two organisations that are promoting the interests of Afghans in the Netherlands, the Federation of Afghan Refugee Organisations in the Netherlands and the General Association of Afghan Refugees in the Netherlands (GAARN). The Federation wants to be an umbrella organisation for all Afghan associations in the Netherlands, except for those affiliated to Afghan war criminals. At the moment eighteen Afghan organisations have joined the Federation. The Federation accuses GAARN, the membership of which consists mainly of Afghan former Moscow-loyal communists, of harbouring war criminals. GAARN denies this and claims that the Federation hardly has any support within the Afghan community in the Netherlands.

The events on 11 September 2001 have prompted the BVD to intensify its attention for the Afghans in the Netherlands. Most of them strongly criticised the terrorist actions in the United States. The vast majority of the Afghan community in the Netherlands supported the American war on terrorism in Afghanistan, although they felt great anxiety about the consequences of the American bombings for the Afghan civilian population. Afghan organisations drew attention to this aspect during several small-scale demonstrations. These demonstrations had a peaceful character and did not involve any anti-Western expressions.

The BVD investigated rumours within the Afghan community in the Netherlands about the presence of active Taliban cells in this country. It is possible that these rumours were mainly inspired by the atmosphere of distrust between the various groups in the Afghan community and that they were even purposefully meant as imputations. It is a fact, though, that among a number of groups in the Afghan community, particularly the nationalist Pashtun, some solidarity was felt with the Taliban, who also partly consist of Pashtun. The Afghan community in the Netherlands also includes a small group of other fundamentalist Muslims. There is no evidence to suggest that this group, which has hardly formed any organisation, has violent intentions.

The investigations into active Taliban cells within the Afghan community in the Netherlands were focused on two specific matters. First of all the visit of the then Minister of Public Health of the Taliban to the Afghan community in the Netherlands in February 2001. This was probably a more or less secret diplomatic mission, intended to establish contacts with Afghan migrants in the Netherlands and persuade them to render support to the Taliban regime, which found itself in an isolated position as a consequence of the UN sanctions.

The second matter was the list of one hundred names of political opponents of the Taliban. The media got hold of the list in autumn 2001 and interpreted it as a 'hit list'. It probably came from the office of the unofficial Taliban representation in Frankfurt. On the list was one Afghan resident in the Netherlands. This caused some reaction in the Dutch press, but it did not trigger any panic within the Afghan community in the Netherlands. The BVD received several comments from Afghans about the list, which appeared to be largely outdated and unsystematic. On closer

examination, the BVD seriously doubted whether the list really was a hit list. As a result of the investigations it also became clear that there was little truth in the rumours about a large number of Taliban supporters in the Netherlands.

The war on terrorism in Afghanistan and particularly the fall of the Taliban regime led to renewed activity among several prominent members of former Afghan regimes resident in the Netherlands. A number of them is seeking to reinforce their network of political friends within the Afghan communities in western Europe with a view to a possible role in the new Afghanistan.

## **2.6 Pakistanis in the Netherlands**

The events on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan also had their effects on the Pakistani community in the Netherlands. We can assume that most of the about 17,000 Pakistanis in the Netherlands sharply disapproved of the terrorist Al Qaeda actions. Within the Pakistani community in the Netherlands, the majority of which hardly displays any political activities, there is only a small number of radical Muslims. Unlike radical Muslim groups in Pakistan, however, they did not attract public attention through public demonstrations. Neither was there any evidence to suggest that they were planning any violent activities. Most of the Pakistanis in the Netherlands reacted moderately to violent incidents in Kashmir, where Muslim fighters of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) pursue secession from India.

## **2.7 Chechens**

Although the international attention for the conflict in Chechnya seems to be fading, it is still a matter of great importance to the small Chechen community in the Netherlands. However, among other minority groups, particularly radical Turkish groups, the readiness to support the fight in Chechnya through protest demonstrations and fund-raising campaigns seems to have declined. But some members of these groups are involved in an Internet site that has appeared under various names (e.g. [www.qoqaz.nl](http://www.qoqaz.nl)), making appeals to take part in the armed fight in countries like Chechnya.

## **2.8 Islamic non-governmental organisations**

The BVD investigates to what extent and in what way other countries are using Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a means to disseminate radical-extremist ideas among the Muslim population in the Netherlands. As we reported in the annual report for 2000, the BVD has monitored the activities in the Netherlands of one of these NGOs, the Libyan World Islamic Call Society (WICS), for considerable time.

Islamic NGOs are primarily occupied with humanitarian and social-cultural activities. It has appeared, however, that sometimes certain persons or sections within these organisations are involved in supporting armed struggle. The events on 11 September 2001 have once more underlined the relevance of the question to what extent Islamic NGOs are involved in (financial) support to terrorism. Reports in the media about this subject led to questions in parliament about the role of a number of Islamic NGOs (Muwaffaq, Al-Haramain, International Islamic Relief Organisation and particularly World Assembly of Muslim Youth). The BVD considers it likely that from or via some of these NGOs support is given to violent activities of extremist Muslims. At the

same time, it is a fact, however, that the Dutch branches of these NGOs are moribund organisations at the moment. The BVD will continue to watch the activities of these and other NGOs in and from the Netherlands.

## 3 Terrorism

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As a consequence of the 11 September attacks in the United States the phenomenon of terrorism was put high on the international political agenda. Once again it became clear how vulnerable a society is to acts of violence aimed at defenceless citizens and intended to realise political or social changes. This chapter gives a general introduction to the BVD's investigations into terrorism, followed by a description of developments relating to various Islamist groups and other organisations monitored by the BVD because of their involvement in terrorism.

### 3.1 Expanded investigation into terrorism

The scope and effects of the attacks in the US have prompted the BVD to expand its investigation into Islamist terrorism drastically. First of all, it was necessary to investigate possible Dutch links to the attacks in the US and to widen our regular investigations in order to identify any new attacks planned to be carried out soon after the attacks in the US. At the same time, it was necessary to be prepared for possible new eruptions of violence in reaction to or even inspired by the attacks in the US, taking into account that also Europe might be the target of such terrorist violence.

The Netherlands did not experience any large-scale political-Islamic inspired violent incidents or attacks after 11 September. In the first few weeks after 11 September, several small-scale incidents were targeted at Islamic property, such as mosques and schools. Some cases of vandalism were also aimed at buildings with a Christian function. The attacks in the US had a frustrating effect on social cohesion in the Netherlands and on the integration of Islamic minorities into the Dutch society. Especially in the period immediately following the attacks, there were several signs of mutual feelings of fear and distrust between Islamic communities and part of the indigenous Dutch population. The sharp rise in the number of anxious citizens who approached the BVD was a case in point. The anxiety was even reinforced by the anthrax letters in the United States. So far no letters containing anthrax have turned up in the Netherlands, but the number of 'fake letters' was legion.

After 11 September various sectors in Dutch society felt an increased need for threat assessments from the BVD. During the months following the attacks, the BVD indeed brought out various elaborate threat assessments for the benefit of a large number of clients responsible for security at a national, regional and local level. In view of the fact that the Netherlands is increasingly functioning as a platform for international administration of criminal justice, extra alertness is required in order to prevent any violent incidents initiated by radical-Islamic groups or individuals.

### 3.2 Nationally oriented radical-Islamic groups

A number of members of radical-Islamic groups oriented on their countries of origin, i.e. Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, are living in the Netherlands.

#### 3.2.1 Algerian radical-Islamic groups

In 2001 the BVD's investigations into Algerian radical-Islamic groups were mainly concentrated on the 'Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat' (GSPC) and the 'Takfir Wal Hijra' (TWH). The GSPC is a radical splinter of the 'Groupe Islamique Armé' (GIA), which was set up in

the early 1990s. In Algeria the GSPC still pursues the realisation of an Islamic state by waging an armed fight against the Algerian regime. There is specific evidence that the GSPC is receiving financial and material support from members of the organisation resident in western Europe. Some GSPC members have settled in the Netherlands, mainly illegally. Arrests in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain in December 2000 prevented GSPC members from setting off a fragmentation bomb at the popular Christmas Fair in Strasbourg. This incident has demonstrated the fact that several radical-Islamic groups and networks, including the GSPC, may very well target an attack at citizens. It cannot be ruled out that this attempt was inspired by Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation; anyway, the arrested persons were in contact with members of this organisation.

For several years the BVD has monitored a network of Algerian members of the radical-Islamic Takfir Wal Hijra (TWH) in the Netherlands. This group pursues a global Islamic caliphate. Partly on the basis of these BVD efforts, arrests in the Netherlands, Belgium and France in September 2001 prevented members of this group from committing an attack on the American embassy or the American cultural centre in Paris. There is specific evidence to suggest that this attempt was plotted by Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation. So far no organisational links with the 11 September attacks in the US have been found, apart from the fact that Al Qaeda was involved in both events.

In view of these incidents we can conclude that Algerian radical-Islamic networks and groups constituted a considerable threat to western Europe, including the Netherlands, in 2001. Although these networks and groups are operating largely autonomously, pursuing their own objectives, several of their members underwent military training in Afghanistan and/or participated in Islamic fighting in, for example, Chechnya or Afghanistan. Some members of these groups and networks maintain contacts with Al Qaeda members.<sup>2</sup>

### **3.2.2 Egyptian radical-Islamic groups**

Since the Egyptian radical-Islamic Al Jama'a al Islamiyya (AJAI) group declared a cease-fire in its fight against the Egyptian regime in March 1999, the AJAI has been divided among itself. Prominent members like Ahmed Rifa'i Taha and the blind sheikh Omar Abderrahman (who is serving a prison sentence in the US for his involvement in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993) publicly criticised the cease-fire several times. They believe that a cease-fire will not help the group to realise its principal aim, the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.

The AJAI seems to maintain its cease-fire for the time being, despite the fact that the Egyptian regime is not willing to compromise and has not yet released several imprisoned leaders of the organisation, although they served their full term. The attitude of the AJAI seems partly to result from the policy of the Egyptian authorities. On the one hand they dealt the AJAI considerable blows in the judicial field, but on the other they stole a march on the organisation by embarking on a more Islamic course. Consequently, the AJAI now poses a limited terrorist threat to western Europe, including the Netherlands. The BVD is monitoring some members of the organisation who have lived in the Netherlands for several years and who might be supporting acts of violence in other countries.

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is a small terrorist group that operates in close co-operation with Al Qaeda. For this reason the group poses a substantial terrorist threat to the West. There is specific evidence to suggest that some EIJ members stayed in western Europe in 2001.

<sup>2</sup> On the basis of BVD information, several arrests were made in the Netherlands in April 2002, in connection with a growing radicalisation among members of the GSPC and other extremist organisations and an apparent increase in recruitment attempts for the jihad.

### 3.2.3 Kaplan

In spite of its marginal position and its minor political importance, the radical-Islamic Kaplan movement in the Netherlands attracted much public attention. Germany, where the organisation is headquartered under the name of Hilafet Devleti (the Caliphate), banned the movement in December 2001 in connection with new measures for the prevention of international terrorism. As a consequence of this ban, the affiliated Foundation Servant of Islam, located at Papendrecht, also attracted much attention. So far, however, no direct involvement of the Kaplan movement or its members in activities threatening the international rule of law has been established. The fact that the leaders of the Kaplan organisation see violence as a justified means to realise their political-religious goal - i.e. an Islamic polity in Turkey - prompts the BVD to keep close watch on the Kaplan movement.

## 3.3 Internationally oriented radical-Islamic groups and networks

Internationally oriented radical-Islamic groups and networks with links to the Netherlands include Al Qaeda and other, more diffuse networks.

### 3.3.1 Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation

The Al Qaeda ('The Base') organisation was set up by Osama bin Laden about a decade ago. Over the past few years several hundreds of people of various origin joined the organisation. Early in 1998, Al Qaeda entered into an association with several like-minded radical Muslim organisations, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Al Qaeda also maintains contacts with some other radical-Islamic terrorist organisations, including Algerian groups. Al Qaeda can be associated with several terrorist attacks in the past few years, including the attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam in August 1998.

Al Qaeda's key objectives are the realisation of a global Islamic caliphate and the conquest of the holy places of Islam. Consequently, the organisation aims its violence against Israel and the dominant position of the West, in particular the United States, but also, for example, against the Saudi regime. Al Qaeda renders support to parties involved in regional conflicts, like in Chechnya and Kashmir. In recent years Osama bin Laden has also supplied many mujahideen for the fight of the Afghan Taliban against the Northern Alliance.

It is beyond doubt that Al Qaeda was responsible for the 11 September attacks in the United States. First of all, in interviews Osama bin Laden admitted - in guarded terms - that he and his Al Qaeda organisation were responsible for the attacks. Secondly, the terrorists involved in the 11 September attacks were proved to be in contact with several persons who belong to or can be associated with Al Qaeda. In addition, there is clear evidence that Al Qaeda members were aware of the preparations for the attacks and that they anticipated possible repercussions by the US already before September 2001.

The attacks on Afghanistan by Western powers largely destroyed Al Qaeda's infrastructure in Afghanistan. Several prominent members of the organisation were killed. However, many members of the organisation had already left Afghanistan when the attacks started. It is quite likely that these mujahideen will regroup in other countries. Terrorist attacks initiated or supported by Al Qaeda cannot be ruled out in the near future. The BVD monitors several radical Muslims residing in the Netherlands who are in contact with Al Qaeda-affiliated persons abroad. The BVD

considers it likely that Al Qaeda fighters will illegally try to find refuge in western Europe, including the Netherlands. This group of Al Qaeda members may not only include persons who were directly involved in supporting or carrying out terrorist attacks, but also, for example, persons who used to fight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance on Osama bin Laden's orders.

### **3.3.2 Other radical-Islamic groups and non-organised radical Muslims**

As we mentioned in the first chapter, there is a diffuse network of mujahideen of various nationality who underwent a military training or were involved in scenes of battle in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Chechnya. Part of them used to belong to nationally oriented radical-Islamic groups, like the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and they are still in contact with members of these groups. This diffuse international network of mujahideen has scattered over many countries in the world. Several have settled in western Europe, including the Netherlands. Over the past few years the network has grown and its organisation has improved, while the members have blended into the growing circuit of illegals and fringe groups in western European countries.

Members of this network have also appeared to be capable of radicalising other Muslims, including both illegals and members of established Muslim communities, or even employing them for supporting or carrying out violent activities. Several radical Muslims monitored by the BVD in 2001 have thus become involved in the Islamic fight.

### **3.4 Palestinian and Lebanese groups**

Despite the sharp escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, the terrorist-related activities of Palestinian and Lebanese radical-Islamic groups were largely confined to the conflict area in 2001.

The Netherlands is the base of the Al Aqsa foundation. Al Aqsa raises funds for the radical-Islamic Palestinian Hamas organisation, to which the foundation is affiliated. In 2001 negative reports about Al Aqsa appeared in the media, because the foundation appeared to have provided a Dutch Islamic primary school with a video about the Palestinian intifada. So far no proof has been found that the funds raised by Al Aqsa in the Netherlands were used for terrorist activities in the trouble spot. In addition to violent activities, the Palestinian Hamas is also involved in many social activities in the Palestinian Territories.

Although the non-radical Islamic Palestinian community in the Netherlands sharply criticises the actions of the Israeli government, it was not involved in any violent protest actions in 2001.

### **3.5 DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front)**

The activities of the Turkish violent left-wing DHKP/C group were restricted to a mere handful of protest actions (e.g. presentation of petitions, graffiti campaigns, short sit-ins and relay hunger strikes) in sympathy with their friends in Turkey. Since 2000 particularly DHKP/C supporters have criticised the reforms to the Turkish prison system by means of massive hunger strikes in Turkey. More than forty hunger strikers have died so far. The campaigns in the Netherlands are mainly aimed at drawing media attention to the political situation in the mother country.

In view of the continued violent character of the DHKP/C in Turkey - in an attack committed by the movement in Istanbul in September four people died and twenty were injured - the DHKP/C is still considered a terrorist organisation.

### **3.6 New People's Army**

In the Philippines President Arroyo replaced her ousted predecessor, Estrada, on 20 January 2001. Shortly after taking office, Arroyo entered into peace negotiations with violent groups in her country, including Muslim rebel organisations (like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf) and the communist New People's Army (NPA). Part of the (unofficial) negotiations with the communists took place in the Netherlands. The leading members of the forum negotiating with the Philippine government on behalf of the communist party live in the Netherlands. One of them is a long-time subject of BVD attention; he is one of the founders and the first chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and still its political leader. As early as in 1992, the BVD established that the NPA, which is seen as the CPP's military wing, was actually controlled from the Netherlands. The NPA is responsible for a large number of violent incidents in the Philippines, causing between one hundred and two hundred casualties on an annual basis. The application for asylum made by the CCP chairman gave the BVD reason to present an official message to the State Secretary of Justice in 1993, stating that vital interests of the state would be at stake if the CCP chairman obtained a refugee status. The State Secretary decided against granting the CCP chairman a refugee status and a residence permit. In 1997 the State Secretary won a court case about this decision. However, the CCP chairman is still resident in this country, because deportation proved to be legally impossible because of the fact that he would be sentenced to death in the Philippines.

The above-mentioned negotiations seemed to involve a lot of drama in 2001. According to press reports in February, an assault was being plotted on one of the Philippine communists in the Netherlands. Verification of these reports did not yield any evidence to substantiate the allegations. The negotiations have not yet led to a cease-fire. Even during the negotiations new appeals were made from the Netherlands to continue the armed resistance in the Philippines, which is reason for concern. The BVD is discussing the matter with the ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs in order to find an effective approach.

### **3.7 Threat against Bangladesh Prime Minister**

In spring 2001 newspapers in Bangladesh and India reported about an attempt on the life of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh that was allegedly plotted in the Netherlands. According to these reports, which were taken over by the Dutch media, a Bangladesh national resident in the Netherlands was involved in these plans. BVD investigations showed that there was no evidence to substantiate these allegations.

### **3.8 Mujahedin-e Khalq**

The Iraq-based Mujahedin-e Khalq group has resisted the Islamic Republic of Iran by means of armed struggle for more than two decades. Consequently, it constitutes a serious threat to the Iranian government. In the past two decades the MKO claimed responsibility for numerous violent attacks on government buildings in Iran and for assaults on various representatives of the Iranian

government. Their objective is to destabilise the Iranian society.

The MKO is an Islamic-Marxist organisation, headed by the Massoud and Maryam Rajavi couple, resident in Iraq. The MKO demands unconditional obedience and permanent readiness for action of its members. By means of forced subordination to the collective, mental oppression and ideological indoctrination, the members are reduced to tools in the hands of the MKO leaders.

In the West the MKO is represented by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). In the United States and the United Kingdom the MKO is on the blacklist of terrorist organisations.

Until recently the MKO activities in the Netherlands (e.g. fund-raising, political lobbying and recruitment of new sympathisers for the MKO fight in Iran) were controlled from the NCRI office in The Hague. In spring 2001 the NCRI leaders in this country were ordered to leave to Iraq and the office was closed (partly for financial reasons). At present the activities are continued by individual members who receive their instructions from the European headquarters in France.

In addition to the NCRI, the MKO is working with a number of other front organisations, including the Foundation for Solidarity with Iranian People. This foundation occupies itself with obtrusive and misleading fund-raising. The proceeds are partly used for the maintenance and armament of MKO camps in Iraq.

## 4 Politically motivated violent activism

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One of the tasks of the BVD is to identify where and when 'politically' motivated activism tends to involve violence, i.e. violence against persons or property that involves sometimes considerable material damage. In order to identify such developments at an early stage, the obvious first step is to study open sources. A next step is to monitor extremist individuals or organisations with the help of both human and technical intelligence resources, if such is considered necessary.

This paragraph mainly describes politically motivated 'radical left-wing' activism and violent activism, such as anti-globalisation, anti-militarism and animal rights activism. Other subjects are the developments surrounding the royal marriage early in 2002 and Moluccan activism.

### 4.1 Anti-globalisation

Also in the Netherlands the new resistance against especially economic 'globalisation' has gained much ground. Particularly the events in Seattle in November 1999 triggered the emergence of a global movement that is characterised by its preparedness to organise and take part in joint demonstrations and campaigns. The principal goal of the activists is to halt the political-economic restructuring of the world. This topic is highlighted by both the far left and the far right, both progressive and conservative groups and individuals, an ad-hoc coalition that until recently seemed to be impossible. Although often separately, the far right takes part in anti-globalisation demonstrations, because they are opposed to globalisation on the basis of their nationalist ideas. But also neo-Marxists/neo-Trotskyists participate. Their number has considerably grown, and in the Netherlands they have even got a firm grip on the movement. They claim to have already partly reached their ultimate goal, a vanguard position in the global anti-globalisation movement leading to an assumption of power.

In 2001 a broad range of Dutch activists dedicated themselves to what they see as a fairer world with more attention for the oppressed and exploited population of the poor countries. The protests against the present situation - which they believe is partly caused by the activities of the IMF and the World Bank - came to a head during the Euro Summit in Göteborg in June and the G8 Summit (meeting of the eight most important industrialised countries in the world) in Genoa one month later. During these riots, caused by a small group of political hooligans operating in 'black blocks', also Dutch protesters were apprehended or placed in administrative detention.

The events in Göteborg and Genoa gave the anti-globalists reason to reconsider their campaign, which had a dual effect. Part of the moderate anti-globalists, mainly members of non-governmental organisations, no longer dared to demonstrate along with the small group of radical activists. Other, more 'civil disobedient' individuals and groups, however, showed understanding for the rioters, whose violence they tend to see as a proportional reaction to the tough action of the authorities. The group supporting aggressive action is not very large, however.

According to the expectations, also the protests against the Euro Summit in Brussels in December were largely initiated by anti-globalists. The Dutch representation consisted again of a multicoloured mixture of activists who peacefully expressed their dissatisfaction.

The attacks on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in the United States have led to a temporary lapse in the activities of anti-globalists. Only one or two demonstrations

went through, but under the banner of 'anti-war' and 'anti-racism'. Some peace watches were held, but soon the activists started to organise protests against the 'new war'. These protests were mainly incorporated into the general resistance against globalisation, which, in the eyes of the activists, should also mainly be blamed on the United States.

Dutch peaceful demonstrators fear that they will be confronted with the adverse effects of the hunt for terrorists. This has already led to a tightening of the European regulations and sparked debate within the European Union whether violent anti-globalisation should also be seen as terrorism. Partly on the basis of analyses of the escalated demonstrations in Göteborg and Genoa, the BVD believes that anti-globalisation should not be regarded as terrorism, but as a broad-based, predominantly peaceful protest movement, within which small cells of politically motivated violent activists are operating. The activities of these radical cells in the movement pose a serious threat to the democratic legal order and they are therefore watched by the BVD.

#### **4.2 Anti-militarism**

In 2001 anti-militarist campaigns were again continued, but mainly on a small scale. Particularly the Volkel Air Base continued to attract a small, rather consistent group of activists. Obviously, the present war on terrorism also inspired anti-militarist activists and researchers to step up their campaigns.

#### **4.3 Animal rights activism**

An attempt to liberate animals in the night of 1 January 2001, but particularly the accompanying claim letter, set the tone for animal rights activism. In the claim letter the activists warned that cruelty against animals, including laboratory animals, would no longer be tolerated. The times of peaceful campaigns were over, they said.

Particularly the Biomedical Primate Research Centre (BPRC) at Rijswijk was confronted with many protest campaigns, part of which were playful and peaceful, but some of which were objectionable and radical. On 16 January an action group inflicted large-scale damage. The Centre was also confronted with many picket lines, demonstrations in front of the building and blockades of the entrance. The actions increasingly shifted towards the homes of staff members and researchers, however, in some cases even involving intimidation of their partners and children. According to an Animal Liberation Front spokesman, this psychological pressure was meant to put a stop to cruelty to animals.

Some of the media supported the campaign against the BPRC. They created the impression that their critical reports reduced the willingness of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Welfare to subsidise the Rijswijk institute. Animal rights activists, particularly the radical ones, do not only see this achievement as a great victory, but also as an incentive to continue their tough line of action.

In addition to the BPRC, also pig-transporting and pork-processing companies, particularly in the province of North Brabant, were confronted with arson attacks. In one case this led to a damage of millions of euros. In addition to arson, there were again some animal liberation incidents in 2001, such as the liberation of about 18,000 mink at Valkenswaard in August.

An alarming development in 2001 was the growing influence of the, partly extremely violent, British animal rights activists on Dutch sympathisers. Not only the BPRC was confronted with this phenomenon. The British SHAC (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty), which is campaigning against the BPRC's British counterpart, Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), has launched an international campaign against multinationals and other financial enterprises involved in the activities of the HLS on the European continent.

#### **4.4 Risks to the wedding of the Prince of Orange with Miss Zorreguieta**

Particularly during the last six months of 2001, the BVD investigated possible risks in relation to the wedding of the Prince of Orange with Miss Zorreguieta. Initially our attention was mainly focused on the undisturbed proceeding of the festivities, but after the events on 11 September, the BVD increasingly focused attention on the safety of the guests. To that end the BVD maintained contacts with relevant counterpart services and with national and international experts on Argentina. In the run up to the wedding, the BVD made a number of risk and threat assessments, also in relation to the royal couple's pre-wedding introduction tour of the country.

#### **4.5 Moluccan activism**

The Moluccan community again showed an emotional involvement in the situation in the Moluccas. Although the scale of the outburst of violence in the Moluccas was reduced, several new incidents occurred in between relatively peaceful periods. The concerns felt by Moluccans in the Netherlands about the violence and the humanitarian suffering in the Moluccas have not diminished, as appeared from discussions between the Minister of Big Cities and Integration Policy and representatives of the Moluccan youth. Although in radical Moluccan circles plans for aggressive actions were discussed a couple of times, these were not carried out. In the first few months of 2001 there were several anonymous threats, however.

In summer the media elaborately speculated about improper interference of the so-called RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) government in exile in the Netherlands with the fight in the Moluccas. This publicity was based on a leaked letter from the 'president of the RMS government', written in 2000, in which he made an appeal to four so-called combat groups in the Moluccas to join forces under one command in order to facilitate support from the Netherlands. The letter resulted from contacts between the 'RMS government' and a Moluccan individual who allegedly represented the combat groups as 'Envoy of the Mother Country' in the Netherlands. However, the letter is unknown in the Moluccas, it did not lead to requests for weapons or to any actual support from the 'RMS government' to the four 'combat groups'. Apart from this case, however, it happened several times that Moluccans from the Netherlands who visited the archipelago were confronted with urgent requests for weapons. For this reason it cannot be ruled out that part of the funds raised by Moluccans in the Netherlands for humanitarian aims will be used by the recipients in the Moluccas for arms purchase.

The attacks in the United States and the subsequent 'war on terrorism' did not lead to any tensions within the Moluccan community in the Netherlands, a small part of which consists of Muslims. Hopes were raised, however, that the international coalition against terrorism would pay more attention to the violence in the Moluccas and be prepared to pressure the Indonesian government to curb the activities of extremist Muslims in the islands. At odds with these expectations, however, in the last few months of 2001, new violent incidents occurred in the Moluccas, in which also a

Moluccan visitor from the Netherlands was killed. A rather large-scale demonstration in Amsterdam on 8 December reflected a growing need to draw attention to the situation in the Moluccas. The continuation of the violence in the Moluccas might also trigger a growing readiness for action among young, radical Moluccans. Partly for this reason, the BVD will continue to pay attention to the conflict in the Moluccas and its reflection on the Moluccan community in the Netherlands in 2001.

## 5 Unwelcome interference of foreign powers

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Several countries, inspired by different motives, are clandestinely trying to exert influence or to obtain information in the Netherlands. This chapter gives some details about activities carried out by Iraq, Iran, China and the Russian Federation.

### 5.1 Iraq

The principal task of the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, is to combat Iraqi resistance abroad against Saddam Hussein's regime. For that reason the Mukhabarat also focuses attention on the Iraqi community in the Netherlands. In view of the precarious political and economic situation in their mother country, there is still a considerable flow of Iraqi refugees to the Netherlands. The variety within the Iraqi community gives the Mukhabarat opportunities to recruit people, forcibly or otherwise, for information gathering on the Iraqi resistance in Europe. To that end the Mukhabarat uses travelling officers, sometimes under the cover of trade delegations.

The attacks in the United States gave the BVD reason to widen and intensify its focus on the Iraqi community in the Netherlands, on the one hand because of possible reactions to the American action and its possible repercussions on security in the Netherlands, on the other because it was feared that the Mukhabarat might intensify its efforts aimed against the Iraqi community.

### 5.2 Iran

The election of the reformist President Khatami in 1997 marked the beginning of the still progressing democratisation process in Iran, which was reconfirmed by Khatami's re-election in 2001. The country is still faced with a conflict between reformists and conservatives, however, and should be seen as a theocratic republic. Iran's foreign policy is characterised by - partly successful - attempts to normalise the relationship with the West. The Dutch government is not unfavourably disposed towards overtures, but it stipulates as one of the conditions that the human rights situation in Iran should be improved.

One of the tasks of the Iranian intelligence service MOIS is to track down and register persons abroad who are in contact with opposition groups. Special attention is paid to members and former members of the principal opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO) (see paragraph 3.8). The Iranian authorities see the MKO as a terrorist organisation and urge western countries to ban it. With the help of members and ex-members of the MKO the MOIS tries to collect as much information on the organisation as possible. Agents of the Iranian intelligence service also receive instructions to spread adverse information about the MKO or its members. The MOIS thus tries to destabilise the organisation and to discredit it in the host country, which affects political and social support for the movement. The MKO is well aware of these efforts and defends itself by a strict, internal control regime. In its capacity as National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) it reports each (alleged) attempt by the Iranian intelligence service to infiltrate the organisation or to disseminate negative information to the authorities in the host country.

### **5.3 People's Republic of China**

BVD investigations into intelligence operations and other unwelcome activities initiated by the Chinese authorities carried out abroad have shown that these activities may also damage Dutch interests. As a result of the frantic attempts of the Beijing regime to eliminate the spiritual Falun Gong movement worldwide because of its alleged dangerous and terrorist character, loyal Chinese nationals abroad have been tasked to track down Falun Gong supporters and to undermine their activities where possible. In addition to the intensive persecution in the People's Republic of China (PRC) itself, this has also led to harassment of Falun Gong sympathisers in a number of other countries. This harassment involved, for example, a dissemination of radical anti-propaganda in order to discredit the movement and a pressuring of local authorities in order to have meetings and publications blocked. As a consequence of these efforts, individual Falun Gong supporters feel watched and threatened. Although on a smaller scale than in other countries, also the modest group of supporters in the Netherlands has been faced with such practices, so far in the form of intrusive interest in Falun Gong manifestations and frustration of their Internet communications, possibly carried out from the PRC.

The Netherlands experiences an increasing inflow of entrepreneurs from the Chinese coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian, provinces that are traditionally oriented on migration to western Europe. It is practically certain that they will be followed by many compatriots, including employees and relatives, in the long term. They will take advantage of economic activities abroad as a relatively cheap and risk-free migration alternative. For the Chinese government this commercial expansion not only widens the opportunities to obtain hard western currency, but it also reinforces the overseas potential of sympathisers who might help the PRC both in acquiring high-grade know-how and technology and in promoting political objectives.

The growing and qualitatively changing presence of people from the People's Republic of China in the Netherlands will gradually lead to increased efforts from Beijing to influence, monitor and employ the overseas Chinese community. Indications relating to relevant clandestine activities already have the full attention of the BVD, as well as the sometimes hidden agendas of Chinese delegations visiting the Netherlands. It has often appeared that unspoken political and economic motives play a role in the background. For this reason the BVD will continue to watch security implications of the Chinese presence in this country.

### **5.4 Russia**

This paragraph first concerns itself with the Russian intelligence and security services. Secondly, some details are given about the Hanssen case, an espionage case in the United States with international implications.

#### **5.4.1 Russian intelligence and security services**

The prominent position of the intelligence and security services in the Russian government structure and their extensive statutory powers have added to a reinforcement of President Putin's political power, especially in view of his own intelligence background. These services exert much influence through their position in the national security council, which is responsible for national and international policy development. The continuing concentration of power in the Russian political centre and the prevention of political and administrative decentralisation have even strengthened this key position. In addition to the institutional power of the services, the influence

they might exert through informal networks also plays an important role. President Putin has appointed many representatives of the intelligence community to key positions within the federal government and the presidential administration. The President's ties with the intelligence community, rooted in his own background, account for the wide political and financial scope that has been given to the services.

In addition to the strengthened national position of the Russian intelligence and security services, also the co-operation with other countries has been intensified. While early in 2001 the international political developments (such as the war in Chechnya, the American withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and the eastward expansion of NATO) still evidently cooled the relations between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the United States and Europe on the other, the relations with the West have now considerably improved as a result of the attacks in the United States. The international coalition against terrorism presented Russia with an opportunity to find response in the West for its long-time fight against the Islamic threat in Chechnya. It also helped Russia to recover its super power status. As opposed to the other pillar under Putin's power base, the army, the Russian intelligence community supports the co-operation with the western coalition, with a view to its political and economic benefits for the weakened Russia.

The above-described co-operation between the Russian Federation and the West in the field of politics, economy and security does not imply that the Russian intelligence and security services are stepping down their offensive activities aimed at the co-operation partners. In their relationship with western counterparts the Russian services evidently follow a two-track policy. The collection of political, economic, military and scientific information is a task laid down by law which still has first priority. Apart from this, they are gladly willing to co-operate in the field of international counter-terrorism, the combat of organised crime or non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a TV interview last year, the head of the foreign intelligence service SVR (Sluzhba Vnesnej Razvedki), Sergej Nikolajevich Lebedev, made it quite clear that the western partners should accept the combination of co-operation and intelligence activities.

Being a highly developed industrial country and a NATO and EU Member State, the Netherlands continues to be an important target of the Russian intelligence and security services. The staff of the official Russian representations in the Netherlands include representatives of the SVR and the military intelligence service GRU (Glavnu Razvedyvatelnu Upravlenye). The security service FSB (Federalnu Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) focuses its attention on the Dutch diplomatic representations in the Russian Federation.

#### **5.4.2 The Hanssen case**

Robert P. Hanssen was arrested in the United States on 18 February 2001. Hanssen was a senior FBI officer who is suspected of espionage for the Soviet intelligence services KGB and SVR, committed in the period from 1985 to 2001. Hanssen is accused of having passed on large quantities of sensitive FBI and CIA information and probably also information from other intelligence and security services<sup>3</sup> in that period of time. The BVD has a long history of co-operation and - within certain frameworks - information exchange with the FBI in relation to national security. Following Hanssen's arrest, the BVD conducted an internal survey in order to find out whether Hanssen might have compromised BVD information. In order to assess possible damage, questions were also asked to the FBI itself. The investigation did not bring any evidence to light suggesting that during the frequent personal contacts between BVD officers and FBI representatives (operational) information was discussed that might have been compromised by Hanssen's treason.



## 6 International legal order

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The BVD's contribution to the protection of the international legal order consists of several elements. Firstly, the BVD contributes to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undesirable trade in conventional weapons. Secondly, the BVD is involved in the security of international organisations based in the Netherlands.

### 6.1 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undesirable trade in conventional weapons

The Dutch government actively tries to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent that conventional weapons are exported from or via Dutch territory to trouble spots or to states against which international arms embargoes have been imposed. This policy is intended to safeguard the interests of the international legal order and national security. For this reason the Netherlands has joined several disarmament conventions and non-proliferation treaties and participates in current export control regimes.

In order to implement this policy the Dutch government has a number of statutory instruments at its disposal. The Import and Export Act is the statutory basis for export control of strategic goods (i.e. both military and dual use goods). Early in 2001 the provisions in this Act governing the transit of military goods via Dutch territory were tightened. The act arose from the European agreements on a common export policy for dual use goods (EC Regulation no. 1334/2000). It also contains a regulation for control of intangible technology transfer.

The BVD supports the Dutch non-proliferation and export policy by giving relevant advice to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs. To that end the service tries to identify clandestine attempts by foreign powers to procure goods or technology for their programmes for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in or via the Netherlands. The BVD also supplies the government with information on possible Dutch involvement in illicit or politically undesirable flows of conventional weapons to trouble spots.

#### 6.1.1 Weapons of mass destruction; state involvement and other actors

The efforts of several countries, e.g. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, India and Pakistan, to obtain or to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles represent a threat to international security. These countries still partly depend on procurement abroad. In relation to this procurement they are in contact with individuals and organisations from China, Russia and North Korea. Despite the support from these countries, countries like those mentioned above seeking to produce weapons of mass destruction also have to rely on industrialised countries, however. Since this usually concerns procurement of goods falling under international export control measures, a new trend seems to be developing, implying that countries of concern increasingly co-operate and exchange know-how and technology amongst themselves, a so-called secondary proliferation. An example is the increasing co-operation between Iran and Syria.

In May 2001 Iran launched - reportedly successfully - its first self-produced short-range ballistic missile, the Fateh-110. Along with earlier test launches of the medium-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile in 2000, this launch once more confirmed Iran's aspirations and efforts in the field of proliferation. In the absence of UN inspections, Iraq seems to have continued its development of programmes for weapons of mass destruction in pursuit of a dominant position in the Middle East.

In addition to this state involvement, the fact that terrorist groups have shown interest in obtaining nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical agents is another cause for concern. This phenomenon has manifested itself in the second half of 2001. The anthrax attacks in the United States demonstrated the possible consequences of this type of terrorism, also for the Netherlands. In support of the policy of the Dutch government, the BVD participated in an interministerial working group that concentrated on preparations and response to a possible terrorist attack with the above-mentioned agents. As a preventive measure, the BVD continued its proliferation-awareness programmes for companies and scientific institutions in 2001. This awareness programme was intensified in relation to the anthrax attacks in the US.

#### **6.1.2 Illegal and politically undesirable trade in conventional weapons**

The Dutch arms export policy seeks to promote caution and transparency in the export of conventional weapons. This applies particularly to the export to trouble spots or to countries where human rights are seriously violated. Secondly, the Netherlands complies with its international commitments under the current UN and EU arms embargoes imposed on e.g. Iraq, Burma and Congo.

The BVD investigated whether the Netherlands might be involved in illegal or politically undesirable arms transactions. The Netherlands is an important transit country and plays a leading role in the distribution and transit of various types of goods, particularly via Schiphol Airport and the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In addition, illegal arms trade usually involves roundabout routes via third countries, changed final destinations, false end-user statements, vague descriptions of shipments or forged shipping documents and so-called arms brokers. The BVD investigation did not produce any specific evidence to suggest that substantial flows of weapons were transported from or via Dutch territory to trouble spots or embargo countries.

### **6.2 International organisations**

The Netherlands hosts a growing number of international supervisory and legal bodies, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Europol, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the Scottish Court in the Netherlands. As a host country the Netherlands should facilitate the undisturbed functioning of these organisations. Potentially, physical threats exist to the premises, staff and visitors of the organisations. It is also possible that information within the organisations would be stolen or manipulated. In order to prevent these risks, the BVD recommended security measures and screened personnel for a number of organisations.

#### **6.2.1 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia**

The BVD examined threats that might arise from the arrival and detention in The Hague of persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2001. Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was transferred to the ICTY detention centre at Scheveningen on 29 June 2001. The transfer involved a multitude of security measures. Prior to Milosovic's arrival and during his detention, the BVD provided risk assessments to the organisations involved. These assessments were focused on possible threats to ICTY or to the Netherlands as its host country. No breaches of the peace or violent incidents took place.

The trial against Milosevic started in February 2002. The BVD focuses attention on potential threats that might arise from emotions sparked by the trial. The BVD is also prepared for possible risks involved in the possible transfer of other persons to ICTY, like the Bosnian Serbs Mladic and Karadzic.

#### **6.2.2 International Criminal Court**

The International Criminal Court (ICC) will probably start its activities in The Hague in 2002. Facilitators will first try to find suitable accommodation and to arrange the organisation of the ICC. In advance of these efforts, discussions between representatives of the ICC countries and the Netherlands have already started. The BVD contributed to these discussions by providing security advice. In 2002 the BVD will continue to give the relevant bodies advice on the security risks involved in the installation of the ICC in The Hague.



## 7 Other fields of interest

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This chapter describes a number of miscellaneous subjects, such as Surinam, illegal migration and financial investigation. Unlike earlier annual reports, this report no longer contains a separate paragraph on organised crime. The combat of organised crime is primarily a responsibility of the police and judicial authorities. Insofar as aspects of organised crime interface with the BVD's areas of work, like illegal migration or illegal arms trade, this will be pointed out in the paragraphs below.

### 7.1 Surinam

In 2001 the BVD investigated security risks - whether or not initiated from Surinam - involved in the criminal prosecution of Desi Bouterse for involvement in drug trafficking. On 23 October 2001 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal brought by Bouterse's lawyer against the 11-year prison sentence that was imposed on Bouterse. On the basis of a new testimony, however, the lawyer has announced that he will ask the Supreme Court to reopen the case.

Secondly, the BVD investigated whether any security risks might arise from the proceedings against Bouterse instituted both in Surinam and the Netherlands for his involvement in the assassination of 15 members of the opposition against the military regime on 8 December 1982. On 18 September 2001 the Supreme Court judged that in the Netherlands no legal action could be taken against Bouterse for his involvement in the December liquidations. The judgement of the Supreme Court thus made it impossible to indict Bouterse for this crime in the Netherlands. Next of kin of the victims have announced to bring the case before the European Court of Human Rights.

BVD investigations have not revealed any specific threat in relation to the above-mentioned proceedings. As yet, the BVD will continue to focus attention on this subject.

### 7.2 Migration and security risks

Since 1998 the BVD has focused attention on security risks relating to (illegal) migration, like the possible abuse of migration channels by foreign intelligence services and radical political-religious organisations. The BVD also investigated violations of integrity at Dutch government institutions involved in admission and residence of aliens or in the combat of illegal migration.

In 2001 the BVD specifically concentrated on abuse of migration channels by political-religious extremist organisations. Radical-Islamic groups have networks of supporters who facilitate migration. These networks are capable of forging identity documents. The documents are not only used for travelling, but also for settling in a country for a longer period of time. Members of radical-Islamic groups are also frequently trying to obtain a legal residency status in western countries.

Migration and asylum procedures are not only abused by extremist organisations. Also the PKK, which has manifested itself as a peaceful democratic movement in the past few years, uses them for smuggling cadre members into European countries, including the Netherlands. The activities displayed by these cadre members in Europe usually have an organisational character.

In addition to investigating the above-mentioned security risks, the BVD also contributed to the efforts of the Task Force Migrant Smuggling. The task force was set up by the Minister of Justice as a co-operation group of bodies involved in the combat of migrant smuggling, like the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary, the police, and some ministries. The BVD helps to draw up the second report on migrant smuggling, which will be brought out in 2002. The BVD also studied illegal migration from Afghanistan and China, particularly focusing on the routes, mode of operation and principal transit countries. It is remarkable that the Netherlands increasingly functions as a transit country for Chinese and Afghan refugees. Afghans are using the Netherlands as a transit country on their way to mainly the United Kingdom. Chinese nationals are using the Netherlands as a transit country from which they travel on to the US and the UK.

The BVD started to co-operate with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service on the identification of so-called '1-F cases'. 1-F refers to asylum seekers who, under article 1F of the 'Convention on the Status of Refugees' from 1951, are excluded from international protection as a refugee, because of the fact that there are serious reasons to suspect that they committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.

In 2002 the BVD will continue both its activities for the Task Force Migrant Smuggling and its investigations in relation to the aforementioned security risks, particularly focusing on networks of radical-Islamic groups that facilitate migration. Without these networks it is more difficult for the members of these groups to cross frontiers without hindrance. In order to combat terrorism effectively, it is essential to gain insight into the activities of these facilitating networks and to frustrate their activities where possible.

### **7.3 Financial investigation**

The methods for conducting investigations on the basis of financial data were further developed and they were applied considerably more often. These methods are a valuable supplement to the BVD's existing range of methods for investigation. Financial information may not only provide insight into, for example, the financing of terrorism, but it may also help us to develop profiles of terrorists and to locate terrorists.

The BVD plays a role in, for example, the identification of individuals and groups to whom financial sanction regulations are applicable. After 11 September 2001, the UN and EU drew up several lists of persons and organisations with possible links to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and/or terrorism. These lists were presented to financial institutions that could freeze the assets of the listed persons and organisations. Along with the Ministry of Finance, the Public Prosecutions Department and auditors in the financial sector, the BVD is in contact with the financial institutions about these lists.

The co-operation with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba was intensified. The BVD gave presentations on financial subjects for several international forums, including the Middle Europe Conference (MEC).

The BVD was involved in the preparations for the introduction of the euro as circulation currency. The service helped to realise the undisturbed change of currency by participating in the development of successive risk assessments, which enabled the bodies responsible to take appropriate security measures. The BVD also screened key officials involved in the change of currency.

#### **7.4 Scientific research**

The BVD is co-sponsor of external scientific (doctoral) research focused on the question to what extent organised crime within Turkish and Kurdish circles is passed on to the second and third generation of Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands from or via Turkey. This research is taking place under the responsibility of the Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Science of the University of Utrecht. The BVD participates in the committee that gives guidance to the research. The first part of the research is completely focused on migrant smuggling and illegal migration, in particular on the role of political and religious organisations and certain Turkish government bodies. The findings of this first part of the research are expected to be published by the Willem Pompe Institute by summer 2002.



## 8 Protective security

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One of the statutory functions of the BVD is protective security. This includes the promotion of security measures in order to protect information the secrecy of which is required in the interest of the state and in order to protect sectors in the public and the private sector that are of vital importance to the maintenance of social life. This chapter describes the various fields that are relevant to this protective security function: special information security, vital sectors, integrity of public administration and security screening.

### 8.1 Special information security

Special information encompasses state secrets and other sensitive information that requires extra protection. The developments in the field of information and communication technology play an essential role in this field. There is a growing awareness of the social reliance on information and communication technology and the necessity of its reliability. At the same time, because of the growing complexity and interaction of information systems, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish general and special information as separate areas in information systems.

The BVD contributed to special information security in various ways, for example by contributing to the development of national and international legislation, such as new regulations on special information security within the public service. The BVD's efforts also included advice to government institutions and companies and the evaluation of equipment. In these fields several projects were launched in 2001.

The Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA), which used to come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been incorporated into the BVD since 1 January 2001. This new agency enabled the BVD to contribute to projects interfacing with information and communication technology of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice.

The Special Information Security Council is an interdepartmental committee that co-ordinates the policy relating to the protection of special information within the public service. The Director General of the BVD chairs this committee and the BVD is responsible for its secretariat. The Special Information Security Council worked on a review of the regulations for the protection of state secrets (see paragraph 8.1.1) and the development of a Dutch structure for the evaluation and certification of IT security products (see paragraph 8.1.2). At the request of the Special Information Security Council, the BVD urged the need for a secure mobile telephone system for part of the Dutch public sector and took steps to realise this.

#### 8.1.1 Review of regulations on the protection of state secrets

An interdepartmental project group, chaired by the BVD, is working on the review of the regulations for the protection of state secrets dating from 1989 (Directives for the Protection of State Secrets and Vital Sections of the Public Service). Under the new regulations the protection of state secrets processed and stored in automated systems should meet more (technical) requirements. The efforts of the project group have led to a proposal for new regulations for special information security. The proposal will be submitted to a number of bodies for their comment. The review should be completed in 2002.

### **8.1.2 Evaluation and certification of IT security equipment**

By mid 2001 the Special Information Security Council approved a Dutch structure for the evaluation and certification of information technology (IT) security equipment. This structure was developed by an interdepartmental project group in co-operation with TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research) under co-ordination of the Special Information Security Council, after which TNO and the BVD worked it out in detail. The Dutch Council for Accreditation will approve it by mid 2002. This will make it possible to evaluate and certify IT security products in the Netherlands in accordance with the so-called Common Criteria, an international method (ISO standard 15408) for evaluation and certification. This satisfies the need of consumers and producers to gain or provide more insight into the security levels of IT security products.

### **8.1.3 Echelon**

The Dutch government considers it likely that global eavesdropping systems exist. Such a system, known under the name of Echelon, is believed to be focused on interception by the United States and the United Kingdom of international communication on the air (e.g. satellite communications) and via sea cables. In January 2001 the Second Chamber received a letter from the Council of Ministers about this matter, which also provided answers to the questions asked in parliament about this subject. The standing committees of Justice, Defence and the Interior and Kingdom Relations discussed large-scale interception of telecommunication with the relevant ministers on 29 November 2001. At this meeting the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations promised to present a memorandum on possible protective measures against eavesdropping of citizens, companies and institutions. In order to draw up this memorandum the BVD, in consultation with the ministries concerned, made an overview of the legal and technical options for protection on the basis of the findings of the European Parliament's investigation into Echelon that was completed in September 2001 and the recommendations from the accepted resolution. The memorandum was presented to the Second Chamber on 4 April 2002.

### **8.1.4 NATO**

The Military Intelligence Service, the Security Authority (i.e. Ministry of Defence) and the BVD hold the Dutch National Security Authority (NSA) on behalf of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In this capacity they participate in the meetings of the NATO Security Committee and its working groups. This committee develops the policy for the protection of classified NATO information. In 2001 the BVD worked on a review of the general policy rules for the protection of classified NATO information. The new policy document is expected to be completed in 2002. The BVD also worked on the development of a convention to provide for rules for the protection of classified information exchange between NATO and EU. At present this information is still protected on the basis of an interim agreement between NATO and EU. In compliance with NSA responsibilities imposed by NATO on the Member States, the BVD conducted an inspection at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The findings were positive. For the sake of completeness, some advice and recommendations were given in order to improve the efficiency of the security organisation.

Also the NATO Office of Security (NOS) carried out an inspection in the Netherlands. During such an inspection the NOS visits organisations within the public and the private sector that are holding classified NATO information. The BVD and the Ministry of Defence prepared and accompanied

the inspection, which concerned, in addition to some Defence divisions, also Fokker Space and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The findings did not give reason for taking any special measures.

Under the 'host nation commitment' a host country is obliged to guarantee the security of a NATO institution based on its territory. At the request of the NOS inspection team, the BVD explained the implementation of this commitment to the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Programme Management Agency (NAPMA) at Brunssum. During this meeting the BVD also answered questions about Dutch nationals employed by NAPMA in relation to the 'parent nation' commitment, which implies that a mother country is responsible for issuing security clearances for its subjects employed by NATO.

### **8.1.5 European Union**

Since 1 December 2001 security regulations have come into effect pertaining to both the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. These security regulations do not only apply to internal procedures at the Council secretariat and the Commission, but also to classified EU information within the Member States. Within the framework of the security regulations for the Council, an EU Security Committee was set up, in which the Netherlands is represented by the BVD and the Ministry of Defence. This Security Committee, which is formally chaired by the Secretary General/High Commissioner of the European Union, held two meetings in 2001. The principal subjects for discussion were the implementation of the regulations and the security of the networks between the Council secretariat and the Member States. The BVD rendered support to the secretariat. The international consultation group on information security, comprising Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands, met on nine occasions in 2001. The BVD chairs the Dutch delegation. Important items on the agenda were the European Commission's proposal for a European policy on network and information security, the eEurope action plan (focused on the further development of the European information society) and the intended policy of the European Commission in the field of computer crime. Attention was also paid to the actual implementation in the Member States of the Commission's proposals relating to information security.

## **8.2 Vital sectors**

Within its protective security function, the BVD also focuses attention on so-called vital sectors of society, i.e. organisations in both the public and the private sector that the ministers responsible deem to be of vital importance to the preservation of social life. The BVD provides these organisations with information about threats and security advice and, if necessary, screens personnel.

The 11 September attacks in the US reconfirmed the reliance and vulnerability of vital organisations in the public and the private sector. Within the context of the Action Plan for Counter-Terrorism and Security, under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations a coherent package of measures for the protection of the infrastructure in the public and the private sector is being developed.

### **8.2.1 Vital ICT infrastructure**

In relation to the protection of the ICT infrastructure, the BVD participated in an investigation into the vulnerability of the Internet. This investigation was commissioned by the Minister of

Transport, Public Works and Water Management. It turned out that in recent years the number of incidents interfering with the availability, confidentiality or integrity of information and information systems had considerably grown. As a result of the advent of the Internet the boundaries between separate information systems have been blurred. The multitude of links has increased the vulnerability. The findings of the investigation were described in the report: 'Vulnerability on the Internet; joint efforts to improve security and reliability'. On the basis of this report - following the example of various foreign governments - the Dutch government decided to initiate a public-private plan to reduce the vulnerability of the Dutch part of the Internet. The BVD will contribute to this plan.

### **8.2.2 Security surveys**

The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment asked the BVD to examine its prevailing security policy. The BVD conducted a security survey in order to help the organisation to improve its security set-up.

A security scan (a less in-depth investigation) was conducted at the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection at Bilthoven. The reason for this scan was the fact that due to the events on 11 September 2001 the general threat had changed. The security scan resulted in findings and recommendations relating to organisational, physical and personnel security. Within the Institute a project group was set up to work out adequate measures. The BVD will play an advisory role.

### **8.2.3 Civil aviation**

A security survey at Schiphol Airport, which was completed in March 2001, resulted in a number of recommendations on the security set-up for civil aviation in the Netherlands. The recommendations concerned the allocation and performance of tasks and responsibilities of the parties involved in security and a specification of adequate security measures for Schiphol Airport. The BVD participated in several working groups set up by the Ministry of Justice in order to work this out in detail. Following the 11 September attacks in the US, the co-operation with the Ministry of Justice was intensified in order to tighten the security of civil aviation where necessary.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations informed the Second Chamber of his intention to reduce the number of positions involving confidentiality at Schiphol Airport, without affecting the security level. Under the changed regulations, applicants for a large number of positions need to have a Certificate of Good Behaviour, to be issued by the Ministry of Justice, instead of a security clearance. The certificate should sufficiently guarantee the reliability of personnel at Schiphol Airport. This does not apply to persons who are directly involved in security and/or supervision of security, however. This category will still be submitted to regular security screening. The implementation of the plan to reduce the number of positions involving confidentiality at Schiphol Airport will take considerable time, because it has to be placed on a legal footing and the Ministry of Justice has to set up a unit responsible for issuing the Certificates of Good Behaviour.

### **8.2.4 New generation of travel documents**

The BVD had been involved in the project for the development of a 'new generation of travel documents' since 1999. During the project the BVD gave advice on the security of production, distribution and issuing of new travel documents and on the security of information and

communication networks between the producer and the clients. The production of the new travel documents actually started in October 2001 and the project was formally concluded in November. The BVD will remain involved in the security of the new travel documents, because of the designation of positions involving confidentiality at the producing company. Applicants for these positions will be screened by the BVD.

### 8.3 Integrity of public administration

The integrity of public administration is of essential importance to the quality of the democratic legal order. If a government service lacks integrity, it loses the confidence of the citizens and thus its legitimacy. A democracy cannot function without confidence and legitimacy. This paragraph explains the role of the BVD in the field of integrity. Firstly, the BVD gives guidance to integrity projects within organisations. Secondly, the BVD registers reports about alleged integrity violations relating to civil servants or to public administration.

#### 8.3.1 Integrity projects

Since 1996 the BVD has promoted and given guidance to integrity projects in the public sector. These projects enable organisations to gain insight into the integrity-related vulnerability of procedures and functions. The projects are primarily carried out by the organisations themselves. If necessary, the BVD may give guidance to a project (on request). In 2001 the BVD started to review its guidelines for integrity projects on the basis of the experiences in the past few years. The emphasis will now be put on self-activation, user-friendliness and relevance to current procedures. The new guidelines will be completed in 2002. Within the context of a project subsidised by the European Union, the BVD was asked to pass its expertise on integrity projects to a number of government officials in Estonia. The BVD particularly supported Estonia's security service.

#### 8.3.2 Registration of integrity violations

Anyone can report supposed violations of the integrity of public administration or other integrity violations in the public sector to the BVD. On the basis of a preliminary investigation, during which the reports are tested against three criteria, it is decided whether the BVD itself will deal with the reported incident. In that case the incident should first of all concern an integrity violation within the public administration sector. Secondly, the incident should fall within the statutory functions of the BVD, i.e. it should jeopardise the democratic legal order, national security or other vital interests of the state. Finally, the incident should not fall within the competence of, or already being handled by, another body. If these three conditions are met and the reported integrity

**Table 1 Reported and investigated integrity violations**

State of affairs in 2001	Reported incidents	Closed	Pending
1999 pending cases	6	6	0
2000 pending cases	18	17	1
2001 new cases	33	18	15

violation is possible and seems not unlikely, the BVD starts an investigation. In accordance with the Intelligence and Security Services Act, the BVD will protect the identity of the person who reported the incident under all circumstances. Table 1 gives an overview of the number of reported incidents and the progress of the investigations into these incidents.

## 8.4 Security screening

Prior to the appointment of a person to a position involving confidentiality, the BVD conducts a security investigation or vetting inquiry as provided for in the Security Investigations Act (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1996, 525). A person can only fill a position involving confidentiality when a security clearance has been issued by or on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Positions involving confidentiality are divided into several categories. The principal categories are the so-called A, B, and C positions. These positions enable the employees to damage national security or other vital national interests seriously (A-category) or less seriously (B-category) or to prejudice these interests (C-category). The depth of an investigation is related to the category of the position. Investigations for police positions include, in addition to A-category investigations, also less in-depth P-category investigations.

### 8.4.1 Number of positions and investigations

Table 2 gives an overview of the number of positions involving confidentiality and the number of

**Table 2 Confidential posts (c.p.) and vetting inquiries (v.i.)**

	c.p. 1999	v.i. 1999	c.p. 2000	v.i. 2000	c.p. 2001	c.i. 2001
Public sector*	6,958	1,134	8,822	1,374	5,215	1,600
Defence order companies	12,559	2,636	13,659	2,950	16,000	2,866
Civil aviation**	35,285	35,285	35,171	35,171	31,430	31,430
Vital companies	1,180	824	1,314	796	1,547	918
Miscellaneous ***		873		1,513		1,470
<b>Total</b>	<b>55,980</b>	<b>40,752</b>	<b>56,966</b>	<b>41,804</b>	<b>54,192</b>	<b>38,284</b>

investigations in 1999, 2000 and 2001.

In relation to 2000 the total number of security investigations went down by 3,520. This reduction is accounted for by the fact that security screening in civil aviation went down by 3,741 investigations. This manifested itself particularly after the attacks in the United States in September 2001, which led to a reduction in employment in civil aviation. This downward trend is not expected to continue in 2002.

The BVD has mandated the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary to carry out vetting inquiries for civil aviation and to issue security clearances. In the event that it does not seem advisable to issue a security clearance, the case is transferred to the BVD. While in 2000 3,567 investigations were transferred to the BVD, in 2001 this number went down slightly to 3,334 cases. In 10,065 of these cases the subject had a relevant criminal record and in 2,269 cases the investigation had produced insufficient relevant information. In these cases the BVD started its own investigation in order to determine whether a security clearance could be issued or not.

In September 2001 the BVD started to conduct A-category investigations for the police (see paragraph 8.4.5). In January 2002 a number of police forces were ready to carry out - mandated by and on behalf of the BVD - the so-called P-category investigations themselves. The rule that possible rejection cases must be transferred to the BVD also applies to the police. Table 3 gives an overview of the number of investigations conducted by the BVD in 1999, 2000 and 2001, not including the investigations for civil aviation carried out by the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary, except for those cases that were transferred to the BVD.

**Table 3 Vetting inquiries conducted by the BVD (including screening of BVD staff)**

Category	1999	2000	2001
A	956	1,071	1,055
B	5,509 (incl. 2,247 Royal Military Constabulary)	7,514 (incl. 3,567 Royal Military Constabulary)	7,709 (incl. 3,334 Royal Military Constabulary)
C	1,249	1,615	1,424
Total	7,714	10,200	10,188

#### 8.4.2 Results

In 36,038 cases a security clearance was issued on the basis of security screening in 2001. The number of cases in which security clearances were refused rose from 1,175 in 2000 to 1,471 in 2001. The 1,471 refusals concerned 1,384 B-category investigations for civil aviation. In three cases A-category investigations led to refusal of security clearances.

In 1,329 out of 3,334 cases transferred by the Royal Military Constabulary to the BVD security clearances were issued, while in 1,384 cases clearances were refused. 593 investigations were prematurely broken off at the employer's or the applicant's request. The number of cases to be dealt with rose by 28. A negligible number of investigations conducted by the Royal Military Constabulary exceeded the statutory term of eight weeks. Cases in which the statutory period was exceeded mainly concerned A-category investigations (which involve field work) carried out by the BVD. The average duration of A-category investigations was 12 weeks in 2001; about 25% of the total number of A-category investigations was completed within eight weeks. The reason for the delay partly lies in the fact that the BVD often has to rely on information from other countries.

#### 8.4.3 Objection and appeal

According to the General Administrative Law Act, a person can lodge an objection against a refusal of a security clearance. In 2001 51 persons availed themselves of this opportunity. 55 objections - partly lodged in 2000 - were dealt with in 2001. Three of these objections were withdrawn by the applicants. Twelve of the remaining objections were declared inadmissible because the applicant failed to lodge the objection within the required term. Eighteen objections were dismissed as unfounded. The other 22 objections were declared well-founded, after which a security clearance was issued. In most of the cases these positive decisions were based upon additional information provided by the objector.

In case of an intention to dismiss an objection, the Appeals Commission for Security Screening is asked for advice. The Commission gave advice on 18 cases in 2001. In five cases the Commission recommended to declare the objection well-founded. On the basis of these recommendations security clearances were issued in four cases. In the fifth case the Commission deemed that, on the basis of inadequate motivation, the decision could not be upheld. It was recommended to take a new decision. Subsequently, the motivation was extended and the refusal of the security clearance was reconfirmed. In the other 13 cases the Commission recommended to dismiss the objections as unfounded.

In the year under review two appeals were lodged against decisions on objections. One appeal was disallowed because the applicant failed to pay the court registry fee and to put forward the grounds for the appeal. Finally, three pending appeals cases were dealt with. In these cases the appeals were dismissed as unfounded.

#### **8.4.4 Process criteria**

The BVD continued to work on an update and review of the basic methodology for security screening within the context of the Security Investigations Act. The subjects to be investigated and the investigation model were specified in detail, including the basic principles of the various categories of vetting inquiries (A, B, C and P investigations), the relevance in relation to the positions involving confidentiality and the criteria on which decisions should be based. Specific attention was paid to the interpretation of personal conduct and circumstances, and criteria were formulated for the issuing or refusal of security clearances. The results will be examined by an external body in spring 2002. The implementation into the work process, which is planned for 2002, will be preceded by a pilot project.

#### **8.4.5 Security screening for the police**

In 2001 the preparatory activities in the project that was set up to extend the number of positions involving confidentiality in the police were completed. Within the context of the Security Investigations Act, specific attention was paid to the security screening of police officers who fill or will fill vulnerable positions. The ministerial policy distinguishes two categories of positions involving confidentiality at the police. Positions involving a substantial risk of being compromised: the A-category confidential posts (for which screening is carried out by the BVD) are ranged under the first category. The less vulnerable P-category posts, for which screening has been mandated to the police, are ranged under the second category. In order to implement this ministerial policy, the BVD was in contact with the 25 regional forces and the National Police Agency. The discussions were mainly focused on two items, the organisational embedding and implementation of P-category investigations and the compilation of lists of positions involving confidentiality. A training course has been started for police officers who will be responsible for P-category investigations. At the moment within practically half of the police forces officers followed this training course.

In order to compile lists of confidential posts, it was necessary to find out which positions satisfied the criteria for designation as a position involving confidentiality. All police forces presented draft lists in 2001. By the end of 2001, the Minister approved the designation of the confidential posts listed by five police forces. These forces may start security screening for P-category positions. The BVD conducted approximately 80 A-category investigations for these forces. They will soon start the P-category screening. The other forces will start in 2002. On the basis of the draft lists an estimate was made of the number of positions involving confidentiality at the police. This number is higher than originally expected, which requires a proportional increase in manpower responsible for screening.

The number of A-category positions involving confidentiality at the police is estimated at about 4,600. The number of P-category positions is estimated at 10,900. This implies that, instead of the initially estimated 9,000 confidential posts, the total number of confidential police positions will be about 15,500. The definite number will be known in the course of 2002.

#### **8.4.6 Evaluation**

In 2001 preparations were made for an evaluation of the implementation of the Security Investigations Act. The evaluation itself is expected to start by the middle of 2002. The delay in the planning was caused by the fact that priority was given to the processing of security investigations in general and in particular to the implementation of security screening at the police.

## 9 Co-operation

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The BVD co-operates closely with various bodies in the Netherlands and the overseas territories and with intelligence and security services and other relevant bodies at an international level. This chapter gives an overview of these relations.

### 9.1 National co-operation

In the Netherlands the BVD co-operates with the Military Intelligence Service (MID), with the police and judicial authorities and with the so-called Great Evaluation Triangle and Technical Evaluation Committee, which are advisory bodies.

#### 9.1.1 Co-operation with the Military Intelligence Service

The BVD co-operates with the Military Intelligence Service (MID) in several areas. First of all, the development of the new Intelligence and Security Services Act, which governs both the BVD and the MID, prompted co-ordination between the services. The international combat of terrorism has led to an intensification in the working-level relations between BVD and MID. Co-operation also takes place in the field of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and undesirable trade in conventional weapons. Also the (small-scale) revival in anti-militarism in the Netherlands demanded the attention of both services. Other contacts relate to the evaluation of security measures, vetting procedures and the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act.

#### 9.1.2 Co-operation with the police and judicial authorities

The 11 September attacks in the United States have poignantly reconfirmed the fact that co-operation between security and intelligence services and the police/judicial authorities on the prevention and combat of terrorism is essential. The present statutory framework offers sufficient scope for an effective and efficient co-operation.

The prevention of terrorism is primarily a task of the security and intelligence services. Their efforts form the 'front side' of the process of counter-terrorism. Only when there are good reasons to suspect that certain individuals are guilty of plotting or committing terrorist activities, information gathering is followed by prosecution and repressive measures. An officer of the Public Prosecutions Department responsible for counter-terrorism cases, with whom the BVD is in close contact pursuant to Article 22, paragraph 3 of the Intelligence and Security Services Act, is responsible for the co-ordination of the criminal proceedings relating to counter-terrorism. This officer also chairs the co-ordination group on terrorism, in which both the BVD and the National Police Agency (KLPD) are represented. The consultations within this group will be intensified in 2002. Following the attacks in the United States, in consultation with the Public Prosecutions Department and the KLPD, a liaison officer of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Tasks Department of the KLPD was appointed in order to optimise the exchange of information, leaving intact, however, the respective statutory terms of reference and separate competencies.

Under the Intelligence and Security Services Act a chief of police carries out certain activities for the BVD. These activities are in fact carried out by the Regional Criminal Intelligence Services under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and on instructions of the Director General of the BVD (Article 18, Intelligence and Security Services Act). The

regional criminal intelligence services play a very important role in the prevention of terrorism. Their principal task is to identify radicalisation tendencies and they also play a role in distinguishing ethnic, political and religious tensions and controversies. With a view to the combat of terrorism, a provision was incorporated into the Action Plan for Counter-Terrorism and Security (Second Chamber 2001-2002, 27925, no. 10) for an expansion of the regional criminal intelligence services. The BVD will, of course, also continue to work with the regional criminal intelligence services in other fields of interest, on the basis of annual plans for activities and manpower planning.

### **9.1.3 Great Evaluation Triangle and Technical Evaluation Committee**

The BVD participates in the Great Evaluation Triangle and the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) of the National Co-ordination Centre (NCC). These are interdepartmental advisory bodies for security-related matters. At the request of the TEC, the BVD makes assessments of potential threats to people, property and/or events for which the central government is responsible. On the basis of the findings of the TEC, the Great Evaluation Triangle makes recommendations to the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about security measures to be taken.

Like in the past few years, also in 2001 a large number of threat assessments was drawn up in relation to major meetings, manifestations and visits of foreign heads of state and dignitaries. In relation to the arrest of the former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic and his transfer to the detention centre at Scheveningen in 2001, the security of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was a permanent item on the agenda of the above-mentioned advisory bodies. Other important items, in addition to regular activities, were the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2001 and the wedding of the Prince of Orange on 2 February 2002.

The events in the United States on 11 September 2001 obviously had a major impact on the activities and the meeting frequency of the Great Evaluation Triangle and the Technical Evaluation Committee. The events in the United States and the subsequent developments in the world led to a large number of threat assessments and risk analyses that formed the basis of measures to protect and guard people and property in the Netherlands.

## **9.2 Co-operation with the overseas territories**

The security services of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba consult each other on developments relating to domestic security in the respective countries in order to benefit from mutual experiences. Specific information is exchanged where such is necessary for the security of the countries involved. The terrorist attacks in the United States have reconfirmed the fact that the combat of terrorism is in the interest of the entire Kingdom. For this reason the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands decided that the co-operation should be intensified. Priority is given to the identification of vulnerabilities within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and to adequate information gathering on these weak spots.

The security service of Aruba is going through a reorganisation. The BVD gave advice in the field of organisation development.

## **9.3 International co-operation**

This paragraph gives an overview of the BVD's international co-operation with European intelligence and security services, NATO and the European Union.

### **9.3.1 European intelligence and security services**

The attacks in the United States have had considerable impact on international co-operation. In view of the transnational character of this Islamist terrorism, initiatives have been taken to rapidly intensify international co-operation and to set up multilateral co-operation groups. This has considerably enhanced the importance of the BVD's co-operation network of intelligence and security services with regard to intelligence-gathering, prevention and positioning.

Following the attacks in the US, on the initiative of the heads of the European security services, a specific counter-terrorism-focused co-operation group of the EU security services plus Norway and Switzerland was set up in October 2001. The objective of this Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) is to improve operational co-operation. The first meeting was held in The Hague in November, chaired by the Belgian service and organised by the BVD. The CTG meets every three months under the chairmanship of the service of the country holding the EU presidency. It is not a new EU working group, however. The CTG reports to the national representatives in the regular EU groups via the national capitals.

Within the context of the Middle Europe Conference (MEC), a co-operation group of a number of western European and central European intelligence and security services, including the BVD, a seminar was held on international terrorism on 27 November 2001. The participating services decided to intensify their co-operation in the field of counter-terrorism. To that end agreements were made on operational co-operation and intensification of information exchange at all levels.

### **9.3.2 NATO**

Under Belgian chairmanship the NATO Special Committee informed the North Atlantic Council on potential threats to the security of the Alliance and the national security of its members.

Following the 11 September attacks, the services represented in the Committee decided to reinforce the NATO international secretariat by seconding a small number of experts. They will regularly provide the North Atlantic Council with assessments of the threat from violent Islamic extremism on the basis of information obtained by the security services. Within the same context the committee discussed a possible intensification of the co-operation on the combat of international terrorism with representatives of Russia. In May 2001 the committee had a meeting with the services of the countries which were nominated for entry into NATO, the Membership Action Plan countries, about the role of the security services within a NATO context.

### **9.3.3 European Union**

After the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the discussions within the EU about security matters were considerably intensified. Policy development progressed rapidly, as appeared, for example, from the EU framework decrees on punishment of terrorist crimes and on international arrests. As a result of the conclusions of the Council of Justice and the Interior of 20 September, the heads of European security services set up a consultation group of directors of counter-terrorism departments, which meets four times a year. Like the security services of most of the other EU Member States, the BVD stationed a liaison officer to the counter-terrorism task force of Europol.

Counter-terrorism and security were discussed in much more EU working groups than the usual ones. It has appeared that the EU and organisations like the UN and NATO have more and more interfaces. The UN Security Council has drawn up, for example, a number of resolutions intended to tackle the financing of terrorism. These resolutions are worked out at a national level and at an EU level insofar as the legal footing and implementing regulations are concerned. In December

2001 the European Union accepted an implementation decree intended to freeze the financial assets of individuals and organisations involved in terrorist actions.

Under Portuguese chairmanship agreement was reached on the Dutch proposal to draw up a non-classified threat assessment document in addition to the existing confidential threat assessment document. The public document will be collated by Europol on the basis of information from the Member States. Other subjects discussed under Portuguese presidency included the abuse of the Internet by terrorists and the EU policy to stimulate information exchange on this subject.

After summer 2001, the Belgian presidency was completely dominated by the consequences of the 11 September attacks. In addition to the debate about assessment of the threat from terrorism, the Belgian presidency reintroduced a procedure for rapid information exchange after terrorist incidents, concerning both attacks and arrests. An initiative was taken to draw up an unclassified EU list of terrorist organisations whose financial assets should be frozen. A completely renewed encrypted e-mail system, the so-called Bureaux de Liaison (or BdL) net, with new equipment was presented to the Working Group on Terrorism in November 2001. A pilot group of six EU countries, chaired by the BVD, worked on this system for a couple of years in order to bring the security of e-mail communication up to the present standards. The second pillar working group on terrorism mainly focused its attention on the EU counter-terrorism aid programme for the Palestinian intelligence and security services and on the EU preparations for the UN treaty negotiations on counter-terrorism prior to the half-yearly negotiations at the UN in New York.

## 10 Data disclosure and complaints procedures

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This chapter concerns itself with applications under the Freedom of Information Act and complaints about the BVD.

### 10.1 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act

Like in previous years, in 2001 the BVD received again a considerable number of requests to inspect BVD files.

Information that is no longer relevant to the performance of the BVD's duties may in principle be released. However, information that would provide insight into sources or methods of the BVD is not released. Personal data are not provided to third parties. Under the new Intelligence and Security Services Act, data disclosure to third parties will be possible, subject to the aforementioned restrictions, when it concerns a deceased spouse, registered partner, child or parent of the applicant.

Handling applications under the Freedom of Information Act is quite labour-intensive. In 2001 it again appeared to be practically impossible to deal with all applications within the statutory period of four weeks. For this reason under the new Intelligence and Security Services Act the statutory period will be extended to in principle three months at most. This term may be extended by four weeks. The applicant should be informed of such an extension by motivated letter.

By the end of 2001, 83 applications under the Freedom of Information Act were pending, as well as 64 objections against rejected applications, 11 court cases against decisions on objections and 26 proceedings on appeal.

### 10.2 Complaints

The National Ombudsman dealt with two complaints about alleged inadmissible actions by the BVD. The first complaint concerned an application under the Freedom of Information Act. The Ombudsman considered this complaint manifestly unfounded. The second complaint was lodged because the complainant claimed to have been followed by the BVD. As this complaint was already being dealt with by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ombudsman did not start an investigation. The Minister informed the complainant that his complaints were unfounded. The complainant did not avail himself of the opportunity to lodge a new complaint with the Ombudsman.

In the year under review the BVD itself handled two complaints. One of these complaints also concerned alleged BVD surveillance. The complainant was informed that an investigation had not produced any evidence of improper actions by the BVD. The essence of the second complaint concerned alleged improper and objectionable actions of the BVD that were said to have damaged the complainant's private and professional life. Also in this case, after an internal investigation, the BVD concluded that there was no evidence of any improper actions.

Complaints cannot only be filed with the National Ombudsman, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the BVD, but also with the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence

and Security Services. In 2001 no complaints were lodged that gave the committee reason to approach the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations or the BVD.

## 11 Organisation and staffing

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This chapter describes developments relating to the internal organisation of the BVD.

### 11.1 Personnel

Partly as a result of the amendments to the Intelligence and Security Services Act and the incorporation of the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA), the number of full-time equivalents grew to 702. In 2001 the BVD employed a staff of 749, consisting of 252 women and 497 men. There was an inflow of 138 new employees, while 39 employees left the service.

The personnel policy was renewed on a number of points. The emphasis was put on a centralisation of all recruitment activities, the development and professionalisation of several in-company training courses and the preparations for the introduction of new instruments such as personal profiles and job profiles.

In preparation of the new foreign intelligence function, a recruitment programme for new personnel was started and special attention was paid to training courses for several job categories.

The recommendations of the Working Conditions Management Group resulting from a risk survey were laid down in an action plan. In 2002 priority will be given to some aspects of the health and safety system that still have to be worked out, such as a specific health and safety policy plan and an information programme. By the end of 2001, a measuring instrument was introduced, in accordance with the agreements laid down in the Employment Conditions Agreement for the Public Sector 1999-2000. A computer programme generates a report with a general indication of the causes of pressure of work, on the basis of questionnaires filled in by the employees on a voluntary basis.

### 11.2 Archives

By the end of 2001 the National Archives Inspectorate brought out a report on an inspection of BVD records management in 2000-2001. The general conclusion was that the level of records management at the BVD was adequate. A number of aspects pointed out by the national inspectorate will be improved.

The motivation for the selection list of BVD records will be worked out in detail in 2002, encompassing the completion of the institutional investigation report, a records analysis and a list of proceedings.

In 2001 the BVD officially transferred records to the National Archives Office for the first time. These records were compiled by one of the BVD's forerunners, the Bureau National Security (Bureau Nationale Veiligheid). The national press paid attention to the official transfer, which was signed by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the State Secretary of Education, Culture and Science and the Head of the National Archives on 4 October.

The BVD again visited all Regional Criminal Intelligence Services in order to inspect their administration in 2001. This inspection is meant to verify whether the administrations still comply

with the Privacy Regulations for the BVD, while it also enhances the uniformity of administrative processes. The inspection brought to light a number of aspects to be improved.

### 11.3 Computerised information

The BVD needs to have easy access to publicly available information via the Internet and other information networks. In the year under review preparations were made to extend the internal network infrastructure to a level that enables all BVD officers to consult the aforementioned networks at their own workstation. The extension of the internal network, which should obviously meet high security requirements, will be completed in 2002. Additional measures have been taken in order to improve the round-the-clock availability of the computer systems. The computer department also worked on an extension of options for information exchange with foreign counterparts via data communication systems. In view of the further intensification of international co-operation, the BVD will continue to pay special attention to this aspect.

### 11.4 Accommodation

Last year's highlights in relation to accommodation were the move of part of the BVD to temporary accommodation and the subsequent move of the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NLNCSA) to the BVD office. The present BVD building cannot properly house the growing organisation in the long term. For this reason options were examined for expansion at the present location and for potential alternative locations in the region.

### 11.5 Finance

The BVD budget is part of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Consequently, budgeting and accountability fall within the financial process of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In addition to a 'public budget', the BVD also has a 'secret budget', covering the service's operational expenditure.

#### Expenditure in 2001

Staff	€ 35.3 million	(NLG 77.8 million)
Resources	€ 22.2 million	(NLG 48.9 million)
Total public budget	€ 57.7 million	(NLG 126.7 million)
Secret budget	€ 1.9 million	(NLG 4.3 million)

In relation to tasks in the field of illegal migration, the Lockerbie trial and security screening for the police extra resources were allocated to the BVD. Security screening for the police will still require more manpower, also in the near future. The transfer of the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency also had its consequences for the budget, as well as the further development of the foreign intelligence function and an extra investment in relation to applications under the Freedom of Information Act. The investments required for the incorporation of the NLNCSA into the BVD proved to be adequate, as well as the investments for new personnel for the foreign intelligence function. Investment in resources for this new function has largely been postponed until the new Intelligence and Security Services Act will come into effect.

The resources allocated to the BVD were spent effectively and efficiently. Especially in relation to facilities management several plans were adjusted in the course of the year. Some planned renovations to the building were postponed, while others were advanced. The estimate of the alteration costs in relation to the transfer of the NLNCSA proved to be correct, while the costs of the alterations to the temporary accommodation turned out to be lower than estimated. This enabled the BVD to carry out other necessary improvements. In relation to ICT, funds were allocated to the expansion of the internal data network. This large-scale operation is also on the budget for 2002.

The costs of recruitment and selection of new staff were higher than expected. This was caused by the fact that the inflow of new, highly qualified employees was larger than expected. As a consequence of this unexpected growth, also the training costs turned out to be higher than estimated.

In autumn 2001 the developments in the field of counter-terrorism led to a shift in operational priorities and a re-allocation of resources. Meanwhile extra funds have been allocated to the BVD in relation to counter-terrorism. The service will grow from 702 full-time equivalents in 2001 to 835 full-time equivalents in 2002. Eventually, the BVD will grow to 975 full-time equivalents in 2006.

## **11.6 National Court of Audit**

The National Court of Audit examined the BVD's management of resources in 1998. Between October 1999 and January 2000 the National Court of Audit conducted a brief, additional audit in order to check the follow-up to its recommendations. In October 2001, the President of the National Court of Audit saw no reason for a second additional audit, on the basis of the BVD's progress report. Audits of the BVD will henceforth be part of the National Court of Audit's regular monitoring activities.



**Parliamentary reports**

- 25877**            **Regulations pertaining to the intelligence and security services and amendments to a number of Acts of Parliament (Intelligence and Security Services Act 19..)**
- No. 14            Memorandum relating to the additional report.
- No. 15            Second memorandum of amendments
- No. 16            Letter of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations about the text of the Detailed Opinion of the European Commission with regard to the bill on the Intelligence and Security Services and the reply of the Dutch government to this Detailed Opinion.
- No. 17            Third memorandum of amendments.
- Nos. 18 to 21    Amendments by Mr Van Oven.
- No. 22            Amendments by Mr Van der Hoeven.
- No. 23            Amendment by Ms Scheltema-de Nie.
- No. 24            Ditto.
- No. 25            Amendment by Mr Vos.
- No. 26            Amendment by Mr Van Oven and Ms Scheltema-de Nie to substitute the amendment printed under no. 21.
- Nos. 27 to 51    Amendments by Mr Harrewijn.
- Nos. 52 to 54    Amendment by Mr Rouvoet.
- No. 55            Amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 37.
- No. 56            Adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 41
- No. 57            Adjusted amendment by Mr Rouvoet to substitute the amendment printed under no. 53.
- No. 58            Report of the legislative meeting on 11 June 2001.
- No. 59            Letter of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Speaker of the Second Chamber of the States General.
- No. 60            Fourth memorandum of amendments.

No. 61	Adjusted amendment by Ms Scheltema-de Nie to substitute the amendment printed under no. 24.
No. 62	Further adjusted amendment by Ms Scheltema-de Nie to substitute the amendment printed under no. 61.
No. 63	Adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 29.
No. 64	Adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 34.
No. 65	Adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 49.
No. 66	Further adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 56.
No. 67	Letter of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Speaker of the Second Chamber of the States General.
No. 68	Memorandum of amendments.
No. 69	Adjusted amendment by Mr Van Oven to substitute the amendment printed under no. 19.
No. 70	Sub-amendment by Mr Van Oven en Ms Scheltema-de Nie.
No. 71	Further adjusted amendment by Mr Harrewijn to substitute the amendment printed under no. 65.
No. 72	Report of the legislative meeting on 25 June 2001.
No. 73	Letter of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Speaker of the Second Chamber of the States General.
Proceedings TK 93-5838	Debate on the bill on the Intelligence and Security Services on 28 June 2001.
Proceedings TK 93-5854	Ditto.
Proceedings TK 94-5883	Vote on the bill on the Intelligence and Security Services on 3 July 2001.

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- No. 337 Amended bill.
- No. 58I Preliminary report of the standing committee on the Interior and the High Institutions of State.
- No. 58a Memorandum of reply.
- No. 58b Final report of the standing committee on the Interior and the High Institutions of State.

**27591 Large-scale interception of modern telecommunication systems**

- no. 1 Letter of the Minister of Defence about the technical and judicial aspects of large-scale interception of modern telecommunication systems.
- No. 2 List of questions and replies.



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Reply to written questions asked by Mr Rehwinkel and Mr Van Oven about the Islamic organisation Hilafet Devleti.



## **1 The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations**

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for the BVD. The Minister determines on what subjects the BVD should focus attention. The Director General of the BVD informs him about the performance of the duties of the service. In addition to information about specific cases, provided both verbally and in writing, monthly discussions take place about policy-related matters. The Minister also receives a bimonthly overview of current operations. The Minister participates in the Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (MICIV). The Minister is accountable to parliament. The Second Chamber (Dutch Lower House of Parliament) has delegated members to form the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. Subjects that cannot be discussed in public for reasons of national security are discussed with this committee in confidence.

## **2 Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services**

The Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (MICIV) co-ordinates the policy relating to the intelligence and security services and is responsible for a proper co-ordination of the activities of the services. The Prime Minister chairs the MICIV. The Committee comprises, in addition to the ministers responsible for the services (i.e. the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence), also the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Economic Affairs, Finance, and Transport, Public Works and Water Management. The MICIV meetings are also attended by the members of the Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN) (see paragraph 3) and the secretaries general of the relevant ministries.

The MICIV met on four occasions in 2001. The subjects for discussion included the memorandum on large-scale interception of telecommunication systems, which was presented to both Chambers of the States General, and the legislative proposal for a new Intelligence and Security Services Act. After 11 September 2001, the MICIV paid special attention to counter-terrorism and security, also in relation to international co-operation within this context.

## **3 The Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee**

The Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN) prepares the subjects to be discussed by the MICIV. The CVIN co-ordinates the activities of the intelligence and security services and furthers the co-operation between the services. The CVIN is chaired by the co-ordinator of the intelligence and security services, who is employed by the Ministry of General Affairs. Its members are the directors general of BVD and MID and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. Some of the eight CVIN meetings held in 2001 were also attended by representatives of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministry of Economic Affairs because the items on the agenda were also relevant to these ministries.

The CVIN meetings covered a range of subjects. The highlights were national and international (terrorist) threats and the consequences for the services, the possible spillover in Europe of conflicts on other continents, special information security, the new Intelligence and Security

Services Act, including the new foreign intelligence function of the BVD, and the interception of telecommunication. The CVIN exchanged information and ideas about control and co-ordination of the activities of intelligence and security services with two Swedish committees.

At a special CVIN meeting, convened after the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington, it was decided to set up a broad official steering group for counter-terrorism and security. In this context a wide-ranging national action plan against terrorism was developed.

#### **4 The Second Chamber**

During a meeting on 26 September 2001, the standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations discussed the annual report of the BVD for 2000 as well as the report of the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services for that year. The committee also elaborated on the memorandum 'Terrorism at the start of the 21st century; current threat and positioning of the National Security Service'.

The standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations organised two legislative meetings about the bill on the Intelligence and Security Services. This bill was subject of one plenary debate in the Second Chamber.

At a general meeting on 29 November 2001, the standing committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, jointly with the standing committees for Justice and Defence, discussed the memorandum 'Large-scale interception of modern telecommunication systems', which was brought out by the Minister of Defence on behalf of the Justice and Interior ministers in January 2001.

During the debate about the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations several subjects were discussed that were relevant to the BVD.

The questions asked by Members of Parliament about the activities of the BVD in 2001 have been listed in annex I of this annual report.

#### **5 Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services**

The parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services discusses operational activities of the BVD with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in confidence. The committee consists of the parliamentary leaders of the four largest political parties.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations provided the Committee with many written reports in 2001, both on request and unsolicited. The committee met the Minister on six occasions. The subjects for discussion included the security risks involved in hosting international organisations and the secret part of the BVD's annual report for 2000. Matters relating to the combat of international terrorism were elaborately discussed several times. The Director General of the BVD and BVD experts accompany the Minister at the meetings. If necessary, they give the committee detailed information about current operational matters.

The committee brings out a public annual report. This report does not include any operational information. Consequently, the report is usually just a general outline of the subjects discussed.

This annex gives an overview of the developments within Islamist terrorism. The overview is an update of the paper 'Terrorism at the start of the 21st century; current threat and positioning of the National Security Service', which the BVD brought out in 2001.

Although the violent political Islam - hereafter referred to as Islamism - has generally been regarded as one of the major threats to international security for decades, the nature and scope of this threat have been subject to changes; both are in a state of flux. Looking back upon the past few decades and upon the picture sketched in the BVD papers 'Political Islam in the Netherlands' (1998) and 'Terrorism at the start of the 21st century' (April 2001), we can roughly distinguish three phases in the Islamist threat to the West, including the Netherlands.

The first phase roughly covers the period until the late 1980s. During this period, the threat to the West emanated practically exclusively from nationally oriented radical Islamic groups, whether or not supported by an Islamic state like Iran. It concerned groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Egyptian Al Jama'a al-Islamiyya (AJAI). These groups focused practically entirely on realising an Islamic state in their country of origin. Consequently, most of the terrorist attacks of these groups were committed in the country of origin. Since the late 1980s, several other nationally oriented violent political-Islamic groups have been set up, like the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat. Later on, these nationally oriented groups gradually developed closer ties with radical Islamic individuals and networks from other countries (including Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation) and they no longer aimed their activities solely against the regime in their own country, but also against the West and against Israel. Thus the threat to the West from these new groups has become more substantial than the threat constituted by the old, nationally oriented groups before the late 1980s.

The second phase began by the late 1980s, after mujahideen fighters successfully drove the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989. Quite soon after the Russian invasion in Afghanistan in 1980, Muslims from various (mostly Arab) countries converged on this region in order to participate in the resistance. This concentration and joint fight of radical Muslims of various nationalities has been of crucial importance to the emergence of an internationally oriented violent political Islam. In Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1979 and 1989 a solidarity grew between mujahideen from various countries on the basis of shared ideology and (war) experiences. This solidarity persisted also after 1989, when many of these so-called 'Afghanistan veterans' left the region. They either returned to their country of origin, moved to new scenes of battle, for example in Bosnia and Chechnya, or they applied for asylum in the West. Since then these Islamic fighters have formed a diffuse network of internationally oriented radical Muslims who often appear to be prepared to lend support to, or sometimes even to take part in political-Islamic inspired violence. Unlike the members of nationally oriented violent political-Islamic groups, these internationally oriented mujahideen mainly aim for reconquering the holy places of Islamic faith and establishing a global caliphate, which should cover the entire once Islam-dominated area. Consequently, their campaigns are mainly aimed against Israel and the power and culture of the entire 'imperialist' West, personified by the dominant position of the US in the Middle East, especially since the Gulf War in 1999.

The internationally oriented fighters who settled in western Europe after the late 1980s initially occupied a very isolated position in the western societies. They hardly fitted into the organisations

of the established Islamic communities. In that period of time, the threat to western Europe constituted by these former Islamic fighters mainly concerned their logistical, financial or material support to violent Muslim activities in other parts of the world. The political-Islamic motivated terrorist attacks committed in western Europe at the time could mainly be blamed on the aforementioned nationally oriented political Islamic groups, like the GIA. Members of this organisation committed several attacks in France, which they associated with the Algerian regime, in the middle of the 1990s.

The third phase roughly began by the middle of the 1990s. This phase is first of all characterised by the expansion and professionalisation of the diffuse international network of Islamic fighters. Also after 1989 tens of thousands of Muslims followed a military training in Afghanistan. After having completed this training, they scattered over various countries, including western European countries. This new generation of mujahideen joined the diffuse international network. The support activities carried out by members of this network were professionalised and expanded in the past few years. They are now using high-tech means of communication, while many 'brothers' are provided with forged identity papers which enable them to travel (illegally). Secondly, the former Islamic fighters who settled in western Europe a couple of years earlier are gradually breaking out of their social isolation. Not only does a growing number of radical religious brothers settle in these societies - illegally or otherwise -, they are also linking up with the strictly orthodox or even radical section within the Islamic communities that have lived in these countries for decades. This has resulted in, for example, increased fund-raising in western Europe in support of the Islamic fight in other parts of the world, both involving terrorist actions and other armed struggle.

We can conclude that in the 1990s Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation played a key role both in giving Muslims military training and in plotting and facilitating terrorist activities through members of the international mujahideen network. In addition, the Al Qaeda organisation also started to support and even control operations of many of the traditionally nationally oriented violent political-Islamic groups.

The objectives of the 'members' of this diffuse network in the third phase do not essentially differ from those pursued in the second phase. However, in the third phase the threat to the West constituted by violent political-Islamic groups and networks no longer just concerns their possible support to armed struggle and terrorism outside western Europe. The fact that the Islamic fighters in the West no longer find themselves in a socially isolated position increasingly enables them to exert radical influence on particularly young members of the Muslim communities in these western countries. They successfully recruited young people who grew up in a western environment for the Islamic fight. The most striking case in point were the 11 September attacks in the US. Originally non-radical Muslims were radicalised and recruited in western Europe (in this case Germany) in order to commit a political-Islamic motivated terrorist attack in and against the West (in this case the US). But the attack in the US is not an isolated case. In the past few years also other (attempted) attacks in the West involved various long-time western residents who underwent a process of political-Islamic radicalisation during their stay in the West.

It has become evident that the anti-integration tendency within some Muslim communities in the Netherlands is beginning to interface with violent activities of a terrorist nature initiated by political-Islamic groups and networks. Within a small group of Muslims raised in the Netherlands the strong disapproval or even repudiation of the Dutch society (based on social or political-religious reasons) seems to be a forerunner to further radicalisation. Some of them have even proved to be receptive to recruitment for support to or even participation in political-Islamic inspired violence.

In conclusion, we can say that the threat to the West emanating from violent political-Islamic individuals and groups over the past few decades has increased. A major reason for concern is the fact that also among members of the established Islamic communities sympathy for and support to the violent political Islam has grown, although it still concerns a very small number of Muslims resident in the Netherlands.

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July 2002