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Seal of the Department of Defense

Reserve Component
Employment Study
2005

Volume 1
Study Report

Seal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Download full report in .pdf format (800k)


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

Study Background and Methodology

Assessment of Alternative Employment Concepts

Homeland Defense

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Major Theater Wars

Refinement of Remaining Alternative Employment Concepts

Resource Challenges for the RC Employment

Conclusion

Glossary


Executive Summary

In April 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued the Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, which directed the Department to conduct the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study. The study reviewed employment of the Reserve Component (RC), and developed several recommendations to enhance the role of the RC in the full range of military missions from homeland defense to major theater wars (MTWs). The study examined how to make the RC easier to access and use, and how to better train, equip, and manage it to ensure effective mission fulfillment.

In examining the RC role in the future, the RCE-05 Study focused on three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies, and MTWs. While the study evaluated several initiatives in each area, certain key themes emerged as particularly important to ensuring an effective future Total Force.

Homeland Defense. Given the increasing threats to the territory, population, and infrastructure of the United States, the RC should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The study suggests new ways for the RC to:

Smaller-Scale Contingencies. While U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCs) will continue to be selective, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years. Increasing the role of the RC in SSCs where feasible will provide some operational tempo relief for the Active Component (AC), and build RC operational skills. The study recommends new ways for the RC to:

Major Theater Wars. The most stressing requirement for the U.S. military remains our commitment to being able to fight and win two MTWs nearly simultaneously. While substantial portions of the RC are already integral to the warfighting effort, its role, particularly that of the combat units of the Army National Guard (ARNG), can be further clarified. The study highlights new ways to:


Study Background and Methodology

The Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, issued in April 1998 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, mandated that the Department of Defense conduct a study examining RC employment in support of the defense strategy across the full range of employment options including homeland defense, SSCs, and MTWs. The DPG language stated:

"By February 26, 1999, the CJCS and ASD (S&TR), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD (RA)), D (PA&E), the CINCs, and the Services will conduct a study of alternative concepts for employing Reserve component forces in the future. The study will: (1) review the full range of combat and support RC roles in current operational plans and assess currently planned employment; (2) identify and assess potential RC missions in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC’s role in the strategic reserve; (3) develop and assess alternative employment roles and force-mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits and risks for each option; and (4) assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements."

A Senior Steering Group (SSG), cochaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Director, Joint Staff J-8, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, was established to oversee the study. The SSG included representatives from OSD(PA&E), all components of the Services, the Coast Guard, the Service Secretaries, the National Guard Bureau, and the Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve Matters. A copy of the RCE-05 study plan, which was approved by the SSG, can be found in Annex A.

The SSG created four panels to conduct the study -- Missions and Capabilities, Force Mix Employment Alternatives, Assessment, and Resources -- to examine the range of issues mandated by the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. Each panel had discrete tasks, although in many cases the panels conducted their work simultaneously. The SSG regularly reviewed and refined the work of the panels.

During its review, the study's Missions and Capabilities panel found that the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard RCs are capable of executing the same missions as the AC, with only a few exceptions such as extremely short-notice non-combatant evacuations and some special operations missions. Availability of RC units to execute these missions is resource dependent, and varies by Service and mission requirement. As noted in the U.S. defense strategy, the number of SSC operations is likely to remain relatively high over the next 10 to 15. Threats against the United States homeland also are a serious concern. While carrying out SSCs and homeland defense missions is not entirely new for US forces, they are emerging as increasingly important for the Department of Defense. The study determined that the RC can make important contributions in both areas, in addition to its traditional role of helping to fight and win the nation's wars. A summary of the Missions and Capabilities Panel work was retained by JCS/DJ8 for reference as required.

Drawing on its examination of current and emerging missions for the RC, the study's Force Mix Employment Alternatives panel developed a variety of force mix employment concepts that were eventually consolidated and prioritized into 13 alternative concepts. Of the many alternative concepts that were developed, the Senior Steering Group determined that the study would devote most of its attention to evaluating the concepts that concerned RC employment in homeland defense missions, SSCs, and MTWs. Because of the importance of these missions, the report discusses the study's assessment of these alternatives in detail below. The study examined several of the remaining concepts and refined them for possible future consideration, and recommended that 2 of the 13 concepts analyzed in detail be dropped from the RCE-05 study because they were being addressed through other Department efforts.

In addition to the work on these specific alternatives, the study's Resourcing Panel examined a wide range of RC resource challenges that affect the Services’ ability to integrate and employ their RC effectively. The panel's review of initiatives to address these resource challenges is discussed in greater detail later in the report.


Assessment of Alternative Employment Concepts

As noted earlier, the Assessment panel focused primarily on examining how the RC could be better employed in homeland defense missions, SSC, and MTWs. In each area, the study reviewed several different initiatives and for each one either recommended a near- or mid-term action, or determined that the particular initiative did not merit implementation in the foreseeable future. Recommendations for follow-on actions are described in detail in Annex B.


Homeland Defense

Because homeland defense is becoming an increasingly important mission for the Department of Defense, the study examined several initiatives to increase RC participation in homeland defense missions in considerable detail. In many cases the RC is particularly well-suited to homeland defense missions because the RC infrastructure exists throughout all 50 states, and RC units are already quite familiar with disaster response requirements, a significant component of the homeland defense mission.

Dual Mission RC Units for WMD Consequence Management Missions. The study also examined whether selected RC units could be assigned homeland defense-related missions in addition to their existing mission of fighting the nation's wars. Specifically, the study assessed whether existing RC units could be tasked to provide physical security for key national critical infrastructure facilities and consequence management capabilities in the event of an incident involving nuclear materials, chemical or biological weapons.

Several studies are underway within the Department of Defense to better define the requirements for consequence management and critical infrastructure physical security, and the RCE-05 study drew on this ongoing work to examine whether "dual-missioning" certain RC units might be productive. Many consequence management and critical infrastructure tasks require capabilities that already exist in the RC, such as providing support to civil authorities. Because many RC units already maintain these capabilities to support their existing State missions, they are well suited to being dual-missioned for both warfighting and homeland defense. However, other tasks in this area, for example the capability to conduct chemical weapons detection and provide mass decontamination, require significant additional equipment and skills that are not widely available in typical RC units today. Though there are several RC units organized for nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare-related tasks, all are apportioned to overseas theaters in the event of major theater war. Though they could be made available in peacetime to provide WMD consequence management support at home, they might be unavailable should a WMD attack on the United States occur during a period of overseas conflict. Making such units available for CONUS WMD consequence management support may require remissioning them from their existing MTW-related commitments. Providing such capabilities with RC units, not currently organized to perform such specialized tasks, would require restructuring, equiping, and training those units for the new missions. Given the significant additional requirements for certain homeland defense tasks, it may be impractical and costly to maintain skills for both warfighting and specialized homeland defense missions in a large number of RC units. Remissioning or restructuring a certain number of RC units to focus solely on specialized homeland defense tasks could be a more cost-effective solution. Additional discussion of how RC units might to support these requirements is contained in Annex C.

To determine more precisely if dual-missioning and remissioning or restructuring certain RC units to focus on homeland defense missions such as consequence management would be beneficial, the study recommends tasking the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and JCS/DJ5, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), the CINCs, and the Services and their components to determine by March 2000 the mission requirements for homeland defense. This follow-on study also would examine which RC units could be dual-missioned to meet these requirements, and which units might need to be remissioned or restructured to focus solely on homeland defense tasks.

Convert Air National Guard Bare Base Air Wings to RAID-like Teams. Air National Guard Bare Base Wing support elements, which during the Cold War supported the establishment of operational capability at austere locations, are no longer needed because the bare base mission has become an integral part of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept. As a result, the study examined whether these bare base air wing support elements could be converted into teams structured to provide additional consequence management capabilities, similar to the concept applied with the currently programmed Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams in the Army National Guard. These units are on-call in the event of an attack within the United States that involves nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. RAID teams provide a rapid-response capability to assess what type of agent might have been used in an attack and provide recommendations and assistance to local authorities in managing the consequences. As indicated earlier, providing support for WMD consequence management is likely to require a broad range of capabilities, some of which will be highly specialized. Existing Bare Base Wing support elements, which include engineering units and other specialized mission support elements, provide an appropriate foundation upon which to build the specialized capabilities that consequence management missions are likely to require.

There are as many as 6,000 Air National Guard personnel in Bare Base units who could be made available through unit conversions to organize into mission-specific units similar in concept to RAID teams. While the study was not able to determine the precise cost, this kind of conversion would provide the Department of Defense with needed additional homeland defense capabilities. Finally, while it appears that the Air Force may have specific personnel available for such a conversion, the concept of converting RC support units into units specifically responsible for homeland defense tasks could be applied to all of the Services.

To better determine whether the Bare Base air wing support element conversion would be beneficial and cost-effective, the study recommends tasking the Air Force in coordination with ASD(RA) to assess the conversion in detail and examine how it might be implemented by March 2000. Drawing on the work of the previously addressed USD(P) study on homeland defense requirements, the Air Force will determine whether the Bare Base Wing support elements conversion could cost-effectively fill a portion of these requirements. The Air Force will report its findings, including any implementation plans, to OSD/RA by March 2000.

Create A Joint RC Virtual Information Operations Organization. To further explore how the RC can contribute to the homeland defense mission, and how to capitalize on RC existing skills, the study examined the costs and benefits of developing a 400-person joint integrated RC "virtual organization" for information operations and information assurance. The Defense Information Systems Agency, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), and the Services developed the concepts for the "virtual organization." It would consist of individuals with information technology skills who could perform their duties from dispersed locations rather than working as a single consolidated unit at a specific training center. A "virtual organization" could support the JTF Computer Network Defense, which the Secretary of Defense established in December 1998 to monitor and protect DoD computer networks and Internet sites from unauthorized access, as well as other DoD organizations focusing on information operations and information assurance. The RC members of this unit would communicate with their headquarters elements through classified DoD information systems such as SIPRNET, from existing Reserve centers or other DoD-controlled facilities located in regions where high concentrations of information technology skills are established

Forming a "virtual organization" to concentrate on information operations and information assurance would enable the Department to recruit and retain highly skilled technology professionals into the RC, which might reduce the need to rely on external contractor support for these missions. Some members of the "virtual organization" could be drawn from the current RC personnel pool, others might be recruited from the civilian sector and be asked to join the RC for a specific number of years in exchange for high technology training provided by the Department of Defense. A "virtual organization" may generate costs savings due to reduced reliance on contractors, though it is difficult to quantify the exact costs of such an organization without a more detailed assessment. Moreover, personnel management for a "virtual organization" would present a set of unique challenges for the Department, including how to monitor unit and individual performance, how to ensure sufficient security measures, for unit equipment and personnel, and how to retain quality personnel over the long term.

To explore this concept, the study recommends tasking the Joint Staff J-1, J-3, and J-6 Directorates and the ASD(RA), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, OACJCS(NG&RM), DISA, USSPACECOM, USACOM, and the Services to implement this initiative on a small scale. The study will evaluate its effectiveness and examine in more detail how to address the management challenges such a unit would pose. The study and proof of concept will be completed by 30 June 2000 and provided to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Increase RC Participation in a Joint Task Force Headquarters for Homeland Defense. To better determine how the RC might contribute to the command and control of homeland defense missions, the study examined how RC personnel might participate in a joint task force (JTF) headquarters for homeland defense. While there is not yet an official JTF structure for homeland defense requirements, a JTF homeland defense headquarters would likely be responsible for coordinating homeland defense missions involving DoD organizations in conjunction with civilian agencies. Moreover, a JTF homeland defense would likely be subordinate to a main operations center run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency or National Domestic Preparedness Office. For the purposes of this assessment, the study posited a prospective JTF headquarters of 300 personnel, structured similarly to existing JTF headquarters with domestic support missions, such as Joint Task Force 6.

The balance between AC and RC personnel in a JTF headquarters for homeland defense could vary significantly, so the study examined three options to determine broadly which AC-RC ratios would be most cost effective. Manning the JTF headquarters using 100 percent AC personnel would cost approximately $18 million in annual personnel costs. Manning the JTF using 70 percent AC and 30 percent, RC personnel would cost approximately $13.5 million annually. Finally, manning the JTF using 30 percent AC, 30 percent full-time support (FTS) and 40 percent selected Reserve personnel would cost about $13.3 million annually. 1

In addition to providing measurable savings compared to manning a JTF headquarters using only the AC personnel, significant RC participation in the headquarters could also increase the organization's effectiveness. RC participation in the JTF headquarters for homeland defense would increase the JTF's expertise because the organization would be staffed with a significant number of personnel, assigned for relatively long periods of time, who are familiar with the specific organizations that are most likely to perform various homeland defense missions

The study will provide its assessment to USACOM for consideration as it continues to develop homeland defense-related command and control architecture. The study also recommends that USACOM report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(RA) by October 1999 how to best incorporate the RC into homeland defense-related command and control systems, including structures like the JTF civil support.

Use RC Personnel for National Missile Defense Missions. If the United States deploys a limited national missile defense system in the next few years, the RC may be able to participate significantly in this mission. While there is not yet a final program decision outlining the precise design of a national missile defense system architecture, the final DoD concept is likely to include deployment in the United States of ground-based interceptors, X-band radars, and upgraded early warning radars. Because these elements would be ground-based and would have regularly programmed activities, staffing such a system with a significant number of RC personnel appears feasible. As part of its Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA-07) process, the Army is examining how it might use RC personnel in implementing the national missile defense mission.

Recognizing that a final decision on the type of national missile defense system the United States might deploy has not been made, the study recommends that the USD(A&T), in coordination with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO), and its National Missile Defense program office, and the Army consider how the RC could be used most effectively to staff a future system.

Convert AF National Preparedness Office from AC to RC Personnel. The Air Force National Preparedness Office currently provides disaster response assistance such as weather tracking for the Director of Military Support Office (DOMS). Because a major portion of the Preparedness Office's work consists of preparing for disaster response efforts, and the RC plays such a significant role in disaster response, the study analyzed whether it would be efficient to staff the Center using primarily RC personnel.

Converting approximately 80 percent of the current Preparedness Office staff into RC positions would require replacing 11 AC officers and 9 enlisted AC personnel with the same number of Air Force military technicians. This conversion would generate $335,000 in savings annually due to the lower personnel costs for military technicians and a reduced number of permanent changes of station required for RC personnel. 2   Moving RC personnel from other current missions to staff the Preparedness Office, however, is likely to have a negative effect on some existing missions, but in the absence of specific offsets, the study was not able to determine the precise negative effects of these offsets.

Converting the majority of the Preparedness Office staff to RC positions would not only generate cost savings, but would also enhance the office's ability to respond to disasters. Because the RC has so much experience with disaster response efforts, increasing the number of staff personnel in the Preparedness Office familiar with these skills is likely to strengthen the office's ability to coordinate effectively with RC units charged with implementing disaster response missions. Because this conversion had significant, though relatively small-scale, potential benefits, the study recommended the Air Force consider including this initiative in its Program Objective Memorandum (POM). If the Air Force does not include the initiative in its POM, the Department will consider the initiative for implementation in the summer Program Review.

Transfer Alaska Regional Operations Control Center to Air National Guard. The Air Force has successfully transferred responsibility for two regional operations control centers (ROCC) from the AC to the RC. The study examined whether the Alaska ROCC, the third center of this type, also should be transferred to the RC. The Alaska ROCC is currently manned by 57 active duty officers and 311 active enlisted personnel. Using the same conversion process that was applied to the two other ROCCs, transferring the Alaska facility from the Air Force to the Air National Guard would require staffing the Center with 45 full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officers and 266AGR enlisted personnel. The transfer also would require 12 drilling, or part-time, officers and 45 drilling enlisted personnel. The transfer would increase manning costs by approximately $1.7 million annually, but the assessment indicated that over time the transfer would generate savings due to less frequent permanent changes of station and some infrastructure and base support savings. 3

Ensuring a sufficient pool of RC personnel to staff the Alaska ROCC could be challenging due to the Center’s remote location. The study also determined that there would be costs associated with retraining and relocating personnel assigned to the ROCC. In the absence of more detailed information, the study was not able to definitively determine whether sufficient personnel would be available to staff the Alaska ROCC, nor was it able to quantify possible retraining and relocation costs. To determine whether to proceed with the transfer, the study recommended that the Air Force examine the staffing issue in detail and consider this initiative for their POM. If the Air Force does not include the initiative in its POM, the Department will review the initiative for implementation during the summer Program Review.

Increase RC Participation in Counter-drug Operations. Currently, operational tempo for AC and RC personnel participating in JTF counter-drug operations is substantial. In some cases mission requirements in these areas go unfilled because of AC and RC resource shortfalls. The study examined whether increasing RC participation in these types of operations could fill some of the existing shortfalls and relieve some of the operational tempo for the AC at a reasonable cost. For approximately $20 million annually, RC participation in these operations could be increased by up to 25 percent over existing levels, which would generate an additional 237,000 man days of additional small unit and individual Reserve support for the counter-drug mission. 4 This additional support might relieve operational tempo for some AC elements.

The Services' ability to support a 25 percent increase varies. In some cases, Service RC personnel are already providing significant support to JTF-6 missions and could not provide additional support without increasing end strength. For example, the Navy already provides significant RC aviation support to counter-drug missions and could not increase its existing participation by an additional 25 percent. Other Services whose RC are not already providing the majority of personnel for particular missions could provide some additional support. Increasing the amount of RC participation in these missions would likely create additional opportunities for individual RC personnel who would be interested in volunteering for specific positions.

Some individuals and units assigned to these operations due to the increase in RC participation would spend less time preparing for wartime requirements. Because the study did not identify which small units and individuals would be redirected to these kinds of missions, it was not able to determine the negative effects these shifts would have on the original missions or on the ability of individuals and units to train for wartime requirements.

Finally, while additional funding for DoD support of the counter-drug mission would sustain additional activities in this area, the Assessment panel could not determine if the benefits of additional counter-drug activities would outweigh their cost. Moreover, the Department increased funding for counter-drug activities substantially in the FY 1999 budget so it is not clear if an additional $20 million of activity is required.

To more fully analyze the costs and benefits of such an increase, the study recommends that ASD(SOLIC) coordinate a Service-by-Service review of the proposed initiative. The review should be completed by October 1999. If the increase would clearly be beneficial, the follow-on study will determine where offsets could most efficiently be made to accommodate the increase. ASD(RA) will then submit the results of the follow-on study to the Director for Programs, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) for consideration during the summer Program Review.

1 Army Forces Cost Model

2 AF/XPXQ

3 HQ/ANG/XPPI

4 Army Forces Cost Model


Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Because the demand for U.S. participation in SSC operations remains high, the Department of Defense is looking for new ways to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible and manage operational tempo effectively. 5  Increasing the RC role in these operations may make more effective use of the range of skills available in the RC, and provide an important mechanism to help manage operational tempo for the AC.

Alternate AC and RC rotations for Interpositional Peacekeeping Operations. RC assumption of every other rotation for interpositional peacekeeping operations like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai could also increase RC participation in SSCs while relieving some operational tempo for the AC. The FY 2000-2005 DPG illustrative planning scenarios anticipate that in 2005 there will be an ongoing requirement for two interpositional peacekeeping operations. Manning every alternate 6-month rotation for these two operations would require approximately 1400 RC personnel each year, at a personnel cost of approximately $32 million annually above already programmed costs. 6

To provide forces for interpositional peacekeeping operations like MFO mission in the Sinai, the United States provides sufficient personnel and equipment to station a light infantry battalion in Sinai throughout the entire year. Meeting this obligation requires that at any given time during the year, one light infantry battalion is currently serving in the Sinai, another is undergoing reorganization and preparing to deploy to the Sinai, and a third battalion is reconstituting its combat readiness from having served the previous rotation. By manning every other rotation using RC personnel, fewer active battalions would be needed for this type of mission. The DPG illustrative planning scenarios call for light infantry battalions for interpositional peacekeeping operations, and 17 percent of the total number of light infantry battalions would be involved in supporting these types of operations. If RC personnel filled every alternate rotation, only 8 percent of the AC light infantry battalions would be required to man the remaining rotations. Because 39 light infantry battalions are in the programmed Army RC structure, there would be sufficient RC personnel to provide one battalion for 6 months for up to two missions each year. The study recommends that the Army(all components), in coordination with the USD (P&R), ASD(RA), Joint Staff, and OACJCS(NG&RM), conduct a detailed study to determine whether such an initiative is feasible, and if so, the optimum frequency for RC rotations.

RC Assume a Bosnia-like Peacekeeping Operation. The study also examined whether the RC could provide forces sufficient for one continuous rotational large peace implementation operation similar to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Based on the extended duration of such operations, the study determined that meeting such a requirement would not be possible using only volunteers, and would require repeated use of a Presidential Select Reserve Call-up (PSRC). Using force requirements drawn from the FY 2000-2005 DPG illustrative planning scenarios, the study assumed that such an operation would require a force package comprised of approximately a brigade. It would include supporting combat support and combat service support assets, about 60 fighter and support aircraft, forces to conduct a maritime interception operation (MIO), and possibly additional support from embarked USMC amphibious elements. A review of the programmed RC force structure indicates that there are adequate combat forces to meet the rotational requirement. However, the RC does not have sufficient units in several high-demand areas to sustain a rotational force package of this size under existing law regarding the use of a Presidential Select Reserve Call-up (PSRC). In examining what RC force structure would be available for this type of operation, the assessment also considered the requirement to provide support to other missions as described in the DPG illustrative planning scenarios. Specific force structure shortfalls are shown at Annex D.

Even if the RC had sufficient units to meet these requirements, the financial costs associated with manning this mission using only RC personnel are very high. Bringing sufficient RC personnel on active duty to fulfill such a mission would cost approximately $350 million more in personnel costs annually than would supporting the mission using AC personnel already in the force. 7 In addition to significant financial costs, current RC personnel policy, which does not allow RC units to serve in operations for more than one period of up to 270 days under a single PSRC, would have to be revised before this initiative could be legally implemented. If the provisions of the PSRC were adjusted, operational tempo and associated retention issues would be a significant concern.

Based on the high financial costs of this initiative and its probable impact on RC operational tempo, the study recommends that no further action be taken on this initiative.

Review CINC Rotational Timeline Restrictions. Currently both US European Command and US Central Command set minimum rotation lengths for personnel serving in contingency operations in those theaters. US Central Command requires that individual RC personnel serve at least 120 days. US Central Command allows RC units serve a minimum of 90 days, but prefers that units serve for 120 to 179-day rotations. US European Command requires individual RC personnel to serve in 90-day rotations, while RC units serve a minimum of 29 days. The study examined whether shortening the required number of rotation days would facilitate increased RC participation in SSCs operations such as SFOR in Bosnia.

Each Service sets a different policy for providing RC personnel to operations overseas. Under current Army and Marine Corps policy, RC units that deploy overseas for a SSC spend considerable time at their home stations or other training sites preparing and training for the specific mission once they are notified of the impending deployment. For example, personnel in units who will deploy overseas are often required to receive special vaccinations, learn specific rules of engagement, and complete other specialized training. Shortening the minimum rotational requirement so that these personnel can be moved in and out of theater more quickly is not more efficient because given the extensiveness of the predeployment preparations, it is more cost-effective to keep them in theater for a longer deployment than to deploy them for only a few months. Because most Air Force personnel operate from bases outside the direct area of most SSC operations, the Air Force does not have to invest as much time in predeployment preparations and is able to move personnel in and out of theater more quickly. While the Air Force can already move flight crews in and out of theater to a greater degree than the Army and Marine Corps can move ground-based personnel, shortening the rotational requirements would enable it to move individual RC personnel in and out of the theater even more frequently, increasing the pool of individuals who could serve in these operations. This concept could be of value to selected personnel specialties in other services, as well, such as medical professionals. Increasing the number of RC personnel who can serve in SSC by shortening the rotational requirements may also relieve some of the stress on AC personnel serving in these operations, which would could help lower attrition rates in the AC.

Shortening the rotational requirements so that personnel can move in and out of theater more frequently will be more expensive, and may make management of SSCs more complicated for the theater CINCs. Savings from lower attrition rates in the AC may offset increased operational costs, although the study was unable to quantify how much attrition rates might decrease. To better assess the impact of shortening rotational requirements, the study recommends tasking the Joint Staff J3 and J5, in coordination with ASD(RA), OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs, and Services, to complete a review of rotational policies by September 1999. The review will examine in detail the impact of shortening rotational requirements, including costs and operational risks that might be incurred, and recommend exceptions to rotational policies where merited.

Meet Initial SSC Requirements with AC Only. When the U.S. military deploys today for a SSC, units found largely in the RC must meet several of the initial mission requirements. Because the RC is not designed to respond as rapidly overall as the AC, calling up specialized units on short notice is complicated and stressful for RC personnel. Establishing an AC only capability to meet all mission requirements for the first 60 days of SSCs could have beneficial effects in reducing the stresses on the RC of short-notice deployment. First, such a policy would give the RC units needed for the mission additional time to plan their contribution to the mission and prepare for deployment. The 60-day policy would also allow time to implement the PSRC, which is required to activate RC personnel involuntarily and to ensure that sufficient personnel are provided for the operation. Without the PSRC, the Services must find volunteers to fill the requirements in the first 60 days, which can be challenging and is much more complicated than using a PSRC to call up entire units, who have also had the advantage of training together over time.

Instituting a 60-day policy would also have significant disadvantages. Such a policy would not be consistent with the current Total Force policy. The Total Force policy grew out of DoD's determination in the wake of the Vietnam War to structure the RC to include a significant number of units needed for the first two months of an operation. This policy limits the Executive Branch’s ability to commit troops to substantial overseas contingency operations without ensuring there was sufficient political support for the mission. Under the Total Force policy, each time the President sends a significant number of troops overseas, the Services must draw on AC and RC personnel. As a result, the American public is always aware when its leadership sends troops to a conflict overseas. If the Army restructured to meet all requirements in the first 60 days of an operation using only active duty personnel, this political "check and balance" would no longer exist.

A 60-day, active-only policy would also entail significant financial costs. Comparing the types and numbers of forces required for SSC operations through 2005 to the existing programmed AC force structure shows that there are approximately 62 different types of organizations. The total is 244 fewer available active force units than required to meet the DPG illustrative planning scenarios. To allow SSC missions to proceed for 60 days without using RC units to supplement the active units, these additional 244 units would need to be created or converted from existing AC assets. The specific units required are shown in Annex E.

Given the significant financial costs, the policy shift involved, and the lack of endorsement for this initiative among AC or RC leadership, the study recommends no further action be taken along these lines.

Expand RC Use in Meeting High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) requirements. Because certain high demand, low density (HD/LD) units in the AC are experiencing high operational tempo due to the volume of ongoing operations, the study examined whether expanding RC participation in these areas would relieve some of the tempo concerns. The study first examined whether there were RC units that could be used to meet HD/LD requirements. In the existing RC structure, there are several HD/LD assets, including A-10, HC-130 cargo plane, and EA-6B Prowler crews; civil affairs and psychological operations units; and Patriot batteries. Assessment showed that the Services already use these RC units as much as possible to alleviate AC tempo levels with the exception of the Patriot batteries in the Army National Guard (ARNG). Increased use of the Patriot batteries in the ARNG could help relieve a portion of AC tempo. The study endorses the Army’s existing plans to employ these units in meeting SSC requirements once they have attained an appropriate operational status.

Individuals in the RC have HD/LD skills that could be used to relieve personnel tempo on an individual level for the AC, but with the exception of the Air Force, the Services do not currently comprehensively track high demand skills data on an individual level. To facilitate drawing on the RC to relieve personnel tempo for HD/LD AC individuals, the study recommends tasking the Services, in coordination with the ASD(RA), Joint Staff J-1 and J-3, and OACJCS(NG&RM), to develop a mechanism by November 1999 to track individuals with HD/LD skills and identify potential actions for relieving high tempo demands.

Increase RC Manning in USMC staffs. SSCs frequently require splitting headquarters staffs and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command elements into a forward-deployed echelon and a rear echelon that remains behind to support the deployed forces and supporting CINCs. Today, when headquarters staffs and command elements deploy for these types of operations, active personnel deploy with the command element and few additional personnel are available to backfill the positions that have been vacated. Headquarters staffs and command elements also participate frequently in other CINC activities and exercises, and are not replaced when they leave the headquarters for these operations. Increasing the number of reservists assigned to these headquarter staffs, command elements, and their associated deploying elements could enhance the Marines' ability to provide support when active duty personnel deploy for both SSCs and shorter TDY assignments.

Currently, RC personnel already provide approximately 85,000 man-days of support to Marine Corps staffs. Increasing this manning support by 25 percent would provide 21, 250 additional man-days of support to provide some incremental backfill capability, but would cost approximately $3 million dollars annually. 8 The additional RC personnel would be assigned to specific positions for 3 to 5 years, and while they would not serve full-time, these RC personnel would acquire experience in the same position over a relatively long period of time, which would provide greater operational continuity in the headquarters staffs. The study recommends tasking the Marine Corps to evaluate this initiative in more detail by July 1999 to determine its utility as a force management tool. The Marine Corps will report its findings, including any implementation plans, to the USD(P&R).

Increase RC Participation in SSCs Using the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept. As part of its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, the Air Force envisions substantial RC participation in SSCs. Increased RC participation will be critical to sustaining an adequate rotational base. Beginning in January 2000, when the first two Air Expeditionary Forces will be fully operational, RC crews and personnel will start rotating into SSC operations on a 90-day deployment basis (with 15-day in-theater RC personnel swaps). The Air Force AEF concept makes broad use of RC capabilities in SSCs, and the study recommended that as the Air Force fully implements the AEF program, it continue to refine RC participation in these types of operations.

5 During the assessment phase, the study based its assumptions of likely SSC requirements in 2005 on the FY 2000-05 DPG illustrative planning scenarios, supplemented by supporting Services input.

6 Army Forces Cost Model

7 Army Forces Cost Model

8 USMC RAC


Major Theater Wars

The RC has always played an important role as part of the Total Force when the United States goes to war. Today the U.S. defense strategy requires that the Total Force be able to fight and win two MTWs in overlapping time frames, in addition to performing other important shaping and responding missions. As the entire Total Force strives to fulfill all the requirements of the U.S. defense strategy within the context of limited available resources, ensuring that the RC’s role in MTW is optimized is essential. To facilitate this optimization, the study examined a range of possible initiatives to increase the role of the RC in MTW.

Examine Post-Mobilization Training and Integrated Division Employment for Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs). Drawing primarily on FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, and the Army’s AC/RC integrated division concept, the study also examined post-mobilization training and incorporation of eSBs into the Army's integrated division concept.

Existing war plans envision sending eight of the fifteen eSBs to fight in the second MTW within 140 days after mobilization. The eSBs first-to-fight status requires a higher state of readiness than many other large RC units. This applies particularly in terms of equipment and manning levels, so that the brigades can achieve full combat proficiency more quickly. The Army plans to send the mobilized eSBs in sequential waves to the four major post-mobilization training sites the Army maintains for use during war time. Three sites, Fort Irwin, California, Fort Hood, Texas, and Yakima, Washington, would be used to train heavy brigades. The fourth site, Fort Polk, Louisiana, would be used to train light brigades. Existing plans envision training and validating the 15 eSBs at these training sites. With current resources, only four brigades can be trained and validated at one time, hence four eSBs will be ready 90 days after mobilization and four additional eSBs will be mobilized 35 days later. The remaining seven eSBs would cycle through the training and validation sites using the same timelines. Each eSB is expected to be ready for deployment 90 days after its mobilization.

In addition to the existing four training facilities, other sites, such as Fort Carson, Colorado, Fort Riley, Kansas, and the USMC training facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, may be available to expand mobilization training capacity for the enhanced separate brigades. For example, under current post-mobilization timelines, Marine Operational Forces located at Twenty-Nine Palms will be fully deployed within a short time after the initial C-day, leaving the facility potentially available for use to train-up eSBs. Additional training facilities would enable the eSBs to move through the training pipeline more quickly and deploy, or could be used to begin post-mobilization training for the ARNG divisions.

The study endorses the Army’s efforts to ensure it provides sufficient resources through its budget to ensure that the eSBs can deploy as required by FY 2000-2005 according to DPG readiness guidance. The study also recommends that the Army examine by February 2000 whether to provide additional training sites such as Fort Carson and Fort Riley and, in particular, consider establishing a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the U.S. Marine Corps to facilitate use of Twenty-Nine Palms. If there are other existing non-Army sites like Twenty-Nine Palms that may be available for training soon after mobilization, the Army should consider developing MOAs with the relevant Services to secure their use in the event of a war as well.

Finally, the study examined how the eSBs are being incorporated into the Army's AC/RC integrated division concept. The integrated division concept establishes an active duty division headquarters to oversee the training and readiness of its associated three eSBs. While this arrangement provides readiness and training benefits to the eSBs, under this concept the integrated division is not deployable because it lacks a division combat support (CS)-combat service support (CSS) base. Although the AC/RC integrated divisions currently are not deployable as division-sized combat formations, the Army has identified deployability as a possible future evolution of this concept. The study endorses the Army’s plan for the continued evolution of this concept as more experience is gained with the organization.

Create Round-Up Relationships for eSBs. Establishing round-up relationships between certain eSBs and selected active Army combat divisions could prove beneficial in terms of increasing the role of the RC in MTWs and in increasing the combat power of certain Army divisions. As established in Army doctrine during the 1980s, the concept of rounding-up a combat division envisions designating an ARNG brigade as the fourth ground maneuver brigade included in a division during wartime. This linkage is distinct from the concept of a round-out or up relationship, which entails designating an ARNG brigade as the integral third ground maneuver brigade of an active combat division.

Once a round-up relationship is established between an ARNG brigade and a combat division, the ARNG brigade could target its training efforts on mission-specific requirements to enhance its integration into its affiliated combat division. If round-up relationships were established between eSBs and active combat divisions, eSBs could better focus peacetime planning and training to prepare for possible deployment to a war. For example, an eSB with a round-up relationship could incorporate the relevant standing operational procedures (SOPs) and tactical techniques of its parent division into its training plan. This would raise training quality and facilitate integration of the ESB into the division structure once the brigade is in the theater of operations.

The benefits of round-up relationships between eSBs and divisions are offset by the current multi-apportionment of divisions in the warplans that significantly complicates efforts to create these relationships. Each active combat division is assigned to a specific theater of operations. For example, if war breaks out in Southwest Asia (SWA) first, certain divisions are scheduled to go to that theater, while others are scheduled to go to Korea in the event of a second war. Likewise, certain divisions scheduled to go to the SWA if war breaks out there first are simultaneously scheduled, or multi-apportioned, to go to Korea if war breaks out first there instead. Unlike multi-apportioned divisions, eight of the fifteen eSBs are scheduled to fight in the second war, no matter where the war occurs. As a result, establishing round-up relationships between the divisions and the eSBs may be challenging because the eight eSBs could only establish "round-up" relationships with divisions fighting in the second war, but due to multi-apportionment, most divisions could fight in either the first or second war, depending on which war breaks out first.

In some cases the round-up relationship could limit the flexibility of theater commanders during a major conflict. For example, a round-up eSB would train during peacetime to operate with a specific division in theater during wartime. In wartime, however, a CINC might determine that the round-up eSB would be more useful performing a different mission than that of its "parent" division, or is needed to operate with a different division entirely. The eSB’s division-focused training program, while better preparing the eSB to fight with its affiliated division, could result in the eSB being less well prepared to execute a broader range of missions.

The RCE-05 Study recommends that the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), ASD(S&TR), ODPA&E, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM) and the CINCs, conduct a review by November 1999 to determine the number of optimum cases for eSB round-up relationships.

Examine Post-Mobilization Training for the ARNG Divisions. While the eSBs are being sufficiently resourced to meet current war plans requirements, there are no current formal post-mobilization training requirements for the ARNG divisions. For the ARNG divisions to be included fully in existing war plans, the Army will need to establish post-mobilization training standards and timelines for division deployments.

The existing operations plans (OPLANs) do not describe how the ARNG divisions would be employed in a MTW, nor are any of the divisions currently apportioned to a specific theater. It is difficult to determine how quickly the ARNG divisions could be available for deployment to the warfighting theater since there is no official post-mobilization training for these divisions.

Several factors clearly will impact how quickly an ARNG division can prepare to deploy for MTWs. The factors include missions the division will be required to conduct, its peacetime training and readiness, the availability of training sites and personnel, the prioritization of the divisions relative to the eSBs at the post-mobilization training sites, and the level of training validation required prior to deployment.

ARNG and AC divisions are not maintained at the same level of readiness. The higher readiness rating an ARNG division has during peacetime, the faster it can achieve the desired readiness level for mobilization to the theater during wartime. Historically, the ARNG divisions have been funded to provide sufficient individual, crew, and squad level training. However, resourcing constraints have reduced available funding for training, which has resulted in severe readiness shortfalls and nondeployability rates.

The number of training sites and personnel available to support post-mobilization training sites also are a major factor in how quickly an ARNG division could be ready to deploy. Existing Army plans envision training and validating each of the 15 eSBs at one of its four training sites, but these plans do not address whether or where the ARNG divisions would be trained. Further assessment would be required to determine how many training sites would be needed to accommodate the ARNG divisions, and whether there would be sufficient personnel available to send the divisions through the training sites while the majority of AC personnel deploy to the theater for combat. While there are advantages to training an entire division at a single location, the ARNG divisions would be available for deployment more quickly if subordinate battalion and brigade task forces could train simultaneously at multiple sites. If additional sites were established, the divisions could finish training faster, though activating additional post-mobilization training sites clearly has resource implications.

Similarly, the order in which the ARNG divisions proceed through available training centers relative to the 15 eSBs will also affect how quickly training could be completed. The Army currently envisions training all 15 eSBs at the four training sites described in its FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2. Using concurrent training, the ARNG divisions would be ready more quickly than if they were sequenced after all eSBs had completed training.

Finally, mission requirements will affect how quickly the ARNG divisions can be ready to deploy to the theater in wartime. Upon mobilization, each division subordinate unit has some level of intrinsic capability based on its existing training. As the division headquarters and its subordinate elements undergo additional post-mobilization training, they become progressively more proficient, gaining skills and achieving validation standards for combat operations at each echelon, culminating in validation of the division as a whole. However, there may be situations where the urgency of need and low anticipated threat would permit consideration of deploying divisions prior to achieving full combat capability. Such situations may include post-conflict operations, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance missions. If these missions require only battalion or brigade-level combat validation to enable mission accomplishment at acceptable levels of risk, divisions given these missions could potentially deploy to the theater before completing full division-level combat validation, and hence be available earlier to the theater CINCs. Clearly, deploying units that are not fully validated at the division level to the theater would entail some risk. If war broke out anew after an apparent surrender, for example, units deployed early for post-conflict operations, may not be fully prepared to participate in division-level maneuver operations that might take place in the event of renewed hostilities. As a matter of policy, divisions will attain full combat validation, although earlier deployment could be considered in exceptional cases.

The assessment conducted by the RCE 05 study considered the above factors, and made tentative determinations for the availability of ARNG divisions for MTW requirements. The study lacked the time or resources to perform a detailed analysis of this subject, and the results of this assessment do not reflect the concurrence of all participants in the study. The results will be considered as a foundation for further, more comprehensive analysis and will be provided separately to the Army and other RCE study participants as a reference for the follow-on study discussed below.

Nevertheless, the assessment indicated that with enhanced premobilization readiness (equivalent to that maintained currently by the eSBs), training its brigades simultaneously at three post-mobilization training sites, a division could be validated for combat in significantly less time than currently estimated. With additional post-mobilization training sites, training at multiple locations, enhanced peacetime readiness, and/or adjusted sequencing, availability could be accelerated even further. Specific timelines are dependent on many factors, and definitive answers will require more detailed analysis.

While currently in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) as available forces, no apportionment of the ARNG divisions to the theater CINCs is envisioned until they have established post-mobilization training standards and a clear timeline under which they can train and deploy to the warfighting theater. 9 As a result, the study recommends tasking the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(S&T), ASD(RA), OSD(PA&E), Joint Staff DJ8, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USACOM, to formulate standards and guidelines for the validation of ARNG divisions, based on common deployment standards for Active and Guard divisions, and to establish post-mobilization preparation and deployment plans for the ARNG divisions. The study would identify associated training and resource requirements (including analysis of options for the provision of additional post-mobilization training sites, facilities, and capabilities); potential enhancements to existing levels of peacetime readiness in ARNG divisions; and integration of ARNG divisions with eSBs into the post-mobilization training sequence. This study will be completed by February 2000. The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 will conduct supporting lift analysis for the Army-led study. After the deployment timelines and strategic reserve requirements studies are completed, the RCE-05 study recommends that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff build on the results of these two studies to apportion ARNG divisions to the MTW CINCs in the next JSCP review cycle.

Define the Strategic Reserve. Throughout the Cold War, all RC combat forces played critical roles in the deliberate war plans and provided an important hedge as a strategic reserve in the event of global war. Given the threat posed by the Soviet Union, it was prudent to have a significant reservoir of personnel who could augment active and reserve forces if a U.S.-Soviet conflict proved more challenging than the war plans predicted. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. defense strategy called for the reconstitution of military capabilities in the event the security environment proved to be substantially more challenging than predicted. This reconstitution would have drawn heavily from a strategic reserve of military capabilities. A survey of post-Cold War DoD strategy and planning documents reveals that today there is no official Department-wide definition outlining the potential need or employment concept for a strategic reserve.

Nevertheless, potential requirements may exist for additional, relatively, low-cost capabilities as a hedge against MTW risks in two mission areas.

First, MTWs may generate unanticipated requirements, or foreseen requirements may be more demanding than initially anticipated. Existing theater force requirements are based on scenarios positing the most likely conditions and threats versus the most dangerous ones. Greater than expected use of weapons of mass destruction, effective attacks on our strategic deployment infrastructure, or asymmetric attacks using means for which we are not fully prepared could generate requirements for forces or capabilities beyond those currently programmed. Further, existing OPLANs do not comprehensively address requirements for the post-conflict stages of MTWs. While meeting these unanticipated or more demanding requirements undoubtedly would be accomplished with the assistance of allies or coalition partners, the need for additional U.S. forces remains a distinct possibility.

Second, meeting the mobilization challenges associated with responding to two near-simultaneous MTWs, will place exceptional demands on all military services, in particular the Army. Providing the Total Force combat, CS, and CSS capabilities critical to success in the MTW theaters will require the support of a substantial base generating and sustaining force, much of which will come from forces not apportioned in existing OPLANs.

As a result, DoD needs to determine the requirements and mission for a strategic reserve in the overall U.S. defense strategy. Only then can the Department determine the capabilities needed to meet that mission. Accordingly, the study recommends that the ASD(S&T), ASD(RA) and Joint Staff DJ8, in coordination with the DPA&E, Joint Staff DJ5, OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs, and Services (all components),conduct a two-part study by December 1999 to define the strategic reserve concept, determine the military requirements, and develop associated force options.

Create More Air Force Associate Program Units. Within the Air Force, the study examined whether it would be useful to establish a certain number of associate program squadrons comprised of Reservists to fill shortages to fully man active A-10, OA-10, F-16, and F-15C squadrons in wartime. For example, creating associate A-10 squadrons will require additional personnel to fly and maintain the aircraft, but would not require additional A-10 platforms.

Current AC shortfalls prevent some squadrons from being fully manned. Establishing associate program units would fill shortfalls by converting 20 percent of AC positions into associate reservist positions. This includes high demand assets, which could be filled by the RC. Because AC personnel are not manning these positions currently, the RC personnel would increase the number of available crews to fly missions. This would distribute the operational tempo demands more equitably among the AC personnel. In turn this would increase the ability of the total force to retain skilled Air Force personnel in the Air Force Reserve and ANG. Developing these associate program relationships would increase personnel and training cost by approximately $12 million annually, not including O&M costs. 10 Because this initiative appeared to have potential benefits, the study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), conduct a study by March 2000 to evaluate the potential for establishing associate units in the tactical fighter force.

Similarly, augmenting the planned joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) squadrons with RC personnel through an associate program may also increase Air Force’s ability to respond effectively during MTWs. Not only would such an increase provide a more robust JSTARS capability during MTWs, such an increase could also prove beneficial in peacetime. Increasing the number of available RC personnel by 30 percent would reduce operational tempo for AC personnel assigned to JSTARS platforms. However, as the JSTARS is expected to be a high demand asset, operational tempo for the associate reserve personnel is likely to increase. If the JSTARS squadrons are deployed frequently overseas, the Air Force may be challenged to ensure a sufficient RC pool to man the platforms as required by the theater CINCs. Even with a large RC pool, CINCs may prefer to avoid rotating associate crews in and out of theater. Therefore, a small group of reservists would experience very high operational tempo for extended periods, which could jeopardize employer relations and retention rates. Establishing associate program units with JSTARS squadrons would cost approximately $8.6 million annually and does not include the operations and maintenance costs associated with additional use of the JSTARS platform. 11

Associate program organizations have been successfully established for AWACS platforms, and could be appropriate for other similar high demand assets such as RC-135 Rivet Joint, etc. Because the associate program relationship appeared to offer potential benefits at minimum cost, the study recommends that the Air Force also consider this initiative for its upcoming POM, and if not so programmed, that the initiative be considered for implementation during the summer Program Review.

Transfer AC Bombers to RC Units. Transferring one B-52 and one B-1B squadron from the AC to RC may generate cost savings and could mitigate the current shortage of active duty pilots for these platforms. Transferring one B-52 squadron to the Air Force Reserve and moving one B-1B squadron to the ANG will save approximately $54 million annually. 12 Shifting these squadrons into the RC will reduce the number of aircraft that must be manned by AC pilots, mitigating AC aircrew shortages. Moreover, these assets are not used frequently in peacetime, which means manning the platforms with RC pilots should not have a negative affect RC pilot retention. Converting these bombers from the AC to the RC would create management challenges -- determining how to certify RC personnel under the Personnel Reliability Program, the monitoring process all personnel who have access to nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems must undergo. Transferring these squadrons from the AC to RC also would result in fewer planes for active duty pilots to fly and would increase career competition. Fewer bombers for active duty pilots to fly also means that fewer pilots will ultimately separate from the Air Force with these skills, resulting in a smaller pool of potential pilots who will join the Reserves. Finally, transferring the bombers from the AC to RC will generate costs due to changing basing configurations and conducting additional personnel retraining. The study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with DPA&E and ASD(RA), conduct a study by November 1999 to jointly evaluate whether this transfer is feasible. At a minimum, this follow-on study would examine the operational impacts, and basing and conversion costs associated with the transfer. The study also recommends that USD(P), in coordination with USD(P&R), resolve the Personnel Reliability Program issues affecting use of drilling reservists in nuclear weapons-related programs.

Convert 1 Air Force Fighter Wing from AC to RC. Finally, the study considered whether converting one AC fighter wing to the RC would enhance the U.S. ability to respond effectively during a MTW. The AC wing could be converted into aircraft and personnel that are used to plus-up existing F-16 and A-10 squadrons, for example, or the active wing could be converted into 3 new ANG F-15 squadrons and a number of additional plus-ups to existing RC F-16 squadrons. Either conversion option would entail substantial near term costs, $40 million and $125 million respectively, due to expenses associated with retraining pilots and crews, ensuring proper equipment is available and changing base arrangements as needed. 13 Over the long term, however, conversion costs would decrease and the total cost of maintaining the fighter wing capability would be less than the current costs because reserve personnel are generally less expensive than active duty personnel. Importantly, converting a fighter wing to the RC would significantly increase operational tempo for the remaining AC pilots and crews because fewer wing assets would be available to fly the same number of missions during peacetime. Finally, RC pilots assigned to fly the upgraded and more sophisticated F-16 platform after the conversion would face additional training requirements that might negatively affect long-term retention for this group. While such a conversion might have significant negative impacts on active duty operational tempo and would incur substantial near-term costs, the study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), and ASD(RA) conduct a study to examine the costs and benefits of this conversion in more detail. The study will be completed by March 2000.

Shift RC Echelon Above Division Elements from second to first MTW. Shifting a percentage of RC CS and CSS units that are apportioned for echelon above division (EAD) requirements in the second MTW to fill similar requirements in the first MTW also could prove beneficial. The study examined the impact of shifting units comprising 10 percent of RC personnel who serve in EAD CS/CSS roles from the second to the first war. The shift would create greater flexibility for using the AC units, which are relieved by the RC shift, in meeting contingency operational requirements during peacetime, at less risk to potential MTW commitments.

The study determined that the Army already accomplishes the intent of this initiative through its force management process. This system routinely identifies both AC and RC units to fill early-deploying requirements generated by the commitment of MTW-apportioned units to peacetime contingencies. Formally reapportioning assets, as called for under this initiative, does not appear necessary, and might constrain the existing flexibility with which the Army meets requirements. The study endorses the existing Service efforts to use its total force capability in meeting peacetime and wartime requirements and requires no further study of this issue.

Increase RC Participation in Logistics Management. Increasing the RC role in logistics transportation management during MTWs could provide useful additional support to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Currently, personnel assigned to Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, Defense Contracting Service, and Air Mobility Command are the core logistics and transportation management personnel during MTWs. Increasing the number of RC personnel who serve in these commands in the event of a MTW by 25 percent would provide additional support for USTRANSCOM at a lower cost than providing this increase using active duty personnel.

Increasing logistics and transportation management personnel by 25 percent, or about 956 personnel, would cost an additional $5 million per year if the increase were accomplished by adding these personnel to the total number of personnel currently in the RC. 14 Given the size of the RC and current budget constraints, increasing the size of the RC for this specific purpose may not be cost effective. Alternatively, the Department could provide USTRANSCOM the same increase by moving existing RC personnel out of current positions into logistics management positions at USTRANSCOM. Shifting personnel out of other current mission areas could have an adverse impact on those missions, hence potential offsets for the USTRANSCOM positions would need to be studied carefully to ensure the benefits outweighed the risks. Finally, shifting personnel from other mission areas into positions at USTRANSCOM would require some retraining, which while not extensive, would entail some costs.

The study recommends a study by November 1999 to determine whether increasing the number of logistics management personnel at USTRANSCOM would be beneficial. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USTRANSCOM, in coordination with its AC and RC components would conduct the study of whether additional personnel would facilitate moving equipment, supplies and forces to the warfighting theaters. If logistics and transportation management personnel shortages are a significant choke point that could be eased by adding personnel in wartime, the Service Components will then identify personnel offsets to facilitate the increase. The study also will determine the impact of these offsets on existing missions as well as the training requirements and associated costs such offsets would generate.

Provide RC Support for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. To further explore how RC personnel might be used more frequently in support of MTWs, the study examined the impact of using RC personnel to operate half of all strategic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a platform currently under development. While using the RC for this mission may be promising, the Department has not decided which UAV program to procure. Uncertainty over the future of the Global Hawk UAV program made it difficult to determine the costs and benefits of using RC personnel to oversee a significant number of UAV missions. If strategic UAVs become a high-demand asset, which many experts predict, using RC to man 50 percent of these missions may have an adverse impact on RC retention. If Global Hawk is developed as currently envisioned, using RC to support half the UAVs would save $35 million annually. However, RC end strength would need to be increased, or offsets would be required to generate the necessary RC positions. 15 These savings and manning levels could vary significantly based upon how the strategic UAV program is implemented. The study recommends that the Department not pursue this initiative until official decisions are made concerning UAV programs under development.

9 The 1998 JSCP shows eight ARNG divisions as available to the CINCs.  However, the ARNG Division Redesign Study has determined that two of the eight division will be converted into CS and CSS units by 2009, leaving only six divisions available for possible apportionment to the warfighting CINCs.

10 AF/REXP

11 AF/REXP

12 SABLE Model v. 2.0 (AF CAA), HQ ANG/XPPI and AF/REXP

13 AF/REXP

14 USTRANSCOM; Army Forces Cost Model

15 AF/REXP


Refinement of Remaining of Alternative Employment Concepts

In addition to examining the RC role in homeland defense, SSCs, and MTWs, the study also refined a handful of employment concepts that, while not yet sufficiently developed for major analysis or implementation, merited further examination. The study examined increased RC participation in Prepare, or Department-wide transformation activities, increased RC participation in the strategic nuclear deterrence mission, greater AC/RC integration, and using the RC to provide greater operational and personnel tempo relief for the AC. Some of the following portion of the study overlaps with those examined in detail, and there were no fundamental inconsistencies in the findings. The study results for these concepts are summarized below, and covered in detail in Annex F.

To increase RC participation in Prepare activities, the study determined that the Services should examine the potential benefits of increasing RC participation in support of joint experimentation activities by 25 percent. The study also examined whether developing a standardized database of individual RC skills would facilitate increasing RC support for information operations and other missions. While such a database would enable the Services to more easily provide targeted RC support for Prepare activities, the database would likely be expensive and highly complex. As a result, Services may not choose to pursue this initiative.

The RC also may be able to participate more broadly in the strategic nuclear deterrence mission. The Services may examine whether to convert 50 percent of current manning for U.S. Strategic Command's alternate mobile command and control facility to the RC. This conversion would generate some costs savings. The study also considered transferring a squadron of AC Air Force nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to the RC to provide tempo relief for the AC units that fulfill the SIOP mission. However, the increased RC training costs and increased tempo likely to be incurred will be significant. As a result, the Air Force may not choose to study this initiative.

To increase integration of RC and AC, the study refined a variety of alternatives for Services to consider. Each Service should examine increasing the number of RC personnel able to take the Joint Professional Military Education II course by 10 percent, which would produce more joint qualified RC personnel. Increasing the number of full-time Service reservists and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) on major staffs by 30 would also facilitate greater RC integration, as would increasing the level of RC representation in Department decision-making processes. The Marine Corps may increase the number of RC augmentees to Division and higher-level staffs by 30 percent for all Marine and major joint exercises, which would incur some costs, but also would provide tempo relief for the AC.

To increase RC integration, the Army may consider increasing integration of RC personnel into corps and echelon above corps (EAC) positions. The Army is establishing several multicomponent units that combine of AC, RC, and ARNG soldiers into single units. The Army is applying this concept on a test basis to combat, CS, and CSS units. While this concept may present training challenges, it creates greater stability within units because RC personnel do not generally change units as frequently as AC personnel. The Army is also planning to assign six eSBs to an AC-RC integrated division structure, as previously discussed.

Finally, the study examined a variety of mechanisms to increase the RC role in providing tempo relief for the AC. While not all of these mechanisms merited further analysis, the study did recommend that a few be examined in more detail. For example, while forecasting the requirements for linguists is challenging, the study recommended that each Service consider ways to increases recruitment and retention of these specialists. As programmed in the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS), the Army has planned increases in RC CS and CSS capabilities (e.g., engineer, ordnance, and military police units) to relieve tempo for HD/LD AC units. The Navy may consider increasing U.S. Navy Reserve support for interdeployment training cycle activities to increase integration of it RC into the active duty Navy. The study recommended that the Marine Corps examine converting RC division and wing headquarters staffs and HD/LD units into an IMA structure, under operational control of the AC and command element staffs. This would facilitate filling these positions efficiently because the Marine Corps could draw on individuals from various units rather than being required to identify an entire unit to be assigned to the staff. Finally, the Air Force may examine whether to enlarge its associate reserve AWACS squadron by 50 percent to provide additional tempo relief for these HD/LD active units.

The study determined that two alternative employment concepts it developed did not need further examination within the RCE-05 study because they are being addressed by other ongoing Department efforts. The theater engagement process (TEP) is fundamentally restructuring how the Department prioritizes, plans, and funds its engagement activities. Once the TEP is firmly in place, the Department can determine whether an effort to expand RC participation is needed. Finally, the ongoing ARDS is addressing how to increase the number of CS and CSS units in the RC, the last initiative the study raised for possible examination.


Resource Challenges for the RC Employment

The study's Resourcing panel also examined resource challenges for RC employment. The study assessed more than 30 resource issues confronting the RC, including RC accessibility, utilization, mobilization, training, staffing, and management. Several of the highest priority RC resource challenges are discussed below. For additional information on other resource challenges and the study's assessment of those issues, see Annex G.

Lifting the 180 Day Limit Requirement. Title 10, United States Code, Section 115(d)(6), states that volunteer reservists who have been on active duty for more than 180 days must be counted against the active military end-strength levels, which are set by law. The Services are unwilling to violate the Congressional end-strength authorizations, therefore, the Services are often hesitant to use reservists where their employment might otherwise be clearly beneficial. In some cases, the Services have terminated active duty tours for reservists near the end of a fiscal year to avoid violating the end-strength authorizations, even if this disrupted mission performance. Lifting this restriction would facilitate greater and more effective use of the RC, particularly in cases where RC personnel are providing tempo relief for AC personnel. As a result, the study supports the proposal in the DoD FY2000 Omnibus to modify this legislation. The modification would allow reservists to serve for 181 days or more as long as the total number of reservists on active duty does not exceed .2 percent of the authorized active duty end strength.

Expediting Supplemental Appropriations Reimbursements. Each Service’s budget includes funding to cover the costs of volunteer RC personnel and unit participation in peacetime operational missions. However, the Services requirement for RC personnel participation in these operations often exceeds the available funding. Supplemental appropriations may be used to cover these costs for the Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. But there is not always sufficient time left in the fiscal year to use the supplemental funds, and opportunities to employ RC personnel must be limited in scale or cancelled entirely. Because the supplemental funds cannot be used beyond the fiscal year in which they were issued, these opportunities to employ RC personnel are lost permanently. In other cases, sufficient funds to cover the costs of RC active duty support may exist, but the rules governing use of those funds may preclude transferring the funds between accounts.

Given the challenges to funding RC participation in SSCs, many active duty commanders are reluctant to use RC personnel and units even when they could make a clear contribution because the commander’s limited ability to cover the costs of participation. The study examined whether a mechanism could be created to ensure that contingency operation costs are reimbursed more quickly. Currently, obtaining reimbursement once a supplemental appropriation is granted is a lengthy process that can up to 2 years. The study recommended that USD(C), ASD(RA), and the Services review current reimbursement processes and develop recommendations to increase how quickly reimbursements can be made.

Modify Limitations on Use of O&MA, O&MAR and O&MARNG Funds. In the Army’s proposed multi-component units, soldiers from all three components will be assigned to units with an active unit identification code (UIC). Some interpretations of current law imply that only O&MA funds can be applied to units with an active UIC. The study recommends that the law be clarified to permit expenditure of O&MAR and O&MARNG funds on active UIC multi-component units to support Army and ARNG personnel assigned to those units.

Improving AC/RC Interoperability. In many cases, RC units and personnel do not have equipment that is interoperable with the equipment of AC counterparts. The DoD "first-to-employ, first-to-equip" policy, which underlies the Services’ equipment distribution policies, requires that equipment be provided to units commensurate with their planned wartime deployment or employment. Compatibility and sustainability shortfalls in later-deploying units that have resulted from this policy have reduced unit effectiveness even as they continue to play a greater role in contingency and other ongoing operations. Particular concerns are in the areas of communications, utility helicopters, specific aircraft modifications and upgrades, tactical wheeled vehicles, engineering and construction equipment, and night vision devices. Currently, the Services use alternative resourcing methods that include borrowing equipment or rotating personnel while equipment is left in place, but readiness shortfalls remain for the loaner units. While it is not financially feasible to equip AC and RC units with identical equipment, the Services have begun to identify specific acquisition funding for RC equipment within their POM submissions.

The FY 2000 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report identifies the Services’ plans to address RC shortages and incompatibilities, and as part of the FY2000-2001 Presidential budget, the Department plans to spend nearly $6.6 billion for RC equipment between 1999 and 2002. The ASD(RA) has developed a RC equipping strategy to ensure that RC units are equipped in the future to support the National Military Strategy, to include crisis response and peacetime engagement activities. The long-term goal of the equipping strategy is to provide RC units with modern, compatible equipment.

Smart Cards to Minimize Processing Delays. Mobilizing RC personnel and units for active duty is sometimes delayed due to concerns over personnel data and deployment qualification records for RC personnel. When personnel records are incomplete, or their status is unclear, processing must often be completely redone, which can cause significant mobilization delays. The study determined that providing RC personnel with smart cards, or identification cards that contain a computer chip to store personnel information and other data, would help ensure that essential mobilization data is up-to-date and accurate, and would reduce unnecessary mobilization delays. The OSD Smart Card Technology Office issued a report to Congress on 31 March 1999 and to SecDef by September 1999 on the feasibility of implementing smart cards for the Uniformed Services. The Services, using a variety of test case mechanisms, are already examining the feasibility of providing smart cards to RC personnel.

Simplifying RC Peacetime Employment Procedures. Many AC commanders find it difficult to access RC personnel for use in joint military operations because of the lack of uniformity among the Services' RC structures and mobilization systems. The Joint Staff J-4 Mobilization Division has made significant progress in simplifying the mobilization process. However, the process is still complicated and poorly understood by many AC and RC commanders and staffs. The ASD(RA) is leading a working group to examine simplification and revision of the mobilization and deployment process. DoD Instruction 1235.12 and Joint Pub 4-05.1 address access to the RC during war, national emergencies, and contingency operations, so the working group is focusing on peacetime, non-PSRC access to RC personnel. The working group will complete its work by November 1999.

Establishing a Joint Professional Military Education Course for the RC. While there is a professional military education program to prepare AC personnel for service in joint assignments, a similar program for RC personnel does not exist. As a result, many RC personnel who serve in joint assignment begin those duties less prepared than is desirable. While RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations. To address this concern, the Department has proposed in its FY2000 Omnibus Legislation that a professional military education course for the RC on joint assignments be established, specifically focused on the joint professional military education (JPME) phase 2 program. Currently no billets are allocated to the RC for JPME phase 2. The proposal also calls for an increase in RC billets for JPME phase 1 curriculums.

Benefits Equity Between the AC and RC. While much progress has been made in recent years to ensure equity in the benefit packages that are provided to AC and RC personnel, the study determined that disparities continue to exist for RC personnel. The study reviewed a variety of benefit issues and determined that commissary visits for IDT or AT category RC personnel and family members were recently increased from 12 to 24 visits annually. IDT or AT category RC personnel and family members also currently have unlimited access to exchanges. National Guard members responding to a federally-declared disaster now have full access to commissaries and exchanges while on active duty. The ASD(RA) is currently negotiating a GSA contract for drilling reservists to obtain the government contract airfare discount when travelling to drill sites. Space available travel, which is a benefit normally given to the AC for emergency leave or regular leave, does not apply to RC personnel in the IDT or AT status because RC personnel in this status do not accrue leave.

The study also determined during its review of benefits policies that the USD(P&R) is preparing a report to Congress on AC and RC pay and benefits parity that will be submitted by January 2000. Required by Defense Authorization Act, 1997, Section 1256, this report will focus on disparities in benefits for RC personnel who have been on active duty for more than 30 days. The report will address the following issues in detail: basic allowance for housing for reserve members without family members, the 140 day threshold for reserve entitlement to the full basic allowance for housing rate, CONUS COLA, use of leave accrued during short tours of active duty , medical care for family members, and disability severance pay.

In addition, OSD(RA) has been involved in two studies to address RC health care issues, a report to Congress required by the Defense Authorization Act, 1997, Section 746, and the RC Health Care Summit. Both studies will address RC-AC parity for health benefits and entitlements. The Section 746 study is currently in the final draft stage and will be submitted to Congress before August 1999. The RC Health Care Summit will make recommendations to improve the medical readiness of RC members, to provide appropriate health care and medical entitlements for those who become ill or injured as a result of service, and to ensure uniformity and consistency among the Services. The report will be submitted to the SecDef following the submission of the Section 746 study.

Lifting the Restraint on Operational Duties for Full-Time Reservists. Currently, full-time reservists with administrative responsibilities for maintaining RC units are expected to continue those duties when the unit is deployed, rather than assuming other operational or command duties. Title 10, United States Code, Section 101(d)(6)(A), states that AGR duty should be used for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the RC. This policy evolved from a philosophy that envisioned full-time reservists performing significant unit administration so part-time reservists could focus almost exclusively on training. In today's environment, full time reservists are being used increasingly to augment the AC during operational missions; however, existing legal and policy constraints governing use of full-time reservists in operational missions have in some cases precluded reservists from serving in these missions as effectively as possible. The study determined that these issues are being addressed by a congressionally directed study being conducted by the ASD(RA) and the Services that will be completed in November 1999.

Creating More RC Staff Positions at Headquarters. Unfamiliarity within the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the ability of the Department to use the RC most effectively. Increasing the integration of the RC leadership into the decision-making processes within the DoD would reduce this unfamiliarity and facilitate more comprehensive and effective employment of the RC. To integrate RC leadership personnel more fully into the DoD, the study recommended increasing the number of full-time National Guard and reserve officers and senior noncommissioned officers into unified command headquarters and joint activities. The study also recommended raising the number of National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers serving in these organizations. The Reserve Forces Policy Board supports both of these recommendations.


Conclusion

Due to its broad mandate, the RC Employment 2005 Study examined a wide range of issues and drew participants from virtually every organization interested in the future of the total force. Not only did the study generate a variety of new initiatives that will enhance the role of the RC across the spectrum of DoD missions, the study process strengthened relationships between the AC and RC. The follow-on studies resulting from RCE-05 will build on this enhanced relationship, and are likely to generate additional mechanisms to increase AC and RC integration.


GLOSSARY

AAN - Army after next

AAR - After action report

AC - active component

ADSW - active duty for special work

AEF - Air Expeditionary Force

AFSC - Air Force Specialty Code

AGR - active guard and reserve

ALO - authorized level organization

ANG - Air National Guard

AOR - Area of Operational Responsibility

ARNG - Army National Guard

ADRS - Army National Guard Redesign Study

ASD(C3I) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence)

ASD(RA) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

ASD(SOLIC) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)

AT - annual training

C2 - command and control

CB - chemical-biological

CINC - commander-in-chief

CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM - consequence management

COLA - cost of living allowance

CONUS - continental United States

CONPLAN - contingency plan

CS - combat support

CSS - combat service support

DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency

DASD - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

DepSecDef - Deputy Secretary of Defense

DEPTEMPO - deployment tempo

DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency

DMDC - Defense Manpower Data Center

DoD - Department of Defense

DoDD - Department of Defense Directive

DoDI - Department of Defense Instruction

DPAG - Defense Planning Advisory Group

DPG - Defense Planning Guidance

DPP - Defense Program Projection

DRI - Defense Reform Initiative

DoD - Department of Defense

EEA - essential elements of analyses

EAC - echelon above corps

EAD - echelon above division

ESB - enhanced separate brigade

FWE - fighter wing equivalent

FORSCOM - Forces Command

FTS - full-time support

FY - fiscal year

FYDP - Future Years Defense Program

GO/FO - general officer/flag officer

GOSC - general officer steering committee

HD/LD - high-demand/low-density

HQ - Headquarters

IA - information assurance

IDA - Institute for Defense Analysis

IDT - inactive duty for training

IMA - individual mobilization augmentee

IO - information operations

IPS - illustrated planning scenarios

IRR - individual ready reserve

JMETL - joint mission essential task list

JOPES - joint operations planning and execution system

JPME - joint professional military education

JRAM - joint readiness automated management system

JSCP - joint strategic capabilities plan

JTD - joint table of distribution

JTF - joint task force

JTF-CND - joint task force for computer network defense

JTMD - joint table of mobilization distribution

JWRAC - joint web risk assessment cell

MFO - multinational force and observers

MIO - maritime intercept operations

MOA - memorandum of agreement

MOE - measurement of effectiveness

MOS - military occupational specialty

MOU - memorandum of understanding

MRS - Mobility Requirements Study

MTW - major theater wars

MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force

N/A - not applicable

NCO - noncommissioned officer

NEC - naval enlisted code

NMD - national missile defense

NMS - National Military Strategy

NSIPS - Navy Standard Integrated Pay System

OACJCS(NG&RM) - Office of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (National Guard and Reserve Matters)

OCONUS - outside continental United States

O&MA - operations and maintenance Army

O&MAR - operations and maintenance Army Reserve

O&MARNG - operations and maintenance Army National Guard

OPLAN - operations plan

OPSEC - operational security

OPTEMPO - operational tempo

O&M - operations and maintenance

PAA - primary assigned aircraft

PERSTEMPO - personnel tempo

PIM - pre-trained individual manpower

PME - professional military education

POE - posture of engagement

POM - Program Objective Memorandum

PPBS - Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

PRP - personal reliability program

PSRC - presidential selected reserve call-up

QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

RAID - rapid assessment and initial detection

RBA - revolution in business affairs

RC - Reserve Component

RFPB - Reserve Forces Policy Board

RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs

RML - revolution in military logistics

ROC - required operational capabilities

ROCC - regional operations command center

SecDef - Secretary of Defense

SMCR - Selected Marine Corps Reserve

SOS - support to other Services

SRC - standard requirements code

SSC - smaller-scale contingency

SSG - senior steering group

TEP - theater engagement plan

TPFDD - time-phased force deployment data

TTAD - temporary tour of active duty

UAV - unmanned aerial vehicle

UIC - unit identification code

UJTL - universal joint task list

ULB - unified legislative budget

USACOM - United States Atlantic Command

USCINCACOM - Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Command

USCINCCENT - Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command

USCINCSPACE - Commander-in Chief, United States Space Command

USCENTCOM - United States Central Command

USEUCOM - United States European Command

USPACOM - United States Pacific Command

USSOCOM - United States Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM - United States Southern Command

USNR - United States Naval Reserve

USMCR - Unites States Marine Corps Reserve

USD(A&T) - Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology

USD(C) - Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller

USD(P) - Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USD(P&R) - Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness

USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command

UTL - universal task list

WEAR - wartime executive agency requirements

WMD - weapons of mass destruction


Updated: 29 Jul 1999