[Mission Area Plans]

Air Force Modernization Planning (U)

Combat Delivery

Mission Area Plan (U)

FY1996

 

 

 

General, USAF

Commander

 

15 November 1995

 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FY96 COMBAT DELIVERY MISSION AREA PLAN

 

(U) This Mission Area Plan pertains to weapon systems specifically designed to perform the theater airlift mission--the C-130 and C-27. It does not address all systems that occasionally may perform theater airlift on a limited basis, such as the C-17 or C-141. It describes mission area deficiencies and a corrective investment strategy using the strategy to task process.

(U) The mission of the C-130 is to provide rapid transportation of personnel or cargo for delivery by parachute to a designated drop zone, or by landing at austere locations within the theater of operations. The C-130 provides long range, day or night capability that is degraded in most threat environments. Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS)-equipped

C-130s have the additional capability of performing airdrops without external assistance in inclement weather. It can be used as a tactical transport and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. The C-130 can land and take off on short runways, and it can be used on landing strips such as those usually found in advance base operations. It is a highly versatile weapons system with many specialized variations.

(U) The C-27A is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft which provides all weather airland and a limited Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) airdrop capability with a shorter range and smaller payload than the C-130. Its capabilities are degraded in some threat environments. The C-27 was designed to deliver conventional combat equipment/troops into austere airfields and onto marked or unmarked assault zones with shorter runways than the C-130 requires. It can be used as a tactical transport and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions.

- (U) Mission Area Assumptions.

-- (U) Maintain current operations tempo, frequency of humanitarian missions, and two major regional contingency taskings

-- (U) Execute tasking during both peace and war, hostile or non-hostile environments, in visual or adverse weather conditions

- (U) Key Operational Objectives.

-- (U) Sustain force’s readiness to deploy to theater of operations.

-- (U) Combat delivery of personnel, equipment, and material (hostile environment).

-- (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material into the theater.

-- (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material within the theater (non-hostile environment).

-- (U) Disrupt enemy political base.

-- (U) Sustain forces and operations tempo within the theater of operations

-- (U) Establish/sustain contingency operating locations.

- (U) Key Operational Tasks.

-- (U) Airland movement of personnel, equipment, and material. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

-- (U) Airdrop of personnel, equipment, and material. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

-- (U) Train mission ready personnel. Provide adequate personnel, equipment, airspace, and exercises to train mission ready personnel. Includes joint and combined operations, and exercises periodically conducted with allied nations.

-- (U) Reduce operations and support (O&S) costs and sustain efficient full spectrum operations. Enhance readiness and maintain a robust force by reducing O&S costs and balancing force readiness, support, and modernization requirements through the application of various programs, policies, and methods. Included but not limited to Weapon System Cost Reductions related initiatives and actions to reduce weapon system and support costs.

-- (U) Conduct aeromedical evacuation operations. Movement of casualties by air transportation under the supervision of qualified aeromedical evacuation crew members to/between medical treatment facilities.

-- (U) Support psychological operations. Support of operations targeted against the minds of the enemy civilian population and combat forces. Speaker operations and leaflet airdrops can be used to influence and demoralize hostile forces prior to and during offensive operations.

-- (U) Conduct aerial firefighting operations. Suppression and containment of forest fires or chemical fires via airdrop of extinguishing agents onto the fire.

-- (U) Conduct aerial spray operations. Aerial dispersal of disinfectant or insecticide for purposes of disease or pest control. Other chemicals may be dispersed through this system for wide area coverage.

 

- (U) Key Deficiencies.

-- (U) Lack of adequate detection and defensive systems.

-- (U) Dependence upon limited supply of material handling equipment (MHE).

-- (U) Specific theater combat delivery tasks are not fully articulated.

-- (U) Limited capability for protection and decontamination of aircraft, cargo, and cargo compartment.

-- (U) Manning shortfalls in key areas limit mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Lack of sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment.

-- (U) Dependence on reduced enroute/theater support, which limits mission flexibility.

-- (U) Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training.

-- (U) Lack of commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, which increases training cost and time.

-- (U) Limited ability to detect NBC threats.

-- (U) Aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness.

-- (U) Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability.

-- (U) Combat control teams (CCTs) lack sufficient equipment for mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Training capabilities for aircrew and maintainers are inadequate.

-- (U) Lack of configuration control and commonality limits forces’ flexibility.

-- (U) Lack of an effective CONOPS for an NBC environment.

-- (U) Aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater.

-- (U) Forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop.

-- (U) Aircraft lack database and charts for worldwide mission planning and execution.

-- (U) Combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment.

-- (U) Forces lack the capability to plan and operate in a laser environment.

-- (U) Campaign modeling tools do not exist to identify combat delivery shortfalls and impacts on warfighting effectiveness.

-- (U) Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

-- (U) Aircraft lack expansion capability to comply with planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

-- (U) Cargo restraint devices are bulky/heavy and time-consuming to use.

-- (U) Aircraft lack combat identification capability.

-- (U) Required weather information is not quickly disseminated to deployed theater airlift assets.

-- (U) Forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours updating manuals.

-- (U) Aircraft lack access to real time and threat order of battle information to aid in avoidance.

-- (U) Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces.

-- (U) Economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

-- (U) Forces lack autonomous precision approach capability in austere environments.

-- (U) Aircraft do not offer adequate passenger emergency life support protection.

-- (U) Aircraft lack collision avoidance capability in areas without radar coverage.

-- (U) Aircraft security and protection capabilities at deployed locations are limited.

-- (U) C-130 aircraft cannot communicate with ground forces during critical mission phases.

-- (U) Aircraft lack over-the-horizon secure voice and data communications capability.

-- (U) Theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft.

-- (U) Forces are limited in their ability to deploy and sustain themselves.

-- (U) Aerial firefighting equipment is nearly unsupportable.

-- (U) C-130 bleed air duct system is not reliable.

-- (U) Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations.

- (U) Key Solution Concepts.

-- (U) Threat Avoidance. Improved capability to detect/degrade/defeat threats. Install chaff/flare dispensers, missile warning system, radar warning system, radar jammers.

-- (U) Maintainability. Research/identify high maintenance items. Initiate programs to improve, including replacements for autopilot, APN-59 radar, and station keeping equipment system; replace magnetic compass system with dual inertial navigation units; install secure radios.

-- (U) Reliability. Replace aging C-130E aircraft with C-130J. Upgrade electrical system to produce steady power supply.

-- (U) Modeling. Produce useable logistics module to an existing campaign level model to determine impact of combat delivery force structure and modifications on outcome of theater campaign.

-- (U) Training. Procure weapon system trainer for C-130H3 and C-130J. Ensure simulator mods keep pace with aircraft mods.

-- (U) Precision Airdrop. GPS integration will increase capability for first pass precision airdrop.

- (U) Bottom Line Impact. The proposed investment strategy for combat delivery emphasizes reliability and maintainability improvements in current operational systems and modification of those systems with capabilities required to perform the mission. Modifications will depend on current technology and off-the-shelf equipment. During these R&M and modification efforts, technology developments in materials, design, and avionics will be pursued. These technology developments will then be incorporated into the next generation of combat delivery operational assets. As the combat delivery fleet, particularly active C-130Es, begins to reach the end of its service life in the first decade of the next century, an acquisition program for replacement aircraft is critical. This strategy depends heavily on current technologies applied in new ways.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ANNEXES B, C, AND D ARE REMOVED

Table of Contents

Section Page

1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 1

1.1 Mission Description ................................................... 1

1.2 Process Overview ................................................... 2

2 Mission Area Assessment .............................................................. 5

2.1 Strategy-to-Task ................................................... 5

2.2 The Threat ............................................................... 15

2.3 Concept of Operations ................................................... 16

2.4 Operational Concept ................................................... 20

2.5 Operational Tasks ................................................... 23

2.6 Force Structure ................................................... 25

3 Mission Needs Analysis .......................................................................... 29

3.1 Current Assessment ................................................... 29

3.2 Operational Tasks ........................................................... 31

3.3 Deficiencies .................................................................... 31

3.4 Task-to-Deficiencies ................................................... 31

3.5 Prioritized Deficiencies ................................................... 33

4 Mission Area Plan .......................................................................... 43

4.1 Solution Concepts ................................................... 43

4.2 Selected Near Term Solutions ....................................... 45

4.3 Selected Mid Term Solutions ....................................... 57

4.4 Selected Far Term Solutions ....................................... 58

4.5 Solution Sets ............................................................... 59

4.6 Modernization Roadmaps ....................................... 78

4.7 Mission Area Enabling Technologies ............... 88

5 Post Investment Assessment ......................................................................105

6 Summary .....................................................................................................108

ANNEX A Glossary of Acronyms (U)

ANNEX B Combat Delivery Threat Assessment (SECRET/NOFORN)

ANNEX C Future Force Structure Requirements (SECRET/NOFORN)

ANNEX D Classified Enabling Technologies (SECRET/NOFORN)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Mission Area Plan

for

Combat Delivery

1. (U) Introduction. This Mission Area Plan pertains to weapon systems specifically designed to perform the theater airlift mission--the C-130 and C-27. It does not address all systems that occasionally may perform theater airlift on a limited basis, such as the C-17 or C-141. It describes mission area deficiencies and a corrective investment strategy using the strategy to task process.

1.1. (U) C-130. The C-130 is an all-metal, high-wing, long-range, land-based monoplane. The fuselage is divided into the cargo compartment and the flight station. It can be fully pressurized and air conditioned in flight. The mission of the airplane is to provide rapid transportation of personnel or cargo for delivery by parachute to a designated drop zone, or by landing at austere locations within the theater of operations. The C-130 provides long range, day or night capability that is degraded in most threat environments. Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) equipped C-130s have the additional capability of performing airdrops in inclement weather without external assistance. It can be used as a tactical transport carrying 92 ground troops or 64 paratroops and equipment, and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. When used as an aeromedical evacuation asset, the airplane can carry 70 litters. There are provisions for normal life raft storage to accommodate 80 persons for overwater flights. The C-130 can land and take off on short runways, and it can be used on landing strips such as those usually found in advance base operations. It is a highly versatile weapons system with many specialized variations.

1.1.1. (U) C-130 Current Variations. The USAF inventory includes AC-130A/H/U,

C-130E/H, EC-130E/H, HC-130N/P, LC-130H, and MC-130E/H aircraft. As AF Special Operations Command assets, the AC-130A/H/U, EC-130H COMMANDO SOLO, MC-130E/H, and HC-130N/P COMBAT SHADOW are discussed in the AFSOC Force Application MAP. ACC HC-130N/P assets are discussed in the Rescue MAP. The EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) is discussed in the Theater Battle Management MAP. The EC-130H COMPASS CALL is discussed in the Electronic Warfare MAP. ACC also has specially modified C-130s used in a reconnaissance role and addressed in the Reconnaissance MAP.

1.2. (U) C-27. The C-27A is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft. The basic aircraft is an Alenia G-222-710 modified by the Chrysler Technologies Airborne Systems Division. The C-27 provides Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) airland and a limited Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) airdrop capability with a shorter range and smaller payload than the C-130. Its capabilities are degraded in most threat environments. The C-27 was designed to deliver conventional combat equipment/troops into austere airfields and onto marked or unmarked assault zones with shorter runways than the C-130 requires. It can be used as a tactical transport carrying 34 ground troops or 24 paratroops and equipment, and can be readily converted for aeromedical evacuation or aerial delivery missions. When used as an aeromedical evacuation asset, the airplane can carry 24 litters.

1.3. (U) Operational Support Airlift (OSA). The primary use of OSA aircraft is movement of high priority personnel and small cargo between main operating bases within the theater. OSA aircraft can be used to transport Air/Integrated Tasking Orders to units with no classified electronic reception capability. OSA aircraft can be used for aeromedical evacuation and movement of maintenance recovery teams into austere locations with short runways.

1.3.1. (U) C-21. The C-21 is a twin engine jet executive transport aircraft manufactured by Lear. The primary use of this aircraft is movement of high priority personnel and small cargo between main operating bases within the theater. Air Mobility Command is the USAF proponent for Operational Support Airlift and includes the C-21 in its Airlift MAP.

1.3.2. (U) C-12. The C-12J is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft. The basic aircraft is a Beech 1900 executive transport aircraft. Pacific Air Forces is the lead command for the C-12J.

1.4. (U) Other MAPs referencing the Combat Delivery MAP. The following is a list of other MAPs that reference Combat Delivery assets:

1.4.1. (U) Contingency Base Operability.

1.4.2. (U) Close Air Support/Interdiction.

1.4.3. (U) Counter Air.

1.4.4. (U) Electronic Combat.

1.4.5. (U) Rescue.

1.4.6. (U) Surveillance & Reconnaissance.

1.4.7. (U) Theater Battle Management.

1.4.8. (U) Airlift (AMC)

1.4.9. (U) Force Application (AFSOC).

1.5. (U) Annual Review. This MAP will be reviewed annually or as required to ensure aircraft and weapons technologies are effectively integrated into our force structure. This is the second version of the Combat Delivery MAP.

1.6. (U) Process Overview. The Operational Requirements Planning Process is described in AFI 10-1401, Modernization Planning Documentation, and AFI 10-601, Air Force Mission Needs and Operational Requirements. Long-range plans for force modernization and strategy are derived from national and Joint Staff strategy guidance. HQ ACC is designated as the Air Force proponent Major Command (MAJCOM) for combat delivery. The HQ ACC Directorate for Plans and Programs develops the Theater Airlift Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Roadmap to provide guidance for combat delivery operations and force structure respectively. HQ ACC Directorate of Requirements develops this MAP to provide guidance on the modernization of the force structure and to ensure the capabilities required in the CONOPS are fielded today and in the future.

1.6.1. (U) Strategy-To-Task/Task-To-Need. The Strategy-to-Task (STT) and Task-to-Need (TTN) processes are used to conduct Mission Area Assessment (MAA) and Mission Needs Analysis (MNA). A Combat Delivery Mission Area Team (MAT) comparison of mission needs with current doctrine and tactics, coupled with weapon system performance against the current and future threats, determines non-material and material deficiencies. Comparisons are made using time phasing to allow for a near, mid, and far-term assessment of capabilities to assist long-term planners to match investments to documented needs. After deficiencies are identified, the Mobility Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT) and the MAT gather solution concepts, and analyze, select, and prioritize the solutions based upon urgency, technology risk, cost, and the effect a solution has on multiple deficiencies. Selected solutions are integrated into the combat delivery modernization roadmaps.

1.6.2. (U) Mission Area Assessment. The Air Staff, Major Commands (MAJCOMs), and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) identify missions through the MAA process. This process is depicted in Figure 1.1 and links mission tasks requiring certain capabilities (current and programmed) to the military strategy provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the MAA phase, MAJCOMs review their tasking and assigned missions under concepts of operations (CONOPS) for the various regional plans. These regional plans assign specific military objectives for Air Force assets. MAJCOMs continually evaluate plans and Joint Staff guidance for changes in assigned missions and objectives which may change the tasks required for that mission.

Figure 1.1. (U) Mission Area Plan Process

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1.6.2.1. (U) In January 1995 a CAF MAA process was initiated to standardize STTs within ACC mission areas. The analysis was performed by an integrated product team (IPT) consisting of representatives for eleven CAF Mission Area Plans and functional area representatives from XP, DO, SG, SC, LG, and IN. The IPT developed and prioritized a common Mission Area Assessment of all CAF MAPs.

1.6.2.1.1. (U) The group began with a USAF/XOX STT Baseline which describes the STT process and terms. The final product contains objectives & tasks for scenarios across the entire spectrum of conflict. References for the effort were the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG); AFM 1-1; Army Field Manual 1; Naval Doctrine Publication 1; Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of US Armed Forces; Joint Pub 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations; and Joint Pub 5, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

1.6.2.1.2. (U) The IPT identified and defined CAF objectives and tasks. Relationships were established between levels using Quality Function Deployment (QFD), a structured process which identifies and prioritizes customer requirements and the translation of these requirements into appropriate solutions.

1.6.3. (U) Mission Needs Analysis. Once a task is identified, MAJCOMs conduct an MNA by analyzing the factors which impact our current and programmed capability to accomplish that task. The task-to-need process evaluates our force structure, the environment, and the threat we expect to encounter while conducting the assigned mission. Once deficiencies are identified, doctrine, tactics, and training (non-material solutions) are examined to determine if changes in these areas can solve the deficiency. If modifications to current systems or new systems are required, a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) documents the required characteristics of the new system. Procedures outlined in AFI 10-601 are followed.

1.6.4. (U) Mission Area Plan. The MAP summarizes and uses the products of the MAA and MNA processes to identify key technologies and weapons system modernization efforts required to correct known deficiencies. The MAP is the primary planning document for acquisition strategies, national and Air Force laboratory efforts, and industrial independent research and development (IR&D) programs providing a focus for limited investment dollars. This ensures the required technologies are developed/matured as quickly as possible.

2. (U) Combat Delivery Mission Area Assessment.

2.1. (U) Strategy-to-Task (STT) Analysis. The current strategy-to-task framework for the combat delivery mission area is depicted in Figure 2.1, which depicts campaign objective/ operational objective linkages. Operational objective/operational task linkages are depicted in paragraph 2.2 through 2.7.

Figure 2.1. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task.

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2.1.1. (U) National Military Strategy. New national military strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment. Our military forces must perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. These three components of the strategy are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our nation's wars. Accomplishing the specific tasks of the strategy is facilitated by the two complementary strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection.

2.1.1.1. (U) Peacetime Engagement. Peacetime engagement describes a broad range of noncombat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability.

2.1.1.2. (U) Deterrence and Conflict Prevention. In concert with the other elements of US national power, our military capabilities serve to deter aggression and prevent conflict by convincing potential adversaries that their objectives will be denied and that their aggression will be decisively defeated.

2.1.1.3. (U) Fighting and Winning. Being ready to fight and win the Nation's wars remains our foremost responsibility and the prime consideration governing all military activities. This ability serves as the ultimate guarantor of our vital interests and is the fundamental reason that our Nation has raised and sustained its military forces.

2.1.1.4. (U) Overseas Presence. Overseas presence takes the form of both permanently stationed forces and forces temporarily deployed abroad.

2.1.1.5. (U) Power Projection. With fewer US forces permanently stationed overseas, we must proportionately increase our capability to project forces abroad. The existence of a credible power projection capability complements our overseas presence in acting as a deterrent to potential adversaries. It further provides our national leaders greater flexibility in employing military force.

2.1.2. (U) Theater Campaign Objectives. To support the national strategy, the theater Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) must be provided with mission ready personnel capable of rapid deployment to, employment within, and redeployment from the desired area of operations. Furthermore, these forces must be supported and sustained throughout the campaign. Ground forces directly supported by combat delivery will degrade the enemy’s war sustaining capability. Individual campaign objectives and definitions follow.

2.1.2.1. (U) Maintain mission readiness/affordability and perform peacetime operations. Maintain a high state of readiness to respond to enemy aggression. Perform those operational functions necessary to ensure compliance with the designed operational capability (DOC) tasking provided by the MAJCOM. Conduct other peacetime operations in support of the national military objectives. Reduce operating and support costs of forces and balance readiness, support, and modernization requirements.

2.1.2.2. (U) Rapidly deploy to, employ within, and redeploy from desired area of operations. Relocation of forces and material to desired areas of operations. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental CONUS, inter-theater, and intra-theater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JCS Pub 1-02, 24 Mar 94)

2.1.2.3. (U) Degrade war sustaining capability and support surface operations. Stop enemy ground forces from achieving their critical objectives. Move to isolate and destroy enemy forces, including reserve forces prior to their commitment. Disrupt and destroy the enemy’s C4I, logistics network, and other associated military targets needed to continue/maintain their ground operations. Includes disruption of enemy political base. Support US and allied counteroffensive to seize territory and engage, envelop, destroy, or capture enemy ground forces occupying key objectives.

2.1.2.4. (U) Support employment and sustainment of forces. All support activity to employ and sustain the force in the execution of theater strategy, campaigns, and unified operations. This activity links national military strategic sustainment to operational objectives.

2.1.3. (U) Operational Objectives. Individual definitions follow. Figures 2.2 through 2.7 depict linkages with operational tasks.

2.1.3.1. (U) Sustain force’s readiness to deploy to theater of operations. (Figure 2.2) Peacetime processes enabling forces to maximize equipment and personnel readiness for deployability to a given theater within a specified period. Includes providing mission ready personnel. Includes actions to enhance readiness by reducing weapon system operating and support costs.

2.1.3.2. (U) Combat delivery of personnel, equipment, and material. (Figure 2.3) Delivering forces directly into battle and sustaining them by either airland delivery or aerial delivery. It includes airland assault, airborne assault, and combat resupply (AF Doctrine Document 30, Airlift Operations)

Figure 2.2. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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(U) Objective-to-Task

Figure 2.3. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.3. (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material into the theater. (Figure 2.4) Includes movement into theater, and airlift of forces, personnel, and material from theater to second MRC or point of origin.

2.1.3.4. (U) Transport personnel, equipment, and material within the theater. (Figure 2.4) Deployment, employment, and redeployment of personnel, munitions, supplies, and equipment within the theater under non-hostile conditions.

Figure 2.4. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.5. (U) Disrupt enemy political base. (Figure 2.5) Conduct operations to influence public opinion and offensive operations against key non-military leadership agencies (Congress, Parliament, Palace, etc.). Combat delivery forces do not directly plan and execute psychological operations; however, they support this task and its associated objective, disruption of the enemy’s political base, by providing airborne platforms.

Figure 2.5. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.6. (U) Sustain forces and operations tempo within the theater of operations. (Figure 2.6) Logistical support activity required across the full spectrum of conflict to sustain the force and continuity of operations in campaigns and major operations within the theater for (1) support of sortie production (organizational, squadron, etc.), (2) replenishment of arms, ammunition, and equipment required to support forces, (3) providing an uninterrupted flow of fuel to joint/combined forces, (4) establishing facilities in the rear area to repair and replace material and establish policies for repair and evacuation of equipment to support theater forces, and (5) maintain timely flow of stocks and maintenance/manpower.

 

Figure 2.6. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.3.7. (U) Establish/sustain contingency operating locations. (Figure 2.7) Those tasks necessary to provide the infrastructure to sustain an operating force in an area of operations. These include health services, military police, construction of base facilities and infrastructure, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering functions, food services, graves registration, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, property disposal, and other logistic services. Does not include direct sortie generation activities (i.e., aircraft maintenance activities).

Figure 2.7. (U)

Combat Delivery Operational Objective-to-Task

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2.1.4. (U) Operational Tasks. To meet these objectives, combat delivery has two primary operational tasks, airland and airdrop, which allow delivery of personnel, equipment, and material. Combat delivery will use any or all tasks to accomplish the mission.

2.1.4.1. (U) Airland personnel, equipment, and material. Intratheater missions employing point to point movement of personnel, equipment, and material using runway operations. Purpose is power projection or force sustainment.

2.1.4.1.1. (U) Airland - Power Projection. All sorties which involve point to point insertion of resources using runway operations only (Figure 2.8.). Runway types may range from hard surfaced concrete to sand or grass. The airland task includes airland of personnel, equipment, supplies, and a specialized subtask (C-130 only), Pathfinder. Pathfinder missions provide covert insertion of combat control or special operations forces.

 

Figure 2.8. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airland - Power Projection

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2.1.4.1.2. (U) Airland - Force Sustainment. These missions include airland of personnel, equipment, supplies, plus one specialized C-130 subtask, Pathfinder (Figure 2.9). Pathfinder missions provide covert insertion of combat control or special operations forces. A conventional subtask for both the C-130 and C-27 is noncombatant evacuation operations. Noncombatant evacuation operations pertain to the air movement of dependents and other noncombatants from potentially hostile environments. The C-130 also has the conventional subtask of moving nuclear weapons if tasked for that mission.

 

Figure 2.9. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airland - Force Sustainment

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2.1.4.2. (U) Airdrop personnel, equipment, and material. Missions employing aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, or material from an aircraft in flight for power projection or force sustainment purposes.

2.1.4.2.1. (U) Airdrop - Power Projection. Missions employing aerial delivery from an aircraft in flight for direct insertion of resources into a conflict area (Figure 2.10). The airdrop task includes aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, supplies, and two specialized subtasks

(C-130 only). These are flare launch and Pathfinder. Flare launch missions provide illumination to highlight hostile force movements during offensive operations. Pathfinder missions provide covert aerial delivery of combat control or special operations forces into areas not accessible by airland operations. There is one specialized subtask for the C-27, personnel airdrop. Personnel airdrop provides for the overt insertion of troops during combat operations.

 

Figure 2.10. (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airdrop - Power Projection

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2.1.4.2.2. (U) Airdrop - Force Sustainment. These missions employ both conventional and special airdrop operations (Figure 2.11). Conventional missions include airdrop of personnel equipment and supplies to sustain combat and support operations and operations other than war. Equipment airdrops (C-130 only) use door bundle or load extraction methods. Supplies use Containerized Delivery System (CDS) methods of delivery. There is one specialized subtask utilizing only the C-130, which is Pathfinder. Pathfinder missions provide covert resupply, personnel and equipment, to combat control or special operations forces. C-27 conventional missions only airdrop personnel or door bundles.

Figure 2.11 (U) Combat Delivery Strategy-to-Task,

Airdrop - Force Sustainment

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

2.1.4.3. (U) Train mission ready personnel. Provide adequate personnel, equipment, airspace, and exercises to train mission ready personnel. Includes joint and combined operations, and exercises periodically with allied nations.

2.1.4.4. (U) Reduce operations and support (O&S) costs and sustain efficient full spectrum operations. Enhance readiness and maintain a robust force by reducing O&S costs and balancing force readiness, support, and modernization requirements through the application of various programs, policies, and methods. Included but not limited to Weapon System Cost Reductions related initiatives and actions to reduce weapon system and support costs.

2.1.4.5. (U) Conduct aeromedical evacuation operations. Movement of casualties by air transportation under the supervision of qualified aeromedical evacuation crew members to/between medical treatment facilities.

2.1.4.6. (U) Support psychological operations. Support of operations targeted against the minds of the enemy civilian population and combat forces. Speaker operations and leaflet airdrops can be used to influence and demoralize hostile forces prior to and during offensive operations. Combat delivery forces do not directly plan and execute psychological operations; however, they support this task and its associated objective, disruption of the enemy’s political base, by providing airborne platforms.

2.1.4.7. (U) Deliver/maintain timely flow of people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. The actual movement from a point of embarkation outside the theater of operations to a point of debarkation in the theater of operations. Includes maintaining timely flow of stocks and maintenance/manpower and movement from first to second MRC.

2.1.4.8. (U) Pack/configure/assemble (for movement) people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Packing includes those actions associated with the physical acts of making ready and packing technical data, mission equipment, support equipment, tools, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Configuring includes actions associated with making operational, technical, and physical changes required to ensure compliance with current practices; and standardization of data, equipment, tools, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Assembling includes the pre-deployment staging of personnel, equipment, and material for movement.

2.1.4.9. (U) Conduct aerial firefighting operations. Defined as containment of forest and grassland wildfires by airdrop of chemical retardants in advance of the fire line. With proper equipment and aircrew procedures, this task could apply across the full spectrum of conflict. However, theater CINCs have neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system. Existing equipment, which is not owned by DoD, is unprotected and unusable in hostile or urban environments. Additionally, aircrew procedures and tactics do not exist for employment of firefighting systems in hostile or urban environments. Therefore, equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

2.1.4.10. (U) Conduct aerial spray operations. Aerial dispersal of disinfectant or insecticide for purposes of disease or pest control. Other chemicals may be dispersed through this system for wide area coverage.

2.1.5. (U) Supporting Systems. The threat environments that combat delivery assets operate within can be adjusted by the use of supporting aircraft. Supporting aircraft providing air-to-air protection, air-to-ground fire support, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) coverage can degrade the threat, either temporarily or permanently, permitting combat delivery assets to reach the objective area. Combat delivery forces may be augmented by these supporting systems depending on the threat environment, distance to the objective area, and availability of assets. A-10, F-15E, F-16, or other capable CAF and joint assets can provide suppression of the ground threat. CAF F-16 and F-15 aircraft, as well as joint air superiority fighters, can prevent interception of combat delivery assets by hostile aircraft. F-15, F-16, EF-111, and EC-130 can provide lethal or non-lethal SEAD. E-3, E-8, and Airborne Battlefield Command, Control, and Communication (ABCCC) can provide command, control, and communication support for the combat delivery mission. The Global Positioning System (GPS) and Defense Satellite Communication System can be used to provide navigation and communication support to all or part of the package.

2.2. (U) The Threat. Combat delivery assets operate at low level and a relatively slow airspeed. They are susceptible to the full range of ground-based enemy air defense weapons and enemy aircraft. Reference classified Annex B, Combat Delivery Threat Assessment (U), for the specific 25-year combat delivery threat MAA.

2.2.1 (U) Threat Environment Classifications. The threat environment relates primarily to the enemy's ability to detect and lethally engage combat delivery aircraft.

2.2.1.1 (U) No Threat/Permissive: Environment permits operations with virtually no probability of combat or enemy detection leading to engagement.

2.2.1.2 (U) Low: Environment contains threats; however, dispersal, concentration, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with passive measures taken to avoid detection. Detection of combat delivery forces by the enemy is likely to be without consequence; if the enemy engages, weapons encountered will typically be small arms, man portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air missiles (SAM), rocket-propelled grenades, and light optically aimed anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) up to .50 caliber/14.5mm.

2.2.1.3 (U) Medium: Environment contains significant threats. Dispersal, concentration, mobility, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with active measures taken to avoid detection and threats. Detection of combat delivery forces by the enemy is likely to result in engagement. Weapon systems typically include low-threat systems plus early generation SAM, radar-controlled AAA, and aircraft lacking effective look-down/shoot-down and/or all-weather capability. Aircrews can expect to employ extensive mission planning, threat evasive maneuvers, avoidance tactics, onboard electronic countermeasures systems, and/or defensive threat suppression measures to accomplish the mission

2.2.1.4 (U) High: A high-threat environment is created by a hostile force which includes widely dispersed, densely concentrated, integrated air defense systems; advanced or late generation SAMs; aircraft with all-aspect and look-down/shoot-down capabilities; modern ground-based radars or passive detection systems; significant quantities of highly trained and mobile ground forces; and electronic warfare capabilities which would seriously diminish the ability of combat delivery operations to proceed without large-scale combat protection packages. Some of the ground-based systems may be hardened or be unusually difficult to destroy/render inoperable. Combat delivery- specific assets should be employed in environments with integrated defense systems only when those systems can be adequately suppressed by other CAF assets. Combat delivery forces are not currently capable of prosecuting their missions in a high-threat environment without significant threat degradation and force protection from enemy air- and ground-based weapons.

2.3. (U) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). (Figure 2.12.) Theater airlift assets participate throughout the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 2.13.) and the type of missions performed during peacetime and contingencies are basically the same. Threat, availability of suitable airfields or assault zones, and aircraft capabilities all determine the delivery method.

Figure 2.12. (U) Concept of Operations.

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

 

Figure 2.13. (U) Combat Delivery Spectrum.

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

2.3.1. (U) Peacetime. For administrative purposes, theater airlift forces are assigned to the Commander of ACC, USAFE, PACAF, AFRES, or National Guard Bureau (NGB), as appropriate. HQ ACC is designated lead command for areas affecting theater airlift. Sourcing, tasking, planning, and execution of missions will be in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate headquarters. C-27 missions which arrive and depart the MOB on a regularly scheduled basis to move cargo and personnel to destinations within the theater of operations are validated by USSOUTHCOM. USSOUTHCOM will validate and prioritize specific requirements to establish scheduled missions. Missions will be justified largely on the volume and frequency of requirements for delivery to specific destinations other than established main operating bases and established aerial ports.

2.3.2. (U) Combat Operations

2.3.2.1. (U) AOC Airlift Coordination Cell (ALCC). Each theater’s Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) or Commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), as appropriate, is responsible for air operations within the area of responsibility (AOR). The AOC is the deployed operational facility in which the JFACC or COMAFFOR exercises centralized functions of planning, directing, and controlling theater air resources. It acts as the Air Forces Component Commander’s (AFCC’s) focal point for planning and managing the theater air campaign, including theater airlift operations. It provides the capability to monitor the activities of friendly and enemy forces. It is the senior control element of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) and includes personnel and equipment of all the necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air operations. The airlift cadre residing within the NAFs' Air Operations Group (AOG) form the nucleus of the ALCC. The ALCC is part of the AOC and bears overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, managing, and executing theater airlift operations within the AOR. It integrates theater airlift activity with other theater air operations. It normally consists of an airlift plans branch, an airlift operations branch, and an airlift support branch. The ALCC is headed by the Chief, ALCC, who reports to the Director of the AOC. Critical to the success of the theater airlift system is the ALCC’s ability to coordinate directly with theater logistics planners in the Joint Movement Center (JMC) and the C2 system supporting the USTRANSCOM strategic air mobility effort. The theater airlift system is dependent on AMC-owned or controlled strategic air mobility assets. Aerial Port, Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE), and Combat Control Team (CCT) resources are limited and required by both the theater and strategic systems. The ALCC will work closely with either the TACC or the Air Mobility Element (AME), if deployed, to manage support forces so that strategic and theater missions are supported. The Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), if established, exercises coordinating authority to ensure theater and strategic requirements are fulfilled.

2.3.2.1.1. (U) Functions. The ALCC will normally perform flight and system management functions.

2.3.2.1.1.1. (U) Flight Management. Flight management consists of planning, development, and dissemination of an airlift mission schedule (AMS) section in the ATO and then monitoring and tracking mission progress. If AMC is providing flight management, mission information may be provided via an Air Movement Table (AMT) versus the AMS section of the ATO.

2.3.2.1.1.2. (U) System Management. System management consists of: managing the theater airlift system, the assets required for efficient airlift operations, the interface between theater airlift and strategic mobility forces, and satisfying validated user requirements.

2.3.2.2. (U) Supporting Organizations. To manage and maintain an effective theater airlift operation, a variety of support organizations are required. With the division of assets between ACC, PACAF, USAFE, and AMC, extensive coordination will be required to effectively utilize these airlift support elements. Thoroughly planned operations will enable both strategic and theater missions to be serviced by all support elements, whether ACC, PACAF, USAFE, or AMC assigned.

2.3.2.2.1. (U) Air Mobility Operations Groups (AMOGs). AMOGs are in-garrison units which provide personnel and equipment to augment the air mobility en route structure during surge operations. They include maintenance, aerial port, C2, communications, and combat camera specialists. Currently, AMC AMOG and Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS) personnel provide the cadre of deployable personnel and equipment for Air Mobility Element (AME) operations. The AME is provided, upon request of a theater CINC through coordination with USTRANSCOM, to augment or establish strategic airlift operations for the theater, and will not be an element of the AOC. It reports directly to the AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) and performs strategic mobility coordination and monitoring, operations support, intelligence, and airlift mission support functions. The AME serves as an extension of TACC deployed to help support and integrate strategic air mobility operations with theater air operations. AMC TACC, ACC/DOO, and ACC NAFs will work in parallel to validate user requirements and ensure an appropriate airlift system is provided to the theater.

2.3.2.2.2 (U) Airlift Control Squadrons (ALCSs). ALCS and CAF Airlift Control Flights (ALCFs), located at C-130 bases, will be ACC assigned/gained and will continue to support worldwide mobility operations. ALCSs form the cadre for deployed Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) and are augmented by communications, maintenance, and aerial port assets. TALCEs deploy to establish control, coordinate, and report AF airlift/tanker operations at a base where normal airlift and tanker control facilities are not established or require augmentation. TALCE cadre personnel may also come from AMC Air Mobility Control Squadrons/Flights (AMCSs/AMCFs).

2.3.2.2.3. (U) Aerial Port Squadrons (APSs). APSs provide fixed and deployable air terminal operations, air freight, passenger service, and fleet service support to assigned and enroute air mobility aircraft, passengers, and cargo.

2.3.2.2.4. (U) Combat Control Squadrons (CCSs). CCSs and Combat Control Flights (CCFs) are sized and deployed as Combat Control Teams (CCTs) and provide VMC/limited IMC air traffic control and limited airfield operations for expeditionary airfields. CCTs establish and control assault zones, conduct tactical assault zone assessments, position and monitor terminal navigation aids, and provide long range secure command and control (C2) and communications. Corollary missions include removal of obstacles and unexploded ordinance by demolition, gathering and reporting ground intelligence, and providing local weather observations.

2.3.2.2.5. (U) Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Assets. AE assets are responsible for the transport and care of casualties from the forward combat areas to and between treatment facilities within a theater. Duties include matching requests for patient AE with available combat delivery resources.

2.3.2.2.6. (U) Theater Airlift Liaison Officers (TALOs). In peacetime, TALOs coordinate Army deployment planning and assist Army commanders in JA/ATT planning. TALOs also instruct Army personnel on the airlift system. During contingencies or exercises, TALOs deploy to coordinate theater airlift support for their assigned Army unit. TALOs are aligned against each Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) at Corps, Division, or Brigade levels or assigned to active duty C-130 wings. Wing assigned TALOs will fall under the senior Air Liaison Officer (ALO) at the TACP when deployed.

2.3.2.2.7. (U) Air Force Weather Support. Weather support is required to support this mission area. Commanders, planners, and aircrews require timely and accurate observed and forecast environmental products to efficiently employ assigned forces. Effective integration of environmental information into the combat force employment process can successfully influence decisions regarding weapon selections and target options, sortie generation, and support to base-level operations. Because weather support is a backbone objective cross-cutting all operational and supporting mission tasks, the Air Force has developed a weather Functional Area Plan (FAP). The FAP provides a roadmap for supporting MAJCOM validated operational requirements and a strategy for correcting deficiencies. Air Force and Air Weather Service program and budget for standard systems and capabilities required for Air Force and Army support as outlined in the FAP.

2.3.2.2.8. (U) Intelligence Support. Intelligence support is required to support the combat delivery mission area. Commanders, mission planners, and aircrews require comprehensive, accurate, and continuous intelligence products to efficiently employ assigned forces. Integration of tactical and national level intelligence information into the decision making process is essential for successful operations. Because intelligence support is a backbone objective cross-cutting all operating and supporting mission tasks, the Air Force has developed an Intelligence FAP. The FAP provides a road map for supporting MAJCOM validated operational requirements and a strategy for correcting deficiencies identified in individual mission area plans.

2.3.2.2.9. (U) Communications Support. Communications support is essential to coordinate all combat delivery activities within the theater of operations. It is especially critical to support both the AOC and all forward bases. The communications support package will include, but is not limited to, telephones, computers, and connectivity to CONUS and other theater agencies. Additional information on communications support is in the Theater Battle Management MAP.

2.4. (U) Operational Concept. Combat delivery operates under the operational concept depicted in Figure 2.14.

Figure 2.14. (U) Operational Concept

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

2.4.1. (U) Readiness. Combat delivery forces maintain a high state of readiness through realistic training sorties and exercise participation. Training and exercises are conducted day and night and in all environmental conditions, to include water, desert, and mountain operations. As a minimum, each crewmember requires 24 training sorties annually to maintain currency in the C-130 and 24 training sorties annually to maintain currency in the C-27. Minimum mission qualification in the C-130 includes: day/night VMC/IMC formation, day/night VMC tactical airdrop (IMC for AWADS and SKE-equipped units), and day/night VMC assault. Minimum mission qualification in the C-27 includes: day/night VMC assault.

2.4.2. (U) Deployment. Combat delivery aircrews are prepared, if on Alpha alert status, to launch within one hour of notification and proceed to the objective area. Bravo status requires a launch within three hours of notification. In theater, the ALCC is notified of the requirement and tasks forces to support the mission. The magnitude of forces required to accomplish a mission can range from a single unescorted aircraft to a full formation package consisting of all forces required to defeat the threat. When acquired, premission planning of the operation would be accomplished using the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS). AFMSS should permit a quick and standardized flight planning format for decentralized mission preparation in the field. C-130 units are not air refuelable and require staging bases to deploy into the theater of operations.

2.4.2.1. (U) C-130 Deployment. Presently, C-130 units are the only theater airlift forces with limited capability to self-deploy their aviation package to a theater. The sizing and tailoring of airlift Unit Type Codes (UTCs) will be designed to meet a variety of theater and commander requirements. Wing Operations Center (WOC), Aerial Delivery Support Branch (ADSB), TALCE, PRIME RIBS/BEEF, Security Police, aeromedical evacuation (AE), and Combat Control Team (CCT) deployment will require strategic airlift assistance to the theater due to the C-130's limited range and allowable cabin load. Also, ADSB, TALCE, Security Police, AE, and CCT functions may not be deployed to the same location as their parent wing. C-130 units may be deployed in-theater to Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), or bare bases depending on theater airlift/basing requirements.

2.4.2.2. (U) C-27 Deployment. The single C-27 unit has a limited deployment capability from its MOB to support the SOUTHCOM AOR. To meet the requirements of the theater commander, C-27A forces are capable of mobility deployment for at least thirty days. Contractor support personnel, equipment, and spares are required to deploy with C-27A forces for exercises, contingencies, or during wartime. The C-27A has the capability to ferry to operational locations but is not normally self-deployable. Mission support airlift may be required to move Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE), maintenance, and transportation personnel and support equipment to FOBs. SOUTHAF, in conjunction with HQ ACC, 24 WG, and 310 ALS, will develop a mobility plan under the provisions of ACCR 28-2. The contractor is required to develop a transportation/ deployment plan. The SOUTHAF mobility plan will incorporate the contractor's plan. For contingency operations downstream of the MOB, the contractor will be ready to deploy within 48 hours after notification. This 48-hour period will include assembly and packing time for any required onboard support kits. Deployments will require contractor mission support kits and maintenance personnel to accompany the aircraft to FOBs. The contractor is capable of deployment supporting one semi-permanent and one additional FOB with two aircraft each for exercises/contingencies. During wartime circumstances, all aircraft may be deployed to one or more FOBs.

2.4.3. (U) Employment. A C-130 wing can be expected to deploy and operate as a self-supporting, or augmenting unit to composite wings, or multinational operations tailored to the theater commander's airlift requirement. Operations will be conducted day or night in adverse weather conditions, to include airdrop and airland taskings. The theater AOC, through the ALCC, will publish the Air Tasking Order (ATO) for dissemination to the deployed C-130 WOCs for mission preparation. Theater management of airlift will be accomplished by the ALCC. Strategic mobility assets will normally carry cargo from the Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) and off-load at theater MOBs and theater assets will carry the cargo from the MOBs to FOBs, Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), or drop zones for off-load (hub and spoke system). Strategic lift can and does operate into FOBs. C-141, C-5, and C-17 operations can go from APOE to FOL depending on user requirements. In these instances, AMC will control the aircraft. The airlift wing must possess standardized C4I assets, to maintain connectivity with the AOC, TACC, TALCE, AME, and CCT.

2.4.3.1. (U) Employment Capabilities. Combat delivery aircraft ingress to the objective area via low level flight in day or night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) to avoid detection and reduce threat exposure. AWADS C-130s are capable of executing airdrops in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and leading formations of non-AWADS C-130s to timing drops using Station Keeping Equipment (SKE). The C-27 has a capability of VMC personnel airdrop and a Container Delivery System (CDS) airdrop capability currently in the developmental stage.

2.4.3.2. (U) Employment Support. Additional supporting assets can be added to the package depending on the threat environment, distance to the objective area, and availability of assets.

2.4.3.2.1. (U) Employment Support-Escort. Aircraft designated to perform the escort mission will escort the combat delivery package and provide suppressive fire to any enemy ground threats encountered. This escort will usually be initiated prior to the combat delivery's entry into enemy controlled terrain. Escort aircraft should provide coverage of the combat delivery package through run-in to the objective area, airdrop, and escape to friendly lines. The escort mission is primarily assigned to A-10, F-16, or AC-130 aircraft.

2.4.3.2.2. (U) Employment Support-Combat Air Patrol. (U) Aircraft designated to perform the CAP mission should prevent interception of the combat delivery package, and supporting aircraft, from enemy air-interception aircraft. The CAP mission is primarily assigned to F-15 or F-16 aircraft.

2.4.3.2.3. (U) Employment Support-Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). C3I aircraft may be assigned to provide tactical communications links for near real time order of battle information, or to assume the role of Airborne Mission Command. C3I aircraft includes the E-3, EC-130 ABCCC, or E-8.

2.4.3.2.4. (U) Employment Support-Inflight Refueling. Aircraft supporting the Combat Delivery package may require the support of KC-10 or KC-135 aircraft for inflight refueling.

2.4.3.2.5. (U) Employment Support-Other Services . (U) Assets from other United States or foreign services can also be tasked by the theater CINC to support a combat delivery effort.

2.4.4. (U) Sustainment. C-130 combat delivery forces are capable of operating from bare-base facilities. The C-27 is supported by contractor logistics personnel, who are required to deploy with C-27 forces for exercises, contingencies, or during wartime. Reference classified Annex C, Operational Assumptions and Sustainment (U), for the combat delivery supply sustainment periods.

2.4.5. (U) Reconstitution. After cessation of employment operations, both C-27 and C-130 combat delivery forces redeploy using the same procedure as deployment. Upon return to peacetime basing, spares are replenished and deferred maintenance is accomplished. "Lessons learned" and tactics developed during the deployment are incorporated into combat delivery procedures.

2.5. (U) Operational Tasks. Two primary operational tasks, airland and airdrop, are involved in accomplishing the combat delivery mission. Upon receiving notification, combat delivery must proceed to the objective area and either airland or perform aerial delivery to ground combat or combat support forces.

2.5.1. (U) Airland. Airland is the preferred method of combat delivery. Both personnel and/or equipment can be moved throughout the theater. Feasibility of the airland option for personnel and equipment depends upon a number of factors. The airfield must be secured by friendly forces and remain secure for the duration of the airland flow. Landing zones are normally operated by USAF Combat Control Teams. The minimum runway length for assault takeoffs and landings is a function of aircraft weight, temperature, pressure altitude, and obstacles, (peacetime restriction is not less than 3000 feet for C-130 and 1800 feet for C-27). The maximum number of aircraft on the ground which the airfield can accommodate, as well as the speed at which ground crews can onload or offload each aircraft, will determine the takeoff and landing interval of the flow. Dirt landing zone conditions will deteriorate after sustained operations and/or heavy precipitation. Visual flight operations are degraded in inclement weather, although portable navigation aids may allow instrument approaches. Ground transportation must be available from the airfield to the battle area. Most importantly, the airland option must support the airland battle plan for ground combat forces in order to be effective.

2.5.1.1. (U) Combat Offload. Both aircraft are capable of conducting rapid offload of palletized cargo, without material handling equipment, using aircraft acceleration to offload un- restrained cargo from the aircraft. All six C-130 pallet positions may be combat offloaded. Standardized procedures are in MCR 51-1, Volume III. C-27 can offload all three pallet positions.

2.5.1.2. (U) Engine-running Onload/Offload. Engine-running onloads/offloads are used to expedite aircraft movement on the ground and are normally not used for on/offload of explosive cargo unless authorized. Cargo, passengers, or patients may be on/offloaded through the ramp and door or the crew entrance door depending on quantity and size. Material handling equipment may or may not be used.

2.5.1.3. (U) Combat Transport of Passengers (tie-down). During contingency operations, passengers may be floor loaded and secured with tiedown straps fastened across the cargo compartment to provide restraint.

2.5.1.4. (U) Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation utilizes the airland task for the rapid removal of casualties from forward operating bases to main operating bases for transfer out of the theater.

2.5.2. (U) Airdrop. The airdrop option, particularly in formation, affords the CINC a mass concentration of personnel and equipment where needed in the shortest possible time. It is used whenever threats or proximity to the objective area preclude use of the airland option. While

C-130 combat delivery assets can perform airdrops in visual conditions, AWADS C-130s are additionally capable of executing airdrops in IMC (independent of external navigation aids) and leading non-AWADS C-130 wingmen to timing drops using Stationkeeping Equipment. Non-AWADS C-130s can also perform IMC airdrops, but must rely on ground based radar beacons or zone markers for course guidance. Combat Control Teams, Theater Airlift Liaison Officers, or other DoD personnel who are Drop Zone Control Officer or Drop Zone Support Team certified, will communicate with combat delivery aircraft from the ground and control the drop zone. High winds on the surface or at altitude may affect drop accuracy or force cancellation of the drop by the user. Minimum drop zone size is another consideration, depending on type and number of loads. Any air and ground threats in the objective area, unless neutralized by CAP and escort aircraft, will impact airdrop mission success. Selection of the airdrop task to accomplish combat employment or aerial resupply objectives must support the overall airland battle plan. The C-27 has a single ship VMC personnel airdrop capability; its containerized delivery system airdrop capability is still in development.

2.5.2.1. (U) Pathfinder. C-130 Pathfinder (formerly SOLL I) aircrews normally fly single-ship night VFR missions to multiple blacked-out drop zones in support of US Special Operations Command users. They acquire the objective area through the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), radar beacon, and/or zone marker. AWADS Pathfinder crews can navigate along the route and airdrop in inclement weather using ground radar targets.

2.5.2.2. (U) Flare Launch. C-130 aircraft can be used in a variety of roles; night reconnaissance, forward air control of strike aircraft, illumination in support of ground forces, and assisting search and rescue (SAR) operators. Due to the capability of a C-130 to carry a large number of flares and to remain on station for long periods, a single aircraft may perform in many roles on a single mission. The primary use for flares is illumination. However, there are other effects to be exploited. During reconnaissance, flares force vehicle and foot traffic to seek cover, thereby reducing movement. Continued pressure on the road, rail, and water traffic routes may force the enemy to move in daytime when strike aircraft conditions are more favorable. Flares are a source of sustained harassment which result in increased apprehension and lowered morale among enemy forces. The C-27 does not have a flare launch capability.

2.5.3. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Contingency PSYOPS are used to distribute information to friendly forces and to indigenous personnel. PSYOPS can be delivered through the use of the Airborne Speaker System (C-130 only) or by leaflet drop. Psychological warfare units will supply necessary information, tapes, leaflets, and briefings on subject material as required.

2.5.4. (U) Aerial Spray. One C-130 unit is specially equipped to provide aerial delivery of oil dispersants, herbicides, and insecticides to target areas.

2.5.5. (U) Aerial Firefighting. The USAF provides support to US Forest Service (USFS) forest fire fighting operations through a memorandum of understanding between the DoD and Departments of Agriculture and Interior which authorizes the use of military aircraft in combating fires. Since 1973, USAF capability has been activated over 25 times to provide additional fire suppression support beyond the capability of available commercial airborne fire fighting assets. Each activation involved participation in numerous fire fighting operations during large scale fires throughout the US. With proper equipment and aircrew procedures, this task could apply across the full spectrum of conflict. However, theater CINCs have neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system. Existing equipment, which is not owned by DoD, is unprotected and unusable in hostile or urban environments. Additionally, aircrew procedures and tactics do not exist for employment of firefighting systems in hostile or urban environments. Therefore, equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

2.6. (U) Force Structure. Combat delivery must provide sufficient forces to cover two major regional conflicts (MRCs) simultaneously. Each MRC will consist of 10 fighter wing equivalents. Reference classified Annex C, Operational Concept Assumptions and Sustainment (U), for the combat-coded (CA) primary mission aircraft inventory(PMAI) required for each MRC.

2.6.1. (U) Total Force Mix. (Figure 2.15) The Air Force C-130 force structure fully exploits the synergy possible with a Total Force relationship. Air National Guard (ANG), Active, and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) forces act in concert to provide rapid response, reinforcement, and sustainment of US forces and missions worldwide. The theater airlift force mix stands at 34 percent Active, 66 percent ARC and is not programmed to change appreciably through the FYDP. Conversion of ANG and AFRES units from fighters to theater airlift in the past 10 years, along with reductions in the Active duty force, has increased the Reserve component's share of the theater airlift force from 57 percent in FY84 to 64 percent in FY94. Each component, Active and ARC, offers distinct advantages. Active forces fill the role of immediate response for indeterminate lengths of time and a high operations tempo. The Active duty theater airlift force provides the bulk of the initial response in any crisis. Some missions such as Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery (AWADS) and Pathfinder, are unique to the Active forces. Training, readiness of other services, and requirements during contingencies also call for an Active force.

Figure 2.15. (U) C-130 Force Mix

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

2.6.1.1. (U) ARC. The ARC provides, at a lower cost during peacetime, augmentation capability to mobilize and expand the size of the force when the situation dictates. The Reserve component's primary peacetime role is training to ensure their capability to work beside the Active component during wartime. Peacetime airlift is a by-product of this training. Recent events have called for a high peacetime operations tempo and higher than anticipated ARC involvement. As the tempo of ARC operations increases, the cost of maintaining and operating the force also increases.

2.6.2. (U) Operational Status of the Fleet. Tables 2.1. through 2.3. list the current size and capabilities of each AFRES, ANG, and Active C-130 unit as of FY95/4. All units are SKE formation airdrop qualified except for the 109 AG, which is non-formation airdrop only, and the 189 AG, which is not airdrop qualified. The four LC-130s of the 109 AG are equipped with skis to land in polar areas and are not included in theater airlift numerical requirements. Units identified as ADS may not have all of their aircraft modified. Additional planes continue to be modified.

(U) AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Unit/Location

Aircraft (PAI/MDS)

Notes

109 AW, Schenectady NY

4-H, 4-LC

Single Ship Airdrop, 4 LC-130, No SKE

118 AW, Nashville TN

12-H

Snowstorm (3)

123 AW, Standiford KY

12-H

ADS (all)

130 AG, Yeager Field WV

8-H

ADS, SKE Upgrade

133 AW, Minneapolis MN

8-E

 

135 AG, Martin State MD

8-E

 

136 AW, Hensley Fld TX

8-H

ADS

137 AW, Will Rogers World OK

8-H

ADS

139 AG, Rosecrans MO

8-H

ADS

143 AG, Quonset Point RI

8-E

 

145 AG, Charlotte NC

12-H

MAFFS (2), ADS (12)

146 AW, Channel Islands CA

12-E

MAFFS (2)

152 AG, Reno-Cannon NV

8-E*

*Standup FY96, Air Land only

153 AG, Cheyenne WY

8-H

MAFFS (2), ADS (all)

154 WG Honolulu HI

4-H

 

165 AG, Savannah GA

8-H

ADS

166 AG, New Castle DE

8-H

ADS

167 AG, Eastern WV Regional WV

12-H

ADS (8)

171 AG, Selfridge MI

8-E

 

176 CG, Kulis ANGB AK

8-H

 

179 AG, Mansfield OH

8-H

ADS (all)

182 AG. Peoria IL

8-E

Snowstorm (2)

189 AG, Little Rock AFB AR

8-E (TF)

C-130 Training Unit, No Airdrop

ADS - Airlift Defensive Systems

AWADS - Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System

E - C-130E

H - C-130H

MAFFS - Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems

MDS - Mission Design Series

PAI - Primary Aircraft Inventory

RWR - Radar Warning Receiver

SKE - Stationkeeping Equipment (enables formation flying in adverse weather)

Snowstorm - Early version of ADS (with 12 flare/chaff dispensers versus 18 for ADS)

Table 2.1. (U) ANG Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

(U) ACTIVE DUTY

Unit/Location

Aircraft (PAI/MDS)

Notes

3 WG, Elmendorf AFB AK

10-H

 

7 WG, Dyess AFB TX

24-H

 

23 WG, Pope AFB NC

28-E

AWADS (28), Snowstorm (5), RWR (3)

314 AW, Little Rock AFB AR

30-E/14-H/18-E(TF)

Includes 18 Training Acft (TF), ADS (14)

347 WG, Moody AFB, GA

8-E

 

374 AW, Yokota AB JA

6-E/10-H

 

86 AW, Ramstein AB GE

16-E

AWADS (17), ADS (all), RWR (16)

See Legend for Table 2.1.

Table 2.2. (U) Active Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

(U) AIR FORCE RESERVE

Unit/Location

Aircraft (PAI/MDS)

Notes

94 AW, Dobbins AFB GA

8-H

ADS (all), RWR (4)

302 AW, Peterson AFB CO

12-H

MAFFS (2), ADS (12), RWR (8)

403 AW, Keesler AFB MS

8-E

ADS (all)

440 AW, General Mitchell ARS WI

8-H

ADS (all), SKE Upgrade

908 AW, Maxwell AFB AL

8-H

ADS (all)

910 AW, Youngstown OH

16-H

ADS (all), Aerial Spray, RWR (3)

911 AW, Greater Pittsburgh PA

8-H

ADS (all), RWR (3)

913 AW, Willow Grove PA

12-E

ADS (all)

914 AW, Niagara Falls NY

8-H

ADS (all)

928 AW, Chicago O'Hare IL

8-H

ADS (all), SKE Upgrade

934 AW, Minneapolis-St Paul MN

8-E

ADS (all)

See Legend for Table 2.1.

Table 2.3. (U) Air Force Reserve Operational Fleet Status

This Table is UNCLASSIFIED

3. (U) Mission Needs Analysis.

3.1. (U) Current Assessment. A current assessment of combat delivery to conduct the ten operational tasks in threat (Combat) and non-threat (Military Operations Other Than War, MOOTW) environments was accomplished. The assessment was coordinated by HQ ACC/DRS with inputs from the Combat Delivery Mission Area Team (MAT) and the Mobility Technical Planning Integrated Product Team (TPIPT). The lack of modeling and simulation of combat delivery mandated this subjective assessment of combat delivery capabilities. A stoplight chart depicting current combat delivery capabilities is at Figure 3.1. Intratheater flight operations tasks are rated under combat and MOOTW conditions, while other tasks are independent of level of conflict. For each task and condition, green equals good capability, yellow equals limited capability, and red equals no capability.

3.1.1. (U) Intratheater Flight Operations. In general, tasks for which there is limited or no capability could be accomplished better in inclement weather with fleetwide AWADS equipment, and in combat conditions with fleetwide airlift defensive systems (chaff/flare dispensers and missile warning receivers) and radar warning receivers. Combat delivery aircraft are currently unable to perform IMC airland missions into austere landing zones due to lack of a ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) and an autonomous or combat delivery aircraft-transportable portable precision landing system. Night VFR operational capabilities could be greatly improved with integration of a fleetwide night vision imaging system. Currently, the

C-130 has only a limited capability to airdrop on covertly lighted drop zones. Combat delivery aircraft currently cannot degrade or prevent injury to aircrews from laser emissions, and theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft. The C-27 currently has no IMC airdrop capability because it lacks the necessary equipment. Finally, current Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) equipment is nearly unsupportable. NOTE: Aerial firefighting equipment and procedures are currently limited to NON-HOSTILE OPERATIONS ONLY.

Combat Delivery Current Assessment

Intratheater Flight Operations

Combat

MOOTW

Day

Night

Wx

Day

Night

Wx

Airland

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Airdrop

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Yellow

N/A

Yellow

Yellow

N/A

Aeromedical Evacuation

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Support PSYOPS

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Aerial Firefighting Ops

C-130

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yellow

N/A

N/A

Aerial Spray Ops

C-130

Yellow

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Other Tasks

Train Mission-Ready Personnel

C-130

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Reduce O&S Costs and

Sustain Efficient Ops

C-130

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Maintain Timely Flow from

POE to POD

C-130

Yellow

C-27

N/A

Pack/Configure/Assemble

for Movement

C-130

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Figure 3.1. - Combat Delivery Current Assessment

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.1.2. (U) Other Tasks.

3.1.2.1. (U) Train Mission Ready Personnel. Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training. Lack of an aircrew training system (ATS), including a weapon system trainer, for C-130H3 crews necessitates TDY travel to a contractor facility for completion of simulator continuation training events. Commonality with the aircraft is insufficient, training is unrealistic, and the course does not meet ATS standards. A C-130H3 ATS will provide standardized training for all CAF aircrews. In addition, the C-130J ORD requires an ATS acquisition with a ready-for-training date no later than initial aircraft delivery. Standardized courseware and contractor simulator training for CAF aircrews will ensure the same material is taught across the board. In addition, lack of night vision equipment degrades training. Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time.

3.1.2.2. (U) Reduce Operations and Support Costs and Sustain Efficient Operations. Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces, and subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

3.1.2.3. (U) Maintain Timely Flow from Point of Embarkation to Point of Debarkation. Combat delivery aircraft lack expansion capability to adapt planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

3.1.2.4. (U) Pack/configure/assemble (for movement) people, equipment, data, spares, consumables, POL, and munitions. Combat delivery aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater. Also, combat delivery forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours in updateing manuals.

3.2. (U) Operational Tasks. In February 1995, the MAT and TPIPT conducted an analytical hierarchy process analysis which resulted in a "relative importance" rating of each operational task (Figure 3.2).

Operational Task Relative Importance

Train mission readiness 1.500

Sustain efficient operations 1.500

Airdrop 2.250

Airland 2.250

Aeromedical evacuation .750

Support psychological Ops .250

Deliver/maintain timely flow of people, etc. .750

Pack/configure /assemble people, etc. .250

Aerial firefighting operations .250

Aerial spray operations .250

Figure 3.2. - Combat Delivery Operational Tasks

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.3. (U) Deficiencies. A MAT consolidated list of proposed current needs was developed through a review of Modification Proposals, Mission Needs Statements, Operational Requirements Documents, and formal correspondence submitted by user commands to the MAT OPR. This list of proposed needs was augmented by a TPIPT/MAT review of projected threat capabilities, current aircraft life-cycles, test plan final reports, defense planning guidance, and engineering studies of current aircraft. The lack of formal studies and analysis on combat delivery’s current capabilities mandated the subjective validation of these needs by the MAT. Needs validated by the MAT were defined and incorporated into the proposed deficiency list.

3.4. (U) Task-to-Deficiency. In February 1995, the MAT/TPIPT conducted a QFD analysis comparing each proposed deficiency against the weighted operational tasks. Each deficiency was scored based upon its effect on combat delivery to accomplish the assigned task. The result was a weighted and prioritized list of deficiencies. Linkages between deficiencies and tasks are depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.


Figure 3.3. - Combat Delivery Task-to-Deficiencies

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

 

Figure 3.4. - Combat Delivery Task-to-Deficiencies (Cont)

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

3.5. (U) Prioritized Deficiencies.

3.5.1. (U) Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

3.5.1.1. (U) Combat delivery aircraft require defensive systems to detect and defeat UNPLANNED encounters with hostile air and ground threats. This capability will allow combat delivery aircraft a measure of survivability while exiting the threat envelope. Current and planned defensive capabilities on combat delivery aircraft DO NOT give combat delivery aircraft the capability to deliberately penetrate a known hostile threat envelope.

3.5.1.2. (U) Combat, combat support, and participation in military operations other-than-war confirmed the requirement for Electronic Combat (EC) systems on C-130 aircraft, even in the most undeveloped regions of the world. Currently, airlift C-130 aircraft are funded for approximately only 57% of the fleet to receive the Airlift Defensive System (ADS) with missile warning and chaff/flare dispensing systems. Additionally, only 16% of the fleet is funded to receive radar warning receivers (RWR), although another 14% will receive wiring for the systems without the component boxes. Currently a limited number of aircraft will also be modified with limited RF countermeasures to be used against unplanned mobile or transportable threats. Current aircraft EC systems are not integrated, distracting crewmembers from other flying tasks. Aircraft are not like-configured, hampering training and operations. Simulator modifications are planned but lagging behind aircraft modification, and previous delays in technical order development are being corrected. Some support equipment items are in short supply or unavailable because of funding shortfalls. We need a fully configured fleet with standardized, integrated systems, complete and realistic training device support, complete and continuously updated technical orders, and all necessary support systems. Additionally, manning, funding, and testing are required to support C-130 EC systems to ensure combat programs and software are continuously updated and fielded to meet the most current threats.

3.5.1.3. (U) Combat delivery assets are inherently vulnerable to all types of threats. Typical mission profiles require formations to fly at high and low altitudes and relatively slow airspeeds, particularly on the run-in to the objective area. Aircrews plan simulated threats on nearly all low level training missions, participate in Red Flag, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Combat Aerial Delivery School, and Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center employment and resupply missions, and practice threat avoidance tactics on a regular basis to minimize their exposure. This realistic training has evolved over decades and will help crews to implement airlift defensive systems, but it is not a substitute for the modifications. Tactics alone will not defeat the threats.

3.5.1.4. (U) Installation of fleetwide defensive systems on combat delivery assets would provide detection of and protection from certain man-portable infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles, light weapons fire, and radio frequency (RF) guided missiles. These systems include ADS, RWR, crew protection armor, and RF jamming systems. These systems are being installed on various parts of the fleet, but depending on the system, only between 6% and 57% of the aircraft will receive the modifications.

3.5.1.5. (U) Current C-130 EW systems are not integrated, therefore the missile launch warning is unable to differentiate between IR and RF missiles. Automatic dispensing of flares is possible, but chaff must be manually dispensed after RWR declaration of RF threats. This increases aircrew workload and the possibility that aircraft could sustain hostile damage due to incorrect countermeasures dispensing. ADS on most AFRES aircraft use older AN/ALE-40 flare/chaff dispensers that are not standard with the remaining aircraft, and do not allow future automatic integration with RWR or other systems. These dispensers should be replaced with AN/ALE-47 dispensers to solve the configuration and future integration problems.

3.5.1.6. (U) C-130 aircraft suffer from a lack of rearward vision due to the size and position of scanner/loadmaster windows. In an air threat environment there is an urgent need for the best possible 360 degree vision for the aircrew.

3.5.1.6.1. (U) C-130 aircrews have used a rear vision device (bubble) for ten years to spot air threats, SAM launches, and AAA and small arms fire. A crewmember must position himself on the top bunk, maintain a constant lookout through the bubble with an incomplete field of vision, and notify the pilot of the position and type of threat before evasive action is taken. Effective use of the rear vision device relies heavily on alertness of the "lookout" and good crew coordination. However, it should not be considered an alternative to chaff/flare dispensers and a missile warning receiver.

3.5.1.6.2. (U) The aircraft cannot be pressurized with the rear vision device installed. The bubble cannot be installed inflight because of safety considerations. As a result of being non-pressurizable, this bubble is restricted to use on missions that could remain unpressurized for the entire flight. Deployments or missions involving high altitude ingress to an objective area preclude the use of the bubble. A pressurizable bubble has been developed and is in use by the ANG. This bubble increases the flexibility of possible missions, while still affording the aircrew with the best possible rearward visibility in a threat environment.

3.5.1.7. (U) The paratroop windows in most C-130 aircraft are inadequate for threat detection. The small size of the windows coupled with the black out "shower caps" ring, severely limits the aircrew members viewing angle. A crew member's helmet comes in contact with the ring three inches from the window, limiting visibility to no more than a 45 degree field of vision. These optical conditions severely limit the aircrews ability to visually acquire threats from the optimum attack angles of above or behind. The current paratroop door configuration provides no physical support or restraint for the observer. Today, the aircrew member must stand on uneven footing in a semi-crouched position while the aircraft, if engaged, will be subjected to -1 to +3 Gs. The current configuration greatly increases the odds that the aircrew member in this position will be injured during an engagement. The C-130 requires larger windows and an integral scanner’s seat in the paratroop doors to aid in threat acquisition. An observer position on the cargo door, similar to those on the AC-130U gunship, may be an acceptable solution.

3.5.2. (U) Combat delivery forces are dependent upon limited supply of material handling equipment (MHE). The Air Mobility Command (AMC) enroute structure has been drastically reduced in the last five years, and with it the MHE needed for timely loading/unloading of transient combat delivery aircraft. The lack of MHE has been identified as a deficiency in AMC’s Airlift MAP. The lack of available 60K loaders to support C-5 and C-17 operations must be remedied using already scarce MHE that would be normally tasked to support combat delivery aircraft. The Air Force currently lacks a C-27 transportable forklift capable of being delivered to C-27-only airfields to assist in loading operations. Currently C-27 crews must onload/offload by hand or combat offload at C-27-only airfields.

3.5.3. (U) Specific theater combat delivery tasks are not fully articulated. Warfighting CINCs must specify roles and missions required of combat delivery forces to support their specific operations plans. In a recent example of this shortfall, a theater CINC staff had neither developed nor stated their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system, yet demanded this capability from combat delivery forces during a contingency operation. Deliberate war planning combat delivery force structure must be validated to ensure sufficient force allocation.

3.5.4. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their protection and decontamination of aircraft, cargo, and cargo compartment. Current combat delivery aircraft lack capability to successfully operate in a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) environment. Reconstitution of aircraft and parts outside of the area of operations by air logistics center personnel has never been addressed for combat delivery aircraft. The two-level maintenance concept exacerbates this deficiency.

3.5.5. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment. Combat delivery aircraft must be able to conduct flight operations 24 hours a day in support of peacetime and wartime taskings. To best accomplish a joint mission, the US Armed Forces must have the combined air forces to prosecute around-the-clock operations, thus denying an enemy freedom of action in what was previously a night sanctuary. To support this mission, Air Force aircraft must have a night operational capability which includes the employment of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) during all phases of a combat mission. Combat experience in Operation DESERT STORM confirmed the tactical benefits gained with night attack, and lessons learned indicated that operational effectiveness could be enhanced by the use of NVGs. NVGs are being acquired to ensure CAF C-130s are survivable during night operations. The proliferation of NVGs also increases the probability of detection/tracking of C-130 aircraft that do not have NVIS exterior lighting.

3.5.6. (U) Manning shortfalls in key areas limit mission accomplishment. ARC, USAFE, and PACAF aircrew manning ratios are lower than those of ACC units, which does not allow them to sustain operations at the same Optempo. Therefore, warfighting CINCs will not receive the same sortie generation capability from non-ACC units.

3.5.7. (U) Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability. Combat delivery aircraft require robust, portable, and fixed mission planning systems that allow rapid integration of operational and intelligence data. This facilitates rapid mission changes dictated by changing taskings and threats.

3.5.8. (U) Combat control teams (CCTs) lack sufficient equipment for mission accomplishment. Current shortfalls in portable precision landing systems and lightweight airfield lighting systems degrade the ability of CCTs to support combat delivery operations at austere landing zones.

3.5.9. (U) Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time. The proliferation of uniquely configured combat delivery aircraft creates a disproportionate workload for air logistics center and unit maintenance personnel. This problem is typified by the lack of any standardized, credible technical order (TO) description for even our older C-130Es. The lack of credible TOs inhibits training and operation of the current C-130 fleet. For successful configuration management, acquisition of combat delivery aircraft must be programmed on a total force basis, with equal priority assigned to modernization of ARC units IAW Air Force Policy Directive 10-3.

3.5.10. (U) Combat delivery aircraft are dependent on reduced enroute/theater support, limiting mission flexibility. The AMC-supported enroute support structure has been reduced, which adversely impacts non-AMC assigned combat delivery forces. Without sufficient enroute maintenance/C2/aerial port support, combat delivery forces cannot adequately maintain peacetime Optempo in support of humanitarian/peacekeeping operations.

3.5.11. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their detection of NBC threats. There is no current capability (other than litmus paper) for combat delivery aircraft to detect the presence of NBC contaminants. This is a critical deficiency, as combat delivery aircraft have the ability to transport contaminants across AORs without aircrew knowledge and contaminate other clean areas.

3.5.12. (U) Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training.

3.5.12.1 (U) With half of the CAF C-130 fleet composed of C-130H2 and C-130H3 model aircraft, there is currently only one C-130H2 WST planned to support training. In contrast, the C-130E portion of the fleet is supported by seven WSTs. The C-130 fleet requires additional

C-130H Aircrew Training Devices (ATDs) to provide an equal level of training to both C-130E and C-130H aircrews. Congressional language directed modernization of the CAF C-130 fleet through the purchase of new aircraft. The requirements vehicle for the acquisition program is the C-130H ORD, which requires the procurement of state-of-the-art C-130H3 ATDs commensurate with force structure plans. These ATDs must be FAA Level III certified devices with modernized/updated ATD visual and landmass systems. In addition, the visual and landmass systems on nine C-130 WSTs require replacement. In order to provide realistic NVG training, a new visual and landmass that trains a student in a variety of atmospheric conditions, i.e., different moon illuminations, cultural lighting, rain and starlight, will be needed. According to Armstrong Laboratories, crewmembers using NVGs will require 25 hours of experience to see the effects, limitations, and illusions in the aircraft.

3.5.12.2 (U) C-27 has no flight simulator, only a paper mock-up of the flight deck which depicts an outdated instrument panel.

3.5.13. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness. The lack of human factors analysis in determining the placement of new avionics components on combat delivery aircraft adversely affects mission accomplishment and the aircrew’s ability to recognize and correct problems.

3.5.14. (U) Training capabilities for aircrew and maintainers are inadequate. Combat delivery forces lack part-task trainers and other training aids needed to effectively utilize scarce training time.

3.5.15. (U) Lack of configuration control and commonality limits combat delivery forces’ flexibility. C-130 aircrews often cannot interfly with other C-130 units due to dissimilar cockpit configurations.

3.5.16. (U) Combat delivery forces lack an effective CONOPS for an NBC environment.

3.5.17. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater. ACC, as the lead command for theater airlift and combat delivery aircraft, cannot fulfill the warfighting CINCs’ requirement for intratheater movement of outsized cargo. Outsized cargo [e.g., multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)] requires a 12 foot wide cargo compartment. The US Army has designed equipment required to successfully prosecute the ground war that cannot be transported in the theater by theater-assigned combat delivery aircraft. Warfighting CINCs must rely upon strategic assigned airlifters that they do not currently control to satisfy this deficiency.

3.5.18. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop. Aircrews receive intensive low level airdrop training and regularly practice basic dead reckoning and visual airdrops. Factors inherent in our present airdrop systems lend themselves to errors which only material solutions can correct, i.e., increased radar reliability, more accurate ballistic wind sensors, and greater navigation accuracy.

3.5.19. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack data base and charts for worldwide mission planning and execution. Factors include lack of reliable and detailed worldwide navigational charts and digitized terrain data. These shortfalls adversely impact aircrew ability to safely conduct effective low level operations in austere environments.

3.5.20. (U) Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

3.5.20.1. (U) The C-130 electrical system produces unstable voltage, causing four-engine power loss and interface difficulties with newer digital avionics systems.

3.5.20.2. (U) The C-130 fuel quantity system includes analog indicators with a MTBF of less than 1600 hours. The fuel tanks also require extensive in-tank maintenance.

3.5.20.3. (U) The APQ-122 radar on AWADS C-130Es has a mean time between failure (MTBF) of 17 hours and is nearly unsupportable due to lack of spare parts.

3.5.20.4. (U) APN-59 radar units on non-AWADS C-130s are becoming increasingly unreliable and unsupportable.

3.5.20.5. (U) C-130 Stationkeeping Equipment (SKE) used in formation is becoming unsupportable and requires modernization. It has a low Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and is too expensive to maintain.

3.5.21. (U) Combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment. SCNS units have already reached or exceeded their processing capacity. The current SCNS, an integrated navigation and radio management system which provides the aircrew with inertial and Doppler-based navigation solutions, was not originally designed to manage the number of avionics components now being integrated.

3.5.22. (U) Combat delivery forces lack the capability to plan and operate in a laser environment. Combat delivery forces cannot determine or plot damage zones caused by the use of laser optical systems.

3.5.23. (U) Campaign modeling tools do not exist to identify combat delivery shortfalls and impacts on warfighting effectiveness. Joint staffs, theater CINC staffs, and acquisition planners currently have no such modeling capability. This capability is needed for Mission Area Assessment, Mission Needs Analysis, and Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis.

3.5.24. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack expansion capability to comply with planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

3.5.24.1. (U) The FAA has directed that ground based navigation aids will be phased out in the US by 2000. C-130 and C-27 aircraft often travel to remote locations outside the US with no ground based navigation aids. Currently neither aircraft has a space-based navigation capability.

3.5.24.2. (U) Combat delivery aircraft now fly precision approaches using the ILS, which the FAA has scheduled for phase-out after 2000 due to frequency congestion. C-130 aircraft are receiving microwave landing system (MLS) avionics which will allow them to fly precision approaches to civilian airfields outside the CONUS (C-27 aircraft are not scheduled to receive MLS avionics). It will also enable C-130 aircraft to land at small austere airfields equipped with USAF mobile MLS units. However, the combat delivery fleet must be compatible with future CONUS precision approach systems. They currently have no CONUS ILS replacement system installed.

3.5.24.3. (U) The C-130 has no traffic collision avoidance system. The C-130 has no automatic digital air-to-ground communication capability between aircraft and air traffic control. Without this equipment, the C-130 force will not comply with US Federal Aviation Navigation System guidelines by 2000 and could face major rerouting and delays.

3.5.25. (U) Cargo restraint devices are bulky/heavy and time-consuming to use.

3.5.26. (U) Theater airlift aircraft lack combat identification capability. Combat delivery aircraft movements must be adequately tracked within the AOR to preclude engagement by friendly, combined, or joint air or ground forces.

3.5.27. (U) Required weather information is not quickly disseminated to deployed theater airlift assets. Combat delivery forces lack air transportable weather support packages, deployable to austere AORs, to support combat delivery operations.

3.5.28. (U) Combat delivery forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours updating manuals. The purpose of IETM is to streamline the maintenance process by automating much of the data entry, presentation, and maintenance activities that consume considerable time during maintenance operations. New maintenance concepts call for our technicians to have general skills and to be capable of maintaining numerous subsystems. This task requires operations and maintenance information from a variety of sources that must be current, complete, and easily accessible. The most effective method of providing this data is through the automation of technical orders (TOs). The system will be utilized by maintenance and support personnel and will eventually interface with a number of maintenance tracking systems including Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance System (CAMS) and Standard Base Supply System (SBSS).

3.5.29. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack access to real time and threat order of battle information to aid in avoidance. Combat delivery aircraft must have immediate and constant access to air and ground order of battle data from joint/combined forces to effectively employ the primary defensive tactic of combat delivery aircraft, which is threat avoidance. Current and planned defensive capabilities on combat delivery aircraft DO NOT give combat delivery aircraft the capability to deliberately penetrate a known hostile threat envelope. Therefore, they must rely upon threat avoidance as the primary means of self-protection.

3.5.30. (U) Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces. Multiple configurations of C-130 aircraft increase overhead and cost of ownership for using commands and air logistics centers. The requirement to maintain multiple logistics tails for different parts that fulfill the same function increases required spare levels and war readiness materials and drives up C-130 cost per flying hour.

3.5.31. (U) The economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

3.5.31.1. (U) Although service life computations are not used to determine grounding or airframe restrictions, the Air Force does use service life estimates as a planning tool to anticipate when major aircraft structural events can be expected. A key issue is the structural service life of the C-130 airframes, which depends on mission severity, fatigue, and corrosion factors.

3.5.31.1.1. (U) A severity factor accounts for the difference between normal civilian flying and military flying (low level, shortfield landings, etc.). Mission profile determines the severity factor, which is averaged over the aircraft's most recent two year history. This translates airframe clock hours into equivalent airframe damage hours which indicate the higher aging rate of the military airframes. On average (based on past 2 years), Active C-130 aircraft fly approximately 600 hours per year, while ARC C-130E and C-130H aircraft fly about 375 hours and 450 hours per year, respectively.

3.5.31.1.2. (U) Currently, the critical fatigue component for the C-130 fleet is the center wing box, which is structurally more susceptible to the stresses of mission profile and payload. The center wing box has a limit of 60,000 relative baseline hours (flight hours multiplied by the mission severity factor).

3.5.31.1.3. (U) A corrosion limit of 40,000 flight hours is based on historical data and engineering judgment. It considers corrosion factors not considered in airframe fatigue analysis.

3.5.31.2. (U) Actual airframe service life depends on which limit, fatigue or corrosion, is reached first. The Air Force completed a limited C-130 service life analysis in 1977 and plans a comprehensive service life analysis to determine the actual structural condition of the C-130E and older C-130H aircraft and project a new structural life expectancy. A fuselage durability test is critical for validation of current service life estimates and assessment of cost effectiveness of a service life extension program (SLEP) for older C-130E/H aircraft. It will also aid in force management, as the effects of corrosion (especially for current ARC airframes previously assigned to the Pacific) can impact basing decisions for individual airframes.

3.5.31.3. (U) The C-130 currently uses a vacuum tube life history recorder for tracking airframe stress. Its unreliability impedes efforts to project airframe longevity and provide a data base for identification of structural fatigue factors prior to failure.

3.5.32. (U) Combat delivery forces lack autonomous precision approach capability in austere environments. Precision approach radar (PAR) is manpower intensive and requires extensive maintenance to remain operational. Instrument landing systems (ILSs) have special siting requirements and often cannot be installed because of geographical constraints.

3.5.33. (U) C-130 aircraft do not offer adequate passenger emergency life support protection. Life raft capacity is 80 persons total (four twenty-man rafts), which limits the maximum number of passengers on overwater missions. The lack of adequate passenger oxygen support, beyond portable oxygen kits, limits the effective cruise altitude of combat delivery aircraft.

3.5.34. (U) C-130 aircraft cannot communicate with ground forces during critical mission phases. With only UHF/VHF/HF capability, C-130 crews may not receive vital information on drop zone conditions, creating potentially dangerous situations for paratroopers and ground personnel during marginal high wind conditions.

3.5.35. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack collision avoidance capability in areas without radar coverage. A system is needed that will provide traffic collision avoidance for flight inside congested terminal areas and non-radar controlled airspace. This is very important to

C-130 Air Reserve Component (ARC) units that are assigned to civilian airports getting the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Although the USAF has a waiver for US operations, TCAS will be required for operations in Europe by 1999. C-27 aircraft operate primarily in the SOUTHCOM AOR and do not require this capability.

3.5.36. (U) Aircraft security and protection capabilities at deployed locations are limited. Combat delivery aircraft are tasked to deploy and operate at unsecure austere locations. Combat delivery forces require air transportable intruder detection systems and adequate security personnel to protect deployed assets.

3.5.37. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack over-the-horizon secure voice and data communications capability. Recent combat delivery operations in austere locations have not been adequately supported at destination airfields by theater command and control. Combat delivery forces require real time communications capability with displaced command and control agencies and other aircraft for accurate threat situational and weather data to effectively conduct airlift operations.

3.5.38. (U) Theater aeromedical evacuation (AE) support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft. Current delivery platforms limit the capability of AE to provide oxygen, lighting, and equipment for wartime casualty needs. AE equipment must be adaptable and effectively operate on a variety of airlift platforms with varying power capabilities. At present, most AE equipment requires 115VAC/60Hz outlets with a total 30 amp output from accessible outlets and cannot be operated off aircraft power (i.e., C-130 cargo compartment outlets currently provide only 20 amps). Thus AE crews must supply converter/inverters units for each aircraft (117 pounds per unit). Otherwise AE equipment must operate with batteries which have limited electrical capacities. In addition, combat delivery aircraft are unable to support increased patient oxygen requirements. This requires AE crew to bring their own liquid oxygen units which are bulky and heavy, and therefore difficult to carry. They are limited in capacity and very difficult to refill at deployed locations. They also are often treated as "hazardous cargo" by aircraft flight crews who have refused to let them on-board with the patients needing the oxygen. Combat delivery aircraft need to have a patient oxygen delivery capability able to provide multiple outlets capable of 50 (+/- 5) PSI. Onboard lighting is dim which limits patient assessment capability in flight.

3.5.39. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to deploy and sustain themselves. The amount/type of required equipment for combat delivery forces to sustain themselves for extended time periods has increased while unit PAA has decreased, therefore no longer permitting a C-130 unit of less than 16 PAA to self-deploy.

3.5.40. (U) Combat delivery aerial firefighting equipment is nearly unsupportable. The current MAFFS units will be completely unsupportable in two years and do not meet drop coverage levels required by the Interagency Air Tanker Control Board for nonconventional multi-engine air tankers. There is an immediate need to replace the existing MAFFS units with an improved aerial fire retardant delivery capability. This is a unique capability that directly impacts the USAF's ability to support USFS forest fire fighting operations.

3.5.41. (U) C-130 bleed air duct system is not reliable. The current bleed air ducts on the

C-130 are manufactured using stainless steel material. Recent failures of these ducts were attributed to corrosion and other factors. Subsequently, WR-ALC released TCTO 1397 to replace a group of ducts considered as safety critical with a new duct made of inconel. However, there remains many other bleed air ducts on the C-130 that should be replaced. While these ducts are not critical to safety of flight, they should be replaced to lower cost of ownership and increase component reliability.

3.5.42. (U) Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations. Combat delivery forces require a standardized theater C2 CONOPS and structure to increase operational effectiveness. This would facilitate rapid transition of combat delivery forces from one theater to another in response to changing world situations.

4. (U) Mission Area Plan.

4.1. (U) Solution Concepts.

4.1.1. (U) Nonmaterial Alternatives. There are several ways to influence and resolve the aging of the C-130 fleet. In addition to material solutions such as selective repair, aservice life extension program (SLEP), or procurement of new aircraft, non-materiel actions are possible. Aircraft transfers among Active, Guard, and Reserve units could better utilize the available service life remaining and thereby delay and smooth the force structure curve. Pre FY78 aircraft are deemed unacceptable for transfer to the ARC due to airframe (center wing box, high time, and configuration) considerations. Other transfer options must consider training aircraft to support both ARC and Active duty requirements. Active C-130Es pace the fleet in terms of service life. The average age of the C-130E model is over 28 years and 19,800 hours, the newest E-model being produced in 1972. Even so, based on the projected operations tempo and overall mission severity, C-130E aircraft have an average remaining service life of 15 years. Average age of ARC C-130s is 15 years. ARC C-130E aircraft with longer service life remaining could be cascaded to Active units to fly out their time. Excess C-130E models with available service life will become available as more new aircraft are delivered. Because Active C-130Es are nearing the end of their service life first, ACC will determine the suitability of excess ARC C-130s for potential transfer to the Active fleet.

4.1.2. (U) Material Alternatives. In January 1995, a call for concepts was submitted by HQ ASC/XR through the Commerce Business Daily for solutions to all CAF MAP deficiencies. Over 800 concepts were submitted by industry, military laboratories, and other federal agencies. No non-material solutions were submitted to correct the deficiencies identified.

4.1.2.1. (U) The Mobility TPIPT reviewed each concept for applicability to the FY96 combat delivery deficiencies. Several material solution concepts were selected and presented to the MAT in March 1995. The review resulted in the consolidation of duplicate solutions and the removal of other solutions determined not to be applicable. The final concept list contains 61 solutions. Specifics of each solution are on file at ASC/XR and ACC/DRS.

4.1.2.2. (U) In June 1995, the MAT used the QFD process to evaluate proposed material solutions. Task/Deficiency and Deficiency Solution Matrixes depicting complete linkages of tasks, deficiencies, and solutions (including numerical weights) are available upon request from ACC/DRS. Solutions were grouped into near (FY96-02), mid- (FY03-10), and far (FY11-21) term categories. Availability of solutions is depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

Figure 4.1.

Combat Delivery Deficiency-to-Solution Availability

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 4.2.

Combat Delivery Deficiency-to-Solution Availability (Cont)

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.1.3. (U) From April 1995 to May 1995, the MAP OPR (HQ ACC/DRS), in conjunction with the TPIPT and Air Force labs, selected solutions for incorporation into the FY96 Combat Delivery MAP.

4.1.3.1. (U) Proposed solutions were categorized by deficiency with which they were linked.

4.1.3.2. (U) Solutions were then selected based upon QFD determined relative importance rating, cost estimates, technological risk, training requirements, and logistic supportability.

4.1.3.3. (U) Selected solutions, categorized by their availability, are found in paragraphs 4.2 through 4.4. Solutions are grouped by the time frame that they will be available. Reference the modernization roadmaps in paragraph 4.6 for the specific time periods in which solutions will be implemented.

4.2. (U) Prioritized Near Term (FY96-02) Solution Summaries.

4.2.1. (U) C-130J Hercules. The majority of ACC's C-130s were purchased in the early 1960s. C-130 force structure drops below required numbers by 2007. Procurement of the

C-130J will ensure total force structure numbers are maintained, while reducing costs of ownership. The current program procures 12 C-130Js, i.e., two per year from FY96 to FY01. This program should be expanded in FY02 to procure 12 C-130Js a year (Figure 4.2.a.) to replace the active duty and ARC C-130Es which are nearing the end of their useable service life. The C-130J will perform airland, aerial delivery, low level, and formation operations at night and in adverse weather conditions. To support lower operating costs projected by the manufacturer, the C-130J must accomplish all current C-130 combat delivery missions using a two-person cockpit crew (consisting of two pilots and eliminating the navigator and flight engineer positions) and reduced maintenance personnel. It will be capable of generating the same number of sorties as current C-130E/H aircraft determined on the basis of the sortie generation rate for the theater specified scenarios. The C-130J ORD requires the aircraft to have at least the same operational capabilities of the latest production version of the C-130H. The

C-130J will provide timely deployment, employment, and redeployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies throughout the combat theater. This personnel and cargo movement is accomplished by aircraft transport to remote locations, primarily through airland and airdrop flight operations at unimproved airfields and obscure drop zones. The C-130J forces will also augment both special operations forces (SOF) and strategic airlift forces aircraft.

Figure 4.2.a.

C-130 Force Modernization Schedule (Notional)

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.2.2. (U) Onboard Mission Planning. Includes inflight database access, inflight route and mission planning/replanning, ground based mass media swap as well as real time intelligence processing. Avionics suite subsystem dependencies include availability of a high bandwidth communications system, sufficient processing power, and swappable mass storage media.

4.2.3. (U) Fleet-wide Airlift Defensive Systems. Installs AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispenser system and AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning System on all remaining C-130s that can be tasked for operations in potentially hostile environments. Complete system consists of missile warning receiver and flare and chaff dispensers. Approximately 191 C-130s will be modified to complete the fleet. Installation of Airlift Defensive Systems on combat delivery assets would provide protection for aircraft and crew from certain man-portable infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles. Current program funds only 87 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), and 38 ANG

C-130 aircraft; 125 total aircraft.

4.2.4. (U) Integrated Fleet-wide Electronic Warfare Suite. The EW-equipped portion of the

C-130 fleet should be modified with an integrated control for all C-130 EW systems, both IR and RF, to reduce crew workload and increase the automatic dispensing capability of countermeasures against threats. There should be an independent bus tying current Airlift Defensive System (ADS) missile launch warning and chaff/flare dispensing with the ALR-69 radar warning receiver (RWR), controlled by a single control head, able to differentiate between IR and RF missiles and automatically dispense the appropriate chaff or flare countermeasure. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.5. (U) Airlift Defensive Systems (C-27). Provides added protection for flight crews and aircraft executing operational missions in the Central and South America AOR. The Air Mobility Command’s Defensive Systems Program was a 1991 OSD directed quick-reaction program that installed protective systems on selected cargo aircraft to counter a shoulder-fired surface-to-air threat to aircraft supporting counter drug activities in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. (Project SNOWSTORM). The current modification installs an AAR-47 missile warning receiver and six ALE-47 flare dispensers. The installation schedule calls for five aircraft modifications per year. System maintenance will be performed by USAF personnel at Howard AB. This program affects 10 C-27 aircraft.

4.2.6. (U) Radar Warning Receivers. Initially installs up to 70 CAF and CAF gained C-130s with receivers to detect radar threats. This effort will be expanded to a fleet-wide modification starting in FY00. Program funds 118 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 142 ANG, and 106 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 366 total aircraft.

4.2.7. (U) NVIS Lighting. C-130 aircraft require NVIS lighting conversions to enable aircrews to effectively employ NVGs. The interior and exterior will be modified with NVIS compatible lights that will not interfere with NVGs. C-130 aircraft without NVIS exterior lighting can be seen at considerable distances and compromise any attempt to use the cover of darkness to aid transported forces in achieving surprise. This modification will also reduce the capability of hostile forces using NVGs to acquire, track, and target C-130 aircraft. The goal is for all CAF aircraft to be fully compliant with MIL-L-85762A, Lighting, Aircraft, Interior, AN/ANVIS-6 Compatible. This initiative will modify all C-130E/H and HC-130P/N with NVIS interior and exterior lighting. The entire cockpit (everything forward of F.S. 245) will be modified to a Class B cockpit for normal lighting. The Flight Engineer panel will be lighted using the secondary lighting system. The Navigator's radar will use external filters. Bezels or internal lighting will be used for ADI, HSI, altimeter, and airspeed gauges. Utility lights will be replaced, and approach plate holders will be modified. The engine instruments, hydraulic, and fuel flow indicators will be replaced with the 1995 C-130H3 indicator package. The cargo compartment will be completely modified except for the lower floor lighting. Two IR lights will be added to the aft cargo compartment for ground operations. Jump lights will be modified and be daylight readable while being consistent with current airdrop operations. Formation lights will require rheostats. All active duty aircraft will be modified with IR taxi and landing lights to support the Pathfinder mission. Refueling pods and hoses on each wing of the HC-130 shall be illuminated by covert IR lights. Tanker status lights will be modified. This program is a new start for FY98 implementation. Program would fund 211 active duty (ACC, AETC, PACAF, USAFE), 205 ANG, and 112 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 528 total aircraft.

4.2.8. (U) C-130H Aircrew Training Device (ATD) Acquisition. The C-130H3 Aircrew Training System is an integrated system of academic, simulator, and flight training, to include all initial, continuation, upgrade, tactical training, and crew resource management training required to maintain appropriate qualification for C-130 aircrews. The C-130H3 ATD will provide seamless procedural training for selected mission and safety of flight tasks to improve the level of aircrew readiness achievable under allocated flying time. The C-130H3 ATS provides standardized training for all CAF aircrews. Standardized courseware and contractor simulator training for CAF aircrews ensures the same material is taught across the board.

4.2.9. (U) C-12/N-1 Compass Replacement. An R&M upgrade projected to save $20 per flight hour over the life cycle of the aircraft. Replaces two high maintenance, delicate gyroscopes and obsolescent compass systems per aircraft with a lower maintenance, highly reliable inertial navigation unit. The second INU will also provide more accurate heading information to the SCNS system than current compasses. This configuration is standard for all ANG and AFRES C-130H3 aircraft and is planned for ACC C-130H3 aircraft. Program funds 216 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 154 ANG, and 96 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 466 total aircraft.

4.2.10. (U) Engine Monitoring Set. Permanently installs the necessary wiring and sensors to perform propeller balance and engine vibration analysis. This system will eliminate the current setup time and enable technicians to periodically monitor the overall engine health. This system would allow the command to move from engine preventive maintenance to an engine predictive maintenance schedule, reducing overall maintenance costs and applying maintenance actions where they are required on the T56 engine. Note: Since 1991, Lockheed has hardwired all production aircraft with prop balance/ engine monitoring. The modification to existing aircraft will not only reduce maintenance, but will help in configuration control of all C-130s. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 679 total aircraft.

4.2.11. (U) APQ-122 AWADS Radar Replacement. Replaces the current precision airdrop radar on 47 aircraft, which has a MTBF of 17 hours and is becoming unsupportable due to lack of parts.

4.2.12. (U) Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS). Provides a rapid, accurate, and survivable mission planning capability in support of tactical, strategic, airlift, and special operations forces. The system will interface with Theater Battle Management command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems and achieves cost reduction through the use of common databases, software, and hardware. The AFMSS is a unit-level mission planning and data preparation system that supports missions ranging from simple day-to-day training and proficiency flying, to peace-time operational/exercise sorties, to complex operations supporting conventional or unconventional armed conflict. Mission planning activities include flight planning computation, electronic combat asset planning, threat analysis, optimum route selection, combat delivery planning, combat mission folder preparation, aircraft systems avionics initialization, and down-loading of post-mission maintenance and operational data.

4.2.13. (U) High Bandwidth Communications. Key features include a fixed wide coverage phased array antenna (or antenna group, three for hemispherical coverage) providing a 20+ Mbps one- or two-way communication channel. Antenna has minimal drag impact and provides rapid (millisecond) satellite acquisition time and closed-loop tracking. To use the capabilities of this system the host platform would need an onboard digital architecture allowing automated direction of incoming information to any of several (arbitrary) subsystems (mission planning, route planning, etc.). Additionally, USAF (or DoD) would need satellite networks (or satellite time) or other high altitude relay platforms and associated infrastructure to implement this concept.

4.2.14. (U) Multi-Source Tactical System (MSTS). MSTS is a TENCAP system developed for Air Mobility Command (AMC) to provide near real-time intelligence information to tactical and strategic airlift aircraft for enroute situation awareness. MSTS provides the capability to receive, process and display near real-time intelligence overlaid on high-resolution imagery and digital charts.

4.2.14.1. (U) The system loads and stores charts, multi-spectral, and high-resolution imagery which is used to initiate and update the data base. Near real-time SIGINT and RADINT are received inflight and appropriate symbology is overlaid on stored images and charts, indicated parameters and lethality ranges are displayed in two and three-dimensional representations.

4.2.14.2. (U) The MSTS is designed as a Strap-On capability. The system is housed in man-portable containers for easy installation and removal. MSTS requires a minimum of two people to carry the system aboard, secure the containers in available space and plug into a host provided power source, UHF SATCOM antenna and GPS. A more in-depth description of the system and components was provided in the original package and is available on request.

4.2.14.3. (U) Prototype MSTS have been flown on C-141, C-130, and KC-135 platforms to demonstrate space product support to AMC. Fourteen systems have been acquired under an AMC Combat Mission Need Statement (C-MNS).

4.2.15. (U) Commercial Microwave Landing System Avionics (CMLSA). Installs a commercial microwave landing system to allow precision approaches and landings. MLS will allow elimination of ILS, which suffers from frequency congestion. FM bleedover to ILS frequencies is an acute problem in Europe, where countries have installed numerous fixed MLS stations as a solution. USAF is procuring a ground-based mobile MLS that will afford CMLSA-equipped C-130s a precision approach capability to austere landing zones. Program funds 237 active duty, 197 ANG, and 116 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 550 total aircraft.

4.2.16. (U) SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) Radio. A form fit replacement for the AN/ARC-186 that provides an AM/FM VHF communications capability and an anti-jam capability by utilizing frequency hopping. Provides a capability for

C-130 FM communication with Army and other ground forces during critical airdrop/rescue missions. Lack of FM VHF communications capability creates potentially dangerous situations for paratroops and ground personnel during marginal high wind airdrops. C-130 aircraft currently cannot access US Army battlefield communications nets that provide critical information on drop zone conditions, a deficiency which can severely degrade airdrop accuracy. This initiative covers Engineering, Kit A, Installation, and Testing. Kit B (LRUs) will be purchased by HQ ACC/DRCA. Program funds 325 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 188 ANG, and 116 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 629 total aircraft.

4.2.17. (U) Embedded Ramp Tow Plates. A permanently installed embedded towplate system compatible with the A/A37A-11 towplate link or a linkless system. Permanent installation eliminates installation time and protects the system from the damage often incurred by the exposed components of the "scab on" system. Compatibility with the current link offers interoperability with the current towplates until they can be replaced. The A/A37A-11 towplate link is in the DoD inventory and possessed by Army Airborne units. Linkless technology is available and would eliminate the requirement for any link in the extraction/deployment line and may or may not be compatible with the current link depending upon the design. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.18. (U) Fuel Quantity System Upgrade. Replaces current analog indicators having a MTBF of 1582 hours with digital indicators having an estimated MTBF of 35,000 hours. Also mounts external probes in tanks. Reduces required maintenance manhours from 90 to 2. This modification affects C-130H aircraft that have not been modified with the new wings. Program funds 60 active duty (ACC, PACAF) and 6 ANG C-130 aircraft; 66 total aircraft.

4.2.19. (U) Fleet-wide Enhanced Station Keeping Equipment (ESKE) Replacement. The Airdrop capable portion of the C-130 fleet will be modified with a fully interoperable formation positioning system. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.20. (U) Electrical System Upgrade (ESU). Upgrades the current 35 year-old electrical system which produces unstable voltage, causing four-engine power loss and interface difficulties with newer digital avionics systems. The existing generator control units will be replaced with more capable systems that improve voltage and frequency regulation and differential fault monitoring. Program funds 297 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 186 ANG, and 124 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 607 total aircraft.

4.2.21. (U) Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM). Converts existing paper technical orders into a digitized interactive electronic medium that will be IAW the CALS standards and type "C" integrated electronic technical manual format. System design will provide for an integrated aircraft onboard digital "G-File" to reduce the requirement for storage of paper copy TOs.

4.2.22. (U) Life History Recorder. Replaces the old tube type life history recorder with a modern state-of-the-system for tracking airframe stress. Program funds 41 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 18 ANG, and 18 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 77 total aircraft.

4.2.23. (U) Autopilot/ Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS). Replaces the existing E-4 autopilot system with a state-of-the-art digital system. New system provides all current capabilities while providing improved reliability, maintainability, and supportability. A new GCAS is congressionally mandated and will also be installed to provide warning of insufficient terrain clearance. Program would fund 283 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 80 ANG, and 132 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 495 total aircraft.

4.2.24. (U) APN-59 Radar Replacement. Replaces an unreliable and unsupportable C-130 radar with one common system capable of color weather detection, precision ground mapping, wind shear detection, and other mission-specific capabilities which can be added with plug-in module cards. Program funds 230 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 186 ANG, and 124 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 540 total aircraft.

4.2.25. (U) Mobile Microwave Landing System. Provides 37 deployable precision approach systems, primarily to combat control teams. Will afford CMLSA-equipped C-130s a worldwide precision approach and landing capability to remote, austere airfields.

4.2.26. (U) Self Contained Navigation System (SCNS). An integrated navigation and radio management system which provides the aircrew with three independent navigation solutions. SCNS enables C-130s to operate without external navigation aids, which could be jammed or otherwise not available during wartime or contingency operations. The system is also being installed on all new production C-130Hs. The SCNS data bus (1553) is the conduit for integrating other modifications, such as MLS, GPS, and the autopilot/GCAS. Also installs a high speed processor into the SCNS system to allow additional avionics integration. Includes HF automatic communications processors and an exclusive calling feature on ARC-190 HF radios. Program funds 256 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 173 ANG, and 120 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 549 total aircraft.

4.2.27. (U) Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Installs a system that will provide collision avoidance for flight inside congested terminal areas. This is very important to C-130 ARC forces that are assigned to civilian airports, some of which are major airline hubs. Although the USAF has a waiver for US operations, TCAS will be required for operations in Europe by 1999. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 166 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 628 total aircraft.

4.2.28. (U) Navstar Global Positioning System (C-130). Installs a space-based all-weather radio navigation system into all SCNS-equipped C-130s to allow autonomous navigation capabilities. Eliminates reliance upon ground-based stations to provide navigational inputs to aircraft systems. Program funds 233 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 190 ANG, and 130 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 553 total aircraft.

4.2.29. (U) AE2100 Turboprop Engine. Potential replacement engine for C-130E/H aircraft. Requires a FADEC system which would have to be integrated with either a new digital avionics suite or the current analog cockpit. Still requires analysis of contractor claims of higher reliability and 15% improvement in SFC.

4.2.30. (U) Smart Diagnostics. Key features include application of commercially available system to military airframes allowing improved speed and accuracy of diagnostic procedures. Assumes implementation in the form of a portable hand-held device. System also allows maintenance data collection and stores complete TOs.

4.2.31. (U) Paratroop Retrieval System Upgrade. A unique method of retrieving towed paratroopers has been developed by the Canadian Air Force, tested by Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) and approved for use. It has also been tested by Special Mission Operational, Testing, and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC) at Hurlburt Field and adopted for use by Air Force Special Operational Command (AFSOC) and installed on the AMC C-17. This retrieval system is in the process of being type classified and should be available through the federal supply system soon. This system will allow the retrieval of 400lb paratroops with an acceptable safety margin. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.32. (U) SATCOM Antennas. Installs a permanent SATCOM antenna, interface cabling, preamplifier, and control panel for portable SATCOM radios required by joint users of combat delivery aircraft.

4.2.33. (U) Threat Warning Systems. Key features include radar warning, IR/UV missile warning, and coherent beam detection/classification. Assumes the use of existing warning systems with development of coherent illumination detection system.

4.2.34. (U) C-130 Life Raft Replacement Modification. Current life raft capacity is 80 persons total (four 20-man rafts), which limits the maximum number of passengers on overwater missions. The C-130J baseline configuration includes three 46-man rafts, enough for all aircrew and passengers, which could translate into a fleetwide modification.

4.2.35. (U) Bleed Air Duct Replacement (Phase II). This program will replace five additional bleed air ducts on a portion of the C-130 fleet. These ducts are located in the horse collar area and adjacent along the leading edge of the wing. The Inconel ducts have been incorporated into new production aircraft and will be compatible with the upcoming "J" model. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 679 total aircraft.

4.2.36. (U) Generator Disconnect Assembly. Permits generator disconnect from the engine following in-flight generator failure in lieu of mandatory engine shutdown currently required. Program funds 188 active duty (ACC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 128 ANG, and 84 AFRES

C-130 aircraft; 400 total aircraft.

4.2.37. (U) C-130 Aircraft Liquid Oxygen System Modification. This modification would equip all C-130s with a coil tube type heat exchanger of 200 liters per minute flow capacity in place of the current exchangers on all C-130 aircraft presently equipped with single LOX converters and dual flat plate type heat exchangers. The current design of the C-130 liquid oxygen system does not comply with standard design practices for aircraft LOX systems which requires that the heat exchanger rated flow capacity be larger than the converter flow capacity, in liters per minute. Under certain conditions on missions using large crews, this has resulted in mission impact, including mission abort, due to lack of sufficient flow capacity to support the crew. Installation of a coil tube type heat exchanger with larger flow capacity will correct this problem and allow the crew to use all the available flow capacity of the converter.

4.2.38. (U) Propulsion Control Flight Control. Modification allows control of the flight path of a multi-engine aircraft by engine thrust modulation alone. By integrating this capability into a digital flight control system, an additional redundancy can be achieved. This additional capability in the flight control system could reduce the need for other backup flight control systems or it could be used to help with the survivability of the aircraft.

4.2.39. (U) Navstar Global Positioning System (C-27). This modification installs design Option E of the "Integration of Global Positioning System User Equipment in C-27A Aircraft" study, dated 4 Nov 92. This study was conducted by the 46TG/GDTI at Holloman AFB NM. Option E includes a GPS Integration Module (GPSIM), full in-flight alignment capabilities, a CRPA-2 antijam antenna, HAVE QUICK timing integration, and a common control display unit for the INS and GPS.

4.2.40. (U) Airdrop Enhancements. Key features include self-guiding cargo delivery system coupled with onboard wind sensing, CARP automated release, and autoflight to CARP. Should be integrated with onboard mission planning system.

4.2.41. (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC) Datalink Capability. System allows automatic digital air-to-ground communication between aircraft and air traffic control. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 679 total aircraft.

4.2.42. (U) Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM). Installs/modifies altimeters and encoding equipment to allow flight inside the new ICAO-designated corridors. RVSM also modifies the link between the pressure altimeter and the autopilot. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 679 total aircraft.

4.2.43. (U) High Speed Ramp. The new configuration of ramp/door will provide the capability to air drop cargo at airspeeds up to 250 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and personnel at airspeeds up to 150 KIAS. Configuration will allow for interface with existing materiel handling equipment for the purpose of loading/unloading platforms and pallets. Aircraft must be capable of making combination air drops (equipment followed by paratroops - either static line or free-fall). It must also allow military free-fall jumps from both the ramp and paratroop doors. All airdrop-tasked C-130 aircraft would be modified. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.44. (U) Digital Radar Landmass (DRLM) and Visual System WST Upgrade. New visual and landmass software database will enhance and improve the training needed for airlift defensive systems, NVGs, and initial aircraft commander, copilot, and navigator training. The training for defensive systems will allow multiple moving targets and occulting opportunities. Current limitations on the Compuscene II system do not allow for proper occulting, i.e., threats can go through a mountain, and only two moving models can be simulated. This leads to unrealistic training for threat analysis and threat avoidance. Initial aircraft commander, copilot, and navigator training can be enhanced with better correlated and enhanced landmasses which will improve chart reading ability and crew coordination. Replacement will also allow training missions to be accomplished throughout more areas of the world than the ones provided by the Compuscene II landmass and visual systems on current WSTs. This will provide aircrews more opportunity for realistic mission rehearsal during predeployment preparation for a contingency operation. This modification affects nine simulators.

4.2.45. (U) Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS). The primary mission of CTAPS is to develop, integrate, field, and maintain a sequence of computer-based capability enhancements for management of airborne assets at the force level and unit level in peacetime, exercise, and wartime environments. It integrates force level battle management planning, dissemination, and execution phases of the battlefield in a joint environment; intelligence gathering and information distribution; multi-service unit level execution and reporting. CTAPS is part of the overall TBM-CS architecture to fully integrate it with the Combat Intelligence System (CIS), and Wing Command Control System (WCCS). Additionally, the Command and Control Information Processing System (C2IPS) system is being integrated into the CTAPS network for an automated capability of airlift support to the Air Operations Center.

4.2.46. (U) Command and Control Information Processing System (C2IPS). The C2IPS is Air Mobility Command's (AMC) Command and Control (C2) Information Processing System that provides automated data and message handling and decision support aids. This will be integrated command-wide and tailored for the specific C2 needs of each of the following echelons: Airlift Coordination Cell, the Director of Mobility Forces, the Air Mobility Element, the Air Mobility Unit and the Tanker Airlift Element. It supports the operational airlift functions associated with mission execution planning, scheduling, and execution monitoring. The IPS also performs functions related to data processing and display, communication processing, and nodal data networking. C2IPS is migrating towards the Theater Battle Management Core Standard for full interoperability with other core systems such as CTAPS.

4.2.47. (U) Pressurized Bubbles. Acquire pressurizable bubbles for all CAF C-130E/H and

HC-130P/N aircraft. The program would procure up to 430 kits.

4.2.48. (U) Square Paratroop Door Windows. New production C-130s, as well as some HC-130s, are equipped with paratroop doors with a large square window and an integral observer seat. This modification proposal recommends retrofit installation of the square window paratroop door on the C-130 airlift fleet to augment the Airlift Defensive System and to enhance survivability under threat conditions in which the fleet is currently being used. Under some circumstances, such as when the automatic detection capability is inoperative or not usable, visual detection of a missile launch is the only means by which the aircrew can be warned in time to react. The proposed paratroop door configuration provides greatly increased visibility as well as safety for the aircrew member. Program would fund 199 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 194 ANG, and 99 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 492 total aircraft.

4.2.49. (U) Campaign Level Theater Model. Adds a theater airlift logistics module to Thunder, a widely accepted USAF campaign level model, to assess the impact of combat delivery on the airland battle outcome.

4.2.50. (U) Landing Gear Tie Down Kits. Procures already available tie down devices that would allow manual tie down of the main landing gear without jettisoning cargo. Program would fund 324 active duty (ACC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 679 total aircraft.

4.2.51. (U) Advanced Cargo Restraint System (ACRS). An implementation of the short-term ACRS concept improves upon current cargo restraint (MB-1 and MB-2) systems by reducing restraint system weight and increasing the speed of cargo restraining actions. Already demonstrated are restraint system weight savings of 37% for the C-130 and a 40% improvement in time required to restrain rolling stock. These improvements are effected by replacing the steel chain based MB-x devices with composite webbing based restraint systems.

4.2.52. (U) Service Bulletins (SBs) (C-27). These are low cost (under $750K each) modifications necessary to improve safety, reliability, maintainability, and mission performance and to reduce logistics cost. Includes "Flight Station Portable Oxygen Bottle Location" (bottle stowed above pilot's head has fallen), and "Electrical Power Fluctuations during Winch Operations (Study)". There are approximately 70 findings from the USAF Air Warfare Center C-27A final test report that will affect the unfunded modification status.

4.2.53. (U) Aging Airframes. Supports two models of fatigue applicable to the C-130 airframe. MODGRO is a structural analysis tool which models fatigue crack growth in aging systems. PROF is a complementary risk calculation tool.

4.2.54. (U) Fuselage Durability Study. As C-130E/H aircraft reach service life, a fuselage durability study is critical for determining investment strategy for a service life extention program (SLEP), a replacement aircraft acquisition program, or a combination of the two. The study of fuselage fatigue and corrosion will determine whether current service life estimates are correct and provide data necessary to validate service life estimates, which is vital to any SLEP decision. If fatigue or corrosion are worse than expected, a SLEP could be more costly than projected. The effort is estimated to take 4-5 years.

4.2.55. (U) Low Cost Safety Mods. Covers various low cost safety modifications. Recent modifications include auxiliary pump relay replacement, nose landing gear bolt modification, and replacement of hydraulic boost pack brackets. Program funds 315 active duty (ACC, AETC, AFMC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 670 total aircraft.

4.2.56. (U) Service Bulletins (C-130). Contractor product improvements required to incorporate Lockheed and other outside organizations' service bulletins identified as items the USAF should comply with (under $900K). Program funds 315 active duty (ACC, AETC, AFMC, AFSOC, PACAF, USAFE), 217 ANG, and 138 AFRES C-130 aircraft; 670 total aircraft.

4.2.57. (U) Low Cost Simulator Upgrades. Low cost mods under $900K, including solid state synchrophaser, dual ADI power source, interphone improvements, Enhanced SKE Repeater Flight Control Indicator (RFCI) lighting and communication/interphone panel. Program funds 11 simulators.

4.2.58. (U) HAVE QUICK Radio Control Heads. Installation provides support for C-130 simulators to align them with aircraft capabilities and provide realistic secure voice equipment training. This modification affects 11 simulators.

4.2.59. (U) Tactical Secure Voice Program. Installs HF and SATCOM secure voice equipment in C-130 simulators to provide realistic secure voice equipment training. This modification affects 11 simulators.

4.2.60. (U) Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) Replacement. This initiative will replace all eight MAFFS units with more reliable, air tanker compliant, systems. All MAFFS missions are currently flown by AFRES and NGB units. The current system consists of seven pressurized tank modules capable of carrying 2,700 gallons of water/retardant and a dispenser control module. When filled, the tank modules must be pressurized on the ground using a system-unique air compressor that stays at the air tanker base. Upon activation, this system dispenses all retardant in a single drop in 6-8 seconds. The new system will be self-contained, multiple-drop capable, and allow flight operations with the ramp up. Currently, MAFFS operations require the host C-130 aircraft to fly at low altitude (150 feet AGL) and at low airspeeds (150 kts) with the ramp open. This significantly limits aircraft maneuverability and performance in rugged terrain operations. The current flight configuration presents significant safety of flight concerns as it increases drag over five times normal parameters and makes recovery of the aircraft during airdrop operations marginal in the event of an emergency situation such as engine failure.

4.3 (U) Prioritized Mid Term (FY03-10) Solution Summaries.

4.3.1. (U) Integrated Cockpit Avionics. Allows improved reliability and maintainability and easy integration of new functions into the cockpit. Replaces all flight instrumentation with six general purpose active matrix liquid crystal displays and dual redundant drivers. This concept does not include a radar upgrade. However, the display system is capable of presenting real-time video signals such as the output of a radar system. Thus, an upgrade radar system should be lower in cost as the usual scope subsystem would be unnecessary.

4.3.2. (U) Threat Countermeasures. Threat countermeasures defeat a threat by either presenting the threat with another target or by jamming the sensor that guides the threat. The former, such as advanced chaff, advanced flares, or a towed pod, operate by trying to present a threat with a better target. The latter, in the case of jamming a radar, tries to overpower the guiding sensor by broadcasting a very powerful signal in the same frequency as the guiding sensor. Another method by which a threat countermeasure can defeat an IR threat is by locking an infrared laser on the IR seeker. Because of the wide variety of possible implementations under this concept, the time frame of this concept can be anywhere from short to long term.

4.3.3. (U) Improved Cargo Handling. Key features include incorporation of articulated ramps, cross rollers, roller tines, powered belts, and control hardware.

4.3.4. (U) Aircrew Visualization Systems. Allows the pilots to fly the aircraft in adverse conditions without looking out the windshield or aircraft windscreens. This can be done by stored information such as future Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) digital terrain elevation data, or by active means such as coupling FLIR with a multi-functioning imaging laser radar.

4.3.5. (U) Advanced Loadmaster Simulator. This mid to long term concept simulates the loading process of a transport. There are two parts of this concept. The first part is an actual full scale model of the loadmaster station. This part would simulate the operations a loadmaster would take in the loading of an airplane. The second part is a model of the aircraft and cargo. This part, which could either be an actual model or a computer generated one, would be displayed on the screens of the loadmaster station. The actions the loadmaster takes at the loadmaster station would be reflected on the screen by the interactions between the cargo and the aircraft. This concept works best with advanced material handling equipment such as McDonnell-Douglas Improved Methods of Autonomous Cargo Handling (IMACH) concept.

4.3.6. (U) Multifunction Radar. This mid-term concept entails a low cost, highly reliable replacement radar system for combat delivery aircraft. One potential implementation of this concept utilizes low-power FM technology. This baseline configuration would provide weather avoidance and navigation capabilities. Also, the same hardware could generate synthetic aperture imagery (0.3m to 10m resolution) if augmented by increased signal processing capability.

4.3.7. (U) Intraformation Positioning System (IFPS). Primary IFPS emphasis is on USAF applications which require an accurate and reliable aircraft positioning and situation awareness capability for day, night, and in-weather.

4.4 (U) Prioritized Far Term (FY11-21) Solution Summaries.

4.4.1. (U) Advanced Theater Transport. Long term replacement aircraft for the C-130E/H. Includes enhanced reliability, maintainability, and availability; advanced cargo handling features; super short takeoff and landing capability; oversized/outsized cargo capability; high speed/low level airdrop capability; articulated cargo ramp; high lift systems with externally blown flaps; fly-by-wire capability; off-the-shelf derivative engines; cross-shafted propellers and rotors; off runway landing gear; advanced cockpit design with autonomous landing capability and onboard mission planning. Survivability features include IR suppression, reconfigurable flight controls, damage tolerance, and California Bearing Ratio hardening. In addition, must have at least the same capabilities as C-130J.

Figure 4.2.b.

C-130 Force Modernization Sechedule (Notional)

This Figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.5 (U) Solution Sets. Solution(s) for each deficiency are linked and grouped into solution sets. Individual solutions are broken into current, near, mid, and far term. Solutions that are available in one time frame may not be fielded until a later time frame. Colors indicate capability at end of term if identified solutions are acquired in that term. Green equals good capability, yellow equals limited capability, and red equals no capability.

4.5.1. (U) Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.5.1.1. (U) Near Term: Fleet-wide airlift defensive system

Integrated fleet-wide electronic warfare suite

Airlift defensive systems (C-27)

Radar warning receivers

C-130J

Threat warning systems

Propulsion control flight controls

Onboard mission planning

High bandwidth communications

Multi-source tactical system

4.5.1.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

Aircrew visualization systems

4.5.1.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.2. (U) Combat delivery forces are dependent upon limited supply of material handling equipment.

4.5.2.1. (U) Near Term: None

4.5.2.2. (U) Mid Term: Improved cargo handling systems

4.5.2.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.3. (U) Specific theater combat delivery tasks are not properly articulated. (NOTE: This deficiency requires a non-material solution.)

4.5.3.1. (U) Near Term: Identify theater lift requirements

4.5.3.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.3.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.4. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their protection and decontamination of aircraft, cargo, and cargo compartment.

4.5.4.1. (U) Near Term: No material solutions.

Non-material: Cargo Aircraft Contamination Control (CACC)

4.5.4.2. (U) Mid Term: Improved cargo handling system

4.5.4.3. (U) Far Term: None

NOTE: CACC is a non-material solution aimed at developing methods and procedures to ensure the safety of aircrews and ground support personnel while handling and transporting chemically contaminated cargo, or while performing operations in a chemically contaminated aircraft. Using existing equipment, the CAF and AMC will conduct a joint FOT&E to develop airborne/ground procedures for handling and transporting chemically contaminated cargo. This FOT&E will also develop methods and procedures for sustaining ground operations in a chemically contaminated aircraft.

4.5.5. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment.

4.5.5.1. (U) Near Term: NVIS lighting

C-130J

4.5.5.2. (U) Mid Term: Aircrew visualization systems

Multifunction radar

4.5.5.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.6. (U) Manning shortfalls in key areas limit mission accomplishment. (NOTE: This deficiency requires a non-material solution.)

4.5.6.1. (U) Near Term: None

4.5.6.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.6.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.7. (U) Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability.

4.5.7.1. (U) Near Term:AFMSS

Onboard mission planning

C-130J

SCNS

Fuel quantity system upgrade

Integrated EW suite

APN-59 radar replacement

APQ-122 radar replacement

4.5.7.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.7.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.8. (U) Combat control teams lack sufficient equipment for mission accomplishment.

4.5.8.1. (U) Near Term: Mobile MLS

High bandwidth communications

SINCGARS radio

4.5.8.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.8.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.9. (U) Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time.

4.5.9.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

Fleetwide airlift defensive systems

Onboard mission planning

Integrated fleetwide EW suite

Airlift defensive systems (C-27)

Radar warning receivers

NVIS lighting

C-130H/J ATD acquisition

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Engine monitoring set

Commercial MLS avionics

Embedded ramp tow plates

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

APN-59 radar replacement

Interactive electronic technical manuals

APQ-122 radar replacement

SCNS

TCAS

GPS

Fuel quantity system upgrade

ESU

Paratroop retrieval system upgrade

SATCOM

Life raft replacement modification

Liquid oxygen system modification

Life history recorder

Bleed air duct replacement

Generator disconnect assembly

AE2100 turboprop engine

GPS (C-27)

ATC datalink capability

Reduced vertical separation minima

High speed ramp

Pressurized bubbles

Square paratroop door windows

Gear tie down kits

Service bulletins (C-27)

Low cost safety mods

Service bulletins

4.5.9.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

Integrated cockpit avionics

Improved cargo handling

4.5.9.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.10. (U) Combat delivery aircraft are dependent on reduced enroute/theater support, limiting mission flexibility.

4.5.10.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Engine monitoring set

APQ-122 radar replacement

Fuel quantity system upgrade

Electrical system upgrade

Life history recorder

Autopilot/GCAS

Liquid oxygen system modification

Contingency theater air control system

C2 information processing system

AE2100 turboprop engine

Smart diagnostics

4.5.10.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.10.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.11. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their detection of NBC threats.

4.5.11.1. (U) Near Term: None

4.5.11.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.11.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.12. (U) Simulation capabilities do not provide adequate mission training.

4.5.12.1. (U) Near Term: C-130H/J ATD acquisition

Digital radar landmass and visual system WST upgrade

Simulator upgrades to match aircraft modifications

4.5.12.2. (U) Mid Term: Advanced loadmaster simulator

4.5.12.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.13. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness.

4.5.13.1. (U) Near Term: Onboard mission planning

NVIS lighting

Integrated fleetwide EW suite

4.5.13.2. (U) Mid Term: Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.13.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.14. (U) Training capabilities for aircrew and maintainers are inadequate.

4.5.14.1. (U) Near Term: C-130H/J ATD acquisition

NVIS lighting

Digital radar landmass and visual system WST upgrade

AFMSS

Low cost simulator upgrades

HAVE QUICK radio control heads

Tactical secure voice program

Non-material: Aircrew training system (ATS) courseware changes

4.5.14.2. (U) Mid Term: Advanced loadmaster simulator

4.5.14.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.15. (U) Lack of configuration control and commonality limits combat delivery forces’ flexibility.

4.5.15.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

Fleetwide airlift defensive systems

Integrated fleetwide EW suite

Radar warning receiver

NVIS lighting

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Engine monitoring set

Commercial MLS avionics

Embedded ramp tow plate

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

SINCGARS radio

APN-59 radar replacement

APQ-122 radar replacement

SCNS

TCAS

Fuel quantity system upgrade

ESU

Paratroop retrieval system upgrade

Life history recorder

Life raft replacement modification

GCAS

Bleed air duct replacement

Generator disconnect assembly

GPS (C-27)

ADS (C-27)

Service bulletins (C-27)

Low cost safety mods

Service bulletins

4.5.15.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.15.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.16. (U) Combat delivery forces lack an effective CONOPS for an NBC environment. NOTE: This deficiency requires a non-material solution.

4.5.16.1. (U) Near Term: Write NBC CONOPS

4.5.16.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.16.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.17. (U) Combat delivery aircraft cannot carry all the Army equipment required to be airlifted within the theater.

4.5.17.1. (U) Near Term: None

4.5.17.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.17.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.18. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop.

4.5.18.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

Embedded tow plates

Airdrop enhancements

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

APN-59 radar replacement

APQ-122 radar replacement

Navstar GPS

Navstar GPS (C-27)

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

4.5.18.2. (U) Mid Term: Aircrew visualization systems

Multifunction radar

IFPS

4.5.18.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.19. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack data base and charts for worldwide mission planning and execution.

4.5.19.1. (U) Near Term: Onboard mission planning

Multi-source tactical system

C-130J

AFMSS

High bandwidth communications

APN-59 radar replacement

4.5.19.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.19.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.20. (U) Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.5.20.1. (U) Near Term: C130J

Engine monitoring set

Fleetwide airlift defensive systems

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Commercial MLS avionics

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

APN-59 radar replacement

APQ-122 radar replacement

SCNS

Fuel quantity system upgrade

ESU

Autopilot/GCAS

AE2100 turboprop engine

Smart diagnostics

Life history recorder

Generator disconnect assembly

Liquid oxygen system modification

Aging airframes

4.5.20.2. (U) Mid Term: Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.20.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.21. (U) Combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment.

4.5.21.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

AFMSS

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

SCNS

Onboard mission planning

Multi-source tactical system

4.5.21.2. (U) Mid Term: IFPS

4.5.21.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.22. (U) Combat delivery forces lack the capability to plan and operate in a laser environment. NOTE: Advanced technology demonstrators for Sensor Multiline/Broadband Laser Protection and Advanced Laser Eye Protection (which may materialize into solutions) are included in Paragraph 4.7, Enabling Technologies.

4.5.22.1. (U) Near Term: AFMSS

Threat warning systems

Onboard mission planning

High bandwidth communications

4.5.22.2. (U) Mid Term: Aircrew visualization systems

4.5.22.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.23. (U) Campaign modeling tools do not exist to identify combat delivery shortfalls and impacts on warfighting effectiveness.

4.5.23.1. (U) Near Term: Campaign level model

4.5.23.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.23.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.24. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack expansion capability to adapt planned ICAO/FAA air traffic control system modernization.

4.5.24.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Commercial MLS avionics

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

TCAS

ATC datalink capability

Reduced vertical separation minima

4.5.24.2. (U) Mid Term: Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.24.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.25. (U) Cargo restraint devices are bulky/heavy and time-consuming to use.

4.5.25.1. (U) Near Term: Advanced cargo restraint system

4.5.25.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.25.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.26. (U) Theater airlift aircraft lack combat identification capability.

4.5.26.1. (U) Near Term: Fleetwide airlift defensive systems

Integrated fleetwide EW suite

Airlift defensive systems (C-27)

SINCGARS radio

High speed ramp

C-130J

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Navstar GPS

Pressurized bubbles

Square paratroop door windows

Multi-source tactical system

4.5.26.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

4.5.26.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.27. (U) Required weather information is not quickly disseminated to deployed theater airlift assets.

4.5.27.1. (U) Near Term: Onboard mission planning

High bandwidth communications

SINCGARS radios

SATCOM antennas

4.5.27.2. (U) Mid Term: Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.27.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.28. (U) Combat delivery forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours updating manuals.

4.5.28.1. (U) Near Term: IETM

Smart diagnostics

4.5.28.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.28.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.29. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack access to real time and threat order of battle information to aid in avoidance.

4.5.29.1. (U) Near Term: Onboard mission planning

Multi-source tactical system

High bandwidth communications

SATCOM antennas

SINCGARS radios

4.5.29.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

4.5.29.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.30. (U) Multiple C-130 configurations increase complexity and cost of logistics for combat delivery forces.

4.5.30.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

Fleetwide airlift defensive systems

Integrated fleetwide EW suite

NVIS lighting

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

Engine monitoring set

Commercial MLS avionics

Embedded ramp tow plate

Fleetwide ESKE replacement

SINCGARS radio

APN-59 radar replacement

IETM

APQ-122 radar replacement

SCNS

TCAS

Navstar GPS

Fuel quantity system upgrade

ESU

Paratroop retrieval system upgrade

SATCOM antennas

Life raft replacement modification

Life history recorder

Autopilot/GCAS

Bleed air duct replacement

Generator disconnect assembly

AE2100 turboprop engine

ATC datalink capability

Reduced vertical separation minima

Liquid oxygen system modification

High speed ramp

Pressurized bubbles

Square paratroop door windows

Gear tie down kits

Onboard mission planning

Radar warning receivers

High bandwidth communications

Low cost safety mods

Service bulletins

4.5.30.2. (U) Mid Term: Threat countermeasures

Integrated cockpit avionics

4.5.30.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.31. (U) Economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

4.5.31.1. (U) Near Term: Fuselage Durability Study

Engine monitoring set

Aging airframes

Life history recorder

4.5.31.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.31.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.32. (U) Combat delivery forces lack autonomous precision approach capability in austere environments.

4.5.32.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J

Commercial MLS avionics

Mobile MLS

Navstar GPS

Navstar GPS (C-27)

C-12/N-1 compass replacement

4.5.32.2. (U) Mid Term: Aircrew visualization systems

Multifunction radar

4.5.32.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.33. (U) Combat delivery aircraft do not offer adequate passenger emergency life support protection.

4.5.33.1. (U) Near Term: C-130J (greater life raft capacity)

Life raft replacement modification

Liquid oxygen system modification

4.5.33.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.33.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.34. (U) C-130 aircraft cannot communicate with ground forces during critical mission phases.

4.5.34.1. (U) Near Term: SINCGARS radios

4.5.34.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.34.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.35. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack collision avoidance capability in areas without radar coverage.

4.5.35.1. (U) Near Term: Fleetwide ESKE replacement

TCAS

Autopilot/GCAS

C-130J

4.5.35.2. (U) Mid Term: IFPS

4.5.35.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.36. (U) Aircraft security and protection capabilities at deployed locations are limited.

4.5.36.1. (U) Near Term: None

4.5.36.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.36.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.37. (U) Combat delivery aircraft lack over-the-horizon secure voice and data communications capability.

4.5.37.1. (U) Near Term: SATCOM antennas

Onboard mission planning

High bandwidth communications

SINCGARS radio (no data capability)

Multi-source tactical system

4.5.37.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.37.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.38. (U) Theater aeromedical evacuation support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft.

4.5.38.1. (U) Near Term: ESU

Liquid oxygen system modification

4.5.38.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.38.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.39. (U) Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to deploy and sustain themselves.

4.5.39.1. (U) Near Term: C-12/N-1 compass replacement

APN-59 radar replacement

SINCGARS radios

Liquid oxygen system modification

Contingency theater air control system

C2 information processing system

SCNS

ESU

Autopilot/GCAS

C-130J

Life raft replacement modification

Life history recorder

Generator disconnect assembly

4.5.39.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.39.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.40. (U) Combat delivery aerial firefighting equipment is nearly unsupportable.

4.5.40.1. (U) Near Term: Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System Replacement

4.5.40.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.40.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.5.41. (U) C-130 bleed air duct system is not reliable.

4.5.41.1. (U) Near Term: Bleed air duct replacement (phase II)

C-130J

4.5.41.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.41.3. (U) Far Term: Advanced theater transport

4.5.42. (U) Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations.

4.5.42.1. (U) Near Term: Contingency theater air control system

C2 information processing system

4.5.42.2. (U) Mid Term: None

4.5.42.3. (U) Far Term: None

4.6. (U) Modernization Roadmaps.

4.6.1. (U) The solution sets above were incorporated into aircraft and non-aircraft modernization roadmaps to guide technology development, the creation of formal Mission Needs Statements, development of Operational Requirements Documents, and the submission of funding requests. The Air Force has planned a number of component upgrades to increase reliability, decrease maintenance costs, and ease aircrew task loading. These modifications aim to ensure the C-130 and C-27 can meet their useful structural life at the lowest cost and continue operating into the next century. Currently there are funded modification programs for the C-130 and for the C-27. Most of the C-130 modifications are incorporated in new H-models coming off the production line and retrofitted on the existing fleet. In addition to these modifications, a replacement aircraft for the C-130E/H must also be considered as older aircraft approach the end of service life. A short synopsis follows in Figures 4.3 through 4.9, which depict the modernization roadmaps for combat delivery weapons systems. An analysis of what evolutions should occur on the modern battlefield over the next 10 to 25 years has been accomplished to ensure key technologies and improvements are developed and implemented into the combat delivery force to ensure that capabilities of today are enhanced tomorrow.

4.6.2. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap.

4.6.2.1. Fully Funded Programs (Prioritized).

4.6.2.1.1. (U) C-12/N-1 Compass Replacement. See program description in paragraph 4.2.9.

4.6.2.1.2. (U) APQ-122 AWADS Radar Replacement. See program description in paragraph 4.2.11.

4.6.2.1.3. (U) Commercial Microwave Landing System Avionics (CMLSA). See program description in paragraph 4.2.15. STATUS: MAC ORD 802-78.

4.6.2.1.4. (U) SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System) Radio. See program description in paragraph 4.2.16. STATUS: TAF ORD 308 80.

4.6.2.1.5. (U) Fuel Quantity System Upgrade. See program description in paragraph 4.2.18.

4.6.2.1.6. (U) Electrical System Upgrade (ESU). See program description in paragraph 4.2.20. STATUS: AMC ORD 015-93.

4.6.2.1.7. (U) Life History Recorder. See program description in paragraph 4.2.22. STATUS: MAC MNS 86-057.

4.6.2.1.8. (U) APN-59 Radar Replacement. See program description in paragraph 4.2.24.

4.6.2.1.9. (U) Self Contained Navigation System (SCNS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.26. STATUS: MAC SON 06-80.

4.6.2.1.10. (U) Navstar Global Positioning System. See program description in paragraph 4.2.28. STATUS: AFSPACECOM ORD 003-78.

Figure 4.3. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.6.2.1.11. (U) SATCOM Antennas. See program description in paragraph 4.2.32. STATUS: MAC ORD 03-81.

4.6.2.1.12. (U) Generator Disconnect Assembly. See program description in paragraph 4.2.36.

4.6.2.1.13. (U) Low Cost Safety Mods. See program description in paragraph 4.2.55.

4.6.2.2. (U) Partially Funded Programs (Prioritized).

4.6.2.2.1. (U) C-130J Hercules. See program description in paragraph 4.2.1. STATUS: ORD CAF (AMC) 005-91-IV/III-A approved 1 Aug 95.

4.6.2.2.2. (U) Fleet-wide Airlift Defensive Systems. See program description in paragraph 4.2.3.

4.6.2.2.3. (U) Radar Warning Receivers. See program description in paragraph 4.2.6.

4.6.2.2.4. (U) Autopilot/ Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.23. STATUS: MAC MNS 88-031.

4.6.2.3. (U) Unfunded Initiatives (Prioritized).

4.6.2.3.1. (U) Advanced Theater Transport. See description in paragraph 4.4.1.

4.6.2.3.2. (U) Onboard Mission Planning. See description in paragraph 4.2.2..

4.6.2.3.3. (U) Integrated Cockpit Avionics. See description in paragraph 4.3.1.

4.6.2.3.4. (U) Integrated Fleet-wide Electronic Warfare Suite. See description in paragraph 4.2.4.

Figure 4.4. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.6.2.3.5. (U) Threat Countermeasures. See description in paragraph 4.3.2.

4.6.2.3.6. (U) Improved Cargo Handling. See description in paragraph 4.3.3.

4.6.2.3.7. (U) NVIS Lighting. See program description in paragraph 4.2.7.

4.6.2.3.8. (U) Aircrew Visualization Systems. See description in paragraph 4.3.4.

4.6.2.3.9. (U) Engine Monitoring Set. See description in paragraph 4.2.10.

4.6.2.3.10. (U) High Bandwidth Communications. See description in paragraph 4.2.13.

4.6.2.3.11. (U) Multi-Source Tactical System (MSTS). See description in paragraph 4.2.14.

4.6.2.3.12. (U) Embedded Ramp Tow Plates. See description in paragraph 4.2.17.

4.6.2.3.13. (U) Fleet-wide Enhanced Station Keeping Equipment (ESKE) Replacement. See description in paragraph 4.2.19.

4.6.2.3.14. (U) Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM). See program description in paragraph 4.2.21.

 

Figure 4.5. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

4.6.2.3.15. (U) Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). See description in paragraph 4.2.27. STATUS: AMC MNS 004-93.

4.6.2.3.16. (U) Multifunction Radar. See description in paragraph 4.3.6.

4.6.2.3.17. (U) AE2100 Turboprop Engine. See description in paragraph 4.2.29.

4.6.2.3.18. (U) Paratroop Retrieval System Upgrade. See description in paragraph 4.2.31.

4.6.2.3.19. (U) Smart Diagnostics. See description in paragraph 4.2.30.

4.6.2.3.20. (U) Threat Warning Systems. See description in paragraph 4.2.33.

4.6.2.3.21. (U) C-130 Life Raft Replacement Modification. See description in paragraph 4.2.34.

4.6.2.3.22. (U) Bleed Air Duct Replacement (Phase II). See description in paragraph 4.2.35.

4.6.2.3.23. (U) C-130 Aircraft Liquid Oxygen System Modification. See description in paragraph 4.2.37.

4.6.2.3.24. (U) Propulsion Control Flight Control. See description in paragraph 4.2.38.

4.6.2.3.25. (U) Airdrop Enhancements. See program description in paragraph 4.2.40.

 

Figure 4.6. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

4.6.2.3.26. (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC) Datalink Capability. See description in paragraph 4.2.41. STATUS: AMC MNS 001-92.

4.6.2.3.27. (U) Reduced Vertical Separation Minima. See description in paragraph 4.2.42. STATUS: AMC MNS 007-93.

4.6.2.3.28. (U) High Speed Ramp. See description in paragraph 4.2.43.

4.6.2.3.29. (U) Pressurized Bubbles. See description in paragraph 4.2.47.

4.6.2.3.30. (U) Square Paratroop Door Windows. See description in paragraph 4.2.48.

4.6.2.3.31. (U) Landing Gear Tie Down Kits. See description in paragraph 4.2.50.

4.6.2.3.32. (U) Advanced Cargo Restraint System (ACRS). See description in paragraph 4.2.51.

4.6.2.3.33. (U) Intraformation Positioning System (IFPS). See description in paragraph 4.3.7.

4.6.2.3.34. (U) Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) Replacement. See description in paragraph 4.2.60.

Figure 4.7. (U) C-130 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED.

4.6.3. (U) C-27 Modernization Roadmap.

4.6.3.1. (U) Fully Funded Programs (Prioritized).

4.6.3.1.1. (U) Airlift Defensive Systems. See program description in paragraph 4.2.5. STATUS: MAC SON 03-86.

4.6.3.1.2. (U) Navstar Global Positioning System. See program description in paragraph 4.2.39. STATUS: MAC SON 03-86.

Figure 4.8. (U) C-27 Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.6.4. (U) Nonaircraft Modernization Roadmap. Figure 4.10 shows the modernization roadmap for systems, other then aircraft, that affect combat delivery.

4.6.4.1. (U) Fully Funded Programs (Prioritized).

4.6.4.1.1. (U) Campaign Level Modeling (CLM) Capability. See program description in paragraph 4.2.49. STATUS: Remains on AFMC Top Priority List.

4.6.4.1.2. (U) Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.45.

4.6.4.1.3. (U) Service Bulletins (C-130). See program description in paragraph 4.2.56.

4.6.4.1.4. (U) Low Cost Simulator Upgrades. See program description in paragraph 4.2.57.

4.6.4.2. (U) Partially Funded Programs (Prioritized).

4.6.4.2.1. (U) Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.12. STATUS: ORD approved.

4.6.4.2.2. (U) Mobile Microwave Landing System (MMLS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.25.

4.6.4.2.3. (U) Command and Control Information Processing System (C2IPS). See program description in paragraph 4.2.46. STATUS: ORD AMC 003-81-III.

4.6.4.3. (U) Unfunded Initiatives (Prioritized).

4.6.4.3.1 (U) C-130H Aircrew Training Device (ATD) Acquisition. See description in paragraph 4.2.8.

4.6.4.3.2. (U) Advanced Loadmaster Simulator. See description in paragraph 4.3.5.

4.6.4.3.3. (U) Digital Radar Landmass (DRLM) and Visual System WST Upgrade. See description in paragraph 4.2.44.

4.6.4.3.4. (U) Service Bulletins (SBs) (C-27). See description in paragraph 4.2.52. STATUS: MAC SON 03-86.

4.6.4.3.5. (U) Aging Airframes. See description in paragraph 4.2.53.

4.6.4.3.6. (U) Fuselage Durability Study. See description in paragraph 4.2.54.

4.6.4.3.7. (U) HAVE QUICK Radio Control Heads. See description in paragraph 4.2.58.

4.6.4.3.8. (U) Tactical Secure Voice Program. See description in paragraph 4.2.59.

Figure 4.9. (U) Nonaircraft Modernization Roadmap

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7. (U) Mission Area Enabling Technologies. Figures 4.10 through 4.15 depict the technology roadmap. This is a prioritized list of currently available technology enabling programs which describes technologies applicable to the combat delivery mission area and their deficiency linkages. Program descriptions do not specifically address combat delivery aircraft in all cases. However, these programs list either the C-130 or C-27 as potential beneficiaries of the new technology. If these technologies prove beneficial to combat delivery aircraft and provide an economical solution to the identified deficiencies, these programs will be transitioned into modification efforts for combat delivery aircraft.

4.7.1. (U) Day/Night Tracking Threat Countermeasures Technology. See classified Annex D for description. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.2 (U) On-Board Electronic Countermeasures Upgrades. See classified Annex D for description. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.3. (U) Multiline/Broadband Laser Protection - Sensors. Current Air Force electro-optic (EO) sensors are highly susceptible to jamming and damage from low energy visible and infrared laser devices that have initially proliferated as rangefinders, designators, illuminators, and ultimately as laser threats. As the laser weapon evolves into broadband and agile (varying wavelength) capabilities, currently available hardening schemes will be unable to protect the sensors. The objective of this effort is to provide broadband (wavelength independent) protection technologies for airborne EO sensors without adverse impact on sensor performance. The payoff for this effort is the capability to employ EO sensors while operating in a proliferated laser environment. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack the capability to operate in a laser environment.

4.7.4. (U) Sensor Hardening Implementation. The objective of this ATD is to demonstrate low-cost, low penalty broadband laser hardening options for forward-looking infrared (FLIR), low light level and all light level televisions (LLLTV/ALLTV), and Infrared Search & Track (IRST) systems. Partial solutions have been identified that enable retrofit of fielded systems to provide fixed wavelength protection against common/known laser threats. State of the art laser hardening technologies can require extensive modification to sensor optical trains that necessitate costly repackaging for fielded systems. Results from recent material advances indicate that these sensors may be retrofitted with advanced laser protection with no changes to the sensor external package and only minor changes to the internal optics. The numerous fielded Air Force electro-optical sensors include LANTIRN, Gunship FLIR and LLLTV, F-117 FLIR/DLIR, Common Module FLIR systems as on the PAVE LOW helicopter, and missile warning receivers. These systems are packaged to minimize weight and size and are generally unable to accommodate state of the art laser hardening technologies. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack the capability to operate in a laser environment.

4.7.5. (U) Night Vision Goggle Operations Weather Software (NOWS). Provides to the Air Force Special Operations Command(AFSOC)and other MAJCOMs (as needed) weather software to assist in the planning of missions requiring the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVG). In particular, provide a capability to determine if the NVG operator will experience degraded NVG visibility, object detection, and/or loss of the visible horizon under various physical, atmospheric, and illumination conditions. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery aircraft lack sufficient capability to operate in a low light, low visibility environment.

4.7.6. (U) Expanded Situation Awareness Insertion. This program will develop, evaluate, demonstrate, and test new approaches, techniques and algorithms to provide aircrews a timely, enhanced situation awareness capability. The improved situation awareness capability will provide Real-time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC) for improved threat/target location and identification, threat intent assessment, response strategy, route replanning, and offensive aiding for precision and stand-off weapon delivery. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery aircraft lack access to real time and threat order of battle information to aid in avoidance.

4.7.7. (U) Total Enhanced Contingency Planning and Support Environment (ECLIPSE). The objective of this research is to improve the Air Force's ability to deploy forces by investigating innovative processes and technologies that will improve wing level deployment planning and execution, reduce deployment footprint, reduce deployment response time, and use deployment resources more effectively and efficiently. This research will advance the state of the art in using computer software to help solve deficiencies in the current deployment planning and execution system. Today’s deployment planning and execution systems lack integration and are too dependent on "stubby pencil " analysis methods. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations.

4.7.8. (U) Reliable/Affordable Traveling Wave Tube Power Supply Technology Insertion. This effort will meet user's defined needs of high reliability and affordability of high voltage power supplies for defensive systems through a risk reducing "proof of principle" demonstration conducted on the ALQ-131 system while operating during simulated combat environment flown on a test pod at Eglin AFB. This program will show a significant increase in reliability (3:1) and decrease in life cycle cost (4:1) to the system owner. The state-of-the-art in power supply (PE6272F/2338) and power amplifier (PE 62234N/P412) technology has been significantly increased, the integration of these two critical results with advanced diagnostics technology such as time stress measurement devices (PRAM/RAMTIP) will have a major impact on the reliability, maintainability, affordability and life cycle cost of defensive systems and, therefore, on the war fighting capabilities, survivability and deployability of our operational forces. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems; subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.9. (U) Large Aircraft IRCM Technology Demonstrator. See classified Annex D for description. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.10. (U) Advanced Laser Eye Protection - Night (FY96 Start). Currently, Air Force aircrews are highly susceptible to eye damage from low energy visible and near-infrared laser devices. TAC SON 505-87 (Aircrew Ocular Protection) substantiates the need for laser eye protection. As laser devices evolve into broadband and agile capabilities, protection schemes based on prior knowledge of the threat laser's wavelength of operation will no longer be effective. Current wavelength independent eye protection efforts are attempting to provide day only protection for aircrews operating in a high G environment, or day/night protection for aircrews operating in a low G mission. To date, the critical limitation preventing the development of wavelength independent protection for night missions has been weight. This ATD will address this operational limitation. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack the capability to operate in a laser environment.

 

Figure 4.10. (U) Combat Delivery Enabling Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7.11. (U) Multiline/Broadband Laser Protection - Personnel. Current Air Force aircrews are highly susceptible to eye damage from low energy visible and near-infrared laser devices. TAC SON 505-87 (Aircrew Ocular Protection) substantiates the need for laser eye protection. As laser devices evolve into broadband and agile capabilities, single fixed-wavelength protection schemes will not provide the needed protection. The objectives of this ATD are to provide known laser wavelength protection with much higher luminous transmission than is currently available (allowing night usage), and to provide broadband protection against all laser threats. The payoff for this effort is to provide aircrews operating in a low G environment , the capability to operate in a laser-rich battlefield without fear of visual jamming or eye damage from friendly or hostile laser sources. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack the capability to operate in a laser environment.

4.7.12. (U) Advanced Hybrid Oxygen System - Medical (AHOS-M). The objective of this effort is to integrate, fabricate, and test a flight brassboard hybrid oxygen generated system. The system will liquefy oxygen generated by a molecular sieve oxygen generator. The liquefied oxygen would serve as an oxygen supply for patient care during aeromedical evacuation and field casualty care operations. The Advanced Hybrid Oxygen System - Medical would eliminate the significant cost and inconvenience of supplying medical grade (99.0%) oxygen, while at the same time reducing aircraft turn around time and the associated safety hazards. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Theater aeromedical evacuation support equipment is not fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft.

4.7.13. (U) Reach Back for the Warrior. The general objective is to demonstrate the capability for a deployed US warrior to reach back to national resources, through a high performance multi-national civil infrastructure, for multimedia command and control information. The DoD, and the participating Ministries of Defense, have determined that the extremely wide bandwidth communications systems needed to support the next generation mission planning and execution functions cannot be attained without reliance on the rapidly developing global commercial infrastructure. This specific demonstration will provide in-transit visibility of a deployed AMC aircraft to the Tanker-Airlift Control Center (TACC) through this infrastructure. This, in turn, requires: 1) the integration of Air Force legacy RF transmission equipment; 2) the integration of the DoD's communications network management and control functions into the civil infrastructure to produce a virtual private military network; and 3) the ability to interact cooperatively with participating Allied coalition nations using this infrastructure at Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) rates of hundreds of megabits per second. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery mission support forces lack consistent C2 for all operations.

4.7.14. (U) Defensive Planning. (1) This effort will demonstrate an automated system that aids the senior air defense duty officers in planning the employment of attack operations, air/ground surveillance, and air defense assets, i.e., AWACS, JSTARS, AAA/SAMs, AEGIS, and CAP/Alert Aircraft. The system will also address the need for integrated defensive planning at the joint force level by considering joint doctrine, tactics, and employment concepts. (2) Presently, within the Air Operations Center (AOC), the defensive planning process is predominately manual and labor intensive. As a direct result, the ability for planning, preparation, and execution of both the airborne and ground based defensive mission, to include attack operations and active defense against the theater missile threat, relative to time critical situations is limited and in some cases not responsive. Defensive planning operations need to be automated to the same extent that the Advanced Planning System (APS) satisfies offensive planning and that the Force Level Execution system (FLEX) satisfies monitoring of ATO execution. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability; subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.15. (U) Operations/Intelligence Integration. Current AOC technology ranges from manual to automated. As a direct result, the ability for planning, preparation, and execution of air combat and theater airlift missions relative to time critical air operations is limited and in some cases not responsive. Other planned improvements to CTAPS that will further automate division functions include FLEX and C2IPS. This effort will examine the volatile nature (update, merge, purge) of data elements essential to planning and execution functions and emphasize those technologies, such as information management and distributed computing, that ensure currency, integrity, interoperability, survivability, and timely availability of data products. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability; subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.16. (U) Operations/Intelligence Integration Phase II. (1) This effort will examine those technologies (multi-level secure systems, distributed computing (DCE), and advanced human-machine interfaces (HMI) to support a proactive approach in responding to high value mobile targets; dense, sophisticated hostile defenses; and mission changes resulting from weather, attrition, and combat outcomes. A DCE will improve survivability of process flow and maximize the utility of critical computer resources during time critical situations by enabling those resources to effectively accomplish multiple functional tasks. Advanced HMI will provide innovative display capabilities for multi-media information, cartographic information and order of battle data to significantly improve situation awareness and battle vision during interactive/collaborative planning. Option generation and rehearsal will be integral to the overall capability for forecasting attrition and combat results. (2) The OII Phase 1 effort provided an approach to information management that facilitates the seamless flow of intelligence information and other data throughout the Air Operations Center (AOC). As a direct result, the ability for planning, preparation, and execution of coordinated air combat and theater airlift missions was significantly improved. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability; subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.17. (U) Advanced Technology Redesign of Highly Loaded Structures (ATROHS). Maintenance costs for operational aircraft structures have steadily increased due to factors such as outdated structural concepts, higher than predicted service loads and extended service life. Advances in design concepts and structural materials are being considered for new aircraft; however, these technologies are not applied to the existing aircraft fleet where large payoffs can be realized. Solving existing aircraft structures problems with advanced technologies simultaneously validates their applicability to future system while saving the user O&M money. The ATROHS program will apply advanced structural concepts and materials to the Air Training Command (AETC) T-38 66 percent wing spar with the goal of reducing life-cycle costs by 30 percent and reducing weight by 10 percent. Preliminary design results show a 62 percent cost savings ($60M) and a 2 percent weight reduction as compared to the existing wing spar. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

4.7.18 (U) Aircraft Battle Damage Assessment/Repair (ABDAR) Technology Integration. The objective of this ATD is to develop technology to provide the aircraft battle damage assessor with a small portable computer which will give him ready access to all information necessary to assess battle damage. When a damaged aircraft lands, the assessor is faced with the very challenging task of determining the extent of the damage, which is often hidden, and what will be required to return the aircraft to service. This task is made more difficult by the fact that he is forced to rely on limited information scattered throughout the technical orders and engineering drawings (if available). Lack of ready information increases the difficulty of the assessment task, significantly slows the assessment process, and lengthens the time required to return the damaged aircraft to combat capable status. A significant force multiplier can be achieved if this process is made more efficient. A small portable computer will gather and integrate all needed information and present it in a form specifically designed to support the assessment task. This will greatly speed up the assessment process and achieve the desired force multiplier. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack electronic technical orders, causing added cost for paper manuals and wasted man-hours updating manuals.

4.7.19. (U) Automated Technical Order Generation (ATOG). The goal of this ATD effort is to provide tools capable of generating automated technical data from existing paper technical data, and from computer aided design (CAD) and logistics support analysis (LSA) data, with minimal input from human authors. The Air Force and DoD are rapidly moving to the use of electronic technical manuals in place of paper based technical manuals. Development of electronic technical manuals is a complex and costly process when done by hand. Technology to develop automated authoring tools to automatically generate aircraft technical orders for presentation on automated technical information systems is badly needed. Automation of this process will greatly reduce the cost of developing electronic technical data. This effort will develop the required automated tools with the technical orders being IETM compliant. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Mission planning systems lack flexibility, efficiency, user friendliness, or DoD interoperability

4.7.20. (U) Analog Hardware Description Language Demonstration. A need exists in the system design community for an industry standard analog hardware description language tool suite for modeling and simulating system hardware during development. An analog system may be defined as any system which may be described by a set of nonlinear ordinary differential, algebraic, or Boolean equations. A hardware description language allows designs to be developed by a top-down approach independent of the manufacturing technology. This means system upgrades can be accomplished without redesign, only a movement of the design to the new technology. An industry standard language brings the assurance that designs will be portable between design systems and manufacturer's. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Campaign modeling tools do not exist to identify combat delivery shortfalls and impacts on warfighting effectiveness.

Figure 4.11. (U) Combat Delivery Enabling Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7.21. (U) Maintenance Free Battery. The objective of this effort is to develop and demonstrate a high performance aircraft battery and charger system capable of operating in military aircraft with no maintenance action required for up to 20 years or 20,000 flight hours. Vented batteries that are currently used on today’s aircraft require scheduled maintenance every 30-90 days. These designs allow the gases that are generated to escape from the battery thus depleting the electrolytes. Furthermore, the chargers used are neither regulated nor do they implement temperature compensated charging regimes. The technology baseline from which this ATD is being derived, focuses on proven satellite sealed battery technology and on an experimental (6.2) NiCd battery effort. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.22. (U) Multi-Function Aircraft Support System (MASS). The primary objective of this ATD is to demonstrate a highly reliable and deployable Multi-Function piece of Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) which will meet the needs of multiple aircraft, as a minimum F-16, F-15, F-117, C-130, KC-135, F-111, and include future generation aircraft such as the F-22. This project will combine up to seven required and common functions of AGE into one modular unit. They include multiple AC & DC electrical outputs, conditioned air (heating and cooling), pneumatics, low & high pressure air, area lighting, nitrogen generation and storage, and hydraulics systems. This will be a coordinated research project with Wright Laboratory’s power and materials divisions. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery aircraft are dependent on reduced enroute/theater support, limiting mission flexibility.

4.7.23. (U) Software Maintenance For Advanced Aircraft Systems. The objective of this effort is to develop the tools and procedures required to permit rapid solution of software based aircraft and avionics system problems. As reconfigurable software becomes a more integral part of aircraft avionics software systems, it is likely that software maintenance is going to become a more important issue. There are at least two issues to be considered--the problem of determining if observed system failures are software or hardware based, and if software based, how to fix those problems (providing rapid fixes to the problems while maintaining configuration control). DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.24. (U) Test Automation For Avionics/Electronics. The objective is to demonstrate advanced software technology that will permit the automatic generation of test programs to support two level maintenance and repair activities. This technology will improve testing capabilities to reduce Can Not Duplicate (CND) and ReTest OK (RTOK) rates. The use of tester independent test information will permit the identification of tester requirements to allow the use of common Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) across multiple weapon systems. Industry standard data formats will be used to capture this test information. Software automation technology will be used to process this information to automatically generate test programs for the ATE. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.25. (U) Advanced Motor Drives For More Electric Aircraft (MEA). The objective of this effort is to develop and demonstrate highly reliable, fault tolerant electrical motor drives for MEA applications with significant improvements in power density and efficiency. Motor drive applications include electric motor driven actuators for flight controls and utility systems, electric motor driven compressors, fuel systems, and pumps for environmental control systems. Specific objectives and goals for the program are as follows: a) design goal of 25,000 hours MTBF reliability for the motor controls and 50,000 hours for the motor controller (2X improvement), b) develop and demonstrate the motor control technology to enable fail safe operation after 1 or more (up to 3) electrical channel faults, c) power density and efficacy design and demonstration goal of 2.0 kW/lb. (2-5X improvement) and 96% efficiency (2% improvement) for the motor controller. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.26. (U) More Electric Aircraft Integrated Power Unit (IPU). The objective of this program is to integrate technologies developed under prior programs which address lubeless/gearless operation into an operational Integrated Power Unit (IPU). Additionally, technologies needed to successfully support the functional characteristics of an IPU demonstration for the More Electric Aircraft (MEA) concept will be addressed. The MEA IPU will perform the dual functions of both an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Emergency Power Unit (EPU). DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

 

4.7.27. (U) Power Management and Distribution for More Electric Aircraft. Develop and demonstrate the electrical system technologies necessary for a More Electric Aircraft (MEA) power system to increase reliability, drastically reduce aerospace ground equipment (AGE), and increase battle damage tolerance. The MEA is responsive to user needs to improve/replace centralized hydraulics for flight loads, improve electrical systems, and improve redundancy. This requires development of a smart, fault-tolerant electrical system large enough to handle the aircraft functions typically powered by hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical systems. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

Figure 4.12. (U) Combat Delivery Enabling Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7.28. (U) Enhanced Missile Warning System. See classified Annex D for description. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.29. (U) Improved Precision Airdrop Capability (IMPAC). Increase aircrew survivability by providing precision aerial delivery technology that will significantly improve airdrop reliability and accuracy at an affordable cost. Technology areas to be demonstrated in this effort include those associated with USAF transport aircraft (C-130 baseline) and all aspects of aerial delivery operations. The technology areas include (1) cockpit (including mission planning), (2) cargo compartment, and (3) cargo delivery system integration. Development of a robust airdrop system will improve current airdrop accuracy from high altitudes by 50% and will provide aerial delivery alternatives that enhance mission flexibility, increase safe areas of operation, and complement the rapid forced entry tactics required to counter anticipated threat environments. Precision delivery will reduce drop zone size requirements and ground troop assembly times, thereby decreasing ground forces' exposure time to hostile fire and detection. An additional benefit will be the increased probability of success of delivery payloads from high altitudes to friendly forces surrounded by hostile forces such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop.

4.7.30. (U) Ballistic Winds. The objective of this program is to demonstrate the suitability of laser radar wind profiling for improving the projectile accuracy of multiple Air Force delivery systems. The projectiles include gun fire, paradropped cargo and personnel, and unguided munitions. The aircraft include AFSOC's AC-130 gunship, AMC's cargo aircraft, and ACC's bomber aircraft. Similarly in the paradrop and unguided munitions applications, the unknown winds from altitude to the ground play an important role in degrading the accuracy of delivering cargo, personnel, and unguided munitions to their targets. The objective in these programs is to demonstrate that the incorporation of onboard real-time wind field measurements will significantly increase the accuracy of these delivery systems. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop.

 

 

Figure 4.13. (U) Combat Delivery Enabling Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7.31. (U) On-board Laser Infrared Self-Defense Countermeasures. See classified Annex D for description. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.32. (U) Integrated Cockpit/Avionics for Transports (ICAT). The objective of this ATD is to integrate and flight demonstrate advanced technologies that enable AMC and AFSOC conventional and special operations missions to be accomplished with a cockpit crew of three or four. Both AMC and AFSOC are acquiring new electronic cockpits, avionics, and mission management systems that will significantly increase the amount of data available to the crew. Mission requirements driving the need for these cockpit and avionics upgrades include the ability to covertly infiltrate unfriendly areas, accomplish autonomous operations using a self-contained navigation and mission planning capability, detect and either avoid or counter threats, and fly at night/adverse weather at low altitudes. In addition, AMC is very interested in achieving a level of commonality among the fleet with these new cockpits and avionics. To support these goals, a common, crew-centered design approach will be pursued that properly integrates the information available from the avionics and air vehicle systems using mission tailored controls and displays and decision aiding/mission management systems to provide a manageable electronic cockpit for the reduced crew complement, Products obtained from this program include facilitated common cockpit design concepts, measures of mission performance and effectiveness for transport crew systems, and trade study data to support advanced technology application. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time.

4.7.33. (U) Multiship Integrated Control (MSIC). Operations involving multiple vehicles and formations require significant premission planning, communications enroute and are prone to cancellation in declining weather conditions. Poor visibility and lack of situational awareness often results in loss of aircraft due to midair conditions and controlled flight into terrain. Advanced flight control and flight management algorithms provide the capability to meet precise time of arrival in dynamic threat environment for single aircraft operations. This technology will improve upon these capabilities in that multiple vehicles can perform precise coordinated operations when interdependence is necessary for a successful mission. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Combat delivery forces are limited in their ability to precision airdrop; combat delivery flight management systems are a limiting factor in mission accomplishment; combat delivery aircraft lack collision avoidance capability in areas without radar coverage.

4.7.34. (U) Transparency Hardening. This program addresses the laser survivability of aircrew canopies and windscreens used on all aircraft. Its goal is to provide an environmentally durable out-of-band laser hardened transparency system applicable to both flat and complex curvature transparency geometries. Present transparent materials deteriorate in a manner that makes them difficult or impossible to see through after irradiation by out-of-band lasers. Draft SAC SON 017-87 requires transparency hardening from infrared lasers. The objective of this program is to coat transparent materials with laser reflective coatings that will allow aircraft to operate in a laser environment without the transparency frosting and burning characteristic of present materials. This objective will be achieved with no adverse impact on performance. A secondary objective of the program is to provide increased environmental durability of aircraft transparencies to extend transparency service life. The desired program output is a laser hardened, environmentally durable transparency system for Air Force and DOD aircraft. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack the capability to operate in a laser environment.

4.7.35. (U) Cockpit Technology Development (CTD). To design and develop new cockpit concepts for both transport and fighter aircraft and to assess their operational utility and pilot acceptance. Technological improvements in sensors, communications, threats, airframes, propulsion, data processing and munitions continue to increase the complexity of air force missions and the weapon systems employed to accomplish them. In addition, the requirement to perform these complex missions in a routine way, in almost any part of the world, day or night, in good or bad weather, is rapidly becoming the norm, rather than the exception. Furthermore, data link and long range sensors are dramatically increasing the amount of raw, unprocessed data available in the cockpit. These unprecedented advances are not being matched by parallel improvements in cockpit technology. To be efficiently assimilated by pilots, data from all sources, both on- and off-board, must be intelligently organized and formatted for presentation on electronic cockpit displays: the data must be intuitive and immediately available at all times. Finally, the user stated requirement to reduce crew complements in both transports and fighters in order to reduce O&M costs, further drives the need for focused cockpit research. Realizing single-seat versions of fighters that perform missions currently requiring two crew members, or two-pilot versions of transport cockpits that perform missions currently requiring four or five cockpit crew members, demands crew systems that fully exploit human performance capabilities without exceeding workload limitations. These systems do not exist. A program that intelligently applies information processing decision aiding, and electronic cockpit displays and controls, must be undertaken if the Air Force is to achieve critically needed cockpit improvements. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack commonality/interoperability in configuration and maintenance, increasing training cost and time; combat delivery aircraft cockpit architecture and design restrict aircrew effectiveness.

4.7.36. (U) Adaptive Communications for Integrated Avionics (ACIA). Build on highly successful Adaptive Communications (ADCOM) exploratory development research to demonstrate innovative high payoff technology for low cost, low probability of detection, and jam-resistant (LPD/JR) communications between aircraft. Present aircraft communications can be detected at long distances by ground, air, and space based interceptors, so when stealth is required, the pilots have no choice but to perform their mission "COMM OUT." This tactic can result in confusion, scrubbed missions, and accidents when unexpected weather, equipment failures, and human errors occur. The ACIA solution to this need for LPD/JR voice and low data rate communications is based on the unique concepts that were successfully demonstrated under a prior 6.2 contract called ADCOM (F33615-89-C-1071). Partial funding and review of this work was provided by the Navy Command and Control Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC); it was reviewed by the National Security Agency; and the high payoff potential was substantiated by an independent technical expert. The ACIA program has been coordinated through ESC/TGH, NCCOSC Code 342, and RL/DCC. The payoff is a new low cost, covert communications capability with significantly increased jam-resistance and greatly reduced frequency congestion and cosite interference. The transition products are the designs and specifications for adding the LPD/JR ADCOM waveform to (1) future integrated communications, navigation, identification (CNI) avionics systems and (2) existing aircraft radios either as appliqués and/or additional slice(s). The goal is to keep the same form and fit as the original radio so expensive aircraft modifications are not required. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery aircraft lack over-the-horizon secure voice and data communications capability.

4.7.37. (U) Logistics Support Materials. The objective is to establish a corrosion and materials compatibility data base on emerging structural materials and commercially available materials which are not covered by existing specifications. Emerging aerospace structural materials require a complete assessment of their deterioration/corrosion behavior in the aerospace environment. In addition, current and proposed environmental, health and safety regulations have eliminated or greatly restricted the use of established aerospace materials and processes. The effectiveness, compatibility, applicability, and supportability of proprietary substitute aerospace materials/processes, which are environmentally acceptable, must be assessed. The payoff of this effort is the timely availability of a corrosion and materials compatibility data base. Such a data base provides the designer, manufacturer, user, and maintainer with the confidence necessary for the successful application of these materials in systems. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive; economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

 

4.7.38. (U) Special Operation and Future Transport Structures (SOAFTS). Develop and demonstrate advanced metallic structural technologies that enable AMC and AFSOC tactical and special operations to effectively increase their transport and special operations-type aircraft performance and effectiveness, through reduced maintenance downtime and increased fatigue life. DEFICIENCY LINKAGES: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive; economic service life of combat delivery aircraft, including effects of structural corrosion, is unknown.

4.7.39. (U) Subsystem Integration and Vehicle Management Technology (SIVMAT). Provide integrated aircraft utility subsystem technology that has significant vehicle level benefits in terms of increased performance and lower costs. Effective and affordable operational aircraft will become increasingly dependent upon reliable, efficient and robust supporting utility subsystems, e.g., electrical, cooling, hydraulic, oxygen generation, etc. The current approach to utility subsystems is to have a primary subsystem with a backup which is dead weight until needed. the SIVMAT program will take advantage of emerging technology and integration to reduce the amount of independent but redundant hardware, while integrating the remaining hardware to function in a fault tolerant manner to provide adequate performance and survivability. Development of integrated subsystems will enhance air superiority by reducing weight for better maneuverability, allowing a 20% higher sortie rate, and extending fighter aircraft range by 10% or more. Mission needs for reduced logistics and maintenance are supported with 40% fewer subsystem parts and 50% lower failure rates. Vehicle acquisition costs could be reduced by up to 5%. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

 

Figure 4.14. (U) Combat Delivery Leveraging Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

4.7.40. (U) Quiet Knight Phase III. This program will address key issues from the Quiet Knight technology demonstration and use maturing technology to demonstrate and valid

ate affordability, applicability to all types of SOF platforms, and retrofit/forward fit of complete or partial solutions for a SOF infiltration/exfiltration mission scenario. Specific deficiencies addressed for the infil/exfil type mission scenario include passive detection, situation awareness of active threats, and crew workload. This effort will bring detection avoidance technology closer to the operational user, and allow end users to "fly before you buy." System integration issues to be investigated include sensor/resource management, fault tolerance/configuration, database management and high-speed data distribution, retrofit with existing avionics platform architectures, and extensibility to future high performance architectures. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces lack adequate detection and defensive systems.

4.7.41. (U) Improved Methods for Airlift Cargo Handling (IMACH). Studies of advanced cargo handling concepts have shown that many emerging technologies such as robotics, expert systems, signal processors, sensors, and composite materials can be integrated into a cargo handling system that can significantly improve transshipment at both aerial ports and austere locations. This program will exploit those emerging technologies to autonomously on and off load all types of cargo from military transport aircraft to Army vehicles, existing MHE, or directly to/from the ground. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Combat delivery forces are dependent upon a limited supply of material handling equipment.

4.7.42. (U) Extended Life Tire (EXLITE). Aircraft tire wear has been identified by several sources as a major problem, with the F-16 and F-15E having particularly severe problems. The F-16 Block 30 main tine is averaging only 8-12 landings and the Block 40 main time is averaging only 4-8 landings, resulting in the Air Force buying nearly 70,000 F-16 main tires each year. Conservation of main tire resources during deployments is a continuing problem for F-16 maintenance personnel. The F-15E main tire is averaging only 18-25 landings. There is currently no capability to analytically predict tire wear nor is there any laboratory capability to evaluate the relative performance of potential improvements to tire wear resistance. The F-22 Program has a stated tire wear life requirement of 50 landings per tire although there is currently no laboratory capability to validate a tire's performance against this requirement. The objective of the EXLITE program is to develop and demonstrate technology, analytical life prediction tools, and laboratory test methods for extended life and reliable tires. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.43. (U) Aerospace Fuels Technology. Ensure the continuous, secure availability of fuels and fuel systems that minimize cost, reduce maintenance, and improve performance. This will be accomplished through the validation of new thermally stable (JP-8+100 and JP-900) fuels and fuel system components that provide greater cooling capability. Demonstrate that the improved thermal stability of JP-8+100 reduces fouling in aircraft fuel system components, thereby significantly reducing operation and maintenance costs. Also, provide greater cooling capability and thermal management for upgraded or future systems through advanced high temperature fuel system components. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.44. (U) Electrically Actuated Brake Technology (ELABRAT/D). Of total aircraft hydraulic fluid fires, more than 45% are caused by hydraulic leaks on overheated aircraft brakes. With existing centralized hydraulic supply systems, little can be done to limit the amount of hydraulic fluid available to feed brake fires, other than eliminating or limiting the hydraulic fluid supply to the aircraft brakes. In FY86 the feasibility of the electrically actuated brake system was laboratory demonstrated and validated by a partial taxi test program. The objective of this program is to develop and laboratory qualify the electrically actuated brake using F-16 aircraft brake hardware. A thorough Maintainability, Reparability, and Supportability data base will be generated, as well as quantifying Life Cycle Cost Savings for applying this technology to the

F-16 aircraft. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.45. (U) High Horsepower Electric Stabilator Actuator Flight Test. This flight test is in support of the More Electric Aircraft program. It explores technology for high speed electric actuators. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

4.7.46. (U) High Reliability Inertial Measurement Unit (HRIMU). The effort will develop and demonstrate a totally solid state inertial measurement unit that has a high system reliability (40,000 hours Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MYBCF)), through component/sensor reliability, effective system mechanization, redundancy, reconfigurability, and fault isolation. This effort will be focused on technologies that reduce unit and life cycle cost and result in significant performance improvements for multivehicle applications. This effort has been coordinated with the Aerospace Guidance and Meteorology Center (AGMC) and the Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center. DEFICIENCY LINKAGE: Subsystem sustainability is becoming cost prohibitive.

 

Figure 4.15. (U) Combat Delivery Leveraging Technologies

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

 

5. (U) Post-Investment Assessment. In July1995, the MAP OPR conducted a post investment assessment. Stoplight charts depict post-investment capabilities in Figures 5.1 through 5.3. The assessments are based upon full implementation of the solutions described in this document for each time period. For each task and condition, green equals good capability, yellow equals limited capability, and red equals no capability.

5.1. (U) Near Term. (Figure 5.1) If all near term solution concepts are implemented by FY02, C-130 capabilities will improve to green in most areas. The C-27 will continue to have limited capability in night and inclement weather conditions. Unlike the C-130, it can airdrop only personnel. Configuration control will begin to reduce operations and support costs, but more work is needed in the middle term. Theater aeromedical evacuation support equipment will not be fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft. MAFFS procurement is expected to improve firefighting equipment reliability, not survivability. Unless theater CINCs develop and state their requirement for an airborne combat firefighting system and the equipment is employed with proper aircrew procedures and tactics for hostile environments, future aerial firefighting operations will be limited to NON-HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS ONLY.

 

Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment

Near Term (FY96-02)

Intratheater Flight Operations

Combat

MOOTW

Day

Night

Wx

Day

Night

Wx

Airland

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Airdrop

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Aeromedical Evacuation

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Support PSYOPS

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Aerial Firefighting Ops

C-130

N/A

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Aerial Spray Ops

C-130

Green

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Other Tasks

Train Mission-Ready Personnel

C-130

Green

C-27

Green

Reduce O&S Costs and

Sustain Efficient Ops

C-130

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Maintain Timely Flow from

POE to POD

C-130

Green

C-27

N/A

Pack/Configure/Assemble

for Movement

C-130

Green

C-27

Green

Figure 5.1. (U) - Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment - Near Term

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

5.2. (U) Mid Term. (Figure 5.2) The C-27 will continue to have limited capability in night and inclement weather conditions. Theater aeromedical evacuation support equipment will not be fully compatible with combat delivery aircraft. The integrated cockpit avionics modification for C-130 will further improve configuration management and reduce operations and support costs significantly.

Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment

Mid Term (FY03-10)

Intratheater Flight Operations

Combat

MOOTW

Day

Night

Wx

Day

Night

Wx

Airland

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Airdrop

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

Green

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Aeromedical Evacuation

C-130

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

C-27

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Yellow

Support PSYOPS

C-130

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Aerial Firefighting Ops

C-130

N/A

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Aerial Spray Ops

C-130

Green

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Other Tasks

Train Mission-Ready Personnel

C-130

Green

C-27

Green

Reduce O&S Costs and

Sustain Efficient Ops

C-130

Green

C-27

Green

Maintain Timely Flow from

POE to POD

C-130

Green

C-27

N/A

Pack/Configure/Assemble

for Movement

C-130

Green

C-27

Green

Figure 5.2. (U) - Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment - Mid Term

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

5.3. (U) Far Term. (Figure 5.3) The Advanced Theater Transport will begin to replace the existing combat delivery fleet in approximately FY16. It will have at least the same capabilities as the C-130J, reduce operations and support costs, and be compatible with aeromedical evacuation support equipment. The C-27 fleet is expected to reach service life in FY13 and will not exist at the end of the far term.

Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment

Far Term (FY11-21)

Intratheater Flight Operations

Combat

MOOTW

Day

Night

Wx

Day

Night

Wx

Airland

C-130/

ATT

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Airdrop

C-130/

ATT

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Aeromedical Evacuation

C-130/

ATT

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

C-27

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Support PSYOPS

C-130/

ATT

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Green

Aerial Firefighting Ops

C-130/

ATT

N/A

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Aerial Spray Ops

C-130/

ATT

Green

N/A

N/A

Green

N/A

N/A

Other Tasks

Train Mission-Ready Personnel

C-130/

ATT

Green

C-27

N/A

Reduce O&S Costs and

Sustain Efficient Ops

C-130/

ATT

Green

C-27

N/A

Maintain Timely Flow from

POE to POD

C-130/

ATT

Green

C-27

N/A

Pack/Configure/Assemble

for Movement

C-130/

ATT

Green

C-27

N/A

Figure 5.3. (U) - Combat Delivery Post Investment Assessment - Far Term

This figure is UNCLASSIFIED

6. (U) Summary. The proposed investment strategy for combat delivery emphasizes reliability and maintainability improvements in current operational systems and modification of those systems with capabilities required to perform the mission. Modifications will depend on current technology and off-the-shelf equipment. During these R&M and modification efforts, technology developments in materials, design, and avionics will be pursued. These technology developments will then be incorporated into the next generation of combat delivery operational assets. As the combat delivery fleet, particularly active C-130Es, begins to reach the end of its service life in the first decade of the next century, an acquisition program for replacement aircraft is critical. This strategy depends heavily on current technologies applied in new ways.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

 

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center

ACC Air Combat Command

ACRS Advanced Cargo Restraint System

ADI Attitude Directional Indicator

ADS Aircraft Defensive Systems

ADSB Aerial Delivery Support Branch

ADSF Aerial Delivery Support Flight

AE Aeromedical Evacuation

AECC Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center

AES Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFCC Air Force Component Commander

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFMSS Air Force Mission Support System

AFR Air Force Regulation

AFRES Air Force Reserve

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AG Airlift Group

AGE Aerospace Ground Equipment

AGL Above Ground Level

AIS Air Intelligence Squadron

ALC Air Logistics Center

ALCC Airlift Coordination Cell

ALCF Airlift Control Flight

ALCS Airlift Control Squadron

ALO Air Liaison Officer

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMCF Air Mobility Control Flight

AMCS Air Mobility Control Squadron

AME Air Mobility Element

AMOG Air Mobility Operations Group

AMOS Air Mobility Operations Squadron

AMPS Automated Mission Planning System

AMS Airlift Mission Schedule

AMT Air Movement Table

ANG Air National Guard

ANGRC Air National Guard Readiness Center

AOB Airlift Operations Branch

AOC Air Operations Center

AOG Air Operations Group

AOR Area of Responsibility

APOE Aerial Port of Embarkation

APS Aerial Port Squadron

ARC Airlift Reserve Component

AS Airlift Squadron

ASC Aeronautical Systems Center

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATD Aircrew Training Device

ATO Air Tasking Order

ATS Aircrew Training System

ATT Advanced Theater Transport

AW Airlift Wing

AWADS Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System

CADS Combat Aerial Delivery School

CAF Combat Air Forces

CAMS Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance System

CARP Computed Air Release Point

CCS Combat Control Squadron

CCT Combat Control Team

CCTS Combat Crew Training School

C2IPS Command and Control Information Processing System

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CDS Container Delivery System

CHOP Change in Operational Control

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CMLSA Commercial Microwave Landing System Avionics

COCOM Combatant Command

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONUS Continental United States

CTAPS Contingency Theater Automated Planning System

CWDE Chemical Warfare Defense Ensemble

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

DBOF-T Defense Business Operating Fund-Transportation

DOC Design Operational Capability

DoD Department of Defense

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DRLM Digital Radar Landmass

DZ Drop Zone

DZCO Drop Zone Control Officer

DZST Drop Zone Support Team

ENAF Emergency Nuclear Airlift Forces

ERO Engine Running Offload/Onload

ESKE Enhanced Stationkeeping Equipment

ESU Electrical System Upgrade

EW Electronic Warfare

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAP Functional Area Plan

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared

FOA Field Operating Agencies

FOB Forward Operating Base

FOL Forward Operating Location

FY Fiscal Year

FYDP Future Years Defense Plan

GCAS Ground Collision Avoidance System

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GDSS Global Decision Support System

GPS Global Positioning System

HE Heavy Equipment

HF High Frequency

HSI Horizontal Situational Indicator

IAW In Accordance With

ICAO International Civil Aeronautics Organization

IETM Interactive Electronic Technical Manual

IFPS Intraformation Positioning System

ILS Instrument Landing System

IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions

INS Inertial Navigation System

INU Inertial Navigation Unit

IP Instructor Pilot

IPT Integrated Product Team

IR Infrared

IRCM Infrared Countermeasures

IR&D Independent Research and Development

JA/ATT Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFC Joint Force Commander

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander

JI Joint Inspection

JMC Joint Movement Center

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

J-SEAD Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

JTF Joint Task Force

KIAS Knots, Indicated Airspeed

KTAS Knots, True Airspeed

LOS Line-of-Sight

LRU Line Replaceable Unit

LZ Landing Zone

MAA Mission Area Assessment

MAC Military Airlift Command

MAFFS Modular Airborne Firefighting System

MAJCOM Major Command

MAP Mission Area Plan

MCR Multi-Command Regulation

MDS Mission Design Series

MHE Material Handling Equipment

MLS Microwave Landing System

MMLS Mobile Microwave Landing System

MNA Mission Need Analysis

MNS Mission Need Statement

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOB Main Operation Base

MOD Mission Operating Directive

MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War

MRC Major Regional Contingency

MRSP Mobility Readiness Spares Package

MRT Maintenance Recovery Team

MSE Mission Support Element

MSL Mean Sea Level

MSPO Mission Support Planning Office

MST Mission Support Team

MSTS Multi-Source Tactical System

MTBF Mean Time Between Failures

NAF Numbered Air Force

NCA National Command Authorities

NGB National Guard Bureau

NM Nautical Mile

NVG Night Vision Goggles

NVIS Night Vision Imaging System

O&M Operations and Maintenance

O&S Operations and Support

OPCON Operational Control

ORD Operational Requirements Document

OSA Operational Support Airlift

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAI Primary Aircraft Inventory

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PMAI Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory

POD Port of Debarkation

POE Port of Embarkation

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

PSYOP Psychological Operations

QFD Quality Function Deployment

RADINT Radar Intelligence

RF Radio Frequency

RTIC Real Time Information in the Cockpit

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima

RWR Radar Warning Receiver

SAAM Special Assignment Airlift Mission

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SAR Search and Rescue

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SCNS Self-Contained Navigation System

SBSS Standard Base Supply System

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SKE Stationkeeping Equipment

SLEP Service Life Extension Program

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOLL Special Operations Low Level

SON Statement of Operational Need

STT Strategy-to-Task

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

TACC Tanker Airlift Control Center

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

TACS Theater Air Control System

TAES Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System

TALCE Tanker Airlift Control Element

TALO Theater Airlift Liaison Officer

TBM Theater Battle Management

TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System

TCTO Time Compliance Technical Order

TF Training Flight

TO Technical Order

TPIPT Technology Planning Integrated Product Team

TRANSCOM Transportation Command

TTN Task-to-Need

UHF Ultra-High Frequency

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USFS United States Forest Service

UTC Unit Type Code

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

VOR VHF Omni-Directional Range

WCCS Wing Command and Control System

WMP War and Mobilization Plan

WOC Wing Operations Center

WR-ALC Warner Robins Air Logistics Center

WST Weapon System Trainer

WX Weather

WWMCCS World-Wide Military Command and Control System

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOTE: FOR GENERAL PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION, CLASSIFIED ANNEXES B, C, AND D ARE REMOVED. ALL ARE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER.