Index

Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces,
but Challenges Remain (Letter Report, 07/18/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-162).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's largest
ongoing initiatives integrating active and reserve combat units,
focusing on the effects of these efforts on the Army's: (1) total costs;
(2) force structure; (3) personnel tempo; and (4) risk in carrying out
the national military strategy.

GAO noted that: (1) integration adds to the Army's total costs; (2) due
to their part-time status, reserve forces are less costly to maintain
than their active counterparts, but integration raises the Army's total
personnel costs when reservists deploy to peacekeeping missions and are
paid for more than 39 days of service; (3) integration also increases
transportation costs, as active or reserve forces travel to participate
in integrated training; (4) since the Army is implementing integration
in a piecemeal fashion, it has not collected comprehensive figures to
measure the cost of integration, has not established cost goals, and has
not determined what cost increases would be acceptable to achieve a
totally integrated force; (5) integration creates new force structure
requirements, as new units are established and the numbers of positions
within existing units increase; (6) these new requirements have been
small, and the Army has reduced requirements in other areas to
compensate for these new requirements; (7) however, as integration and
the roles of the reserves increase, new requirements could grow
significantly, and the Army would have to make major force structure
adjustments to maintain its authorized force structure level; (8) none
of the Army's integration plans discuss the current operational
environment, in which the Army is short on the forces it needs to
conduct two major theater wars, while its personnel level remains
constant; (9) nor do these plans set forth evaluation strategies that
would enable the Army to assess whether reserve forces are properly
structured to carry out new roles; (10) integration generally increases
the time personnel must spend away from home; (11) as deployment
requirements shift, some active forces spend less time away from home,
while reservists spend more time deployed away from home; (12) the Army
has yet to assess fully the effects of integration on the time personnel
spend away from home or on retention; (13) integration could reduce the
Army's risk in executing the national military strategy in the long term
by increasing the training and readiness levels of both active and
reserve forces; (14) however, National Guard wartime support to active
forces may not be as strong as expected; (15) without clearly
established goals for its overall integration efforts, the Army will
have difficulty measuring progress toward its objective of a fully
integrated force; and (16) integration initiatives may even run counter
to other major Army objectives such as ensuring that first-to-fight
combat divisions are filled with qualified personnel (such as medics).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-00-162
     TITLE:  Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve
	     Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain
      DATE:  07/18/2000
   SUBJECT:  Army personnel
	     Mobilization
	     Combat readiness
	     Defense contingency planning
	     Armed forces reserves
	     Military cost control
	     Human resources utilization
	     Military training
IDENTIFIER:  Bosnia
	     Army Force XXI Institutional Redesign

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************

GAO/NSIAD-00-162

Appendix I: Other Army Integration Initiatives

38

Appendix II: Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives We
Reviewed

40

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

42

Appendix IV: Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task
Forces Through 2003

45

Appendix V: Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited
Conversions

46

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense

48

Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999) 7

Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters
and Enhanced Separate Brigades 9

Figure 3: Locations of the Army's Four Divisional Teams 11

DOD Department of Defense

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-285228

July 18, 2000

Congressional Committees

For nearly three decades, the Department of Defense has had a "total force"
policy in place aimed at maintaining the smallest possible active duty force
and complementing it with reserve forces. As the military downsized in the
1990s, it increased its emphasis on the total force concept and sought new
ways to use both active and reserve components effectively. The Department
of Defense has emphasized the importance of integration as one way to do
this, but without clearly defining integration.1 In its broadest sense,
integration could be considered as any arrangement or event that brings
members from two or more components together for a common purpose. It can
include formal arrangements to share information or joint participation in
training exercises and overseas deployments.

The majority of the Army's forces reside in the Army National Guard and the
U.S. Army Reserve,2 and the Army depends heavily on these reserve forces as
it plans for missions ranging from peacekeeping to two major theater wars.3
In 1999, the Army Chief of Staff said that completing the full integration
of the active and reserve components was one of his six main objectives.
However, like the Department of Defense, the Army has yet to define what it
means by full integration.

The Army recently began to focus on efforts to integrate active and reserve
combat units. Previously, most reservists who deployed with active forces
came from support units, not combat units. This changed in March 2000, when
an Army National Guard combat division assumed headquarters responsibilities
in Bosnia for the first time. This headquarters is commanding U.S. Army
active and reserve troops, as well as multinational forces. The integration
of this combat task force in Bosnia is one of the Army's key integration
efforts. It also has a number of other integration initiatives underway.

As agreed with your offices, this report focuses on four of the Army's
largest ongoing initiatives integrating active and reserve combat units:
(1) integrated divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3)
teaming, and (4) the integrated task force in Bosnia. Specifically, we
assessed the effects of these efforts on the Army's total costs, force
structure,4 personnel tempo,5 and risk in carrying out the national military
strategy. This is the fourth in a series of reports issued in response to
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, which requires
us to review the adequacy of the Army's forces in carrying out the national
military strategy.6

The Army's ongoing efforts are increasing the integration of active and
reserve combat forces. However, because the Army has not clearly defined its
goal of fully integrating its active and reserve forces, it cannot precisely
measure and fully evaluate the effects of these efforts. Nonetheless, we
found that integration generally affects the Army in the following ways:

 It adds to the Army's total costs. Due to their part-time status, reserve
forces are less costly to maintain than their active counterparts, but
integration raises the Army's total personnel costs when reservists deploy
to peacekeeping missions and are paid for more than 39 days of service (the
norm for reservists that do not deploy). Integration also increases
transportation costs, as active or reserve forces travel to participate in
integrated training. Since the Army is implementing integration in a
piecemeal fashion, it has not collected comprehensive figures to measure the
cost of integration, has not established cost goals, and has not determined
what cost increases would be acceptable to achieve a totally integrated
force. Further, many aspects of the integration initiatives are unfunded--as
a result, resources are being taken away from other reserve requirements,
and in some cases, soldiers are shouldering higher transportation costs.

 It creates new force structure requirements, as new units are established
and the numbers of positions within existing units increase. To date, these
new requirements have been small, and the Army has reduced requirements in
other areas to compensate for these new requirements. However, as
integration and the roles of the reserves increase, new requirements could
grow significantly, and the Army would have to make major force structure
adjustments to maintain its authorized force structure level. The Army's
current approach of pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative
basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts, may make it
difficult to evaluate the merits of these initiatives. None of the Army's
integration plans discuss the current operational environment, in which the
Army is short on the forces it needs to conduct two major theater wars,
while its personnel level remains constant. Nor do these plans set forth
evaluation strategies that would enable the Army to assess whether reserve
forces are properly structured to carry out new roles.

 It generally increases the time personnel must spend away from home. As
deployment requirements shift, some active forces spend less time away from
home, while reservists spend more time deployed away from home. Although
integration just shifts deployment requirements from active to reserve
forces, it generally increases training times for both active and reserve
forces. The Army has yet to assess fully the effects of integration on the
time personnel spend away from home or on retention.

 It could reduce the Army's risk in executing the national military
strategy in the long term by increasing the training and readiness levels of
both active and reserve forces, as the Army expects. However, Guard wartime
support to active forces may not be as strong as expected. Mobilization
times may limit Guard support to early-deploying active forces. Geographic
separations of more than 1,000 miles between some Guard units and their
active partners, as well as Guard equipment that is older and incompatible
with active equipment, may also limit the Guard's support to active units.
Without clearly established goals for its overall integration efforts, the
Army will have difficulty measuring progress toward its objective of a fully
integrated force. Integration initiatives may even run counter to other
major Army objectives such as ensuring that first-to-fight combat divisions
are filled with qualified personnel (such as medics).

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching
plan to guide the Army's integration efforts and examine whether the forces,
equipment, and training priorities assigned to the National Guard are
consistent with its increased roles. We are also recommending that the
Secretary of Defense review current conditions, in which reservists incur
increased transportation costs, to determine whether changes should be
initiated so that reservists could be reimbursed for their transportation
costs. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense (DOD) agreed with our recommendations concerning the need to review
priorities assigned to the National Guard and the need to examine
transportation costs incurred by reservists but did not agree with the need
for an overarching integration plan. It stated that integration guidance and
principles can be found in several Army and DOD documents and that a variety
of organizations are available to oversee the integration effort. We
retained our recommendation calling for an overarching integration plan
because none of the documents DOD cited contain measurable goals or the firm
criteria necessary to guide and evaluate integration efforts. Also, none of
the existing oversight bodies has provided a clear integration strategy for
the Army to follow.

The Army has a number of efforts7 underway to integrate its active and
reserve forces. We focused on four division-level8 integration efforts that
could affect a large portion of the Army's combat forces: (1) integrated
divisions, (2) Force XXI heavy division redesign, (3) teaming, and (4)
integrated task forces for Bosnia. The methods of integration vary among and
even within the four integration efforts. Some involve integration of all
three components (Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve), while
others involve only forces from the Active and Guard components. The Army
Reserve contains over one-fourth of the Army's total support forces, but its
combat units are limited to one infantry battalion and two Apache helicopter
battalions. All of the Army's combat brigades and combat divisions reside in
the active Army or the National Guard. (See fig.1.)

Source: Army National Guard Bureau.

Two of the major initiatives that we reviewed (the integrated divisions and
teaming) currently integrate only National Guard and active Army units but
may involve Army Reserve forces in the future. The Force XXI heavy division
redesign, and to a limited extent the Bosnia task forces, integrate forces
from all three components, but Reserve involvement is limited mainly to the
integration of individuals rather than units. Below are brief descriptions
of the four initiatives.

Integrated divisions. In October 1999, the Army created two integrated
divisions, one heavy9 (the 24th Infantry) and one light (the 7th Infantry).
Each division was formed by joining a newly created, small, active division
headquarters10 and three existing National Guard enhanced brigades.11 During
this initiative's 2-year evaluation period, the active headquarters are
expected to provide guidance and oversight to improve the training and
readiness of the enhanced brigades. When viewed as composite units, these
divisions are integrated. However, active and Guard soldiers within each
division are separated both organizationally and geographically. The
division headquarters are staffed with active Army soldiers,12 while the
enhanced brigades are staffed with National Guard soldiers. The active
headquarters are located in Colorado and Kansas, while their enhanced
brigades are located in Oregon, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Georgia, and North and
South Carolina. (See fig. 2.)

Source: Army.

Currently, the integrated divisions are not intended or able to deploy.13
However, in October 2001, after examining the training and readiness levels
of the enhanced brigades, the Army will decide whether to (1) expand the
integrated divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, (2) maintain
them as a means of enhancing training and readiness, or (3) disband them.

Teaming. This initiative is the most flexible, least clearly defined
integration effort that we reviewed. It began in October 1998 with two teams
(each made up of one active and one Guard division) and was later expanded
to include two additional teams.14 According to the Army, teaming should
increase its ability to respond across the full spectrum of military
operations by establishing or strengthening the training and operational
relationships of the teamed divisions. Teaming activities include joint
training at the National Training Center, as well as support during
deployment training and preparation. The initiative is being implemented
differently by each team, and the teams have wide discretion to adopt
whatever approach they think is best, as long as the teaming relationship is
mutually beneficial. The headquarters usually coordinate teaming exercises
and activities, but actual integration generally occurs at lower
organizational levels--at the company and even individual level.15 Although
geographic proximity was one of the factors the Army considered when it
established the teams, only one Guard division is located near its active
division partner. The other three Guard divisions are located between 530
and 1,550 miles away from their active teaming partners.
(See fig. 3.)

Source: Army.

Force XXI heavy division redesign. Under this initiative, the Army is
conducting a series of war-fighting experiments to create a more deployable
force that uses emerging technology to increase its capabilities. By using
digital information to quickly identify and transmit the locations of
friendly and enemy forces,16 the Army found it could reduce the size of its
heavy divisions while also increasing the area covered by those divisions.
Also, by integrating reserve forces into the new design, the Army found it
could reduce the number of required active personnel. The Force XXI heavy
division redesign is the Army's most complex integration initiative because
it (1) involves all three components, (2) integrates personnel at all levels
throughout the division, and (3) entails changes in equipment, force
structure, and number of personnel in the division. Furthermore, the test
division for the redesign (the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas) is
also involved in the Army's teaming initiative.17

Although the Guard was required to fill 257 positions and the Reserve 258
positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the two reserve components
approached integration differently. The Guard provided some large units
(such as a multiple-launch rocket system battery), while the Reserve
assigned individuals (primarily junior soldiers with little or no prior
service experience). About one-quarter of the Army Reserve positions were
designated for soldiers who agreed to serve full-time for 2 years with the
division. The Army planned to use the 4th Infantry Division's integration as
a model for the Force XXI redesign of its other heavy forces.

Bosnia Task Force. The Army Chief of Staff considers the Bosnia task force
one of the service's top integration efforts. Reservists have participated
in Bosnia task forces since operations began in 1995. However, in 1998, the
Army altered its staffing philosophy when it tasked the 49th Armored
Division, Texas Army National Guard, to be the division headquarters for the
seventh Bosnia stabilization force rotation. During that rotation, which
will last through October 2000, the 49th will command active Army and
multinational forces, as well as other Guard forces. Appendix IV shows the
other Guard and active units scheduled to lead and participate in future
integrated Bosnia task forces through April 2003.

Unchanged

Integration is not free, but the Army has not precisely quantified its cost.
It is difficult to determine the cost of individual integration efforts
because expenses are tracked at different levels in separate Guard and
active accounts. It is even more difficult to determine the Army's total
integration costs because the Army is pursuing integration in a piecemeal
fashion and has not collected or consolidated the costs of individual
integration efforts. As a result, the Army has not fully assessed the cost
impacts of integration on each component. Despite data limitations, there is
evidence that integration leads to higher costs for the Army as a whole,
primarily through increased reserve personnel costs. It is also evident that
funding priorities have not been fully updated to reflect the increased use
of Guard and Reserve forces in training and operations. While the Army has
provided some funding for integration efforts such as the integrated Bosnia
task force, it has left other efforts largely unfunded. This means that some
costs of integration are being absorbed by Guard and Reserve units
themselves or even by individual soldiers.

The Army's total force policy, which is designed to maintain a small active
force that can be augmented by reserve forces in a war, helps the Army
minimize its costs because reserve units generally cost less than comparable
active units. Pay and allowances are generally much lower for reservists
(who are usually paid for only 38 or 39 days per year)18 than for full-time
active soldiers. Operation and maintenance funding is also generally much
lower for the reserves because they train less. For example, operation and
maintenance funding for the California Army National Guard's 40th Infantry
Division was based on 112 miles per tank in fiscal year 2000, compared with
the 800 tank miles that are normally allocated to active heavy divisions.

The Army currently allocates resources on the basis of a unit's placement in
the war plans, and reserve combat units are generally not among the
"first-to-fight" units that receive the highest resources. For example, the
Guard's combat divisions have historically been in the bottom tier of the
Army's four-tier resourcing model because they are not apportioned to either
the first or second major theater war.19

Missions

The integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia
significantly increases the cost of those missions, challenging the premise
that Guard and Reserve units are a low-cost option for the Army. Active Army
soldiers receive the same basic rate of pay, whether they deploy to
peacekeeping missions or remain at their home bases. Therefore, deploying
active soldiers to peacekeeping missions has little effect on the Army's
total pay and allowance costs.20 However, disbursements from Guard or active
Army pay and allowance accounts increase any time reservists train or deploy
for more than 39 days in a year.21

Had the Texas National Guard not been given the mission to lead the
integrated Bosnia task force in 2000, it is likely that Guard soldiers in
the 49th Armored Division would have received 39 days of pay in fiscal
years 1999, 2000, and 2001, for a total of 117 days. The 49th Armored
Division estimates that its deployed soldiers will average 378 days of pay
over that period.22 Therefore, total Army pay and allowances will rise by
261 days for each of the more than 500 soldiers from the 49th Armored
Division deployed to Bosnia.

The integrated Bosnia task force commanded by the 49th also includes 143
soldiers from the 111th Engineer Battalion of the Texas Army National Guard,
105 soldiers from the Maryland National Guard, and other smaller groups of
Guard and Reserve soldiers, all of whom were mobilized for 270 days. In
total, the cost increase from the Guard's participation in this integrated
task force exceeds 190,000 man-days of pay and allowances.

The use of reserve forces for peacekeeping missions can also lead to higher
equipment costs. Procurement costs can increase if the Army upgrades reserve
equipment to make it compatible with that of deploying active units.
Operation and maintenance costs can also increase when reserve equipment is
used for more than the normal 39 days per year or when equipment is
transferred from one unit to another. For example, the Guard's 49th Armored
Division incurred additional equipment costs when it borrowed more than 20
intelligence analyst workstations from the intelligence school at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, to prepare for deployment to Bosnia. The borrowed
equipment did not add to procurement costs, but it added to total equipment
costs because it cost approximately $400,000 to install the workstations and
load the required software.23 After the 49th Division deployed, the
workstations had to be disassembled and shipped back to Fort Huachuca
because the 49th, like all Guard divisions, is in the bottom tier of the
Army's resourcing system. The Army is likely to incur additional equipment
costs as the Guard's 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions prepare to deploy to
Bosnia.

Reserve Soldiers Bear Some Cost Increases

The integration of reserve soldiers into a previously all active division
increases total Army costs. Declines in active positions within the division
did not result in cost savings because active personnel levels throughout
the Army remained the same.24 However, increases in reserve positions
increased costs because the Army Reserve recruited some soldiers
specifically for 2-year full-time positions in the active 4th Infantry
Division. In addition, transferred reservists traveled further to Fort Hood
(the 4th Infantry Division location) than they traveled to their previous
reserve units, thus increasing their out-of-pocket expenses.

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division and III Corps cited travel costs as
one of their main Force XXI resource concerns. According to 4th Infantry
Division records, 89 percent of reserve soldiers in the division list their
homes of record as being more than 100 miles from Fort Hood. However,
reservists traveling to Fort Hood must fund all transportation costs
themselves because Joint Federal Travel Regulations prohibit the Army from
reimbursing soldiers for expenses incurred traveling to and from their
normal monthly training sites.25 Officials at both the 4th Infantry Division
and the III Corps said they expect reserve retention rates to drop if
soldiers are not compensated for their travel. They requested relief from
the travel regulations, citing the DOD instruction that defines 50 miles as
a reasonable commuting distance.26 The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel recommended pursuing other options, and the Army is now
considering paying soldiers an extra allowance to offset some travel costs.
However, this allowance would go to all reservists in the division,
regardless of the distance they travel, so while the allowance may help some
reservists, it is not an equitable solution to the problem.27 The same
challenge will face other heavy combat divisions and brigades as they
attempt to implement the Force XXI redesign because less than 5 percent of
the National Guard's armories are located within 50 miles of the Army's
active heavy forces.28

The teaming initiative, which is not scheduled for funding until 2002, is
being supported at the expense of other requirements in some Guard units.
The U.S. Army Forces Command has funded some costs for teaming exercises and
activities, but reserve pay and allowances for training must be paid from
reserve accounts. The National Guard Bureau has provided extra pay and
allowances to Guard divisions that participate in teaming rotations to the
National Training Center, but the divisions themselves must fund the extra
training necessary to prepare for the rotations. This affects other division
requirements. For example, the California National Guard's 40th Infantry
Division reported that it cost over $2 million to support the teaming
initiative in 1999, with nearly $700,000 coming from the division itself.
Division officials told us that in the absence of teaming, the $700,000
could have been used for other needed training such as crew certification.
In January 2000, the 40th Infantry Division had less than one-fourth of its
required number of certified M1 tank crews.

Other Guard and active divisions have also reported increased costs to
support the teaming initiative. For example, the Texas Army National Guard's
49th Armored Division reported that between November 1998 and May 2000, it
cost more than $1.1 million to support its teaming partner, the 1st Cavalry
Division.29 Reserve pay and allowances accounted for most of the cost
increases, but transportation costs also increased. Cost increases for
active divisions have been smaller than those for Guard divisions because
active personnel are already paid for full-time service. The active 4th
Infantry Division reported spending only about $15,000 for teaming in fiscal
year 1999 and expected to spend about $50,000 in fiscal year 2000. The
active 1st Cavalry Division reported that it spends approximately $20,000 on
teaming events each year.

Integration is increasing the costs of maintaining Guard and Reserve forces
because the Army is asking these forces to do more. This trend is likely to
continue, as indicated by plans such as the Reserve Component Employment
Study 2005, which is studying ways to enhance the role of the reserve
components in the full range of military operations. While current Army
integration plans are consistent with DOD's goal of making greater use of
Guard and Reserve forces, they have not altered basic resource allocations
or even identified the level of funding necessary to achieve this goal. For
example, the four Guard divisions involved in the Army's teaming initiative
have remained in the fourth funding tier,30 with the same basic resource
allocation level as the other four Guard divisions that are not teamed.

The same is true for the six Guard enhanced brigades in the integrated
divisions. They have remained at the same resourcing level as the other nine
enhanced brigades that are not involved with the integrated divisions.
Because of this situation, some Guard officials have questioned whether the
Army is fully committed to integration. The commanding officer of one Guard
unit, for example, said that lack of integration funding could seriously
jeopardize the success of his unit's integration initiative. He said the
initiative was unfunded under his predecessor and is scheduled to remain
unfunded during his entire time in command, and that by the time the program
is finally funded in 2002, it may be too late for successful implementation.

Because the Army has not estimated the costs of its integration efforts and
does not collect comprehensive figures to measure their costs, it is
difficult for the Army to assess accurately the funding needs of affected
units. Without a better understanding of integration's costs, it is also
difficult for the Army to weigh effectively the merits of funding
integration instead of other priorities.31 If it continues to view
integration from a piecemeal perspective, rather than in the context of a
broad overarching integration strategy, the Army may also find it difficult
to assess the validity of funding requirements for integration. For example,
directing the Guard's 49th Armored Division to return the intelligence
workstations borrowed from Fort Huachuca may be reasonable if the division's
deployment to Bosnia is a one-time event. However, if the 49th is expected
to assist in future peacekeeping operations, or if DOD's Reserve Component
Employment Study 2005 determines that Guard divisions should be apportioned
to war plans, then it may be more cost-effective for the 49th to have its
own work stations so it can sustain future training.

Integration has led to new force structure requirements, as the Army has
created new units and increased the size of some existing units. The Army
has limited these new requirements by (1) shifting positions from one
component to another, (2) assigning units more than one role (known as
dual-missioning), and (3) assigning individuals responsibilities for more
than one job (dual-hatting). Since force structure levels are remaining
constant, the Army is adjusting other requirements to compensate for the
small increases currently associated with integration. Over the long term,
however, Army integration could lead to larger increases in new
requirements, which would require more significant force structure
adjustments. Such adjustments could be problematic for Army leaders because
the Army is already experiencing shortfalls in the forces needed to conduct
two major wars. Any force structure increases that result from integration
would have to be offset by decreases elsewhere throughout the force, because
Army end strength is not increasing. To date, Army plans have not addressed
this issue.

Divisions

Under Force XXI, the Army is reducing the size of its heavy divisions and
integrating them by setting aside positions for all three components. The
design was modified several times during planning and testing, and reserve
positions peaked at 515 in 1999. Later, however, the 4th Infantry Division
recognized that active forces were better suited for some of these positions
and requested, and received authorization, to convert 40 reserve positions
back to active positions. Although the original plan was to replicate the
division's design in other active heavy divisions, the next division
scheduled to convert to the Force XXI design--the 1st Cavalry Division--will
adopt a modified design based on the experiences of the 4th Infantry
Division.

Most of the 515 reserve positions in the 4th Infantry's test design did not
add to the division's force structure because they were not new positions
but simply replacements for former active positions. One dual-mission unit
(a multiple-launch rocket system battery from the Guard's 49th Armored
Division) accounts for about one-fifth of all reserve positions in the 4th
Infantry Division. This unit replaced one of the 4th Infantry Division's
active artillery units and at the same time maintained its 49th Armored
Division responsibilities. Guard and Reserve positions also replaced active
medical, aviation support, and staff positions without adding to the
division's force structure. However, the dual-mission general support
aviation battalion from the Guard's 49th Armored Division did add 65
positions to the 4th Infantry Division's force structure because it added
capability rather than replacing an active unit. Increasing ambulance crews
from two to three people by adding one Reserve soldier to each crew also
added to the division's force structure.

Increase Substantially

Although integration has created few additional positions so far, if the
Army decides to transform the two integrated divisions into deployable
war-fighting units in 2001, these could have a much greater impact on force
structure. The Army used 285 new active positions to create the headquarters
for the two integrated divisions. However, 86 of these new positions were
filled by dual-hatted personnel with responsibilities both in the integrated
divisions and on the active bases where they serve. For example, the
commander of the 7th Infantry Division is responsible for overseeing the
training and readiness of the division's three enhanced brigades in Oregon,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas, but he is also base commander at Fort Carson,
Colorado. As such, he is responsible for supporting active forces at Fort
Carson, Colorado, including the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment that deployed
to Bosnia in the integrated task force led by the Guard's 49th Armored
Division.

In some cases, the new active positions were created at the expense of other
units. For example, the Army transferred 140 active duty positions into the
new divisions from units that were supporting reserve training under the
Title XI program.32 As a result, the integrated divisions' enhanced brigades
will receive more support from the active Army, but other reserve forces
will lose some of the assistance they were receiving under the program.

Although force structure growth in the integrated divisions has been small,
this initiative could have the greatest force structure growth of any
integration initiative, depending on the Army's decision at the end of the
2-year evaluation period. If the Army transforms either or both of the test
divisions into deployable war-fighting divisions, training and logistics
requirements will increase, and the active headquarters positions may
require full-time rather than dual-hatted personnel. In addition, missing
divisional structure such as an aviation brigade, division artillery, and
division support command would need to be added.33 To pursue this
alternative, the Army would need approval from the Secretary of Defense to
add to its current 18-division structure (10 active and 8 National Guard).
However, if the Army maintains these divisions as a means of improving the
training and readiness of the enhanced brigades, the current small
headquarters and dual-hatting arrangement might continue with no further
force structure changes. If the Army decides to disband the integrated
divisions, the active Army would regain the positions from the two small
headquarters units.

Intelligence Forces

To date, the participation of Guard divisions in peacekeeping missions has
not required increases in reserve positions. However, the 49th Armored
Division's assignment as headquarters to the Bosnia mission highlighted
shortages within its intelligence force structure, and the Guard has
proposed adding about 900 new positions to its divisional intelligence
forces. Although the proposal is designed to better position the Guard to
respond to the full spectrum of operations, not just peacekeeping, an
increase in divisional intelligence forces would make it easier to staff
future Guard deployments to Bosnia. If the Army accepts the Guard proposal,
it would increase the size of three National Guard division military
intelligence battalions from their current cadre status to the
full-strength levels characteristic of their active counterparts by adding
about 300 positions to each battalion.34

As it prepared for its rotation in Bosnia, the 49thArmored Division found
that its military intelligence battalion was not properly structured for the
mission. Because of the mission's large force protection and human
intelligence requirements, the division had to draw people from several
different units. It took some intelligence personnel from its own small
cadre military intelligence battalion, some from the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment--the major active Army unit involved in the mission--and the bulk
from the Guard's 629th military intelligence battalion, part of the Guard's
29th Infantry Division. The 629th is the only Guard division military
intelligence battalion with the same force structure level as active
military intelligence battalions.

The next Guard division scheduled to command the integrated Bosnia task
force (in October 2001) is the 29th Infantry Division. However, the 29th
will not be able to use its own 629th Military Intelligence Battalion
because Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority35 is limited to 270
days per operational mission, and the 629th already mobilized for 270 days
for its current deployment to Bosnia with the 49th Armored Division.
Therefore, like the 49th Armored Division, the 29th Infantry Division will
have to draw its intelligence resources from several other units. The
current Guard proposal to add about 900 soldiers to Guard division military
intelligence battalions could reduce the number of units involved in future
peacekeeping rotations and could help the Guard deploy its intelligence
battalions with their parent divisions in the future. However, it is
unlikely to eliminate the need to draw some personnel from other units
because intelligence battalions are structured for war-fighting, not
peacekeeping. Even fully structured active units do not have all the human
intelligence and force protection personnel needed for peacekeeping.

Decisions

The Army's current method of pursuing integration on an
initiative-by-initiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its
efforts, hampers its ability to evaluate force structure proposals within
the context of overall force structure needs. For example, if the Army
continues to look at the integrated divisions separately from other
integration initiatives and from the Army's other major objectives, it could
decide to increase the size of the integrated divisions to that of full
war-fighting divisions without adequately addressing the effect this would
have on Army units that would lose personnel. Individual integration plans
do not currently specify how integration will help move the Army toward its
goal of maintaining the smallest possible active force while maximizing the
effectiveness of its reserve forces.

Increases Reserve Personnel Tempo

Integration provides relief to some active forces by decreasing their
deployment times, but reserve deployments must increase to offset this
decline in active deployments. In addition, integration has increased
training requirements for both components. Current shifts and increases in
personnel tempo could affect both active and reserve retention for years to
come. Yet the Army cannot precisely quantify the effects of integration on
retention, and current plans do not specify what retention effects the Army
would consider acceptable as it pursues its overall integration goal.

Sites

Because active soldiers usually work on weekdays and reserves on weekends,
both have had to make some adjustments to support integration. Integrated
training often adds to a unit's normal training requirements, thus requiring
personnel to spend additional time away from home. Furthermore, even when
active and reserve forces are able to satisfy their normal training
requirements by training together, the requirement to train at a common site
may cause either or both to spend additional time away from home. One
officer summed up the situation thus: "Integration means active soldiers
must work more weekends, and reserve soldiers must put their civilian
careers and education on hold more often."

Two categories--dual-hatted active soldiers in the integrated divisions and
Guard soldiers in the teamed divisions--illustrate this point. Dual-hatted
active soldiers at Fort Carson are required to work some weekends to support
reservists in the division's enhanced brigades. This sometimes involves
travel to the enhanced brigades in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Oregon. However,
this does not change requirements that these dual-hatted soldiers support
active units at Fort Carson, such as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment,
during the week. Guard soldiers in teamed divisions often participate in
major training exercises, particularly National Training Center rotations,
in support of their active division partners. Whenever these exercises last
more than 15 days (the usual annual training period), personnel tempo
increases, requiring support from families and employers. Reserve personnel
tempo may also increase because many of these major exercises have training
requirements that must be met before the exercises themselves begin.
Although these personnel tempo increases are not particularly large, some
Guard officials believe they could affect retention because the Guard is
being asked more frequently to participate in active unit National Training
Center rotations throughout the year, with relatively short notice.36

Active Forces but Not to Others

Guard forces deployed in Bosnia provide relief to some active forces.
However, some heavily used forces, especially those in short supply, do not
see much relief. The Bosnia task forces have focused attention on Guard
forces and the relief they provide to active forces, which as a result need
to deploy less frequently. In particular, the Guard's 49th Armored Division
is relieving strain on the active division headquarters that commanded
previous Bosnia deployments. However, some heavily used occupational
specialties are in short supply in both the active and reserve components,
or they tend to be concentrated in one component or the other. These include
military police and specialists in fire support, petroleum supply,
ammunition, intelligence, and medicine. As a result, personnel that need the
most relief from frequent deployments are the least likely to be helped by
integration.

Additionally, those active troops that deploy with Guard units may actually
spend more time away from home than before. For example, the leaders of the
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment trained for their Bosnia deployment during the
week with their active soldiers at Fort Carson, Colorado, then sometimes
flew to Texas on Fridays for weekend training with the Guard's 49th Armored
Division.

One of the primary reasons for creating the integrated Bosnia task forces
was to reduce deployments of active forces and thus hopefully increase their
retention rates. However, the Army has not quantified the expected effects
of integration on retention rates among active forces, and integration's
possible negative effects on retention among reserve forces could offset any
positive effect that may be achieved.

On the basis of a DOD survey of 66,000 active duty military personnel, we
noted in March 2000 that satisfaction dropped significantly among personnel
who were deployed for more than 5 months in 1 year.37 We also showed that
satisfaction and intent to stay in the military are strongly linked. While
the results of the survey are not projectable to reserve soldiers, some
Guard officials told us they believe peacekeeping rotations will have a
negative effect on employer and family support, leading to decreased
retention rates. Guard officials in South Carolina told us that their
upcoming 3-week rotation at the National Training Center had adversely
affected retention for more than a year prior to this scheduled rotation.
They expected retention to drop further if their units were assigned Bosnia
or Kosovo missions.38 Several Guard officials said their soldiers were ready
and willing to fight in a major war, if needed. However, they also said that
their soldiers would have joined the active Army, had they wanted to spend
most of the year on active duty participating in peacekeeping missions.

Concerned about the potential effects of long deployments on retention, the
Army and Joint Staff set a goal in DOD's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan
to have no Army units deploy for more than 120 days (4 months) a year. The
49th Armored Division's current 9-month deployment far exceeds the goal, but
in March 2000, the Army announced that it would limit future overseas
deployments to 179 days (6 months).39 Although these future deployments are
planned to be much shorter than the 49th's deployment, they will still
exceed the goal by 59 days.

The Army is moving ahead with plans to deploy Guard combat units to all
Bosnia deployments in the next 3 years, despite a lack of hard data on the
effects of long peacekeeping deployments on reserve retention rates.40 Some
Army officials believe that spreading out deployments over a larger portion
of active and reserve forces will increase overall retention. However, until
the 49th Armored Division returns from Bosnia, this theory will remain
untested. Because the cost of replacing soldiers has almost doubled since
1986,41 it is important that the Army understand the effects of its policy
decisions on retention. Likewise, the Army has not evaluated the effects of
its other integration initiatives, or of integration as a whole, on its
ability to retain soldiers. These effects are important because "manning the
force" is another of the Army's six major objectives.

Carrying Out the National Military Strategy

In the long term, the Army expects integration to reduce its risk in
carrying out the national military strategy because it expects forces to be
better trained and more ready. In the short term, however, personnel
shortages and the inappropriate use of reservists to fill certain positions
under the Force XXI redesign have increased the Army's level of risk.42 This
higher short-term risk may be offset by other aspects of the Force XXI
redesign and by the integrated Bosnia task forces. However, these
integration efforts are still in their early stages and do not have
established trend data. Therefore, it is difficult to measure any risk
reductions that may have already occurred. As for teaming, it may reduce
risk less than expected.

Division, but Modifications Limit Risk at the 1st Cavalry Division

Reserve components have not been able to fill all their assigned positions
in the 4th Infantry Division as it implements the Force XXI redesign. Should
the division need to deploy, these shortages could increase the Army's risk
in executing the national military strategy. The Army Chief of Staff has
made filling active combat divisions one of his top priorities. In January
2000, officials at both the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry
Division told us that they were staffed above 100 percent of their active
authorizations, although not by grade and military occupational specialty.
However, at that time, the reserve components had filled only 68 percent of
their allocated positions in the 4th Infantry Division.43 Both reserve
components had shortages, but the Army Reserve was responsible for most of
the shortages.

Officials at the 4th Infantry Division said that risk increased not only
because of unfilled reserve positions but also because of the inappropriate
replacement of some active positions with reserve positions. The division
requested that 40 of its reserve positions, mostly for combat medics and
petroleum supply specialists, be converted back to active positions.
Division surgeons at both the 4th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions and
other medical officers said that placing reservists in independent medic
positions increased risk for a number of reasons. First, reserve medics are
generally not available to train with active units on weekdays, and thus the
Army cannot follow its basic principle to train as it fights. Second, no one
is available to replace the reservists during weekday exercises, increasing
risk for soldiers injured during these exercises. Third, the medic positions
in question are junior positions44 that tend to be filled by reservists with
no prior service experience who do not generally have civilian jobs in the
medical field. The medical officers contended that these reservists
generally have not had the breadth of experience necessary for independent
duty. As for petroleum specialists (who provide aviation support), 4th
Infantry Division officers said that daily requirements in the aviation
support battalion were so high that reservists could not possibly meet
mission needs.

Although the Army originally planned to replicate the 4th Infantry
Division's integration in its other heavy forces, the next Force XXI
division (the 1st Cavalry) will be less integrated than the 4th Infantry
Division. In March 2000, the Army dramatically reduced its integration plans
for the 1st Cavalry Division, after division and III Corps officials raised
concerns about the reserve components' ability to support a second division
in the same geographic area as the 4th Infantry Division.45 Guard positions
in the 1st Cavalry Division were cut from 257 to 233, but Army Reserve
positions were cut from 258 to 3. As of May 2000, the Army had not yet
determined whether the right mix of Army reservists and guardsmen would be
available in the regions surrounding its other active heavy forces in order
to integrate those units. However, there are no National Guard armories near
the Army's heavy forces overseas, and less than 5 percent of the Guard's
armories are within 50 miles of active heavy forces in the United States.46

Forces Decrease Short-Term Risk

Integration added some new capabilities to the Force XXI heavy division and
should thus reduce the Army's short-term risk in carrying out the national
military strategy. For example, the dual-mission general support aviation
battalion from the Guard's 49th Armored Division added 8 UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, crews, and support personnel to the 4th Infantry's 24 Black
Hawks. A third (reserve) medic was also added to some ambulance crews that
previously had only two active Army soldiers.

The deployment of Guard divisions for peacekeeping missions also helps
reduce risk because it increases the readiness of Guard divisions, which
must be certified in war-fighting as well as peacekeeping tasks before they
deploy. It also frees active divisions to train for their primary
war-fighting tasks. This second benefit may be strictly short term because
Guard units can only deploy for 270 days per operational mission under the
Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority.47

Reductions Are Difficult to Measure and May Be Less Than Expected

Army officials expect the active headquarters of the integrated divisions to
improve training in the divisions' National Guard enhanced brigades, thus
allowing the brigades to deploy more quickly and reducing the Army's risk in
carrying out the national military strategy. Officials at the enhanced
brigades we visited said that although the headquarters are small, they
still provide significant benefits in preparing the brigades for deployment,
especially in training battalion and brigade staffs. The active headquarters
also helped spotlight Guard equipment modernization and compatibility issues
that previously had been raised only by the National Guard chain of command.
One brigade attributed the accelerated fielding of new radios,48 at least in
part, to the influence exerted by its active headquarters.

Several factors have made it difficult for the Army to evaluate the
effectiveness of its integrated division headquarters in improving the
training and readiness of their enhanced brigades.49 First, measures of
effectiveness to gauge improvements were adopted only in March 2000. Second,
the commander of one division has questioned the reliability of his enhanced
brigades' baseline readiness data, saying the brigades were not as ready as
their baseline data indicated. Third, the three enhanced brigades in the
heavy integrated division are undergoing Force XXI "limited conversions."
These conversions reduce the brigades' capabilities by removing a full
company of equipment and personnel from each of the maneuver battalions
within the brigades. These reductions were originally scheduled to coincide
with the arrival of new, more capable, digital equipment. However, under the
limited conversions, the maneuver battalions must give up a company before
they receive their digitized equipment. Appendix V contains a table showing
the dates that units are scheduled to undergo limited and full Force XXI
conversions.

Officials expect teaming to help the Army reduce its level of risk in
carrying out the national military strategy by improving the readiness of
teamed divisions. Army officials said that teamed divisions can provide
three types of support to their deploying partner divisions. First, they can
"push out" the deploying divisions by providing transportation for
equipment, administrative support for deploying soldiers, and replacement
personnel to meet home station responsibilities. Second, soldiers from the
partner divisions can be "plugged in" the deploying divisions to fill
personnel shortages. Finally, partner divisions can "plus up" deploying
divisions by providing units that add to the deploying divisions'
capabilities.

The Army describes teaming as a mutually beneficial relationship, and our
discussions with both active and reserve partners have confirmed that both
sides have achieved benefits. However, most of the benefits have centered on
training and pre-deployment events, rather than on actual operations. In the
event of a major theater war, support would flow primarily from Guard
divisions to their active division partners. Any support the Guard divisions
could provide to their active counterparts would certainly reduce the Army's
risk in carrying out the national military strategy, but several factors are
likely to limit this support:

Time constraints. Guard forces need time to mobilize, making it difficult
for them to support early deploying active forces on very short notice.
These difficulties are greatest when active teamed divisions deploy as part
of a division alert force. A division alert force is maintained at an
enhanced level of readiness, whereby it can deploy an initial-ready company
in
18 hours and a division-ready brigade in 72 hours.50 When an active teamed
division is assigned division alert force responsibility, the amount of
push-out support that its partner Guard division can supply is severely
limited. Active divisions that deploy later in a conflict are likely to
receive much more support from their Guard division partners, which will
have time to mobilize.

Geographic constraints. Geographic separation affects the amount of support
that Guard divisions can provide to their active teaming partners,
particularly the amount of "push out" support. The 49th Armored and
1st Cavalry Divisions are located close to each other and both train at Fort
Hood. Because the 49th is headquartered within commuting distance of Fort
Hood, it could easily provide Fort Hood with replacement personnel to meet
home station responsibilities when 1st Cavalry Division soldiers deploy. It
could also provide transportation assets and other push-out support on
relatively short notice due to its geographic proximity to the
1st Cavalry Division. The other Guard divisions are all located at least
500 miles from their active division teaming partners and would have to
overcome transportation challenges before they could push out their
partnered active divisions.

Equipment compatibility problems. Equipment and weapons used by reserve and
active forces are often different or incompatible. This can create problems
as the components train together, and where equipment differences are very
large it could delay or even prevent Guard units from filling or augmenting
their active partner divisions. Officials at the 40th Infantry Division
(California Army National Guard) told us that none of their major equipment
was compatible with that of their teaming partner, the 4th Infantry
Division. They estimated that they were about 10 to 15 years behind the 4th
Infantry Division in modernization. They still had M1IP tanks with
105-millimeter guns, compared with their partner's
state-of-the-art M1A2 digital tanks with 120-millimeter guns.51 These
disparities prevent 40th Infantry Division tank crews from plugging into 4th
Infantry Division tank crews and make it unlikely that tank crews from the
40th would even fill a plus-up role for the 4th Infantry Division. One
officer from the Guard's 40th Infantry Division summed up the situation
saying that during a visit to the 4th Infantry Division's museum he saw
museum equipment that was more modern than the equipment his soldiers are
currently operating. However, Guard divisions, including the 40th Infantry
Division, are receiving upgraded equipment from active forces and Guard
enhanced brigades that are downsizing under Force XXI limited conversions.

Although the Army's integration efforts have increased interaction between
the active and reserve components, the current state of integration is
unclear. DOD and Army officials have both articulated the need for a fully
integrated force, and they have increased the Guard's participation in
military activities, from training at home stations to peacekeeping abroad.
Despite this increased participation and the Army Chief of Staff's emphasis
on "the full integration of the active and reserve components" as one of his
six major objectives, the Army has not clearly defined what constitutes full
integration. It also has not determined the level of resources available for
integration or assessed the effects of integration on other important
objectives such as time members spend away from home or retention. Without
an overarching integration plan to define roles, set measurable and
results-oriented goals, and clearly articulate a framework for a fully
integrated force, the Army will continue to have difficulty measuring the
progress or effectiveness of its integration efforts.

Because integration currently involves a series of individual efforts that
are being implemented on a piecemeal basis, the Army has not fully
considered integration's impacts on its costs, force structure, personnel
tempo, or ability to carry out the national military strategy. As a result,
integration has led to unintended effects: reservists have had larger
out-of-pocket expenses when participating in training, medical support for
the 4th Infantry Division has declined, and personnel tempo has increased
for some active forces. In addition, reserve combat units have faced
significant personnel and equipment challenges as they have attempted to
increase integrated training and deployment times while remaining at the
same low-priority funding levels under the Army's tiered resourcing system.
Finally, a piecemeal approach to integration has prevented integration
objectives from being coordinated with the Army's other major objectives,
such as manning combat divisions at 100 percent of their authorization
levels. This lack of coordination has caused one active heavy division to be
staffed below its authorization level and--should this division need to
deploy--would increase the Army's risk in carrying out the national military
strategy.

Given the Army's current emphasis on active and reserve integration as a
means of maximizing the effectiveness of its total force, and given the
inherent limitations of pursuing integration on a piecemeal basis, we
recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop an overarching plan to
guide the Army's integration efforts. This plan should establish the Army's
strategy, goals, policies, and resources for achieving full integration and
should include milestones and performance measures for gauging progress.
Further, it should fully consider how the integration of active and reserve
forces can be achieved consistent with the Army's other primary objectives,
including the full staffing of its combat forces.

In light of the Army National Guard's increased responsibility in
peacekeeping operations and the Army's desire to reduce deployment burdens
on active forces by substituting reservists, we recommend that the Secretary
of the Army examine whether the forces, equipment, and training priorities
assigned to the National Guard are commensurate with its increased role and
make whatever adjustments are needed, considering the overall needs of the
Army.

Because some reservists are incurring significant increases in their
transportation costs as they integrate with active forces located farther
from their homes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine
whether the benefits of Army active/reserve component integration warrant a
change in current travel regulations that prohibit travel reimbursement
related to inactive duty training.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
agreed with our recommendation concerning the need to review priorities
assigned to the National Guard. It stated that "the equipping issue will
remain problematic" because resources are not available to fully modernize
all units simultaneously, and said that units with the most current
equipment will continue to transfer the equipment to other units with an
immediate need. DOD also agreed with our recommendation concerning the need
to examine transportation costs incurred by reservists, and stated that it
will conduct a comprehensive study of reserve component duty and
compensation, including transportation costs. DOD's comments are reprinted
in appendix VI.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need for an overarching
integration plan. It stated that the September 4, 1997, memorandum from the
Secretary of Defense defined integration and contained DOD's integration
goal and specific sub-goals, which provide an excellent framework for
measuring integration progress and results. In addition, DOD believes that
the Army's white paper, America's Army--One Team, One Fight, One Future,
along with the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan and the declaration by
the Army's current Chief of Staff are guiding active and reserve component
integration. DOD also said that the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee,
the Reserve Component Coordination Council, the Reserve Forces Policy Board,
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs oversee
integration efforts. Finally, DOD stated that precise measurable effects
will become more apparent as integration initiatives mature, and the current
Bosnia mission shows that integration efforts are on target.

We do not agree that DOD has a framework for measuring integration progress
and results. This report acknowledges that the Secretary of Defense's
memorandum is a starting point for looking at integration. However, the
Secretary's statement defines integration in terms of conditions of trust
and leadership confidence, rather than defining it in measurable terms. In
addition, DOD's "seamless total force" goal, and
sub-goals such as "leadership by senior commanders," are not specific or
measurable and require subjective evaluations. Therefore, they are not the
types of measurable, results-oriented goals that should be used to measure
progress toward important organizational objectives. Further, with respect
to the activities of the cited oversight bodies, each body provides some
oversight of the Army's integration efforts, but none has comprehensively
assessed Army integration in terms of the Secretary of Defense's overall
integration goal and sub-goals. During the course of our review, we met with
representatives and former members of these bodies and reviewed the minutes
of their meetings. On the basis of these discussions and reviews, we believe
that these organizations have been primarily reactive, by dealing with
issues and problems as they arise, rather than proactive and providing a
clear integration strategy for the Army to follow. This report clearly
acknowledges the groundbreaking efforts of the 49th Armored Division's
integrated Bosnia task force, and we believe that these efforts present the
Army with an opportunity to examine how it can best set clear, measurable
goals. For example, because one major objective of the task force was to
reduce active component personnel tempo, and thus increase retention, the
Army could set measurable retention goals for units or military occupational
specialties affected by integrated task force deployments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the
Army. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 5140 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Gwendolyn R.
Jaffe, Michael J. Ferren, and Irene A. Robertson.

Carol R. Schuster
Associate Director
National Security Preparedness Issues

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson
Chairman
The Honorable Max Cleland
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen E. Buyer
Chairman
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Other Army Integration Initiatives

Multi-component units. This initiative involves units that are authorized to
include personnel from more than one component (Active Army, Army National
Guard, or U.S. Army Reserve) on a single authorization document. The Army
lists the objectives of multi-component units as improving readiness and
resource allocations, optimizing component-unique capabilities, improving
documentation, and enhancing the total integration of active and reserve
forces. Multi-component units go to war as a single integrated entity. Since
they are included on a single authorization document, all portions of the
unit (both active and reserve) have the same priority with respect to
equipment fielding and modernization.

Integrated light infantry battalions. This initiative was designed to make
more effective use of reserve forces by involving them in a 2-year test of
the Army's old round-out and round-up concepts52 beginning in October 1999.
The round-out portion of the test was to be conducted with an Army National
Guard light infantry company replacing an active company in a battalion of
the 1st brigade of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. The
round-up portion of the test was to involve one company that was added to
the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. The
test was not carried out and the Army decided to reject the round-out
concept and pursue the round-up concept. As a result, one National Guard
anti-tank battalion will be added to the 10th, 25th, 82nd, and 29th
division.

Training support XXI. This initiative created training support divisions
under the operational control of both the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the
Continental U.S. Armies. The initiative was designed to increase reserve
component readiness levels by providing "synchronized, integrated, and
effective training support to priority and other reserve component units,"
thus helping units achieve pre-mobilization training goals and reducing
post-mobilization training requirements.

Active component associate unit mentor relationships. This initiative
centers on the sharing of professional experience and coaching. Senior
active component commanders assist in reserve component training. Senior
mentors (corps- or division-level active component commanders) provide
reserve commanders with leadership and advice on training matters. Peer
mentors (unit commanders of like-sized active components) share experience
and information on implementation of training requirements with reserve
component commanders.

Active/reserve component battalion command exchange program. This initiative
involves the exchange of active and reserve (Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve) battalion commanders. Active component commands will fill key
command and senior staff positions within the Army National Guard, while the
Guard and Reserve will fill key command and senior staff positions within
the active component. The initial tours are for battalion commanders,
brigade and battalion executive officers, and operations officers. In
accordance with a memorandum of agreement between the components, the
positions are considered career enhancing, and reserve commands carry the
same weight as active commands.

Major Units Involved in Integration Initiatives We Reviewed

7th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

39th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Little Rock, Arkansas (National Guard)

41st Enhanced Separate Brigade, Portland, Oregon (National Guard)

45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)

24th Infantry Division Headquarters Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South
Carolina (active)

30th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Clinton, North Carolina (National Guard)

48th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Macon, Georgia (National Guard)

218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National Guard)

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia (active)

28th Infantry Division, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (National Guard)

10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York (active)

29th Infantry Division, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (National Guard)

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (implementing)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (planning stage)

See appendix V for a schedule of units involved in limited conversions.

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

629th Military Intelligence Battalion, Maryland (National Guard)

111th Engineer Battalion, Texas (National Guard)

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report is the fourth in a series of reports issued in response to the
1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires us to review the
adequacy of the Army's forces in carrying out the national military
strategy. This review focuses on the Army's efforts to integrate its active
and reserve combat forces. Specifically, we assessed the effects of these
efforts on the Army's (1) total costs, (2) force structure, (3) personnel
tempo, and (4) risk in carrying out the national military strategy.

We met with representatives from each of the three components to obtain an
overview and the current status of the Army's active and reserve components'
integration efforts. Specifically, we met with officials from the Army
National Guard Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia; the U.S. Army Reserve
Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and the Department of the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Force Development. These meetings provided us
with general information about the Army's many ongoing integration efforts
and helped us focus our efforts on the Army's most significant integration
efforts. Specifically, we focused on the Bosnia task force integration,
teaming, the integrated divisions, and the Force XXI heavy division redesign
because they all involved large numbers of people and were being implemented
at the division level. Army officials confirmed that by reviewing these
efforts, we would cover virtually all the important issues related to active
and reserve component integration.

To determine integration's effects on the Army's total costs, force
structure, personnel tempo, and ability to execute the national military
strategy, we reviewed integration plans and discussed integration impacts
with officials from both headquarters and operational units. At the
headquarters level, we met with officials from the Department of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence Offices. At the Pentagon, we also met with representatives of
the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee and the Reserve Component
Coordination Council. The respective groups are responsible for reporting to
the Secretary of the Army on policy issues and to the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army on action issues related to reserve components and the "total
Army." However, most of the detailed data contained in this report came from
the operational units listed below that are implementing the Army's ongoing
integration efforts. Our review of integration plans and discussions with
officials focused on identifying (1) what additional costs and personnel, if
any, were needed to implement the initiatives; (2) how the initiatives
affected the time reserve personnel would spend away from their home
stations; and (3) the impact these initiatives are likely to have on the
Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy. We did not
independently verify the cost figures in the report but relied on financial
officials, primarily at the U.S. Property and Fiscal Office in Texas and at
the divisions we visited.

While the bulk of our effort was directed toward the units that were
actually involved in the integration initiatives, we also met with officials
at the U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, and III Corps,
Fort Hood, Texas. Both these organizations have oversight and resourcing
responsibilities for the major integration efforts we reviewed. Following
are the divisional units that we visited under each integration heading:

7th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)
45th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Edmond, Oklahoma (National Guard)

24th Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas (active)
24th Infantry Division Forward Element, Fort Jackson, South Carolina
(active)
218th Enhanced Separate Brigade, Newberry, South Carolina (National Guard)

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)
40th Infantry Division, Los Alamitos, California (National Guard)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)
49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas (active)

49th Armored Division, Austin, Texas (National Guard)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado (active)

In addition, we also met with several retired senior Army generals at the
Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia,
to obtain a historical perspective on Army active and reserve component
integration.

We conducted our review from May 1999 through May 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Units Participating in the Integrated Bosnia Task Forces Through 2003

 Bosnia Stabilization
 Force rotation numbers  Headquarters           Other units with
 and dates                                      significant participation
                                                3rd Armored Cavalry
                                                Regiment (active) and 629th
 #7 March-October 2000   49th Armored Division  Military Intelligence
                         (Texas National Guard)
                                                Battalion (Maryland
                                                National Guard)
                                                Companies from the 3rd and
                                                25th Infantry Division
 #8 October-March 2001   3rd Infantry Division  (active) and the 30th and
                         (active)               45th Enhanced Separate
                                                Brigade (North Carolina and
                                                Oklahoma National Guard)
                                                Companies from 3rd and 25th
                                                Infantry Division (active)
 #9 March-October 2001   3rd Infantry Division  and the 48th Enhanced
                         (active)
                                                Separate Brigade (Georgia
                                                National Guard)
                                                Companies from the 10th
                                                Mountain Division (active),
                         29th Infantry Division the 29th Infantry Division
 #10 October-April 2002  (Virginia National     (Virginia National Guard),
                         Guard)                 and the 155th Enhanced
                                                Separate Brigade
                                                (Mississippi National
                                                Guard)
                                                Companies from the 101st
                                                Airborne Division (active)
 #11 April-October 2002  101st Airborne Divisionand the 116th and 76th
                         (active)               Enhanced Separate Brigade
                                                (Idaho and Indiana National
                                                Guard)
                                                Companies from the 3rd and
                         28th Infantry Division 25th Infantry Division
 #12 October-April 2003  (Pennsylvania National (active) and the 218th
                         Guard)                 Enhanced Separate Brigade
                                                (South Carolina National
                                                Guard)

Dates of Force XXI Redesign and Limited Conversions

The following chart shows when the Army's active and reserve heavy forces
are scheduled to undergo Force XXI redesign. Units are scheduled to make the
full conversion in conjunction with the arrival of new digital equipment.
The limited conversions involve force structure changes that will precede
the arrival of the new equipment. The home state of each National Guard unit
is in parentheses.

(Continued From Previous Page)

                 Unit                  Limited conversion  Full conversion
 4th Infantry Division,1st Brigade     Not applicable     January 1999
 4th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade    Not applicable     September 1999
 4th Infantry Division Headquarters    Not applicable     October 1999
 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade     Not applicable     Fiscal year 2001
 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade     Not applicable     Fiscal year 2002
 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade     Not applicable     Fiscal year 2003
 4th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade    June 2000          Fiscal year 2004
 1st infantry Division, 2nd and 3rd
 Brigade                               January 1999
 116th Armored Brigade (Indiana)       October 1999
 30th Infantry Brigade (North
 Carolina)                             October 1999
 155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi)   October 1999
 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia)       October 1999
 81st Armored Brigade (Washington)     October 1999
 218th Infantry Brigade (South
 Carolina)                             October 1999
 256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana)    October 1999
 31st Armored Brigade (Alabama)        October 1999
 49th Armored Division (Texas)         October 1999
 1st Armored Division, 2nd Brigade     February 2000
 1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade     April 2000
 1st Armored Division, 3rd Brigade     June 2000
 3rd Infantry Division                 June 2000
 1st Infantry Division, 1st Brigade    June 2000
 40th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade
 (California)                          September 2000
 28th Infantry Division, 55th Brigade
 (Pennsylvania)                        September 2000
 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade    June 2001
 40th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade
 (California)                          September 2001
 28th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade
 (Pennsylvania)                        September 2001
 34th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade
 (Minnesota)                           September 2001
 28th Infantry Division, 56th Brigade
 (Pennsylvania)                        September 2002
 34th Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade
 (Minnesota)                           September 2002
 35th Infantry Divisions, 149th
 Brigade (Kansas)                      September 2002
 38th Infantry Division, 37th Brigade
 (Indiana)                             September 2002
 38th Infantry Division, 46th Brigade
 (Indiana)                             September 2002
 42nd Infantry Division, 32nd Brigade
 (New York)                            September 2002

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO's responses to DOD's comments dated June 22, 2000.

1. We revised the title of our report to better reflect the scope of our
review--Army combat force integration.

2. This report deals with integration only in the Army's combat forces. The
numbers DOD cited included not only the Army's combat support and combat
service support personnel mobilized and deployed for the Persian Gulf War,
but also reservists from other services who were mobilized and deployed. The
initial call-up for Operation Desert Shield did not contain any Army combat
forces. While later call-ups did include combat forces, the armored brigade
and two mechanized infantry brigades that were mobilized never deployed to
Southwest Asia. Only two field artillery brigades deployed.

3. We agree that peacekeeping missions add to the Army's total costs,
whether the missions are staffed with active or reserve personnel. However,
the key point made in the report is that base pay for active forces is a
fixed cost that does not change, whether active forces deploy or not. This
is not the case for reservists. If reservists are not training or on active
duty, they do not get paid. Therefore, integrated task forces that deploy
reservists for more than their budgeted 39 days per year increase the Army's
total personnel costs. Some reserve mobilizations for peacekeeping missions
last up to 270 days.

4. We agree that when they are not deployed, part-time reserve forces are
substantially less costly to maintain than full-time active forces. We have
modified our report to acknowledge this fact but have retained our
discussion of how integration activities result in added costs.

5. We did not mean to imply that the Army would need an increase in its
personnel end-strength to implement integration initiatives. We have
clarified our report language to state more clearly that, because specific
integration efforts create new force structure requirements, adjustments
will be necessary, assuming end-strength levels remain stable. As the roles
of reserve forces increase, the magnitude of these adjustments will also
need to increase.

6. Because the 49th Armored Division's Bosnia deployment is the largest
deployment of a reserve combat unit in years, DOD and the Army cannot
predict the effect of this 270-day deployment on Guard retention with any
degree of certainty. However, as noted in our report, DOD's data shows that
retention suffers when active forces deploy for more than five months.

7. Documentation from the 4th Infantry Division showed that the Army denied
the request. The report has been changed to explain more accurately the
Army's response to the request. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
recommended pursuing other options rather than endorsing and forwarding the
request.

(702000)

Figure 1: Composition of Army Combat Force (Fiscal Year 1999) 7

Figure 2: Locations of the Integrated Division Headquarters
and Enhanced Separate Brigades 9

Figure 3: Locations of the Army's Four Divisional Teams 11
  

1. For example, in 1997 the Secretary of Defense issued a two-page
memorandum that called for "a seamless total force" and the elimination of
all residual barriers to effective integration. While the memorandum
included four basic principles of integration, such as "leadership by senior
commanders--Active, Guard, and Reserve--to ensure the readiness of the total
force," it did not contain measurable results-oriented goals to evaluate the
services' integration progress.

2. Throughout this report, we use the terms National Guard and Guard to
refer to the Army National Guard. We use the terms Army Reserve and Reserve
to refer to the U.S. Army Reserve and the term reserves (lower case) to
refer to the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve together.

3. The national military strategy calls for the Army to be able to respond
to any contingency up to and including two major wars that occur nearly
simultaneously in separate theaters.

4. The numbers and types of units that comprise the force, their size, and
their composition (i.e., divisions and brigades).

5. In general, personnel tempo is the time spent away from home. Sometimes
the term is narrowly defined to mean only the time spent deployed overseas.
In this report, we use the broadest definition, to include overseas
deployments, training and exercises away from home stations, and increased
work requirements at home stations.

6. The other three reports were Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can
Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997);
Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional
Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998); and Force
Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the
Military Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-99-47, Mar. 15, 1999).

7. Appendix I contains information about some of the Army's other
integration initiatives. Appendix II lists the units that were involved as
of April, 2000 in the major integration initiatives that we reviewed. The
units that we visited are listed in our objectives, scope, and methodology
section in appendix III.

8. A division is usually made up of three combat brigades, and a brigade is
usually made up of two or more battalions. Combat divisions are largely
self-sustaining organizations that are capable of independent operations.
They can vary significantly in size, depending on their purpose, but
typically contain more than 10,000 soldiers. The Army's 10 active and 8
National Guard combat divisions are classified as armored, mechanized,
medium, light infantry, airborne, or air assault, depending on the type and
mix of units and equipment.

9. Heavy divisions are larger and are built around a nucleus of armored
vehicles; light divisions are smaller, contain less heavy equipment, and can
deploy more rapidly.

10. Each headquarters contains less than 150 positions, almost half of which
came from other active units that train reserve forces.

11. There are 15 National Guard enhanced brigades. They are included in the
Army's war plans, and each contains over 350 more positions than a standard
brigade. Enhanced brigades have approximately 4,100 to 5,000 positions,
depending on whether they are infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry.

12. A small number of full-time National Guard soldiers serve as liaison
officers in the headquarters.

13. A substantial increase in personnel and equipment (such as an aviation
brigade, division artillery, and a division support command) would be needed
to make the divisions deployable.

14. The Army also has plans to team combat and support forces from all three
components over the next few years.

15. Battalions are made up of companies, which are divided into platoons,
which are divided into squads made up of individual soldiers.

16. The Army refers to this as situational awareness.

17. The Army planned to field its first digitized division (the 4th
Infantry) in fiscal year 2000 and its first digitized corps (III Corps) in
fiscal year 2004. Full fielding of the 4th Infantry Division is now expected
to be delayed.

18. Both Guard and Reserve soldiers usually participate in 24 drilling
days--typically 48 4-hour training periods--each year, performed during one
weekend per month. In addition, Guard and Reserve soldiers usually
participate in 14 and 15 days of annual training, respectively, each year.

19. Units in the first tier deploy earliest and receive the highest priority
for equipment and people. Lower tiers receive increasingly less priority for
such resources.

20. Although pay does not increase, some allowances do increase.

21. The fact that pay for training comes from Guard accounts, while pay for
mobilized Guard soldiers comes from active Army accounts, or the fact that
peacekeeping missions are financed through supplemental appropriations does
not change the fact that total Army costs increase any time Guard soldiers
exceed their allotted 39 days of pay in 1 year. Regardless of which account
pays, increased Guard participation increases total Army costs because all
the Army's active soldiers are still being paid, and Guard soldiers are
being paid more.

22. By the end of the mission, the average soldier in the 49th Armored
Division will have been paid for 108 days of mission-related training
(fiscal years 1999 and 2000) and 270 days of mobilization (fiscal years 2000
and 2001).

23. The 49th did not take these workstations to Bosnia because workstations
were already in place there.

24. While costs do not decline, the Army may gain efficiencies if personnel
are moved to more critical positions.

25. Joint Federal Travel Regulations part G, U7150C.

26. DOD Instruction 1215.18 defines a reasonable commuting distance as the
maximum distance service members may be required to travel involuntarily
between their residence and their inactive duty sites for training. The
normal distance is 50 miles each way, but the distance can be expanded to
100 miles if the reservists are provided meals and lodging.

27. The designation of the 4th Infantry Division as a high-priority unit
allows the Army to pay each soldier $10 per drill period (there are usually
four drill periods per weekend). Based on a mileage rate of 32.5 cents per
mile, the $40 weekend drill allowance would fully compensate soldiers whose
round trip travel to Fort Hood is 123 miles. Soldiers traveling further
would be undercompensated, and soldiers traveling less would be
overcompensated.

28. The Army's heavy forces in the United States are located at Fort Carson,
Colorado; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia.

29. The National Guard Bureau and the 1st Cavalry Division spent an
additional $664,000 to support teaming events that involved the 49th Armored
Division and the 1st Cavalry Division during this period.

30. Tier 4 units such as Guard divisions had only 36 percent of their
full-time active guard positions funded in fiscal year 2000.

31. Other priorities include shifting from heavy and light to medium
brigades and reducing the shortfall in support forces.

32. Section 414 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years
1992 and 1993
(P.L. 102-190, Dec. 5, 1991, as amended by P.L. 102-484, Oct. 23, 1992,
section 1132, title XI) provides for a pilot program for active component
support of the reserves and requires the Secretary of the Army to provide at
least 2,000 officers and 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted members to
serve as full-time duty advisers to reserve units for organizing,
administering, instructing, or training such units. This is sometimes
referred to as the
Title XI program.

33. A portion of this additional structure could possibly come from the
enhanced brigades, which would be part of a division rather than separate
units that deploy independently.

34. Guard officials told us that other units will draw down to balance the
increase in divisional military intelligence.

35. 10 U.S.C. Section 12304. The authority limits reserve participation in
operational missions to 270 days. Thus, the 629th Military Intelligence
Battalion cannot be mobilized for the Bosnia Stabilization Force mission
again after it returns from Bosnia in the fall of 2000 because it will have
already served its maximum 270 days under the Presidential Selective Reserve
Call-up authority.

36. Guard units usually conduct National Training Center rotations in the
summer and plan for them years in advance. Active units sometimes have only
a few months' notice before their rotations, and Guard units that are called
to participate in them must adjust their schedules accordingly.

37. Military Personnel: Preliminary Results of DOD's 1999 Survey of Active
Duty Members (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-110, Mar. 8, 2000).

38. Shortly after the interviews, the 218th enhanced separate brigade in
South Carolina was notified that it would be tasked to provide a portion of
its forces for the Bosnia mission beginning in October 2002.

39. This does not include the time reservists spend at their mobilization
station, in transit, transitioning between units, on leave, or at their
demobilization station.

40. DOD is currently surveying Guard and Reserve soldiers, but survey
results are not yet available.

41. In 1986 it cost about $5,300 to recruit each soldier. Today the cost is
about $10,000.

42. Risk in executing the national military strategy increases when force
capability is removed and declines when capability is expanded.

43. The reserve components were scheduled to fill those positions by October
1999.

44. Most of the positions are for soldiers at the E-4 pay grade. There are
nine enlisted pay grades, E-1 through E-9.

45. Both divisions are headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas, but the 4th
Infantry Division has only two maneuver brigades there compared with three
in the 1st Cavalry Division, thus making it even more difficult for the Army
to integrate the 1st Cavalry Division with reservists from that geographic
area.

46. Fort Stewart, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Carson, Colorado; and
Fort Hood, Texas.

47. 10 U.S.C. Section 12304.

48. Single channel ground and airborne radio system radios are arguably the
most important piece of communication equipment in the Army. They can
automatically change frequencies and provide secure communications not
available with older radios.

49. The 2-year test period for the divisions is scheduled to end in October
2001.

50. The details of this deployment sequence are found in the Army's Armored
and Mechanized Infantry Brigade Field Manual 71-3, appendix G.

51. The 40th Infantry Division had begun fielding M1A1 tanks with 120
millimeter guns at the time of our visit. However, only 15 of the 91 tanks
it had received were operational, and none of them had single channel ground
and airborne radio system radios.

52. The round-out concept replaces an active unit with a similar reserve
unit (company for company, battalion for battalion, etc.) thus maintaining
capability. The round-up concept increases capability by adding an
additional reserve unit to a standard active configuration. For example, it
would add a company to a battalion or a brigade to a division.
*** End of document. ***