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Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging (Letter Report, 04/29/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-160).

The Dayton Peace Accords, signed in December 1995, are designed to end
years of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. One part of the accords
involves the deployment of a NATO-led coalition in Bosnia to carry out
the peace agreement. In February 1998, NATO voted to continue the
mission in Bosnia indefinitely. This report examines how the military
(1) has provided the needed capabilities for the operation thus far and
(2) plans to provide them in the future. GAO also examines the
President's ability to call up reserves under his presidential selected
reserve call-up authority. GAO focuses on the Army and the Air Force
because they have provided the vast majority of the needed capabilities.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-160
     TITLE:  Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but 
             a Few Challenges Emerging
      DATE:  04/29/98
   SUBJECT:  Armed forces reserves
             Military operations
             International relations
             Armed forces abroad
             Executive powers
             Foreign military assistance
             Military personnel
IDENTIFIER:  Bosnia
             Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up Authority
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee
on National Security, House of Representatives

April 1998

BOSNIA - MILITARY SERVICES
PROVIDING NEEDED CAPABILITIES BUT
A FEW CHALLENGES EMERGING

GAO/NSIAD-98-160

Bosnia

(701120)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  FORSCOM - U.S.  Army Forces Command
  IFOR - Implementation Force
  NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  PSRC - Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
  SFOR - Stabilization Force
  USAFE - U.S.  Air Force Europe
  USAREUR - U.S.  Army Europe

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277889

April 29, 1998

The Honorable Steve Buyer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

The Dayton Peace Accords, signed on December 14, 1995, are designed
to end several years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  One part
of the accords involves the deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)-led coalition force to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
hereafter referred to as Bosnia, to implement the peace agreement. 
In February 1998, NATO's North Atlantic Council voted to continue the
mission in Bosnia indefinitely. 

Concerned about how the military services will obtain the needed
capabilities for continued operations, you asked us to examine how
the military services (1) have provided the needed capabilities for
the operation thus far and (2) plan to provide them in the future. 
You also asked us to examine the President's ability to call up
reserves under his Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
authority.  This report focuses on the Army and the Air Force because
they have provided the vast majority of the needed capabilities. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces
in and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the Dayton Peace
Accords.  U.S.  forces are part of a multilateral coalition under the
command of NATO.  From December 1995 to December 1996, the coalition
was called the Implementation Force (IFOR).  In December 1996, NATO
authorized a new mission and renamed the coalition the Stabilization
Force (SFOR).  That mission was scheduled to end in June 1998 but has
since been extended indefinitely.  In voting to continue the mission,
the North Atlantic Council retained the name SFOR.  The Council
stated that the extent of support over time will be adapted to
developments in the political and security situation and to progress
in the implementation of the civilian elements of the accords.  Force
levels will be reviewed at regular intervals.  The United States has
been a major force provider to the mission, as shown in table 1. 



                                Table 1
                
                U.S. Military Personnel Contribution to
                            IFOR and SFOR\a

                                          Military personnel
                                --------------------------------------
                                   United States\b               Total
------------------------------  ------------------  ==================
IFOR\c                                      16,200              54,000
SFOR\d                                       8,300              31,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a U.S.  military personnel includes people in both the active and
reserve components. 

\b Additional U.S.  military personnel were located in the
neighboring countries of Croatia, Hungary, and Italy.  These persons
totaled 6,000 in support of IFOR and 3,400 in support of SFOR. 

\c As of July 1996. 

\d As of February 1998. 

The SFOR level will likely remain at 31,000, but the United States is
seeking to reduce its troop commitment in Bosnia to 6,900.  The
United States plans to continue basing about 3,400 troops in
neighboring countries. 

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the
active forces for an operational mission, he may use PSRC authority,
which allows for the activation of up to 200,000 reservists at any
one time, with each reservist limited to no more than 270 days of
involuntary service.  In December 1995, the President invoked this
authority for the Bosnia mission. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The military services have successfully provided needed capabilities
for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years.  The U.S.  Army
Europe (USAREUR) has provided the majority of Army forces, augmented
with reserve forces and active forces from the United States. 
Because USAREUR units are assigned fewer personnel than they are
authorized, the Army had to borrow personnel from nondeploying units
so that deploying units could deploy with the required number of
people.  Also, because the operation did not always require entire
units, the Army deployed partial ones.  These steps enabled the Army
to meet the mission's needs but, in some cases, have had an adverse
impact on the parent units that have provided personnel.  The U.S. 
Air Forces Europe (USAFE) has provided the majority of air forces,
augmented with U.S.-based active and reserve forces.  Both services
have used their reserve components to meet the mission requirements
because some critical support capabilities reside primarily or solely
in the reserves and because use of the reserves reduces the high
level of activity of some active forces.  Most Army reservists were
involuntarily activated through PSRC, while most Air Force Air
Reserve Component members were volunteers. 

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army
and the Air Force are currently developing plans for a follow-on
force.  Though the vast majority of the ground-based combat support
and the aviation-related requirements for the mission can be filled,
about a dozen unit capabilities will require special attention in the
future because the capabilities are primarily in the reserves and
many of these capabilities have already been used.  Requirements for
these capabilities have totaled several hundred persons per rotation. 
To satisfy future mission needs, the military services and the U.S. 
Atlantic Command are considering using similar capabilities in the
other military services, asking for greater participation from other
countries, and contracting for some of the needed capabilities. 

Some reservists have served for fewer than the 270 days that the PSRC
statute allows.  Because the statute does not prohibit multiple
involuntary activations if the total does not exceed the 270-day
limit, some of these reservists could be recalled to serve up to the
full activation period.  In addition, the Bosnia mission has led to a
situation in which in some instances all of the reservists with
needed capabilities have been ordered to duty and served the maximum
time allowed for a single call-up.  The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has stated that the current
policy is that the Department of Defense will not request that the
President invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall
reservists who have already served 270 days. 


   USAREUR AND USAFE HAVE
   SUPPORTED BOSNIA MISSION WITH
   SOME HELP FROM RESERVE AND
   U.S.-BASED ACTIVE FORCES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

USAREUR is the major Army command primarily responsible for providing
people for the Bosnia mission.  Because USAREUR units are assigned
fewer personnel than they are authorized, deployed units were
augmented with personnel from other European units and active and
reserve forces from the United States.  At the same time, the
relatively small size of the U.S.  force in Bosnia required the Army
to deploy partial units.  USAFE is the principal Air Force command
providing people for the mission.  The Air Force's personnel
requirements are much smaller and the nature of the Air Force's
responsibilities allows for extensive use of reserve component
volunteers. 


      ARMY AND AIR FORCE RESERVES
      HAVE SUPPORTED THE BOSNIA
      MISSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Almost 16,000 Army reservists and about 10,000 Air Force Air Reserve
Component members have participated in the Bosnia mission between its
inception in December 1995 and January 1998.  Most of the Army
reservists were involuntarily called to active duty under PSRC,
whereas most Air Force reservists volunteered to participate in the
Bosnia mission.  Reserve units have participated because some
required support capabilities reside primarily or solely in the
reserves.  For example, most of the Army's movement control teams,
civil affairs units, and fire fighter detachments are in the
reserves.  Of the 36 civil affairs units in the Army, only 1 is in
the active force.  The remainder are in the Army reserve.  Reserve
units also have been used to reduce the high level of activity of
some active forces.  For example, the Army uses reserve military
police to relieve the high personnel tempo of active-duty military
police units, and the Air Force uses reserve aircrews to relieve the
high personnel tempo of its active-duty aircrews. 


      ARMY PERSONNEL NEEDED TO BE
      ADDED TO FORCES/UNITS
      DEPLOYING TO BOSNIA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Augmentation from reserve forces and U.S.-based active forces was
required because USAREUR did not possess all the personnel and
capabilities the mission needs.  According to USAREUR documents,
prior to the first deployment to Bosnia in December 1995, the units
chosen to deploy were staffed at 87 percent of required strength,
whereas deployed forces were required to be at least at 92 percent of
required strength.  Further, 8 to 10 percent of these units'
personnel were not deployable for a variety of reasons.  To bring
these units to at least 92 percent of required strength, personnel
had to be shifted from other USAREUR units and from U.S.  Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) units, a process known as cross-leveling. 

Throughout the Bosnia mission, individuals have been needed to
augment headquarters staffs at USAREUR, U.S.  European Command, the
American contingent of various NATO command elements such as the SFOR
Headquarters in Saravejo, and actual units.  FORSCOM provided 1,035
active component individual augmentees to support Bosnia, while the
Army Reserve Personnel Center and the U.S.  Army Reserve Command
provided another 1,613 Army Reserve individual augmentees. 


      ARMY DEPLOYS SOME
      SPLIT-BASED AND NEW UNITS TO
      BOSNIA
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

The relatively small size of the U.S.  portion of SFOR has not always
required deploying entire units.  According to FORSCOM and USAREUR
officials, active units have employed split-based operations. 
Split-based operations occur when only parts of units are deployed
and the elements left behind must continue to perform their missions
at the home station.  For example, as of January 1998, elements of
the First Armor Division's headquarters, military intelligence,
signal, artillery, and support command were deployed to Bosnia, while
the rest of the division, including its combat brigades, did not
deploy.  Split-basing has been a strain on USAREUR units.  For
example, during SFOR, USAREUR reported to the Department of the Army
through its Status of Resources and Training System, which is used to
measure readiness, that split-basing had a negative impact on the
readiness of several of its units because of reduced personnel,
equipment levels, or a combination of both factors at home station. 

For reserve units, the Army also has engaged in split-based
operations.  In many instances, the Army extracted elements of
existing units and formed them into what is known as derivative
units.  It has been staffing derivative units with individuals drawn
from the original unit and other Selected Reserve units.\1

According to its mobilization data, the Army formed over 700
derivative units for the Bosnia mission since December 1995. 
Examples of derivative units that have been mobilized for Bosnia
include the target acquisition radar elements of National Guard
divisions, elements of Army Reserve garrison support units, and
platoons from postal companies.  According to a FORSCOM operations
official, extracting these elements often affects the ability of the
parent unit to conduct its normal peacetime activities, such as
training, much in the same way that it has affected split-based
active units.  In responding to a draft of this report, the Army
stated that a positive effect of split-based operations is that the
redeploying soldiers can bring better developed or newly acquired
skills to the unit. 

The Army has also created derivative units, such as various
mobilization support detachments, that are not elements of existing
units.  These detachments are ad hoc units created for the sole
purpose of activating individuals with assorted capabilities that are
needed to meet miscellaneous individual requirements.  According to
an Army Reserve Personnel Center official, this was done because PSRC
authority did not allow for the call-up of individuals unless they
were members of a unit in the Selected Reserve.  The requirements
have been met in part by members who initially belonged to the
Individual Ready Reserve\2 but volunteered to join the Selected
Reserve temporarily so that they could be subject to PSRC.  Of the
previously mentioned 1,613 reservists provided by the Army Reserve
Personnel Center and the U.S.  Army Reserve Command, 1,068 were
reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve who transferred to the
Selected Reserve, including 551 who were placed into derivative
units. 


--------------------
\1 The Selected Reserve includes individuals assigned to units,
trained personnel assigned to active organizations, and individuals
who have not completed initial training. 

\2 The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised of officers and enlisted
soldiers with prior military service who are completing their 8-year
military service obligation or who are not assigned to units. 


   FOLLOW-ON FORCE PLANNING
   UNDERWAY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Army has conducted multiple force rotations for varying lengths
of time to support the Bosnia mission.  With the recent extension of
the mission for an unspecified duration, the Army is planning to (1)
replace forces currently deployed to Bosnia; (2) identify forces
needed for future rotations; and (3) relieve pressure placed upon
USAREUR, which has provided most of the forces for the Bosnia mission
to date. 

Formal guidance has not been finalized regarding Bosnia mission needs
after June 1998.  In the meantime, USAREUR is making plans for a
follow-on force.  It intends to provide personnel for the initial
follow-on force according to the current SFOR organization and
authorized troop level of 8,500 troops in Bosnia.  If the United
States succeeds in its effort to have other troop-contributing
nations provide more troops, the U.S.  force level in Bosnia could
drop to 6,900.  A smaller force, according to USAREUR and FORSCOM
officials, would most likely have fewer combat support and combat
service support units.  For example, one of the potential reductions
involves having only one aviation brigade--a combat support
unit--responsible for supporting the forces in Bosnia and the SFOR
Commander's reserve force.  Additional force reductions will come
from units such as the Army Center for Lessons Learned and military
history units. 

With the decision to extend the Bosnia mission indefinitely, the Army
canceled its June 1998 troop withdrawal and extended its plans for
providing personnel beyond June.  A USAREUR document on providing
future forces specifies that the initial follow-on force deployment
will be from June 1998 through October 1998.  The Department of the
Army has assigned USAREUR responsibility for providing the Army
portion of this force.  USAREUR has developed a strategy and
identified those specific requirements that it can fill, which is
most of the initial follow-on force requirements.  According to
USAREUR and FORSCOM officials, FORSCOM will provide most of the
requirements that cannot be met by USAREUR units through October
1998. 

The Army plans for FORSCOM to provide most of the forces for the next
two follow-on rotations--one in October 1998 and the other in April
1999.  This decision was made to relieve USAREUR of the high
operating and personnel tempo it has experienced since the Bosnia
mission began and to allow it to focus on training for its wartime
mission.  According to USAREUR officials, FORSCOM's providing the
bulk of the forces for the Bosnia mission for a year will allow
USAREUR to recover from the adverse impacts of almost 3 years
continuous deployment to Bosnia.  For example, in June 1995, 6 months
before the first deployment to Bosnia, 46 percent of USAREUR's units
achieved the readiness rating expected of these units; by August
1997, that percentage had dropped to 30 percent as a result of
personnel, equipment, and training required for wartime missions
being diverted to peacekeeping operations.\3

The Air Force has rotated aircraft, aircrews, and ground support
personnel to support the Bosnia mission.  According to a USAFE
operations official, to support the mission in fiscal years 1998 and
1999 the Air Force has identified capabilities and units possessing
those capabilities it plans to deploy.  USAFE will continue to be the
principal force provider. 


--------------------
\3 These data are based on USAREUR reporting on 207 or about 90
percent of its units.  Each unit's readiness goal is based on the
staffing authorization. 


   PROVIDING NEEDED CAPABILITIES
   FOR THE MISSION IS BECOMING
   DIFFICULT IN A FEW INSTANCES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Extending the Bosnia mission beyond June 1998 is causing the services
to seek alternative ways to provide some needed capabilities. 
Although the vast majority of the ground-based combat support and
aviation-related requirements can be filled, about a dozen unit
capabilities will require special attention in the future because the
capabilities are primarily in the reserves and many of these
capabilities have already been mobilized and deployed in support of
the operation.  Requirements for these capabilities have totaled
several hundred persons per rotation.  Solutions have been developed
for providing some of these capabilities and are being sought for the
others. 

FORSCOM recently identified 12 unit types that it may have difficulty
providing from its forces in future rotations primarily because most
of these types of units are predominately or exclusively in the
reserves and have already been called up and participated in the
Bosnia mission.  Each succeeding call-up has reduced the available
pool of members and units available for future rotations.  Table 2
lists the number of these units in the Army and their distribution
between the active and reserve components.  Table 3 provides details
on the 12 unit types, including the number of units needed per
rotation, the number of reserve units remaining, and additional
information on the active units.  According to an Army operations
official, other Army commands, such as the U.S.  Army Pacific and
Eighth U.S.  Army, have some of the 12 unit types that FORSCOM has
identified as difficult to fill.  However, units assigned to those
commands generally would not be able to meet Bosnia mission
requirements because many of the units would be committed to missions
in their command's primary area of responsibility. 



                                     Table 2
                     
                     Distribution of Hard-to-Fill Army Units
                         Between the Active Force and the
                                     Reserves

                                                    Reserve units
                             Active        Reserve      activated    Total units
Type of unit                units\a          units     for Bosnia       in force
--------------------  -------------  -------------  -------------  =============
Broadcast Public                  0              3              3              3
 Affairs Detachment
Replacement                       0              3              3              3
 Battalion
 Headquarters
Rear Tactical                     0              5              4              5
 Operations Center
Target Acquisition             12\c            8\d              8             20
 Battery/
 Detachment\b
Movement Control                  3              4              4              7
 Battalion
 Headquarters
Centralized Movement              2              3              3              5
 Control Team
Air Terminal                      1              9              9             10
 Movement Control
 Team
Public Affairs                   12             10             10             22
 Detachment
Mobile Public                     1             40             24             41
 Affairs Detachment
Engineering Fire                  1             19             11             20
 Fighter Detachment
Military History                  1             16              8             17
 Detachment
Medical Distribution              4              5              1              9
 Unit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a See table 3 for additional detail on the active units. 

\b Target acquisition batteries are a part of heavy divisions; target
acquisition detachments can be a part of light divisions and corps. 
Both types of units can meet the Bosnia mission requirement. 

\c Six of these units are target acquisition batteries; six are
target acquisition detachments. 

\d Seven of these units are target acquisition batteries; one is a
target acquisition detachment. 



                                Table 3
                
                        Hard-to-Fill Army Units

                                             Units   Reserve    Number
                                            needed     units        of
                                               per  remainin    active
Type of unit                              rotation         g     units
----------------------------------------  --------  --------  --------
Broadcast Public Affairs Detachment              1         0         0
Replacement Battalion Headquarters               1         0         0
Rear Tactical Operations Center                  1       1\a         0
Target Acquisition Battery/Detachment            2         0      12\b
Movement Control Battalion Headquarters          1         0         3
Centralized Movement Control Team                2         0       2\c
Air Terminal Movement Control Team               2         0         1
Public Affairs Detachment                        1         0      12\d
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment                 4      16\e         1
Engineering Fire Fighter Detachment              2       8\e         1
Military History Detachment                      1         8       1\c
Medical Distribution Unit                        1       4\f         4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Army National Guard has seven rear tactical operations center
units that differ somewhat from the Bosnia requirement, but, if
modified, they could be used to meet mission requirements. 

\b These are artillery elements within the divisions or corps and, if
deployed independently, would adversely impact the parent unit's
combat capability. 

\c These active force units have already deployed to Bosnia. 

\d Four of these 12 public affairs detachments have already deployed
to Bosnia. 

\e Reserve units remaining cannot meet readiness requirements for
deployment.  With 1-12 months notice, these units can be made ready
to meet deployment standards. 

\f Two of the four remaining units cannot meet readiness
requirements.  With 1-12 months notice, these two units can be made
ready to meet deployment standards. 

Three of the 12 unit types--Broadcast Public Affairs, Replacement
Headquarters, and Rear Tactical Operations Center--do not exist in
the active force.  The active Army does maintain force structure for
the nine remaining unit types, but two have already deployed to
Bosnia and the availability of others may be limited.  For example, a
FORSCOM official told us that each Army division's artillery has a
target acquisition battery or detachment, but deploying the target
acquisition element independently would severely degrade the
readiness of the remaining division.  The active centralized movement
control teams and the military history detachment have already
deployed to Bosnia at least once, and FORSCOM would prefer to not
deploy them again.  The active movement control battalion
headquarters, air terminal movement control team, mobile public
affairs detachment, engineering fire fighter detachment, and medical
distribution units have not been deployed to Bosnia. 

The availability of the Reserve Component to meet some of the future
Bosnia mission requirements at current force levels is limited to
some extent.  According to FORSCOM, all Reserve Component Broadcast
Public Affairs, Replacement Headquarters, Target Acquisition,
Movement Control Headquarters, and some movement control teams
already have been called up under PSRC.  Only the Rear Tactical
Operations Center, Military History and Medical Distribution missions
can currently be met from existing reserve force structure. 
Moreover, FORSCOM told us that some of the remaining Reserve
Component Mobile Public Affairs, Engineering Fire Fighters, and
Medical Distribution units currently cannot meet the criteria for
deployment.  According to FORSCOM, these units could be used, but,
depending on the unit, would require from 1 month to 12 months of
notice before deployment to receive personnel, equipment, training,
or a combination of these sufficient to meet the deployment criteria. 

FORSCOM requested the U.S.  Atlantic Command, which can draw forces
from all services in the continental United States, to assess whether
other services can provide these capabilities.  Solutions were
identified for two of these areas for the next rotation.  An air
movement control unit requirement will be met by an ad hoc Marine
Corps unit, and the Broadcast Public Affairs unit requirement will be
met by an ad hoc unit that was formed by pooling individuals from the
military services because no one unit was available in any service. 
According to FORSCOM and USAREUR, the use of ad hoc units will
increase as the Army's ability to provide specific capabilites
(active or reserve) decreases. 

As of April 1998, the U.S.  Atlantic Command was developing solutions
for the other areas.  If the Atlantic Command is unable to find other
services to meet these requirements, other solutions will be
considered.  These include using more ad hoc units, contracting
civilians to perform the function, and seeking to have other NATO
partners assume some of these responsibilities.  For example,
according to USAREUR, engineering fire fighter requirements will be
contracted out. 

In addition to FORSCOM's identification of types of units that will
be difficult to fill, the U.S.  Army Special Operations Command has
also identified certain components of its civil affairs and
psychological operations capabilities that may be difficult to fill. 
However, the Commanding General of the U.S.  Army Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Command told us that some of these
difficulties will be mitigated as the command improves its
utilization of these capabilities and trains officers from other
nations to undertake some of the mission. 


      AIR FORCE HAS NOT HAD TO
      INVOLUNTARILY CALL UP MANY
      RESERVISTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

The only instances in which PSRC has been used by the Air Force to
support Bosnia is for the air traffic control and combat
communications missions.  Of these two missions, only air traffic
control has posed a problem.  Two-thirds of the Air Force's air
traffic control capability is in the Air National Guard, and the
Guard recently reduced its air traffic control force structure by
almost 50 percent.  Initially the mission was handled by volunteers
on a rotating basis from air traffic control units, but, beginning in
June 1996, PSRC was used to call up Guard personnel for between 120
days and 179 days to perform this function.  All Guard air traffic
control units already have been activated under the Bosnia PSRC.  In
October 1997, the Air National Guard informed the active Air Force
that it would be unable to solely meet these requirements beyond July
1, 1998, and asked to have the active Air Force provide the personnel
to meet the requirement. 

Active and reserve Air Force officials have been seeking short- and
long-term solutions to air traffic control requirements for the
extended mission.  To attract more volunteers from the Guard,
rotations for Guard personnel will be decreased from 120 days to 45
days.  Overall radar operator and tower personnel requirements will
be reduced, and Guard personnel will fill only about half of these
requirements with the balance to be filled by active Air Force
personnel. 

Beginning in October 1998, U.S.-trained Hungarian controllers are
expected to replace U.S.  controllers, further reducing operator
requirements.  USAFE plans to implement contractor maintenance for
the maintenance portion of the mission by November 1998.  This will
leave only one person from the Air National Guard involved with air
traffic control maintenance.  The Air Force hopes these actions will
reduce the need to involuntarily activate Guard personnel for the air
traffic control mission. 

Air Force Reserve Component officials told us that as the mission
lengthens additional capabilities may require changes from current
practices for providing personnel.  Most requirements are now met by
volunteers, but according to an Air Force Reserve official the longer
the mission lasts the greater the probability PSRC will have to be
used to ensure that needed capabilities are provided. 


   PSRC PERMITS INVOLUNTARY
   ACTIVATION OF SELECTED RESERVES
   SUBJECT TO LIMITS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

If the President determines that it is necessary to augment the
active forces for an operational mission, he may initiate a PSRC
call-up under
10 U.S.C.   12304.  With this authority, units and members of the
Selected Reserve may be ordered to active duty without their consent. 
The statute does not limit the number of missions that may be
undertaken with reserve support.  However, reservists cannot be
required to serve on a mission for "more than 270 days." The 270-day
time limit on PSRC activations is long enough to allow for multiple
involuntary activations that cumulate to less than 270 days, and the
statute does not prohibit such multiple involuntary activations. 


      SCOPE OF PSRC AUTHORITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

Authority to mobilize the reserves is governed by statute.  Upon
declaring a national emergency, the President is authorized to
mobilize the Ready Reserve under 10 U.S.C.   12302.  That section's
involuntary activation authority extends to 1 million reservists for
up to 24 months' of service.  In 1976, Congress recognized that
circumstances at times may exist that would require access to the
reserves but would not support an emergency declaration. 

Congress enacted the PSRC statute to broaden nonconsensual access to
the reserves.  This authority was expected to complement DOD's "Total
Force Concept," under which well-trained reserves became more fully
integrated into the force structure.  The President can initiate a
PSRC call-up when he determines "that it is necessary to augment the
active forces for any operational mission."\4

Units and members of the Selected Reserve are subject to involuntary
activation under PSRC authority.  The Selected Reserve is a component
of the Ready Reserves. 

Prior to 1995, PSRC authority had been used twice--for the Gulf War
and the operation in Haiti.  In each instance, an executive order
stated the need for activating the Selected Reserve and defined the
mission.  As implemented in the past, the mission statements were
broad in scope.  Consistent with that practice, the scope of the
Bosnia PSRC mission is defined in Executive Order 12982 as the
"conduct of operations in and around former Yugoslavia."

The PSRC statute allows the Secretary of Defense to prescribe
policies and procedures concerning such matters as the number and
types of Selected Reserve units to be activated, the timing of the
calls-ups, the number of reservists to be activated, and the time
required for each reservist to remain on active duty.  These matters
are discussed in DOD
Directive 1235.10, July 1, 1995.  In addition, an end date for the
use of PSRC authority may be set by the Secretary of Defense.  The
end date for the Bosnia PSRC was first set at May 1997, then extended
to August 1998, and, as of February 1998, the end date was extended
indefinitely.  The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs has stated that the current policy is that the
Department of Defense will not request that the President invoke PSRC
authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists who already
have served 270 days. 

In November 1997, Congress enlarged the reserve components available
for PSRC call-up.  Section 511 of Public Law 105-85 directed the
Secretary to create a PSRC mobilization category for members of the
Individual Ready Reserves.  Up to 30,000 of the Individual Ready
Reserve members who volunteer for the mobilization category can then
be involuntarily activated as individuals.  Before passage of this
amendment, members of the Individual Ready Reserves sometimes
volunteered to temporarily join the Selected Reserve to allow them to
be subject to PSRC.  Department of Defense officials believe that
this authority is not available for a Bosnia-type mission because
they interpret it as being available only as a bridge to partial
mobilization. 

The statute also caps at 200,000 the total number of reservists who
may be serving on active duty under PSRC "at any one time." This
number has grown since the statute was first enacted in 1976. 
Originally, the total number of selected reservists who could be
activated at any one time was set at 50,000.  This was increased to
100,000 in l980 and to 200,000 in 1986.\5

The PSRC statute has always included a limit on the number of days a
reservist could be required to serve without consent.  As originally
enacted, the involuntary activation period was "not more than 90
days." Over the years, that limit has been expanded to the current
level of "not more than 270 days." A 270-day limit is long enough to
permit multiple involuntary activations, and the statute does not
prohibit such multiple activations.  The Army's policy, however, is
not to allow reactivations.  The Air Force does not have a similar
policy, and may soon face the necessity of reactivating some air
traffic controllers who have already served 120 days under the
current PSRC. 


--------------------
\4 The statute prohibits involuntary activation under PSRC to respond
to domestic emergencies and disasters. 

\5 We have previously reported on reserve component responsiveness as
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (P.L.  104-201).  See Reserve Forces:  Proposals to Expand
Call-up Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations
(GAO/NSIAD-97-129, April 18, 1997). 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

The military services have successfully provided the needed
capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years.  The
Army, which has provided the bulk of the armed forces, has taken a
number of steps to match its existing units to the mission
requirements, including deploying partial units, creating derivative
units by borrowing personnel from nondeploying units, and creating ad
hoc units to deploy individual augmentees.  These steps have met the
mission's needs with varying impacts on parent units that have
provided personnel and have required the Army to operate in a fashion
different from the way in which it organizes its forces, which is as
entire units to fight a major theater war.  The Army also has relied
on the reserves both to provide support capabilities that reside
primarily or solely in the reserve component and to reduce the high
level of activity of some active forces.  The Air Force has required
a smaller number of forces, and the nature of the Air Force's
responsibilities has allowed for extensive use of reserve and guard
volunteers. 

The recent decision to extend the Bosnia mission will require
rotating military forces for the foreseeable future.  While formal
guidance has not been finalized regarding mission needs, the Army is
planning for follow-on forces through late 1999.  The first follow-on
force is expected to deploy in June 1998 to relieve the forces that
are currently deployed.  Although the vast majority of the types of
capabilities needed do not represent challenges in providing
personnel, a handful do, principally in the Army.  These challenges
exist because in a few instances all the needed capability is in the
reserves and has already been involuntarily called up under the
current PSRC and in other instances because there is limited
capability in the active force structure or because the active
capability is vital to its parent unit.  For these capabilities, the
Army's force structure does not match the needs of a mission of the
duration and with the continuing requirements of the one in Bosnia. 
Solutions are being developed to meet these challenges.  These
challenges may exist as long as the mission continues at its current
size and with its current tasks. 

The President has statutory authority to involuntarily activate units
and members of the Selected Reserve.  The Bosnia mission has led to a
situation in which in some instances all of the units with needed
capabilities already have been ordered to duty and served the maximum
time permitted.  The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs has said that the Department of Defense's current
policy is that the Department will not request that the President
invoke PSRC authority a second time for Bosnia to recall reservists
who already have served 270 days. 

In some instances, the services have activated reservists
involuntarily for shorter periods of time than the statute allows. 
It is possible that some of these reservists could be recalled to
serve the full activation period under a single PSRC of 270 days. 
The statute does not prohibit multiple activations as long as the
total number of days on active duty does not exceed
270 days. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense partially concurred with the report.  (See app.  I.) The
Department said that operations in Bosnia have been and will continue
to be a success story.  The Department further said that the overall
tenor of our report implies that despite success in mission
accomplishment and active and reserve component integration,
challenges in manning a follow-on-mission to Bosnia are
insurmountable. 

We state in the report that the Department has successfully provided
needed capabilities for the Bosnia mission for the past 2-1/2 years
and do not mean to imply that the Department will be unable to
successfully staff the mission in the future.  We do, however, point
out that there are a few types of units that will become increasingly
challenging to fill and that solutions are being developed to meet
these challenges.  The Department stated in its technical comments
that there are some types of units that will require more management
and we agree. 

The Department also stated it will continue to rely on the reserves
and to task organize, split-base, and cross level units to get the
right force mix to accomplish the mission.  Our report describes how
the Department has used these capabilities and techniques to meet
mission requirements and explains why they have been used. 

The Department also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated where appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To determine how the military services are providing needed
capabilities for the Bosnia mission and plan to provide follow-on
forces for the extended mission, we reviewed documents and
interviewed personnel at the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs;
Department of the Army headquarters and Department of Air Force
headquarters, Washington, D.C.; U.S.  European Command, USAREUR, and
USAFE, all located in Germany; U.S.  Atlantic Command, Norfolk,
Virginia; Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida; Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Air Combat Command,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; and Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Reserve Affairs).  Because the Navy and the Marine Corps
provided few personnel directly to the Bosnia mission, we did not
include them in our work. 

To gain reserve component perspectives on the ability to provide
capabilities in the future, we reviewed documents and interviewed
personnel at the Chief, Army Reserve, Army and Air National Guard,
Washington, D.C.; Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; and
the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. 
Although we obtained documents showing the number of individual
reservists that the Army has deployed to Bosnia, the data did not
identify the specific military skills possessed by these individuals. 

To examine the PSRC authority, we reviewed the applicable U.S. 
statutes and their legislative history.  We also requested and
received the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel's
written interpretation of the statute with regard to multiple
activations within the 270-day call-up limitation and the ability to
invoke the statute's authority for a second time for a similar
mission. 

We performed our review between July 1997 and April 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government accounting standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional
committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will also
be made available to others on request. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.  If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-3504. 

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director
Rodell Anderson, Senior Evaluator
Anthony DeFrank, Senior Evaluator


   ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Leo Sullivan, Evaluator-in-Charge
Frank Smith, Senior Evaluator


   KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

Gregory Symons, Senior Evaluator


   OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4

Margaret Armen, Senior Attorney

*** End of document. ***