Index


Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need To Be
Reassessed (Chapter Report, 11/16/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-6).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the
Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the:
(1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill
and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of
this readiness data.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined,
outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs
that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant
shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning
programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance
condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to
address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years
before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably
assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait,
Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the
three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army
recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those
sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets
afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is
added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining
and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused
by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9)
the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational
projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these
programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes
valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness
cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has
not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle
programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the
detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to
determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to
deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case
scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the
facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in
Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current
requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle
program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of
inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location
visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles
were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and
(18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and
improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance
conditions will be difficult to discern.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-6
     TITLE:  Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need 
             To Be Reassessed
      DATE:  11/16/98
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Equipment maintenance
             Military land vehicles
             Inventory control systems
             Military materiel
             Logistics
             Data integrity
             Defense contingency planning
             Mobilization
             Defense operations
IDENTIFIER:  Kuwait
             Army Afloat Prepositioning Program
             Korea
             Qatar
             Europe
             Persian Gulf
             Air Force Bare Base Program
             Bosnia
             Army Total Asset Visibility System
             
</pre>
Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need To Be
Reassessed (Chapter Report, 11/16/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-6).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the
Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the:
(1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill
and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of
this readiness data.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined,
outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs
that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant
shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning
programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance
condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to
address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years
before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably
assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait,
Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the
three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army
recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those
sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets
afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is
added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining
and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused
by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9)
the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational
projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these
programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes
valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness
cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has
not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle
programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the
detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to
determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to
deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case
scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the
facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in
Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current
requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle
program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of
inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location
visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles
were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and
(18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and
improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance
conditions will be difficult to discern.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-6
     TITLE:  Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need 
             To Be Reassessed
      DATE:  11/16/98
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Equipment maintenance
             Military land vehicles
             Inventory control systems
             Military materiel
             Logistics
             Data integrity
             Defense contingency planning
             Mobilization
             Defense operations
IDENTIFIER:  Kuwait
             Army Afloat Prepositioning Program
             Korea
             Qatar
             Europe
             Persian Gulf
             Air Force Bare Base Program
             Bosnia
             Army Total Asset Visibility System
             
</pre>
Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need To Be
Reassessed (Chapter Report, 11/16/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-6).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the
Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the:
(1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill
and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of
this readiness data.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined,
outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs
that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant
shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning
programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance
condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to
address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years
before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably
assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait,
Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the
three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army
recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those
sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets
afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is
added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining
and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused
by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9)
the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational
projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these
programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes
valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness
cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has
not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle
programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the
detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to
determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to
deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case
scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the
facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in
Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current
requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle
program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of
inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location
visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles
were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and
(18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and
improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance
conditions will be difficult to discern.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-6
     TITLE:  Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need 
             To Be Reassessed
      DATE:  11/16/98
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Equipment maintenance
             Military land vehicles
             Inventory control systems
             Military materiel
             Logistics
             Data integrity
             Defense contingency planning
             Mobilization
             Defense operations
IDENTIFIER:  Kuwait
             Army Afloat Prepositioning Program
             Korea
             Qatar
             Europe
             Persian Gulf
             Air Force Bare Base Program
             Bosnia
             Army Total Asset Visibility System
             
</pre>
Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need To Be
Reassessed (Chapter Report, 11/16/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-6).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the
Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the:
(1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill
and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of
this readiness data.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined,
outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs
that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant
shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning
programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance
condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to
address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years
before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably
assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait,
Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the
three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army
recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those
sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets
afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is
added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining
and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused
by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9)
the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational
projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these
programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes
valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness
cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has
not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle
programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the
detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to
determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to
deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case
scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the
facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in
Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current
requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle
program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of
inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location
visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles
were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and
(18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and
improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance
conditions will be difficult to discern.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-6
     TITLE:  Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need 
             To Be Reassessed
      DATE:  11/16/98
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Equipment maintenance
             Military land vehicles
             Inventory control systems
             Military materiel
             Logistics
             Data integrity
             Defense contingency planning
             Mobilization
             Defense operations
IDENTIFIER:  Kuwait
             Army Afloat Prepositioning Program
             Korea
             Qatar
             Europe
             Persian Gulf
             Air Force Bare Base Program
             Bosnia
             Army Total Asset Visibility System