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Amendment no. 1085 


The PRESIDING OFFICER. 
The Senator from California.



                       Amendment No. 1085


 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Kennedy,
Feingold, Dorgan, Levin, Wyden, Clinton, Mikulski, Lautenberg, Boxer,
Reed, Harkin, and 
Biden, I send an amendment to the desk.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

 The legislative clerk read as follows:


   The Senator from <st1:state><st1:place>California</st1:place></st1:state> [Mrs. 

Feinstein], for herself,

  Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Levin, Mr. Wyden,

  Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Lautenberg, Mrs. Boxer, Mr.

  Reed, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. 
Biden, proposes an amendment

  
numbered 1085.


 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the

reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

 The amendment is as follows:


 (Purpose: To prohibit the use of funds for the Robust 

Nuclear Earth

 Penetrator and utilize the amount of funds otherwise available to

                   
reduce the National debt)


   At the appropriate place, insert the following:

   Sec. __. (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Robust 

Nuclear

  Earth Penetrator.--None of the funds appropriated or

  
otherwise made available by this Act may be used for any

  
purpose related to the Robust 

Nuclear Earth Penetrator

  
(RNEP).

   (b) Utilization of Amount for Reduction of Public Debt.--Of

  
the amounts appropriated by this Act, an amount equal to the

  
amount of funds covered by the prohibition in subsection (a)

  
shall not be obligated or expended, but shall be utilized

  
instead solely for purposes of the reduction of the public

  
debt.


 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I was 13 years old when I saw this

picture. When we discuss 

nuclear weapons, this is the picture I

remember. The only country on Earth that has ever used 

nuclear weapons

is our own. It has been debated ever since whether this was positive

because it saved American troops and ended the war or whether it has

launched our country and other countries into a race which well could

prove disastrous for all of us.

 This is a photograph of <st1:city><st1:place>Hiroshima</st1:place></st1:city> after the 

nuclear bomb was dropped

on the city on August 6, 1945. Mr. President, 80,000 people died from

the initial blast and 60,000 people died from radiation poisoning, for

a total of 140,000 people dead. And that bomb was 15 kilotons.

 The second photograph is of <st1:city><st1:place>Nagasaki</st1:place></st1:city> after August 9, 1945.
Approximately 75,000 of the city's 240,000 residents were killed

instantly. In total, approximately 100,000 people died in the blast.

 I rise today once again to address a critical issue that is related

to the security of the American people and our 

nuclear proliferation

efforts: the renewed push by this administration to reopen the 

nuclear

door, including funding for a 100-kiloton 

nuclear 

bunker 

buster.

 I have argued this on the Senate floor before, 
that such actions,

combined with the policy of unilateralism and preemption, run counter

to our values and nonproliferation efforts and put <st1:place><st1:country-region>U.S.</st1:country-region></st1:place> national

security interests and American lives at risk. Therefore, those of us

who are cosponsors of this amendment wish to delete the $4 million, for

the study and development of the robust 

nuclear earth 
penetrator. The

amendment redirects the funds for debt reduction.

 The time has come for this Senate, like the House has done in this

bill, to send a clear and unambiguous message to the White House and

the Pentagon: We will not support funding for programs to develop new



nuclear weapons.

 Congress made a strong statement last year in deleting funding for

the development of this 

nuclear 

bunker 

buster by eliminating $27.5

million for the 

bunker 

buster, $9 million for the advanced concepts

initiative, which included the study of the development of low-yield

weapons. This action was due in no small part to the leadership of
Representative David Hobson, chairman of the House Appropriations

Energy Committee. The House took a strong position of opposition and

they are to be commended.

 In fact, the House removed new 

nuclear weapons from all bills,

including the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense authorization bill, the Fiscal
Year 2006 Defense appropriations 
bill, and the 2006 Energy

appropriations bill. This was a consequential victory for those of us

who believe the <st1:place><st1:country-region>United States</st1:country-region></st1:place> sends the wrong signal to the rest of the

world by reopening the 

nuclear door and beginning the testing and

development of a new generation of 

nuclear weapons. That is why I was

so disappointed to learn that the administration requested funds this

year to resume the 

nuclear earth 
penetrator study.

 As a matter of fact, this year Secretary 
Rumsfeld asked the
Department of Energy to place the $4 million in the energy budget and
$4.5 million in the defense budget, thereby splitting the amount

requested for the 

bunker 

buster. He hoped to weaken opposition and

split the budget between two Departments so that if it could not get

funding in one, he could get it in the other. The House had the

foresight to reject this idea and has reasserted its determination not

to move forward with the 

bunker 

buster study.

 During its markup on the 2006 Defense authorization bill, the House
Armed Services Committee eliminated all the Department of Energy

funding for the RNEP, and transferred the $4 million to the Air Force

budget for work on a conventional 
nonnuclear version of the 

bunker



buster. The House Armed Services Committee member, Silvestre Reyes,

stated: The committee took the ``N,'' or ``

nuclear,'' out of the RNEP

program.

 Following the Armed Services Committee action, Chairman Hobson and
Representative Ellen Tauscher led the effort to eliminate the
Department of Energy funding of $4 million for the 

bunker 

buster in its

markup in the 2006 Energy and Water appropriations bill. That bill also

eliminated funding for the modern pit facility and banned site

selection for the facility in 2006.

 Finally, the House 2006 Defense appropriations bill limits research

for a 

bunker 

buster to a conventional program. These three actions by

authorizers and appropriators, Republicans and Democrats alike, have

dealt another blow to the administration's plans to develop new 

nuclear

weapons and reinforced the clear intent of Congress that we should not

go down that path because it will only encourage the very proliferation

we are trying to prevent.

 Why should the Senate continue to fund programs that are 
rapidly

losing support in the House and the administration? Now the Senate has

an opportunity to follow the House's lead. Senator Kennedy and I and

others have come to the floor to offer this amendment to do just that.

 During previous debates on this issue, we have argued that according

to the laws of physics, it is simply not possible for a missile casing

on a 

nuclear warhead to survive a thrust into the earth to take out a

hard and deeply buried military target without spewing millions of tons

of cubic feet of radiation into the atmosphere. Consider this: A 1-

kiloton 

nuclear weapon detonated 25 to 50 feet underground would dig a

crater the size of Ground Zero in <st1:place><st1:state>New York</st1:state></st1:place> and eject 1 million cubic

feet of radioactive debris into the air.

 Given the insurmountable physics problems associated with burrowing a

warhead deep into the earth, one would need a weapon with more than 100

kilotons of yield to destroy an underground target at a depth of 1,000

feet.

 Now let me explain. The maximum feasible depth of a 

bunker 

buster is

35 feet. At that depth, a 100-kiloton 

bunker 

buster would scatter 100

million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the atmosphere. There is

no known missile casing that can survive a 1,000-foot thrust into the
Earth and avoid overwhelming and catastrophic consequences. That is a

fact. There is not a single scientist who will say that.

[[Page S7782]]

The head of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration agrees.

 At the March 2, 2005, House Armed Services Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher asked Ambassador Linton
Brooks, the following question:


   I just want to know is there any way a [robust 

nuclear

  
earth 
penetrator] of any size that we would drop would not

  
produce a huge amount of radioactive debris?


 The Ambassador replied:


   No, there is not.


 When Congresswoman Tauscher asked him how deep he thought a 

bunker



buster could go, he answered:


   . . . 
a couple of tens of meters, maybe. I mean certainly--

  I must apologize for my lack of precision if we in the

  
administration have suggested that it was possible to have a

  
bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don't

  
believe that--I don't believe the law of physics will ever

  
let that be true.


 Here is the head of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

saying there is no way one can drive a missile casing deep enough to

prevent radioactive spewing.

 Let me just show what this means. For a 100-kiloton weapon, one would

have to drive it 800 feet deep into the earth to contain the 

nuclear

fallout. One can only drive it a small distance: 35 feet. So the result

is 1.5 million tons of radioactivity. If it is 5 kilotons, one would

have to drive it 320 feet. One could only drive it 35 feet. The spewing

of radioactive debris is 200,000 tons. If it is 1 kiloton, one would

have to drive it 220 feet. One could only drive it 35 feet and the

radioactivity is 60,000 tons. If it is .2 kilotons, one would have to

drive it 120 feet. One can only drive it 35 feet, and the radioactive

spewing is 25,000 tons.

 This is not from me. This is the National Academy of Sciences,



nuclear scientists, physicists, the head of the National 

Nuclear

Security Administration. There is widespread agreement about this. So

why are we doing it?

 On April 27, the National Academies of Sciences study commissioned by
Congress to study the anticipated health and environmental effects of

the 

Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapon found that current experience and

empirical predictions indicate that the Earth-penetrating weapons

cannot penetrate to depths required for total containment of the

effects of a 

nuclear explosion. It would take a 300-kiloton weapon at a

penetration of 3 meters, or 10 feet, to destroy hard and deeply buried

targets at 200 meters, or 656 feet.

 To destroy a hard and deeply buried target at 300 meters you would

need a 1-megaton weapon--not kiloton, megaton. The number of casualties

from an Earth 
penetrator weapon detonated at a few meters depth is, for

all practical purposes, equal to that of a surface burst of the same

weapon yield.

 That is what the National Academies of Sciences studies say. For

attacks near or in densely populated areas, using 

Nuclear Earth
Penetrator Weapons on hard and deeply buried targets, the number of

casualties can range from thousands to more than a million, depending

primarily on weapon yield.

 The bottom line is that a 

bunker 

buster cannot penetrate into the
Earth deeply enough to avoid massive casualties and the spewing of

millions of cubic feet of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. It

would result in the death of up to a million people or more if used in

a densely populated area.

 This chart shows that. The source is the National Resources Defense

Council and the EPA. What it shows is the predicted radioactive fallout

from a B61-11 300-kiloton explosion in <st1:place><st1:city>West Pyongyang</st1:city>, <st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place>,

using historical weather data for the month of May.

 Here is the blast, here is <st1:place><st1:city>Seoul</st1:city></st1:place>, 
here is the radioactive fallout.

 Why are we doing this? It makes no sense.

 I think this is the strongest evidence to date that we should not

move forward with this study and that we should put a stop to it once

and for all. In reality, this has never been about a study. It has been

about the intent of this administration to develop new 

nuclear weapons.
While the administration is silent this year on how much it plans to

spend on the program in the future, last year's budget request totaled

$485 million on the robust 

nuclear earth 
penetrator over 5 years. This
5-year figure was omitted this year.

 Let's look, for a brief moment, at the policies underlying this

request, for they, too, have not been changed. The 2002 

Nuclear Posture
Review places 

nuclear weapons----

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I yield myself another 5 minutes.

 The 2002 

Nuclear Posture Review places 

nuclear weapons as part of the

strategic triad. Therefore, the aim is to blur the distinction between

conventional and 

nuclear weapons. This makes them easier to use.

 National Security Directive 17 indicates that the <st1:country-region><st1:place>United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> would

engage in a first use of 

nuclear weapons--a historic statement in

itself. We have never had a first-use policy. We have always had

strategic ambiguity, but we have never before said we would ever

countenance a first use of 

nuclear weapons. In Security Directive 17 it

is said in response to a chemical or biological attack--and seven

nations are actually named--we would consider a 

nuclear response. In

essence, these policies encourage other nations, and they have

encouraged <st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region> and they have encouraged <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region></st1:place>--those are two of

the nations suggested--to develop their own 

nuclear weapons, thereby

putting American lives and our own national security interests at risk.

 We are telling the world, when it comes to 

nuclear weapons: Do as we

say, not as we do. I object to that policy. It is hypocrisy.

 There are alternatives. I have just been briefed by Northrop Grumman

on a program they are working on with Boeing to develop a conventional



bunker 

buster, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is designed to go

deeper than any 

nuclear 

bunker 

buster and take out 25 percent of

underground and deeply buried targets. This 30,000-pound weapon, 20

feet in length, with 6,000 pounds of high explosives, will be delivered

from a B-2 or a B-52 bomber. It can burrow 60 meters into the ground

through 5,000 
psi of reinforced concrete. It will burrow 8 meters into

the ground through 10,000 
psi reinforced concrete.

 We have already spent $6 million on this program, and design and

ground testing are scheduled to be completed next year.

 We should focus on conventional programs. The House has said this.
The Senate should concur.

 We have a solemn obligation to spend our resources in the most

effective manner and to make this country safer and more secure. That

is why I am so concerned about this administration's decision to come

back to Congress and request additional funds for new 

nuclear weapons.
 
I would like to give my kudos and congratulations to the House of

Representatives. They truly have their heads on straight. I am

delighted that they have eliminated the authorization and the funding

for this entire program in the 2006 appropriation. I urge us to do the

same on just one part of this, which is the 

nuclear 

bunker 

buster, $4

million.

 I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from <st1:state><st1:place>Massachusetts</st1:place></st1:state>,
Senator Kennedy.

 Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I think I had consent for a half-

hour. I do not expect to use it all.

 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. The Senator is right. I change that to a half-hour.

 Mr. KENNEDY. First, I commend my friend and colleague, Senator



Feinstein, for her attention to this issue. She has long been an

advocate for sensible and responsible 

nuclear arms policy. Again, this

evening, she is leading the way in the Senate. All of us are grateful

for her leadership. I welcome the opportunity to join with her in

offering this amendment.

 It is intended to reverse a reckless proposal by the Bush

administration to develop a new generation of 

nuclear weapons.

 We do not ``provide for the common defense,'' as called for in our
Constitution, by launching a new 

nuclear arms race and making the world

more dangerous, but that is precisely what the administration plans to

do.

 President Bush and Secretary 
Rumsfeld want to develop a new tactical



nuclear weapon called the robust 

nuclear earth 
penetrator, and their

hope is that these 

bunker busters can crash deep into the Earth and

destroy bunkers and weapons caches. They hold the dangerous and

misguided belief that our Nation's interests and values are served by

developing what they consider a more easily usable 

nuclear bomb.

[[Page S7783]]


 I think most Americans believe that is wrong. Our challenge in

addressing 

nuclear nonproliferation issues is not that there are too

few 

nuclear weapons in the world but that there are too many; not that

they are too difficult to use but that they are too easy to use.

 <st1:country-region><st1:place>North Korea</st1:place></st1:country-region> has them and is rattling its 

nuclear saber every day.
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region> is moving forward on the development of 

nuclear capability. We all

hope and pray that al-
Qaida and other terrorist groups never ever get

their hands on a 

nuclear weapon.

 So why on Earth, in this dangerous 

nuclear world, with the specter of

a 

nuclear cloud at the hands of terrorists and rogue states, should the
<st1:place><st1:country-region>United States</st1:country-region></st1:place> 
be adding more 

nuclear weapons to the global arsenal?
What moral authority do we have to ask others to give up their nukes if

we are determined to develop a new generation of 

nuclear weapons of our

own?

 For the past 2 years, Congress has raised major doubts about the

program and significantly cut back on its funding. But the

administration still presses forward for more work on these robust



nuclear earth penetrators. Last year, the administration requested $15

million for it and Congress reluctantly provided half that amount. For
2005, they requested another $27 million and submitted a 5-year request

for nearly $500 million. But cooler heads prevailed, and the House
Appropriations Committee rejected the request. As the committee report

stated,


   The Committee continues to oppose the diversion of

  
resources and intellectual capital away from the most serious

  
issues that confront the management of the nation's 

nuclear

  
deterrent . . . The Committee remains unconvinced by the

  Department's superficial assurance that the RNEP activity is

  
only a study . . . The Committee notes that the management

  
direction for the fiscal year 2004 sent to the directors of

  
the weapons design laboratories left little doubt that the

  
objective of the program was to advance the most extreme new

  


nuclear weapon goals irrespective of any reservations

  
expressed by Congress.


 This year, nothing has changed. The FY06 budget request from the
President includes $4 million for the Department of Energy to study the



bunker 

buster and $4.5 million to the Department of Defense for the

same purpose. Thankfully our colleagues in the House were wiser and

decided to eliminate its funding.

 The administration obviously is still committed to this reckless

approach. Secretary 
Rumsfeld made his position clear in January, when

he wrote to Secretary Abraham:


   I think we should request funds in FY06 and FY07 to

  
complete the RNEP study . . . You can count on my support for

  
your efforts to revitalize the 

nuclear weapons infrastructure

  
and to complete the RNEP study.


 The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds only to complete the

feasibility study for these new 

nuclear weapons. But we already know

what the next step is. In the budget they sent us last year, the

administration stated in plain language that they intend to develop it.

 Ambassador Linton Brooks, the head of the National 

Nuclear Security
Administration, claims those future budget projections are merely

placeholders, ``in the event the President decides to proceed with

development and Congress approves.'' But their fiscal year 2005 budget

clearly shows the administration's unmistakable intention to develop,

and ultimately produce, this weapon.

 The Bush administration would like us to believe that this is a

clean, surgical 

nuclear weapon. They say it will burrow into

underground targets and destroy them with no adverse consequences for

the environment. They can believe all they want, but the science says

their claims are false.

 The National Academy of Sciences confirms exactly what most of us

thought--that these 

nuclear weapons, like other 

nuclear bombs, result

in catastrophic 

nuclear fallout. The fallout can poison tens of

millions of people and create radioactive lands for years and years to

come.

 The study goes on to say, ``Current experience and empirical

predictions indicate that earth-
penetrator weapons cannot penetrate to

depths required for total containment of the effects of a 

nuclear

explosion. . . .

 To be fully contained, a 300 kiloton weapon would have to be

detonated at the bottom of a carefully stemmed emplacement hole about

800 meters deep. Because the practical penetration depth for an earth

penetrating weapon is a few meters--a small fraction of the depth for

the full containment--there will be blast, thermal, initial 

nuclear

radiation, and fallout effects from use of an EPW.

 This chart simulates the likely 

nuclear fallout from a one megaton



bunker-

buster detonated at a hypothetical underground target 20

kilometers east of an Iranian air force base in 
Dezful. This model uses

the same simulation program as the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction

Agency. During summer months, the 

nuclear fallout is predicted to

travel 150 to 200 miles, across <st1:country-region>Iraq</st1:country-region> and <st1:place><st1:country-region>Saudi Arabia</st1:country-region></st1:place>. The radiation

could kill up to 650,000 people.

 Even the person in charge of the program, Linton Brooks, conceded at

a House Armed Services Committee Hearing on March 2 that the robust



nuclear earth 
penetrator could not be used without significant 

nuclear

fallout. He stated:


   I really must apologize for my lack of precision if we in

  
the Administration have suggested that it was possible to

  
have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I

  
don't believe that--I don't believe the laws of physics will

  
ever let that be true.


 This chart depicts a 400 kiloton 
bunkerbuster hitting underground

facilities at <st1:place><st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place>'s Air Base at 
Nuchon-ni. Fallout from this

explosion would blow southeast across the DMZ towards <st1:place><st1:city>Seoul</st1:city></st1:place>. This

attack could kill over 4 million people.

 Even if the 
United States were willing to accept the catastrophic

damage a 

nuclear explosion would cause, the 
bunkerbuster would still

not be able to destroy all of the buried bunkers the intelligence

community has identified.

 So we would have a new bomb that can kill and poison tens of millions

of civilians, spread fallout for more than a thousand miles, make their

lands radioactive, but still not destroy its target.

 The huge, one megaton weapon that the administration is contemplating

cannot reach deeper than 400 meters. All an adversary would have to do

is bury its 

bunker below that depth.

 
Bunkerbusters also require pinpoint accuracy to hit deeply-buried,

hardened bunkers. This requires precise intelligence on the location of

the target. As the National Academy Study emphasized, an attack by a



nuclear weapon would be effective in destroying weapon or weapons

materials, including 

nuclear materials and chemical or biological

agents, only if it's detonated in the actual chamber where the weapons

or materials are located. Even more disturbing, if the bomb is even

slightly off target, the detonation may cause the spread of such deadly

chemicals and germs, in addition to the radioactive fallout.

 As we know from the <st1:country-region><st1:place>Iraq</st1:place></st1:country-region> experience, our intelligence isn't always

accurate. In fact, the Bush administration told us there were weapons

of mass destruction and there and we had to send in troops to take them

out. If we had robust 

nuclear earth penetrators at the time, what if

this White House had used them against suspected chemical or biological

bunkers--which turned out not to exist? Charles 
Duelfer, the head of

the Iraqi Survey Group, shows us how dangerous this approach could have

been when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee last October

that, we were almost all wrong on <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iraq</st1:country-region></st1:place>. Despite the administration's

claims, Mr. 
Duelfer's Comprehensive Report on <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iraq</st1:country-region></st1:place>'s WMD stated,
``There are no credible indications that <st1:city><st1:place>Baghdad</st1:place></st1:city> resumed production of

chemical weapons.

 The intelligence community still faces many challenges in getting its

intelligence right. In their report in March for the President's
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the <st1:country-region><st1:place>United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Laurence 
Silberman and Chuck
Robb found that 
The flaws we found in the Intelligence Community's <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iraq</st1:country-region></st1:place>

performance are still all too common. In some cases, it knows less now

than it did five or ten years ago.

 How can we contemplate using a weapon of this destructive power, if

our intelligence can't guarantee where an underground target really is?

 Finally, if it were clear that this weapon is needed to protect our

troops, then I believe many more in Congress would support it. But

that's not the case. At the House Armed Services

[[Page S7784]]

Committee hearing in March, program chief Linton Brooks once again was

asked if there was a military requirement for the 

bunker 

buster. He

stated categorically, No, there is not.

 Robert 
Peurifoy, the retired Vice President of 
Sandia National
Laboratory, one of our premier 

nuclear weapons labs, had this to say:
If you can find somebody in a uniform in the Defense Department who can

talk about the need for 

nuclear 

bunker busters without laughing, I'll

buy him a cup of coffee. It's outlandish. It's stupid. It is an effort

to maintain a payroll at the weapons labs.

 The administration's effort to build a new class of 

nuclear weapon is

only further evidence of their reckless 

nuclear policy. This action

contradicts the spirit of our obligations under the nonproliferation

treaty to disarm our stockpiles.

 It demonstrates the administration's contempt for the 

nuclear

nonproliferation treaty, the foundation of all current global 

nuclear

arms control. The nonproliferation treaty, signed in 1968, has long

stood for the fundamental principle that the world will be safer if



nuclear proliferation does not extend the five nations that nations 
lan

possessed 

nuclear weapons at the does not extend beyond the five

nations that possessed 

nuclear weapons at that time--the <st1:place><st1:country-region>United States</st1:country-region></st1:place>,
<st1:country-region>
Great Britain</st1:country-region>
, the Soviet Union, China, and France. It reflected the

worldwide consensus that the greater the number of nations with 

nuclear

weapons, the greater the risk of 

nuclear war.

 The Bush administration's policy jeopardizes the entire structure of



nuclear arms control so carefully negotiated by world leaders over the

past half century, starting with the Eisenhower administration. This is

just another example of the administration's Do as I say, not as I do

policy.

 How can we ask <st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region> and <st1:place><st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place> to halt their 

nuclear 
research,

when we fail to halt our own? By proceeding with the Robust 

Nuclear
Earth 
penetrator, we are headed in the wrong direction. Our efforts

will only encourage other nations to follow our example and produce



nuclear weapons of their own.

 We have studied this issue long enough. It is ridiculous for the

administration to try to keep this program going, and it could be

suicidal for the Nation and for our troops. If we need this kind of

weapons system, we ought to follow the conventional weapons research

that is being undertaken and not support this proposal. I hope the
Senate will reject it.

 Mr. President, I yield the time back to the Senator from <st1:state><st1:place>California</st1:place></st1:state>.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. 
The Senator from California.

 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
<st1:state><st1:place>Massachusetts</st1:place></st1:state>. I thought the remarks were excellent. I think they were

really right on. The tragedy of this is that people do not listen. I

hope, Senator Kennedy, your words were heard.

 Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from <st1:state><st1:place>Michigan</st1:place></st1:state>, Mr.

Levin.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. 
The Senator from Michigan.

 Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senators from <st1:state><st1:place>California</st1:place></st1:state> and
<st1:state><st1:place>Massachusetts</st1:place></st1:state> and others who have come to the floor at this late hour

to argue and debate an issue which is so critical to the security of

this Nation.

 We will be a lot less secure if we go down this 

nuclear road. We know

other countries are going down the 

nuclear road. We know we are even

threatening those countries--such as <st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region> and <st1:place><st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place>--that we will

not let them go down that road. We are even holding out the prospect

that they would be the subject of military attacks if they go down the



nuclear road.

 But at the same time we are doing this, that we are telling the

world, we are telling <st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region>, we are telling <st1:place><st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place>, ``Do not walk

down that 

nuclear road,'' the administration is proposing to take

another step down our 

nuclear road. It is a decision which, if upheld

by this body, will make us less secure. It will make it more likely

that <st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region> and <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region></st1:place> will say to us, and say to the world: The
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United States</st1:place></st1:country-region> threatens us if we go to 

nuclear weapons, but they

themselves are relying more and more and more on 

nuclear weapons.

 The administration has asked for $4 million to restart the

feasibility study for the robust 

nuclear earth 
penetrator. I emphasize
``restart'' because we ended this mistake in fiscal year 2004. We

should not restart this. We did not need it in 2005. We do not need it

in 2006.

 The $4 million that the Department of Energy seeks for fiscal year
2006 will not finish the study. An additional $14 million will still be

needed in fiscal year 2007, just to finish the RNEP study.

 What is it that the Department of Energy wants to study? What is the

weapon they want to study? What is the RNEP appropriation for? It is to

look at modification of a 

nuclear bomb called the B83. That is what is

being looked at as a possible earth-penetrating weapon, the RNEP. The
B83 is a large 

nuclear bomb. It is huge. It has a maximum yield on the

order of 1 megaton. And 1 megaton is the equivalent of 71 <st1:city><st1:place>Hiroshima</st1:place></st1:city>

bombs.

 So the weapon they are looking at, or want to look at, to modify for

this function, is a bomb that has the power, the yield, as they call

it, of 71 <st1:place><st1:city>Hiroshima</st1:city></st1:place> bombs. The goal of that feasibility study is to

increase the penetrating capability of the B83. The yield, the power,

of the B83, would stay the same. That is not being reduced. So the idea

is to see whether or not that B83--that bomb with the power of 71

Hiroshimas--can be made to penetrate the earth.

 According to the report of the National Academy of Sciences, it will

not be possible, no matter how good the design. The deepest that an
RNEP could ever penetrate is about 12 feet. And when an RNEP detonates

at 12 feet, 12 feet in the earth, it will generate, according to the
<st1:place><st1:placename>National</st1:placename> <st1:placetype>Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place> of Sciences, more fallout than if it were exploded in

the air. So if we go down this road, we will be looking at a weapon

which cannot penetrate deeper than 12 feet in the earth and will have

greater fallout than if it were exploded in the air, according to the
<st1:place><st1:placename>
National</st1:placename> 
Academy</st1:place> 
of Sciences.

 We talk about collateral damage as though it is some kind of a cold

term. This is damage which is so massive. We think of a weapon 71 times

the size of <st1:place><st1:city>Hiroshima</st1:city></st1:place>, with more fallout than if it were exploded in

the air, which--no matter what its design; even if this study is

successful--cannot penetrate more than about 12 feet in the ground, and

we are telling the rest of the world, ``Do not go down that 

nuclear

road,'' when we ourselves are thinking--thinking--about designing a

weapon which has that kind of a power and that kind of a fallout.


 It is not the hundreds of millions of dollars which this would cost

to implement, assuming this study is completed, it is the absurdity, it

is the utter nonsense, it is the danger to <st1:place><st1:country-region>U.S.</st1:country-region></st1:place> security that would be

created if we take this step down the road, telling the world: Do not

do what we urge you to do because we are not doing it ourselves. That

is the message. We can tell the world, 
Do not do it, do not go 

nuclear,

but what they are going to say to us is: Hey, you are going 

nuclear

further than you already are. You are modifying weapons to try to make

them ``usable'' against deeply buried targets. And you are telling us

and the rest of the world we should not go 

nuclear when you are looking

for more and more uses for 

nuclear weapons?

 We asked the National Academy of Sciences to look at this program. We

asked them how much yield would an RNEP have to have to hold a deeply

buried target at risk, and what would the effects be of using an RNEP?
So the Academy reviewed the universe of hard and deeply buried targets

and found you would have to have a huge yield to have any effect on

deeply buried targets. What the Academy concluded was that yields in

the range of several hundreds of kilotons to a megaton are needed to

effectively hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk.

 This report was issued this year, in April of 2005. What it said is

that to be effective against a target 1,000 feet deep, an RNEP would

have to have a yield of 1 megaton.

 There are 10,000 hard and deeply buried targets in the world, about
10,000. According to the <st1:place><st1:placename>National</st1:placename> <st1:placetype>Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place> of Sciences, 2
,000,--2,000--

of those targets would have some strategic significance. But the
Academy finds that on the order of only about 100 deeply buried targets

would be potential targets for RNEP. And many others--many others--

would be too deep to even reach with a 1-megaton yield such as RNEP

has.

[[Page S7785]]


 So what this study would have us do is spend more millions, take us

down a road which endangers us because of the message it sends to

countries that are contemplating 

nuclear weapons. It endangers our

security to study a weapon that cannot succeed in achieving its goal of

hitting many deeply buried targets. And it would have an extensive

fallout because of its huge size, 71 times the size of <st1:place><st1:city>Hiroshima</st1:city></st1:place>.

 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

 Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.

 Mr. WARNER. My distinguished colleague on the Armed Services
Committee is fully aware that we have worked on this matter for several

years. There is an existing law that we passed on our bill. But the

simple, basic, elementary thing here is we are talking about a study.
And our distinguished colleagues from <st1:state>California</st1:state>, <st1:state><st1:place>Massachusetts</st1:place></st1:state>, and

yourself make allegations of a lot of facts. What is the harm 
in

getting the study? The study may confirm the very facts, and then the
Senate is well informed. And the Congress must pass on any dollars

before this thing proceeds to a full test situation.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators are advised to ask their

questions through the Chair.

 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am sorry, I did not hear the ruling of

the Chair.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators are advised to address their

questions through the Chair, not directly from Senator to Senator.

 Mr. WARNER. The Presiding Officer is most correct. I extend my

apologies to the Presiding Officer of the Senate.

 Mr. President, I asked if the Senator would yield for a question. I

thought I said that.

 Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield for a question.

 








Mr. WARNER. Why not have the study so the Senate and the Congress can



all be well informed? And it will either verify or there will be a



denial of the assertions made by our three colleagues who are in



opposition, and possibly a fourth.

 It is interesting. We modified one of the weapons during the <st1:city><st1:place>Clinton</st1:place></st1:city>

administration, and it was approved by that administration. But it was

later determined that that weapon could not effectively deal with a

hardened silo. I ask my good friend the question.

 Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from <st1:state><st1:place>Virginia</st1:place></st1:state> for the question. First of

all, it is not three Senators who are making these assertions. It is

the National Academy of Sciences which has made these assertions we are

quoting. That is No. 1. No. 2, the message which is being sent by going

down this road endangers the security of the <st1:place><st1:country-region>United States</st1:country-region></st1:place>. We are

telling other countries--<st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region>, <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region></st1:place>--do not go 

nuclear. That is

our message. It is a very clear message. The President is even

threatening military action. He is saying he is going to have to put

that option on the table if they go 

nuclear. Then at the same time the

administration wants to restart a program, the program in this case

being a study of a deeply penetrating 

nuclear weapon that has 70 times

the power of <st1:place><st1:city>Hiroshima</st1:city></st1:place> in order to get to deeply buried targets. There

are 10,000 of those targets, according to the <st1:place><st1:placename>National</st1:placename> <st1:placetype>Academy</st1:placetype></st1:place> of

Sciences, and perhaps 100 of them would be held at risk by this weapon.

 So the idea that we are taking another step--you call it a study, but

it is a step down the road, because the purpose of the study is to at

least consider doing something. What we are saying, what the National
<st1:place><st1:placetype>Academy</st1:placetype> of <st1:placename>Sciences</st1:placename></st1:place> has said, is this cannot accomplish its purpose. It

will have a huge fallout. And what we are saying is the possibility

that you could ever consider doing this is so far outweighed by the

danger to us, by the message which is being sent to the world, that we

are walking down a road we are telling others do not walk. That is the

danger.

 Mr. WARNER. In reply to my colleague, I refer to a letter from the
Secretary of State a year ago: Dear Mr. Chairman--addressed to me--I am

writing to express support for the President's 2004 budget request to

fund the feasibility and cost study for the robust 

nuclear earth


penetrator and to repeal the legislation that prohibits the United
States from conducting research and development on low-yield 

nuclear

weapons. I do not believe that these legislative steps will complicate

our ongoing efforts with <st1:place><st1:country-region>North Korea</st1:country-region></st1:place>. And he goes on to explain the
North Koreans will not be in any way deterred by this action of the
<st1:place><st1:country-region>
United States</st1:country-region></st1:place> 
to have a study.

 Mr. LEVIN. I would expect the administration would say something like

that. But common sense tells us otherwise. Common sense tells you that

if you are sitting down with people, in this case the Europeans,

telling them we have to try to persuade <st1:place><st1:country-region>Iran</st1:country-region></st1:place>, don't go down that road,

with the Japanese and the Russians and the Chinese sitting down with

the North Koreans, do not go down that road, each of us has some

experience as human beings. It seems to me it is absolute common sense

that we will be confronted by those countries saying: You are lecturing

us, threatening us, when you yourself are now looking at the

possibility of redesigning a weapon 70 times the size of <st1:place><st1:city>Hiroshima</st1:city></st1:place> so

that you can more deeply penetrate into the ground. It undermines our

position. It weakens our position. It seems to me that 
means it weakens

our security.

 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I could only say to my distinguished

colleague, the Secretary of Defense Colin Powell, a man who has been

held in high esteem by this body, disagrees respectfully with my good

colleague from <st1:place><st1:state>Michigan</st1:state></st1:place>. But the effect of denying a study on this is

simply saying to the world, where there are countries proceeding with



nuclear programs, you can go deep. There is no deterrence on the

horizon. It is off limits, and you can do as you wish and go deep, and

you can then conceal your programs from the eyes of the world and there

is no deterrence for them to go deep.

 Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty seconds.

 Mr. LEVIN. I reserve the balance of my time.

 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. 
The Senator from California.

 Mr. DOMENICI. Will the Senator yield?

 Mrs. 

FEINSTEIN. Yes.
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