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* All numbers are estimates and further described in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the nuclear appendix in the SIPRI Yearbook. Additional reports are published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog. Unlike those publications, this table is updated continuously as new information becomes available. Current update: May 7, 2012.
a This number is higher than the aggregate data under the New START treaty because this table also counts bomber weapons at bomber bases as deployed. Detailed overview of Russian forces is here.
b Of Russia's total inventory of an estimated 3,000-5,000 nonstrategic warheads (down from 15,000-21,700 in 1991), only 2,000 are thought to be assigned to military forces, with the rest awaiting dismantlement. All are declared to be in central storage.
c Includes all non-strategic warheads, strategic warheads assigned to delivery systems in overhaul, and most bomber weapons.
d In addition to the 5,500 in the military stockpile, 4,500 retired warheads are estimated to be awaiting dismantlement. Details are scarce, but we estimate that Russia is dismantling approximately 1,000 retired warheads per year.
e This number is higher than the aggregate data released under the New START data because this table also counts bomber weapons on bomber bases as deployed. See here for analysis of aggregate data.
f Some 160-200 B61 bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in five countries (Belgiium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey). For details, see here.
g Non-deployed reserve includes an estimated 2,290 strategic and 560 non-strategic warheads in central storage. Some 260 nonstrategic warheads for the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) are being retired.
h In addition to the nearly 5,000 warheads in the military stockpile, approximately 3,500 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement. In addition, nearly 14,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 5,000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) are in storage.
i France has stated that it has no reserve, but it probably has a small inventory of spare warheads. For an updated over of the French nuclear posture, see pp. 27-33 of this repport.
j Chinese warheads are not thought to be operational but in storage. Many "strategic" warheads are for regional use. The status of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. Additional warheads are in storage from retirement or new production, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads. Detailed overview of Chinese forces is here.
k Only 50 missiles are left, for a maximum of 150 warheads. “Less than 160” warheads are said to be "operationally available," but only one submarine with “up to 48 warheads” is on patrol at any given time. The number of "operational missiles" on each sub will be reduced to "no more than eight" with 40 warheads in the next few years.By the mid-2020s, the stockpile will be reduced to "not more than 180." Detailed overview of British forces is here.
l Although Israel has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 warheads, the number of delivery platforms and estimates made by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that the stockpile might include approximately 80 warheads. Detailed overview of Israeli forces is here.
m The U.S. intelligence community estimates that Pakistan has produced 90-110 warheads. None of these are thought to be deployed but kept in central storage, most in the southern parts of the country. More warheads are in production. Detailed overview here.
n Indian nuclear warheads are not deployed but in central storage. More warheads are in production. Detailed overview of Indian forces is here.
o Despite two North Korean nuclear tests, there is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability. A 2009 world survey by the U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) does not credit any of North Korea's ballistic missiles with nuclear capability.
p Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.
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