Status of World Nuclear Forces 

* All numbers are estimates and further described in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the nuclear appendix in the SIPRI Yearbook. Additional reports are published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog. Unlike those publications, this table is updated continuously as new information becomes available. Current update: June 7, 2011. 

 ^a Russian ballistic missile are estimated to carry a full warhead load. Bombers do not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances and only a couple of hundred weapons may be present at the bases and the rest in central storage. If only counting warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of operational (i.e. deployed) strategic warheads is 1,461 (see analysis of New START aggregate data).
 ^b Russia's estimated total inventory of 3,700-5,400 nonstrategic warheads, down from 15,000-21,700 in 1991, is declared to be in central storage.
 ^c Includes all non-strategic warheads. May actually be higher to include most strategic bomber weapons.
 ^d In addition to the 8,000 in the military stockpile, 3,000 retired warheads are estimated to be awaiting dismantlement. Although details are scarce, Russia is estimated to dismantle approximately 1,000 retired warheads per year.
 ^e The New START treaty counts 1,800 deployed warheads, which includes 144 "fake" warheads attributed to bombers counted as one bomb each. If only counting warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of operational (i.e. deployed) strategic warheads is 1,656 (see analysis of New START aggregate data). But a few hundred bomber weapons are present at bases with operational bombers.
 ^f Some 150-200 B61 bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in five countries (Belgiium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey).
 ^g Non-deployed reserve includes an estimated 2,290 strategic and 560 non-strategic warheads in central storage.Some 260 nonstrategic warheads for the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) are being retired.
 ^h In addition to the 5,000 warheads in the military stockpile, approximately 3,500 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement. In addition, nearly 14,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 5,000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) are in storage.
 ⁱ France has stated that it has no reserve, but it probably has a small inventory of spare warheads.
 ^j Chinese warheads are not thought to be operational but in storage. Many "strategic" warheads are for regional use. The status of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. Additional warheads are in storage from retirement or new production, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads.
 ^k Only 50 missiles are left, for a maximum of 150 warheads. “Less than 160” warheads are said to be "operationally available," but only one submarine with “up to 48 warheads” is on patrol at any given time. The number of "operational missiles" on each sub will be reduced to "no more than eight" with 40 warheads in the next few years.By the mid-2020s, the stockpile will be reduced to "not more than 180."
 ^l Although Israel has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 warheads, the number of delivery platforms and estimates made by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that the stockpile might include approximately 80 warheads.
 ^m The U.S. intelligence community estimates that Pakistan has produced 90-110 warheads. None of these are thought to be deployed but kept in central storage, most in the southern parts of the country. More warheads are in production.
 ⁿ Indian nuclear warheads are not deployed but in central storage. More warheads are in production.
 ^o Despite two North Korean nuclear tests, there is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability. A 2009 world survey by the U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) does not credit any of North Korea's ballistic missiles with nuclear capability.
 ^p Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.